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How we read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has a huge influence on how 
convincing we find the parts of which it is composed. This thesis will argue 
that by taking its arguments and concepts in isolation we neglect the 
unifying architectonic method that Kant employed. Understanding this text 
as a response to a single problem, that of the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgement, will allow us to evaluate it more fully. We will explore Kant's 
attempts to relate the a priori and the synthetic in the Introduction, 
Metaphysical Deduction and Analytic of Principles of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Having developed this reading at length we will be able to re- 
assess Kant's relation to the work of Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze's critique of 
Kant and his tendency to make selective use of his work has so far 
characterised their relations. However, by reading Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason in terms of its unifying method we will open up a new means of 
relating these two thinkers. Whilst Deleuze rejects many key Kantian 
concerns and concepts he embraces his methodological concern with the 
ability of problems to unify our thought. The problem-setting and forms of 
argument that emerge within Kant's architectonic method will be related to 
Deleuze's account of experience. This thesis will contribute to both Kant 
and Deleuze studies on the basis of the reading of the Critique of Pure 
Reason it will present. By showing how Kant's text is to be read as a whole 
we will be able to challenge the conclusion that the arguments he makes 
ultimately rely upon a notion of 'subjective origin'. The problem of 
accounting for 'the actual' through its relation to 'the virtual' in Deleuze's 
thought will be re-assessed on the basis of his newly established relation 
with Kant. Understanding Kant's method in the Critique of Pure Reason 
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NOTE ON REFERENCES
References to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason will take the following form:
Kant 1996: page number in the Hackett edition of the text, standard 
pagination of the text with the 1781 edition indicated by 'A' and the 1787 
edition indicated by !B'. For example:
Kant 1996: 71, A19/B33.
For other works by Immanuel Kant the standard Akademie edition volume 
and then page number are referred to with the prefix 'Ak. 1 . For example:
Kant 1997: 26, Ak. 4: 282.
References to Deleuze's 1978 seminars on Kant will use the page numbers 
of the 'pdf versions of the English translations of these seminars, which are 
available online at www.webdeleuze.com/php/sommaire.html.
Where square brackets are used in quotations this denotes my addition 
either for the purposes of explanation or in order to abbreviate the original. 
In cases where the use of square brackets is not my own this is indicated in 
the footnote to the quotation.
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INTRODUCTION
How we Read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Understand its 
Relation to the Work of Gilles Deleuze
'Again, in any work that for the most part uses language freely, we can easily dig 
up seeming contradictions if we tear individual passages from their contexts and 
compare then with one another. In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of 
others, such seeming contradictions cast an unfavorable light on the work; but 
they are quite easily resolved by someone who has gained command of the idea 
as a whole'. 
(Kant 1996: 40, Bxliv)
To coin a phrase "Argument be damned; it's the picture that counts'". 
(Buchdahl 1992: 9)
In this thesis we will give a unifying reading of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason. This means that rather than taking its parts in isolation, as 
independent arguments and concepts, we will consider the organisation of 
the text as a whole. This will involve considering how this organisation 
functions as an argument. How are the parts of the whole related in such a 
way that together they present, clarify and make convincing an account of 
experience? How do they carry forward an argument by being unified and 
forming a whole? We will need to consider why Kant found this way of 
arguing convincing and necessary to the account of experience that he seeks 
to provide in the Critique of Pure Reason. Parts of the Critique are often 
read in isolation and the value of a unified reading is doubted. A number of 
critical concerns arise. Is an account of experience that is given as a whole, 
that is presented all at once in a single text, rigid and constraining? If it 
internalises its argument, relying upon nothing external, is it bound to be 
artificial and not at all dynamic? By relying only upon the relations of its 
parts it provides an exhaustive account of experience rather than being open 
to revision. Understanding this form of argument and assessing its value
will be the major concern of this thesis.
In seeking to pursue such a reading we will build upon the work of Kant 
scholars such as Beatrice Longuenesse, Gerd Buchdahl and Henry E. 
Allison. These scholars attempt to make sense of parts of the Critique of 
Pure Reason by considering how all its parts relate. They argue that we do 
not understand any aspect of Kant's account correctly in isolation from the 
whole. The second task of this thesis will be to consider how this way of 
reading Kant contributes to our understanding of the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze. Our focus will be on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in order that 
we may consider how the unity of this text deepens our understanding of 
the thought of both Kant and Deleuze. The unified presentation of this text 
will, as it unfolds, provide us with a mode of argument and concepts that 
show Kant's account of experience in a new light. They will also allow us 
to develop Deleuze's thought in response to critical concerns over his 
account of experience.
In this introduction we will give a brief survey of the ways of reading Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason that have emerged in Kant and Deleuze studies. 
This will show that there is a case for pursuing a unified reading of this text 
and assessing the contribution it makes. How could a reader of Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason take account of the unity of the parts of this text? 
Gerd Buchdahl is a reader of Kant eager to discard the baggage that Kantian 
terms have collected because they have been considered in isolation. He 
writes that he wants to break through '...the usual idea of an "authoritarian 
timelessness" assumed to surround the transcendental approach'. 1 Rather 
than isolating and analysing the terms used in the Critique of Pure Reason 
from an external viewpoint, these terms are to be viewed, as Kant himself 
counsels, by '... someone who has gained command of the idea as a whole'.2
Buchdahl 1992: 9. 
2Kantl996:40,Bxliv.
The reader's task is to gain an Idea3 of the process of cognition as a whole, 
how it relates its terms and assigns them roles and meanings. This might 
seem to be an uncritical reading strategy but in this thesis we will argue that 
we can only be critical or evaluative when we have grasped and understood 
this Idea rather than forestalling it. This means that we locate and 
understand the terms used in the Critique of Pure Reason as various stages 
in Kant's account of the process of cognition as a whole. Buchdahl 
proposes that Kantian terms are to be understood by means of '...the 
dynamical imagery of "flow", enabling us to keep in focus simultaneously 
the various nodal points of the Kantian structure, ...'.4
In order to understand this tendency in Kant scholarship it will be useful to 
put it in the context of opposing views. If we follow Buchdahl's reading 
then Kant's understanding of the process of cognition as a whole marks out 
the position of various terms within this whole. Let's pick out the term 
'thing in itself and consider how it is to be understood and assessed. Paul 
Guyer's strategy is to evaluate this term in isolation and as something 
external to Kant's account as a whole. Instead of considering its role in 
Kant's account of the cognition of experience he asks what it could be or 
what it could represent. He concludes that it refers to ordinary objects, such 
as tables and chairs, which exist both as we represent them and as they are 
'in themselves'.5 They exist prior to the process of cognition and are what it 
is unable to reach, what is lacking in its outcomes. We only have subjective 
representations of these ordinary objects, not knowledge of them as they are 
'in themselves'. According to this reading these down-graded objects or 
'appearances' characterise Kant's account as a whole whereas for readers 
like Gerd Buchdahl it is the whole that characterises its parts. Guyer's
3In this thesis we will follow the convention of referring to Ideas with a capital V in 
order to distinguish the philosophical use of the term from its more common use. As 
we shall see, in Kant's philosophical account of experience Ideas play a role alongside 
concepts and sensations.
4Buchdahl 1992: 38. 
5Guyer 1987: 335.
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reading is often referred to as the 'two-object' or 'two-world' view.6 It 
argues from the inability of cognition to reach ordinary objects or 'things in 
themselves'. From this it follows that Kant's system is characterised by an 
inability or lack. Certain outcomes of cognition are excluded because there 
are potential objects that cognition cannot reach. Henry E. Allison echoes 
Buchdahl when he argues that the notion of objects outside of the realm of 
cognition is vacuous in Kant's system.7 There are for him two different 
'aspects' of objects rather than an object we can reach and an object that we 
always lack. The same object is a 'thing in itself, insofar it is not involved 
in the cognition of experience, and an 'appearance', insofar as it forms part 
of the materials of cognition. Thus Allison's reading is distinguished from 
the 'two-object' or 'two-world' view as the 'two-aspect' view because it has 
behind it an Idea of the process of cognition as a whole. It allows the whole 
process of accounting for the cognition of experience to question the 
assumption that any objects of cognition pre-exist this whole and 
characterise it as lacking in some respect. This issue gives us a sense of the 
great importance for Kant scholarship of the way in which we read the 
Critique of Pure Reason.
Why seek to consider the relation of Kant and Deleuze in a new way, using 
the strategy for reading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason we will be 
developing? We will argue that Kant needs to be read in a new light in 
order that he may contribute in new ways to our understanding of Deleuze's 
thought. This is to question the ways in which the relations of these two 
thinkers have previously been developed. In Deleuze studies there is a 
strong tendency to break up Kant's Critique of Pure Reason when thinking 
about its influence on, and role in, Deleuze's thought. Thus, whilst in Kant 
studies there is a tradition of unified readings of this text alongside the 
tendency to isolate its parts, the Critique of Pure Reason is not read in a
6Guyer 2006: 68; Allison 2004: 3. 
7Ibid: 62.
unified way when it is related to Deleuze's thought. This reflects the fact 
that Deleuze actively selected and made use of parts of Kant's text in order 
to develop his own thought. We as readers of Deleuze are led to understand 
Kant's text as necessarily dismembered. We take our lead from Deleuze 
who, as a reader of Kant, selects parts from the whole on many occasions.8 
Should we therefore treat Kant's text only as a source of further useful parts, 
and not as a unity to be explored on its own terms, when we relate it to 
Deleuze's thought? We see Deleuze writing in Difference and Repetition of 
'...a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment 
which is not even continued by Kant, much less by post-Kantianism - '.9 
This is a reference to Kant's understanding of the thinking subject but 
reflects Deleuze's overall concern to make use of parts of Kant's thought 
regardless of their wider role in his system. These are useful whether or not 
Kant continued to develop them and regardless of their role in his account 
of experience as a whole. If Deleuze's use of Kant is selective it seems that 
there is only so far we can go with Kant before throwing his text aside. 
This seems to be the only way of reading 'between' Kant and Deleuze, of 
developing their relations, because it reflects the limits Deleuze himself 
imposed on his relation to Kant. He rejected aspects of Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason and so reading this text in a unified way seems unproductive if 
we are analysing its relation to Deleuze's thought. Are the relations of these 
two philosophers ultimately limited by Deleuze's selective approach?
8 However, an alternative is developed in an article by the author of this thesis entitled 
'The Genesis of Cognition: Deleuze as Reader of Kant' where the role of the object=x in 
both Kant and Deleuze's accounts of experience is explored. Here it is argued that'... 
Deleuze offers us an approach to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason through the notion of 
the object=x as the genesis of structures that differentiate and unify experience' (Willatt 
2009: 68, this article can be found at the back of this thesis). This unifying theme is 
something Deleuze develops in his work on structuralism and this allows us to argue that 
he provides a unified reading of the Critique of Pure Reason. This thesis will take a 
different approach by seeking to understand how Kant allows us to read Deleuze, how 
his Critique of Pure Reason can contribute to our understanding of key issues and 
debates in Deleuze studies. 
^Deleuze 1994: 58.
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The tendency in Deleuze studies to respect the limits that Deleuze himself 
imposed on his relation to Kant is also supported by another feature of his 
thought. If Kant contributes something to Deleuze this is always in 
competition with the influence of other thinkers. We need to complete our 
understanding of Deleuze's thought not by reading more of Kant's text but 
by considering other influences on Deleuze such as Spinoza, Leibniz, 
Nietzsche and Bergson. 10 Thus we find that Deleuze draws upon Kant's 
philosophy of time and finds it to be revolutionary for philosophy. It opens 
the prospect of thinking time on its own terms rather than understanding it 
as a means of measuring space. 11 However, for Deleuze time is not given 
its full role in Kant's thought. Kant has opened up the prospect of making 
time superior to space but we need to add Henri Bergson's influence to 
understand Deleuze's full conception of time. 12 Thus the Critique of Pure
10Thus, for example, Peter Hallward argues that Kant's influence is insignificant because 
the role of thinkers such as Spinoza and Leibniz largely exclude Kant: 'Against Kant, 
Deleuze will thus assume and renew the self-evident legitimacy of immediate 
intellectual intuition. Since he everywhere assumes our ability directly to see or 
conceive the literal reality of things, to grasp the immediate nature of things, 
Deleuze's work is best read as a renewal or radicalisation of the affirmative 
naturalism he celebrates in the work of Spinoza and Leibniz in particular. [...] 
Deleuze's own philosophy is less distinctively modern or critical so much as 
enthusiastically neo-Spinozist' (Hallward 2006: 12). This affirmation of direct 
experience excludes the Kantian concern, which we will explore in this thesis, with 
justifying certain conditions of experience. We affirm the identity of concept and 
intuition rather than having, as Kant demands, to justify the application of certain 
concepts to sensible intuition. Another example is Keith Ansell Pearson's conclusion 
that Deleuze's notion of critique, which might seem a good candidate for assigning to 
Kantian influence, is Bergsonian (Ansell Pearson 1999: 26). He emphasises 
Deleuze's use of Henri Bergson's notion of intuition and how this widens experience 
and provides a fuller and more critically engaged account of it. In this thesis we will 
argue that, while Deleuze rejects the forms of conceptual possibility that for Kant 
must mediate our relation to sensible intuition, the means by which these conditions 
are secured hi the Critique of Pure Reason provide much scope for deepening the 
relation of Kant and Deleuze.
1! In his 'On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy' 
Deleuze argues that Kant has liberated time from space: Time out of joint, the door 
off its hinges, signifies the first great Kantian reversal: movement is now 
subordinated to time. Time is no longer related to the movement it measures, but 
rather movement to the time that conditions it' (Deleuze 1998: 27-28). Our own 
explanation and discussion of Kant's understanding of time will take place in chapters 
four and five of this thesis. For now we merely wish to survey the current 
understanding of the relations of Kant and Deleuze.
12In this thesis we will argue that Kant allows Deleuze to understand the relation
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Reason is the place where the prospect of time being thought on its own 
terms is uncovered but at this point we stop reading Kant and start reading 
Bergson. Deleuze is therefore seen to select parts from the Kantian whole 
and then connect what he has selected to different concepts from different 
thinkers. This brief survey of ways of reading Deleuze in relation to Kant 
gives us a sense of how neglected the unity of the Critique of Pure Reason 
is in Deleuze studies.
There is strong evidence in Deleuze's writings to suggest that he didn't find 
it worthwhile to think about Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a unified 
whole. His criticisms of Kant suggest that, as Levi R. Bryant puts it, we 
need to locate Deleuze's '...doorway for jumping out of critical 
philosophy...'. 13 It is not then worthwhile to follow the unfolding of the 
Critique of Pure Reason as a unity. Deleuze's assessment of Kant's notion 
of critique suggests that a doorway or means of escape is being sought: 'He 
seems to have confused the positivity of critique with a humble recognition 
of the rights of the criticised. There has never been a more conciliatory or 
respectful total critique'. 14 Deleuze's verdict is that Kant begins by 
believing in what he criticises and then tries to justify his belief. This 
challenges the integrity of Kant's account. As we shall see, Kant holds that
between time as a whole and concrete cases of experience. We will not explore the 
relation between the influences of Kant and Bergson on Deleuze's thought because 
this would be a considerable undertaking and would prevent us from investigating 
Kant's role in sufficient depth. However, we may note the following understanding of 
time that Deleuze locates in Bergson. The difference between the role of time in 
synthesis for Kant, which we will explore in chapters four and five of this thesis, and 
this Bergsonian conception of time is significant: The whole of our past is played, 
restarts, repeats itself, at the same time, on all the levels that it sketches out. Let us 
return to the "leap" that we make when, looking for a recollection, we place ourselves 
at once in the past. [...] It is in this sense that one can speak of the regions of Being 
itself, the ontological regions of the past "in general", all coexisting, all "repeating" 
one another' (Deleuze 1991: 61). As we shall see, Kant contributes an understanding 
of time's role in the present, in concrete cases, rather than considering time as it exists 
in itself. We do not need to 'leap' into the past to discover time but discern it through 
its role in the present.
13 Bryant2008: 181.
14Deleuze 1983: 89. We will consider Deleuze's assessment of Kant's notion of critique 
in more detail in the second section of the second chapter of this thesis.
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an account of experience must not assume what it is to account for. 
Deleuze alleges that he does not live up to his own standards of argument 
because he preserves things that are given in experience. He respects things 
that should be subject to a critical account. We will consider this mode of 
attack at different points in this thesis while seeking to argue that it should 
not dissuade us from exploring Kant's text further in order to develop his 
relation to Deleuze.
An alternative approach to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been 
developed in readings of Deleuze's 1968 book Difference and Repetition. 
This text is unified through its relation to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
rather than needing to escape its influence. This move is captured in Daniel 
W. Smith's claim that '[f|rom the viewpoint of the theory of Ideas, 
Difference and Repetition can be read as Deleuze's Critique of Pure Reason, 
...'. 15 This is strikingly affirmative in contrast to the conclusions we might 
draw from Deleuze's critique and selective use of Kant, and his reliance on 
other thinkers that draws us away from Kant. Advocates of this reading 
unify both texts by locating something that Kant and Deleuze both affirmed. 
Thus Smith finds the unity of both texts in the theory of Ideas that Kant and 
Deleuze were concerned to develop. We will explore this theory in chapter 
two of this thesis but for now are concerned with how reading strategies for 
Difference and Repetition lead us to re-read Kant. In the following passage 
from an article by Ray Brassier we see how something that unites Kant and 
Deleuze can nevertheless result in their quite different accounts of 
experience. The parts of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason are re-arranged 
and developed in new ways by Deleuze's own concerns: 'Representation is 
subjected to a critique which annuls the mediating function of the
15 Smith 2006: 44-45. This claim is also made by Constantin Boundas (see footnote 17), 
Ray Brassier (see footnote 16) and Joe Hughes, who writes that: 'From the point of 
view of the genesis of the faculties, we can see that Deleuze is clearly rewriting the 
Critique of Pure Reason, and that Kant's '^transcendental idealism" has become a 
transcendental empiricism insofar as the ready-made faculties are subject to a genesis 
which has its origin in sensibility' (Hughes 2009: 11).
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conceptual understanding vis-a-vis reason and sensibility. In Difference 
and Repetition the tripartite structure of the first critique ostensibly 
undergoes an involution which folds the Transcendental Dialectic directly 
into the Transcendental Aesthetic'. 16 Sensation is made intellectual because 
it incarnates the Ideas found in Kant's Transcendental Dialectic. The 
distance between the sensible and the intellectual, which for Kant needs to 
be bridged by concepts and their schematism, is annulled. By rejecting 
Kant's forms of conceptual possibility that mediate the relation of Ideas and 
sensation Deleuze offers us a different account of experience. A shared 
theory of Ideas unifies Difference and Repetition and the Critique of Pure 
Reason but with quite different results in each case. The point to be made 
here is that the text has been re-arranged; it has become a different whole, 
with the result that experience has a different character.
Constantin V. Boundas agrees with Brassier that the Transcendental 
Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason is folded into its Transcendental 
Aesthetic in Deleuze's account while arguing that Kant's text as a whole is 
nevertherless repeated or retained. While Deleuze re-organises and revises 
Kant's text he repeats Kant's unifying project: 'The fidelity is revealed in a 
striking display when we put Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Deleuze's 
Difference and Repetition side by side'. 17 This is because the Kantian 
theory of Ideas is retained as the focus or inner problematic of Difference 
and Repetition but it results in a different way of organising the text. As 
Boundas puts it, Deleuze is '... moving about Kantian blocks in a non- 
Kantian way ... f . 18 We have Kantian blocks but these now enter into new 
relations. The whole forms a new argument, it argues for a way of 
accounting for experience, but this is now an argument based upon the 
direct relation of Ideas and sensation. Elements of Kant's account are now
16Brassier 2008: 7. 
17Boundas 2005: 261. 
: 262.
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related by Deleuze's concern with the role of sensation in incarnating and 
realising Ideas rather than through the forms of conceptual possibility that 
are secured in the now discarded Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Does this count as fidelity to Kant's text? Boundas claims 
that by taking Kantian blocks and arranging them in a non-Kantian way, in 
order to form an argument over the course of Difference and Repetition, 
Deleuze is repeating and retaining Kant's account. However, we find that 
the moves made by Kant in the Transcendental Analytic are now neglected 
because of the new and selective arrangement of its parts. For Deleuze the 
Kantian theory of Ideas demands that we consider how Ideas are incarnated 
in sensation and this excludes certain aspects of Kant's own account of 
experience. This seems to be a valid move because Deleuze rejects the 
conclusions of the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
However, in this thesis we will argue that, while the forms of conceptual 
possibility that Kant put forward in his Table of Categories are rejected by 
Deleuze, the way in which he argues for such conditions of experience is 
highly relevant to Deleuze studies. This is to suggest that the Critique of 
Pure Reason has not made itself heard in these readings, even in those that 
claim to affirm Kant's text as a whole in the way they present Deleuze's 
Difference and Repetition. By seeing Kantian blocks as parts to be re- 
assembled we neglect the Kantian process of assembling and unifying an 
account of experience. What if the Kantian way of organising the blocks is 
as important as the blocks themselves in understanding Kant's text and 
developing his relations with Deleuze? It is on the basis of this question 
that we shall proceed in this thesis.
A further question that we will pose is: What if we do not stop at points 
where Deleuze and Kant are at odds and do not move to other influences on 
Deleuze thought? We must accept that Deleuze rejects aspects of Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason very strongly. However, we will not let this 
distract us from pursuing a more unifying reading of the Critique&f Purfy,,
q?10
Reason that may be of use in understanding Deleuze. This is the argument 
we make for devoting the first five chapters of this thesis to developing 
such a reading of Kant's text. It will be given the space to unfold so that we 
may then consider its relation to Deleuze's thought on the basis of a well- 
developed reading. In chapter one of this thesis we will consider how 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason unfolds as a unity through its architectonic 
method. This will set the tone for the following chapters where we will 
consider parts of the text that seek to establish conceptual conditions of 
possibility for experience. Despite Deleuze's clear rejection of such an 
approach to experience we will seek to show, in chapter six of this thesis, 
that the method and forms of argument it involves are of value for his 
thought. Very fruitful work has been done on how, for example, the part of 
the Critique of Pure Reason named the Anticipations of Perception as a 
single argument adds to our understanding of Kant and Deleuze. 19 
However, we will seek to situate this principle, along with the other 
members of the Table of Principles, in the context of Kant's account as a 
whole in chapter five of this thesis. We will ask how the whole forms an 
argument rather than isolating and considering individual arguments in the 
pages of the Critique of Pure Reason. The conclusion to this thesis will 
seek to show the significant contribution that a unified reading of this text 
can make to contemporary debates concerning the philosophies of Kant and 
Deleuze.
Before turning to Kant's architectonic method of presentation and argument, 
which we will explore in the first chapter of this thesis, we must offer some 
further justification for the textual focus we will be maintaining. Deleuze 
himself gives a unifying reading not of the Critique of Pure Reason alone 
but of Kant's critical system that comprises all three of his Critiques. He 
finds the basis of this unity in the third Critique, the Critique of Judgement.
19For example, Michael Bowles develops the implications of the Anticipations of 
Perception for our understanding of the nature and role of matter in the Critique of 
Pure Reason as a whole (Bowles 2000: 1-18).
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Insofar as this retroactively provides the basis for the organisation of the 
earlier two Critiques it is a source of unity that Deleuze is willing to 
affirm.20 If we seek to be true to Deleuze's intentions we should pursue this 
move in his thought rather than pursuing the unity of his first Critique. 
However, the argument for neglecting this aspect of Deleuze's relation to 
Kant is that the singular unity of the Critique of Pure Reason calls for much 
concentration. It demands our attention even though Deleuze did not see it 
as a worthwhile avenue in his reading of Kant. If the Critique of Judgement 
provides a way of unifying and accounting for the relations of the faculties 
in all three Critiques it must be recognised and explored.21 However, this 
must not exclude the full exploration of a form of unity that is not taken 
seriously by many scholars or pursued by Deleuze in his reading of Kant. 
We will seek to show that the singular source of the unity of the Critique of 
Pure Reason is only uncovered by concentrating on the architectonic 
method employed in this text. Only on this basis can the full implications 
for both Kant and Deleuze studies be drawn from its account of experience.
20A 1963 essay by Deleuze entitled 'The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Esthetics' proposes 
that'... the Critique of Judgment, in its esthetic part, does not simply exist to complete 
the other two Critiques: in fact, it provides them with a ground. The Critique of 
Judgment uncovers the ground presupposed by the other two Critiques: a free 
agreement of the faculties. Every determinate agreement can be traced back to the 
free indeterminate agreement which makes the others possible in general1 (Deleuze 
2004: 58). Deleuze also proposes this reading in his Kant's Critical Philosophy 
(Deleuze 1984: 68) and in the fourth of his formulas in 'On Four Poetic Formulas 
That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy' (Deleuze 1998: 33-35).
21 Joe Hughes argues that 'According to Deleuze, what caused Kant to rethink his system 
[in the Critique of Judgement} was the "standpoint of genesis". The first two 
Critiques are built up around "ready-made" faculties. Kant takes a fact, given in 
experience, and asks what its conditions are. He finds these conditions in faculties 
whose existence he takes for granted. In the third Critique, everything changes' 
(Hughes 2009: 3-4). Hughes argues that faculties are now produced by a genesis 
rather than being assumed or taken for granted. In chapter one of this thesis we will 
dispute this reading by locating the relation between the synthetic and the a priori at 
the basis of Kant's account of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. This 
accounts for the nature and relations of the faculties of theoretical cognition. By 
understanding his account in this way we will seek to show that his arguments in the 
Critique of Pure Reason do not start with matters of fact but with the problem of 
justifying certain conditions of possibility for experience.
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CHAPTER 1
Kant's Architectonic Method of Presentation and Argument
'...investigations which earlier were devoted piecemeal to varied topics in 
philosophy have gained a systematic form, and have guided me gradually to the 
idea of a whole which first makes possible the judgements about the value and 
interdependence of the parts'. 
(Kant 1967: 89 1 )
In this chapter we will seek to define a form of argument from within Kant's 
architectonic method. This method is at work in the unfolding of his 
Critique of Pure Reason as a whole. It is realised in the unified form of this 
text. This means that we will not be relying upon an understanding of the 
arguments that Kant uses from outside of this method and its realisation in 
the Critique of Pure Reason. We will instead be treating Kant's method of 
presenting and organising the text as the source of the type of argument that 
characterises the text as a whole. This method of presentation is therefore 
to be the source even of its own form of argument. If we understand Kant's 
method in this way we find that the architectonic must rely upon nothing 
external. The external here includes anything at all that is given in the 
course of experience which for Kant is what we must account for rather 
than assume.2 This emphasises the completeness and self-sufficiency of 
Kant's architectonic as a method of presentation and source of arguments
1 Cited in Kuehn 2001: 232, with translation altered.
2The 'external' for Kant would also refer to what is outside of experience. As we noted 
in the introduction to this thesis, Kant refers to this as the 'thing in itself as opposed 
to the 'appearances' that are actually involved in, or internal to, the formation of 
objective knowledge through the cognition of experience. Our focus in this chapter 
will be upon how Kant seeks to avoid relying upon what is given in experience so 
that we can understand the form of argument he proposes. However, in the 
conclusion to this thesis we will return to the distinction between appearances and an 
'in itself reality in order to show that, on the basis of the reading we are here 
developing, this distinction is not in fact presupposed in Kant's account of theoretical 
cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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that relies upon nothing external to its own unfolding. We will argue that 
this claim is worth taking seriously despite the great amount of baggage that 
the term 'architectonic' has accumulated. It is given meaning both by the 
philosophical systems that were current in Kant's time and by the way in 
which Kant scholars have understood his use of the term. Having 
considered the obstacles this presents to understanding the architectonic as 
proposing a valid form of argument, we will consider how this method can 
be said to be unifying and internalising. The architectonic must relate its 
parts to form a whole in the course of providing a complete account of the 
basic forms of the cognition of possible experience.3 Kant needs to show 
that an account that is unified and internalising is more convincing than one 
that borrows from experience and leaves open the ways in which its 
arguments and concepts can be developed. We will explore this in order to 
understand how Kant's architectonic embodies a form of argument whilst at 
the same time being a method of presenting and unifying the text.
3 When we use the term 'cognition of possible experience1 this should not be understood 
as providing a partial account of experience. Kant did not believe that he was leaving 
anything out when he made 'the cognition of possible experience' the horizon or 
scope of his account. In the Critique of Pure Reason the term 'possible experience' is 
often used negatively. It tells us what cognition must restrict itself to, possible 
experience, and what it must not inquire into, that which is outside of possible 
experience. However, its positive meaning is captured by the following passage: 'In 
the whole of all possible experience, however, lie all our cognitions; and the 
transcendental truth that precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible consists in 
the universal reference to this possible experience1 (Kant 1996: 218, A146/B185). As 
we shall see, possible experience is restricted to certain conditions of possibility but 
for Kant this is what makes experience possible in the fullest sense. It is this positive 
meaning that we will be focusing upon and exploring in this chaper. Also of note in 
the phrase 'cognition of possible experience' is the use of the term 'cognition' rather 
than 'knowledge'. Cognition (erkenntnis) in Kant's account needs to be distinguished 
from knowledge (wissen) because while knowledge is a finished product of cognition, 
cognition is an ongoing process. Knowledge is produced by cognition, it relies upon ' 
the sufficiency of the judgements made by cognition. Furthermore, for Kant we can 
give a complete account of cognition and thus re-found this process once and for all 
while knowledge is something that can always be extended. This will become clearer 
as we explore his account.
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i. What is Kant's Architectonic?
The most straightforward way of understanding the term architectonic as it 
is used in the Critique of Pure Reason is as a method by which we present 
and organise a text in order to make it form a clear and convincing 
argument. Being clear and convincing will allow the text to move forward 
and take the reader with it. However, the architectonic is a method for 
producing an argument by attending to the internal organisation and unity 
of its own parts. It is therefore an inward looking method. Its basis is 
internal and it is internalising because it draws only upon its own parts and 
their relations. Can such a method provide an argument that is clear and 
convincing or does it provide one that is rigid and obscure? To understand 
the architectonc method better we may consider an example of an argument 
that was used by Kant in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. This 
particular argument entitles us to say that 'the sun warms the stone'.4 Here 
Kant locates the role not just of the perception of experience but also that of 
a concept, the concept of cause and effect. If we were to argue merely on 
the basis of the observation of our perceptions we would say: 'when the sun 
shines on the stone, it grows warm'. 5 However, a concept allows us to say 
that the warmth of the stone is caused by the sun. In this argument the time 
order of this perception is a necessary ingredient because in the judgement 
made using the concept of cause and effect the heat of the stone, as the 
effect, must come after the emission of rays by the sun. To draw a 
conclusion about the cause of this heating of the stone we therefore need an 
abstract concept as well as a concrete time order. This argument might
4Kant 1977: 44, n!2, Ak. 4: 301. Here Kant is concerned with what he refers to as 
'judgements of experience' in contrast to 'judgements of perception' (ibid: 44, Ak. 4: 
300-1). He writes that 'By this judgment [of experience] we cognize the object 
(though it remains unknown as it is in itself) by the universally valid and necessary 
connection of the given perceptions' (ibid: 42, Ak. 4: 298-9). He seeks to avoid 
grounding the universal validity and necessity of such a connection in 'the immediate 
cognition of an object (which is impossible)' (ibid). Rather than assuming that 
immediate cognitions precede and organise the account of experience he is giving he 
seeks to secure the connection of cause and effect from within this account.
5Ibid:p.44,nl2,Ak.4:301.
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seem to depend entirely upon the order and organisation of what is given in 
experience and not upon the internal organisation of an argument. 
However, for Kant we must seek to account for scenarios that arise in the 
course of possible experience, such as the coincidence of the sun and the 
stone that is warmed. We must account for these scenarios in ways that do 
not presuppose what is given in experience.6 Such accounts must not then 
follow the order or organisation of what is given in experience. Instead 
they are to be self-organising and in this way to account for and make 
possible such scenarios of possible experience. How we define an 
argument is of course a huge philosophical issue but it is not so contentious 
to say that its organisation is crucial to the argument working. The question 
raised is whether the order of an argument like the one we've just 
considered emerges in experience or is internal to an account of that 
experience. In other words, do we have to wait until we encounter a 
scenario like the one discussed above before we can establish the conditions 
of possibility for our cognition of experience?
When we compare the example we have just given to the task of Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason we see that it clearly does not have the ambitions 
of Kant's architectonic method. It is one thing to unify many arguments, 
like the one which allows us to conclude that 'the sun heats the stone', but it 
is quite another to seek to unify and organise an account of all arguments 
that we could ever make about experience. However, for Kant we must 
unify the argument of the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole and then 
unify and organise all the work of cognition. This will involve assigning to 
their places disciplines like metaphysics, natural science and psychology
6Thus Kant writes of the understanding as a source of concepts involved in accounting 
for the cognition of experience in the following way: 'Pure understanding 
differentiates itself fully not only from everything empirical, but even from all 
sensibility [generally]. Therefore it is a unity that is self-subsistent, sufficient to 
itself, and that cannot be augmented by supplementing it with any extrinsic additions' 
(Kant 1996: 118, A65/B89-90, the addition in square brackets was made by the 
translator).
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once their founding principles have been secured. Kant's architectonic 
method is intended to make every act of cognition convincing and 
objectively valid insofar as it is part of and extends an organised and 
systematic whole. Single arguments like the one we've considered do not 
stand alone. Instead they must somehow have their basis in the way an 
account of cognition is unified and how they are then included in the 
organisation of all cognition, of its various disciplines and bodies of 
knowledge. This is because the order of any argument is part of a much 
wider system that accounts for all our cognition of possible experience. 
This system must therefore include the necessary order of cause and effect 
where effect must follow cause if we are to have an experience in the first 
place.7 Thus for Kant, whether we are making an argument using the 
concept of cause and effect, writing a book that is to account for the 
cognition of experience or organising the work of all the disciplines 
involved in cognition, we are ultimately to be guided by his architectonic 
method. However, the ambitions of this method risk making its precise 
nature unclear to us. We need to keep in view the context of the real, 
concrete work of cognition that it must account for and organise. In seeking 
to re-found all the work of cognition does the architectonic risk losing sight 
of judgements like those concerning the heating of a stone?
The grand ambitions of the architectonic method mean that for Kant it 
provides the basis for a unified reading of the Critique of Pure Reason and 
looks beyond it. It must re-found the work of cognition that up to now has 
not been founded upon an account of how the cognition of experience is 
possible in the first place. It is on the basis of this new foundation that we 
can then organise all the work of cognition, all of its disciplines and bodies 
of knowledge. We first encounter Kant's use of the term architectonic in his 
introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason where it concerns how this
7Kant argues in favour of this conclusion in his second Analogy in the Analytic of 
Principles of the Critique of Pure Reason. We will explore this in the fifth chapter of 
this thesis as part of the unfolding of the architectonic.
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particular text is organised, how its parts are ordered and how this ordering 
allows them to relate to one another and thus form a complete whole or a 
whole argument. Kant writes that '... a science that merely judges pure 
reason, it sources, and its bounds may be regarded as the propaedeutic to 
the system of pure reason1 . 8 We will refer to this as the narrower use of the 
term architectonic or as the architectonic of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
The broader use of the term architectonic refers to the systematic 
organisation of all disciplines of cognition.9 The major difference between 
the narrower and broader uses is that the broader use refers to what Kant 
envisages as a system of all the forms of a priori cognition that found 
different disciplines of cognition and the bodies of knowledge they develop. 
It has the task of formulating these principles in a system that secures a 
priori cognition in all its guises, providing what Kant calls f [a]n organon of 
pure reason [which] would be the sum of those principles by which all pure 
a priori cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about'. 10
Gary Hatfield argues that we can better understand this project if we turn to 
another of Kant's works. He writes: 'The only worked out version we have 
of this body of doctrine is that found in the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science. Here Kant applies principles from the Analytic of 
Principles [of the Critique of Pure Reason} to the (empirically derived) 
concept of motion and purports thereby to derive two of Newton's laws of
8Ibid:64,All/B25.
9In his lectures on logic Kant distinguishes propaedeutic and organon: 'By organon 
namely we understand an instruction for bringing about a certain cognition. This 
implies, however, that I already know the object of the cognition that is to be 
produced according to certain rules. An organon of the sciences is therefore not mere 
logic, because it presupposes the exact knowledge of the sciences, of their objects and 
sources' (Kant 1988: 15). We will see the importance of this distinction in section 
four of this chapter where we will consider how Kant seeks to avoid relying upon any 
discipline or achievement of cognition to secure his account of cognition. The 
propaedeutic is to account for cognition as such, without presupposing any form it 
might take, while the organon must account for and characterise particular 
disciplines.
10Kant 1996: 64, Al 1/B24-5.
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motion in an a priori manner'. 11 Thus the architectonic in the broader sense 
provides principles for sciences such as those that need to rigorously 
analyse motion. This allows them to extend their cognition on a firm 
footing, on the basis of principles that are not derived from experience but 
provide an account of it. 12 It thus looks beyond the Critique of Pure Reason
1992: 218. Movement must be grasped according to a priori forms if we are 
to make the subject matter of the sciences that deal with movement, such as 
mechanics, intelligible. This provides the basis for the rigorous and scientific 
analysis of experience. Our concern is with the narrower sense of the architectonic as 
we've defined this and therefore we are exploring the broader sense primarily in order 
to define the narrower sense. However, the debate opened up by Hatfield's claim is 
worth noting. Werner S. Pluhar tackles this debate over whether, and if so when, 
Kant presented all or part of an organon of pure reason or architectonic in the broader 
sense. In the second edition Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason Kant refers to a 
'metaphysics of nature' that is to complement a 'metaphysics of morals' (Kant 1996: 
39, Bxliii). Both presuppose the work to be completed in the Critique of Pure Reason 
that provides the a priori elements of the cognition of nature and that makes room for 
morality by distinguishing theoretical cognition from the cognition of the postulates 
of practical reason that make morality possible. A book named The Metaphysics of 
Morals was published by Kant in 1797. In the case of the promised 'metaphysics of 
nature1 Hatfield's reading can be questioned. Werner S. Pluhar notes in a footnote to 
his translation of the Critique of Pure Reason that whilst the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science might seem a likely candidate it appeared too early to 
be the book referred to. It was published in 1786, one year before the second edition 
preface of the Critique of Pure Reason which speaks of a metaphysics of nature as 
something to be prepared for (ibid: n!49). He also notes that Kant still speaks of this 
as a task yet to be completed in the Critique of Judgement. Here Kant tells us that 
having completed his critical enterprise with the publication of his third and final 
Critique he will proceed now to his doctrinal enterprise, one made up of a 
metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals (Kant 1987: 7-8, Ak. 5: 170). 
Pluhar argues that the intended work on the metaphysics of nature could be the Opus 
Postumum which Kant left uncompleted at his death. Eckart Forster notes that Kant's 
intended title for the Opus Postumum was Transition from the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science to Physics' (Forster 2000: 1). He argues that Kant is 
here trying to go beyond his earlier Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 
He still needs to show that nature is systematic if he is to ground physics:"... there 
must be something like an a priori "elementary system" of the moving forces of 
matter if physics is to be possible as a systematic science' (ibid: 11). Kant introduces 
what have become known as his 'ether proofs' in the Opus Postumum by writing that 
'[ajll these sections contain the formal principles of the possibility of an empirical 
science of the system of the moving forces of matter - i.e. of the transition to physics' 
(Kant 1993: 62). This is a debate we cannot explore further here but it does give a 
greater sense of the ambitions of Kant's architectonic. By concerning himself with 
ether he has moved beyond the purely formal conditions of experience sought in the 
Critique of Pure Reason to the material conditions of experience that a notion of ether 
will provide.
12The following passage from Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
gives us a further sense of the wider meaning of the term architectonic:''All proper 
natural science therefore requires a pure part, on which the apodictic certainty that
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to the work of cognition and how we organise it into disciplines according 
to the founding and characteristic principles of each science. The narrower 
sense of architectonic is clearly the most concentrated because it concerns 
the organisation of a particular text, the Critique of Pure Reason, that is to 
prepare the foundations for all cognition of experience. Our primary 
concern is with the role and nature of the architectonic in the narrower 
sense, in organising the Critique of Pure Reason, in order that we may gain 
a new understanding of this text by reading it in a unified way. Kant is
reason seeks therein can be based. And because this pure part is wholly different, in 
regard to its principles, from those that are merely empirical, it is also of the greatest 
utility to expound this part as far as possible in its entirety, separated and wholly 
unmixed with the other part; indeed, in accordance with the nature of the case it is an 
unavoidable duty with respect to method1 (Kant 2004: 5, Ak. 4: 469). Whether or not 
a discipline has a pure part will determine its place in Kant's architectonic. Two 
instructive examples are chemistry and psychology. In the preface to the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant writes that: 'What can be called 
proper science is only that whose certainty is apodictic; cognition that can contain 
mere empirical certainty is only knowledge improperly so called. Any whole of 
cognition that is systematic can, for this reason, already be called science, and, if the 
connection of cognition in this system is an interconnection of grounds and 
consequences, even rational science. If, however, the grounds or principles 
themselves are still in the end merely empirical, as hi chemistry, then they carry with 
them no consciousness of their necessity (they are not apodictically certain), and thus 
the whole of cognition does not deserve the name of a science in the strict sense; 
chemistry should therefore be called a systematic art rather than a science1 (ibid: 4, 
Ak. 4: 468). Chemistry is downgraded because in Kant's time it had not been given a 
rigorous mathematical foundation. He describes empirical psychology in his 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View as'... a methodological compilation of 
the perceptions in us, which deliver material for a diary of an observer of oneself, and 
easily lead to enthusiasm and madness' (Kant 2006: 20, Ak. 7: 132). Empirical 
psychology is not founded upon a priori concepts and principles because it is unable 
to rigorously analyse the situation it finds itself in: '...the situation with these inner 
experiences is not as it is with external experience of objects in space, where the 
objects appear next to each other and permanently fixed. Inner sense sees the 
relations of its determinations only in time, hence in flux, where the stability of 
observation necessary for experience does not occur' (ibid: 22-23, Ak. 7: 134). The 
importance of mathematics in all 'proper' sciences is something we will consider 
further. In the case of chemistry, developments after Kant's time have provided it 
with a mathematical foundation and this would not to seem to undermine his broader 
architectonic. It would seem to be extended by the progress of this science. 
However, Kant's view of empirical psychology is something fundamental to his 
account and cannot be explained by the state of this discipline in his time. The 
importance for Kant of the psychological subject being passive because it is situated 
in time is something we will explore further. We will find that this prevents 
empirical psychology from playing a role in accounting for experience. For Kant 
empirical psychology must also be distinguished from rational psychology, 
something we explore in footnote 38 of chapter four of this thesis
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concerned with how elements of an account of possible experience unfold 
and relate to one another over the course of the Critique of Pure Reason so 
as to form an argument when this text is considered as a whole. We will 
consider at length how the internal organisation of these elements 
constitutes an argument. However, before we do this we will discuss the 
reasons for doubting that the architectonic presents a valid argument.
The way in which Kant organises the Critique of Pure Reason is often 
either rejected or neglected in Kant scholarship. This foreshadows our 
approach to the architectonic and demands that we show why it should be 
taken notice of and taken seriously as the source of a valid form of 
argument in accounting for experience. We find Norman Kemp Smith 
writing as follows: 'Architectonic, that "open sesame" for so many of the 
secrets of the Critique, is the all-sufficient spell to resolve the mystery1 . 13 
Thus if we are puzzled about Kant's moves at different points in the 
Critique of Pure Reason we can only contemplate the magical abilities of 
his architectonic method. It organises the text with no basis in anything 
other than what Kemp Smith refers to, in a pejorative way, as magic. On 
this reading the architectonic method fails to meet any criteria that would 
show it to provide a valid form of argument, failing to make clear its moves 
or show them to be convincing. The organisation of the Critique of Pure 
Reason does not clarify and lead us through the stages of an argument. It 
does not relate its parts in a way that carries the argument forward. Readers 
like Kemp Smith speculate that the architectonic was simply a hobby that 
Kant enjoyed or an aspect of his mentality. 14 It was a tendency or quirk that 
needs no further investigation, except by Kant's biographer. He liked to 
come up with a structure that was not led by or related to the arguments he 
was making and how these developed over the course of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. It was not then a dynamic response to the progress of his
l3Kemp Smith 2003: 332-3.
14Ibid: 341; Korner 1955: 77, we will return to Korner's view of Kant's architectonic in 
the fourth chapter of this thesis.
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arguments but a rigid expression of a certain mentality. Thus we might 
organise our possessions in a chest of drawers in a way that makes the 
things we use everyday hard to find simply because we enjoy employing 
this method of organisation. Our organisation of things in particular 
drawers has no relation to how we use these drawers over the course of our 
life. It is unrelated to the concrete concerns, problems and realities we have 
to deal with. Similarly, while Kant's Critique of Pure Reason does present 
arguments that develop with the end of accounting for experience in sight, 
these are not reflected in the way the text is organised. His rigid method 
very much puzzles readers like Kemp Smith because it doesn't reflect a 
valid form of argument that they recognise.
More recent works of Kant scholarship tend to ignore Kant's architectonic 
method rather than speculating about his personal biography. 15 This 
reflects perhaps more rigorous standards of scholarship because it avoids 
using speculations about Kant's personal biography to evaluate his 
philosophical method of organising the text. If the puzzling nature of this
15This is an assertion I would justify by pointing to the absence of the term
'architectonic' in the indexes of many more recent books on Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason (for example, it is absent from Altaian 2008). When it does appear it does 
not play a prominent role and does not unify the reading that is given (in Buroker 
2006 it is referred to on only two pages). However, the concerns of the architectonic, 
with unifying cognition and providing an account that does not rely upon anything 
external, have been recognised and developed in the absense of the term 
'architectonic'. The reason we are using this term is that it specifies Kant's unifying 
method in a unique and indispensable way. We must show that without this term the 
nature and role of the unity Kant seeks to provide cannot be fully understood. For 
example, Onora O'Neill explores the first chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason's 
Doctrine of Method which is concerned with the 'discipline1 of pure reason. Like the 
architectonic, which Kant discusses in a later chapter of the Doctrine of Method, this 
is a unifying and internalising notion. It refers to the self-discipline of pure reason 
rather than suggesting that reason should rely upon anything external to provide its 
criteria. However, O'Neill emphasises the minimal role of this notion of self- 
discipline: 'Reason dictates neither thought nor action; its discipline is construed as 
process, not as the once and for all discovery of secure foundations' (O'Neill 1992: 
303). It is true that Kant does not seek to over-determine cognition. He seeks to 
make it possible as a process that is open-ended rather than telling us what to think 
and what to do. However, the architectonic as we've understood it adds more content 
to the unity Kant envisages. We will seek to understand how he aims to provide 
foundations for all of cognition through the architectonic method.
method is put down to something non-philosophical it can be easily 
dismissed. It seems that such an approach is itself rigid and artificial in that 
it is not open even to considering the philosophical concerns and 
possibilities that the architectonic might realise. One alternative is a 
tendency to reduce the architectonic not to the narrow sphere of Kant's 
personal life but to the historical and philosophical context of his thought. 
Howard Cay gill argues that '[w]ith his concern for the philosophical system 
Kant inherited the Wolffian project of encyclopaedic philosophy or 
philosophia generalis. This project was the form in which German 
philosophy defended its claim against the discrete sciences (and faculties) 
of law, theology and medicine as well as the emergent natural sciences1 . 16 
This could lead us to heavily contextualise Kant's concerns in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. It suggests that the architectonic method would be more 
compelling to someone living in Kant's time, in his intellectual and 
professional world where a pressing concern with the hierarchical 
organisation of university faculties can be located. 17 Indeed, we've seen 
that the architectonic is concerned with organising the different disciplines 
or faculties on the basis of a philosophical foundation. This concern with 
systematising all knowledge by enumerating the basic and founding 
principles of cognition has lost much of its force in the present age of 
specialisation where even the most interdisciplinary approach would not 
entertain such a vision. It is not simply that this seems a difficult 
undertaking but that it seems dubious if we are to learn from the specificity 
of different disciplines and their concrete subject matters. It could be 
argued that the practice of cognition should not be based on a complete
1995: 84-85.
17Kant's concern with this issue is clear when he is discussing the right of philosophy to 
examine the foundations of other faculties: 'But the businessmen of the three other 
faculties [law, theology and medicine] will always be such miracle- workers, unless 
the philosophy faculty is allowed to counteract them publicly - not in order to 
overthrow their teachings but only to deny the magic power that the public 
superstitiously attributes to these teachings and the rites connected with them - as if, 
by passively surrendering themselves to such skillful guides, the people would be 
excused from any activity of their own and led, in ease and comfort, to achieve the 
ends they desire' (Kant 1992: 51).
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system of foundational principles but should allow concrete practices to 
shape its abstract concepts and principles. This is a concern that Kant's 
architectonic has to meet and we will consider his response in the next 
section of this chapter. However, the most damaging conclusion that 
follows from historicising the architectonic method, from reducing it to its 
historical context, is that it is now an argument that is not valid according to 
Kant's own criteria. It draws its strengths from its context rather than from 
the internal force of an argument based solely on the relations of its own 
parts. The type of argument that would characterise Kant's method has 
become known as a transcendental argument. 18 This embodies the concerns 
of the architectonic as we have so far developed them. It is to account for 
experience without presupposing anything given in experience. We find 
that Kant's arguments are in danger of being historicised rather than being 
understood as transcendental or architectonic. This makes them responses 
to Kant's historical context, drawing their force from this rather than the 
internal relations of their parts.
A different approach to those we've considered so far is found in Diane 
Morgan's book Kant Trouble. The apparent weaknesses of Kant's method 
are here understood in a positive light. If we find it unconvincing to argue 
that the elements of an account of the cognition of experience should be 
systematically unified once and for all this is because the foundation of any 
such unity is impossible. This problem with founding the architectonic is, 
according to Morgan, a problem that is actually at work in Kant's text. It 
was not fully uncovered by its author but is still productive in how the text
18This term came to prominence in the wake of P. F. Strawson's selective re-formulation 
of Kant's account of experience which set the terms for the current debate over how 
Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason. We will explore and evaluate the nature 
and progress of this debate in the conclusion to this thesis. Our reason for delaying 
this treatment is the need to secure a unified reading of the Critique of Pure Reason 
before we can assess the terms that this text itself sets for any debate over the 
arguments that characterise it. We will then be able to consider whether the debate in 
question is grounded in the text and whether it recognises all the possibilities it offers
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was written and how we read it. 19 Thus we should not seek to ignore or 
compensate for this apparent weakness, for the impossibility of founding an 
abstract system in the concrete world of experience, but use it to produce a 
unifying reading. Such a reading would then be based on the lack of 
foundation for the systematic unity that Kant proposes. For Morgan this 
problem of foundation was not recognised by Kant because he saw his 
architectonic account as complete and yet its real incompleteness is 
reflected deeply in the text he wrote. We cannot re-found all of cognition 
by formulating the concepts and principles necessary for turning our beliefs 
about experience into objective knowledge. We cannot sum up all the ways 
of doing this in some kind of 'how to' book which would boast 
encyclopaedic completeness. There is always more to concrete reality than 
our abstract concepts tell us. However, for Morgan the architectonic is not 
to be rejected or ignored. Instead we are to take notice of how it is 
unsettled because its abstract grasp of what is possible in experience is 
inevitably exceeded by the concrete realities it faces. Kant writes about 
securing good foundations and constructing a sturdy edifice using his 
architectonic method.20 However, he in fact builds upon a lack of
19In the introduction to Kant Trouble Diane Morgan writes that"... this book does not try 
to sum up Kant and his philosophy. Instead, it contents itself with highlighting an 
ongoing problematisation within the Kantian system of the possibility of founding the 
progressive Enlightenment project securely in the here and now1 (Morgan 2000: 2). 
This is the problem that the here and now, in all its concrete detail, escapes or 
exceeds the attempts to unify knowledge and universalise the principles of cognition 
that the Enlightenment represents. Thus instead of the foundation of a secure and 
complete system we have a construction characterised by what escapes it, by 
problems that are at work in systems without this being explicit to then* authors.
20fNow and then one hears complaints about the shallow way of thinking in our age and 
the decline of solid science. But I fail to see how the sciences that rest on a well-built 
foundation - such as mathematics, natural science, etc. - in the least deserve this 
reproach' (Kant 1996: 7, n!4, Axi). Kant argues that these sciences show us what is 
needed hi other kinds of cognition, what he calls '...a solid way of thinking' (ibid). 
For Kant solidity must follow from the completeness of a system: 'The system's 
completeness and structure can at the same time serve as a touchstone of the 
correctness and genuineness of whatever components of cognition fit into the system' 
(ibid: 118, A65/B90). This means that if the system is not in fact complete in its 
account of experience it cannot adapt to this situation, it will be unsettled and 
unstable in the ways Diane Morgan suggests. We will explore Kant's concern with 
system building in the next chapter of this thesis.
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foundation that will demand revisions and new concepts in response to the 
reality that basic forms of experience can never be summed up 
completely.21 He postulates a foundation that does not reflect the reality of 
the object of cognition but he is then really reflecting this instability, this 
lack of real foundation, in how he thinks and writes. This is a positive 
reading because it concerns how a text is unified and how this unity is 
productive. For readers like Diane Morgan: 'These reflections on blind 
spots are in themselves most illuminating: they open up theoretical 
possibilities mis-recognised by Kant himself.22 If no complete account of 
the cognition of experience can be given this does not mean that Kant's 
architectonic is irrelevant or out of date. Thanks to this very problem it in 
fact has a life that exceeds the author's intentions and the reader's 
expectations.
Amongst Kant's alleged 'blind spots' Morgan lists the concept of affinity, 
the notion that concrete reality corresponds to, or will correspond to, the 
concepts we have of it. It is the affinity of concrete reality with the abstract 
concepts and principles that are to deal with this reality. Kant seeks to find 
the stability of his architectonic here because he will organise the Critique 
of Pure Reason and project the organisation of all a priori cognition 
according to this affinity. The affinity of the abstract and the concrete is to 
be the basis of the sturdy and systematic construction of an account of the 
cognition of experience and the subsequent work of the re-founded 
disciplines of cognition. Morgan writes that in fact such '... moments 
prevent the Kantian project from being able to locate the secure foundations
21 This echoes Deleuze's assessment of Kant's methods: There is something quite 
curious in Kant. When things don't work, he invents something which doesn't exist, 
but it doesn't matter' (Deleuze 1978b: 3). Kant will respond to a problem by 
inventing something new rather than relying upon what is familiar and given in 
experience. This follows from his concern to account for experience without 
presupposing it. We will return to Deleuze's more positive assessments of Kant in a 
number of places in this thesis in order to balance them against the more negative 
ones that we find in his writings.
22Morgan2000:3.
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it needs to be architectonic1 .23 The system is shaken and unsettled by them 
as we recognise that we have not envisaged all that concrete reality has to 
offer and seek to close the gap. We can never attain an account that is 
inclusive and internal, one that relies only upon the relations of its own 
parts without any troublesome remainder. Kant therefore begins a project 
in the Critique of Pure Reason that will always be trying to re-establish 
affinity, to make up for an inevitable lack of affinity with concrete reality. 
This reality always disrupts the abstract construction that seeks to sum up 
and organise the basic principles of our cognition. It unsettles this edifice 
but this only makes the Critique of Pure Reason more productive. 
Morgan's conclusion is that if you attempt to build a system with such grand 
ambitions as Kant's architectonic you will get constructions that are 
unbuildable and temporary.24 This makes Kant's architectonic an exercise 
in 'experimental architecture' because when it seeks to be inclusive and 
internalising it necessarily experiments. Unknowingly, Kant constructs and 
re-constructs in experimental ways as concrete reality challenges the 
abstract pretensions of his architectonic. He is then always seeking new 
ways of building the unbuildable, the complete system that can never last 
but is all the more productive for this reason.25 Having considered Diane 
Morgan's reading it is important to evaluate her positive assessment of 
Kant's architectonic and her emphasis upon how the real impetus of this 
method was not revealed to Kant himself. This does not take into account 
Kant's own refusal to make the basis of his method explicit. He argues that 
we cannot have knowledge of the basis of our construction of an account of 




26Kant therefore writes of the need to base the systematic unity of cognition upon an 
Idea about experience, about what experience must be like in order that it can be 
unified in a system. However: 'We mistake this idea's signification as soon as we 
regard this idea as the assertion - or even just the presupposition - of an actual thing 
to which we mean to ascribe the basis of the world's systematic organization. Instead, 
we here leave entirely undecided what sort of character this organization's basis that
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external reality is susceptible to being unified systematically under abstract 
forms of cognition, that it has any affinity with concepts and principles that 
are independent of experience. We proceed on the basis that basic forms of 
cognition grasp the objects of our experience but for Kant we must not look 
to anything external to the architectonic to guarantee this.
The affinity of the abstract and concrete within Kant's architectonic is 
something we shall consider at length in the next part of this chapter. We 
will question Diane Morgan's argument that we have to look to Kant's blind 
spots to locate the problems that animate his thought. As we shall see, his 
architectonic method organises the text on the basis of a problem that he 
puts centre stage because '[m]uch is gained when we can bring a multitude 
of inquiries under the formula of a single problem'.27 We will argue that 
this methodological precept is integral to the architectonic. The text is 
organised as an account of the cognition of experience on the basis of an 
internal problematic that relates all the elements of the account. The 
architectonic thus finds a source for the unifying organisation it performs 
not in a blind spot but in a problem that, as we shall see, Kant raises 
explicitly in the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason. Thus while 
Diane Morgan's reading takes Kant's architectonic seriously, rather than 
dismissing it prematurely or ignoring it, her account of the role of internal 
problems in this method can be called into question. In the next section we 
will seek to understand the architectonic as a method explicitly based upon 
a single and unifying problem.
eludes our concepts has in itself; we only set up for ourselves an idea serving us as a 
point of view from which alone we can extend that unity so essential to reason and so 
salutary to the understanding. In a word, this transcendental thing is merely the 
schema of that regulative principle by which reason extends systematic unity over all 
experience as far as it can' (Kant 1996: 646-647, A681-682/B709-710). We will 
locate the term 'Idea' in Kant's architectonic in the next chapter of this thesis. 
27lbid: 59, B19.
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ii. The Role of Synthetic A Priori Judgements in the Architectonic
If we consider Kant's concern with a single problem and how it unifies 
inquiry in the Critique of Pure Reason this will help us to understand his 
architectonic method more precisely. We've suggested that for Kant the 
architectonic is a clear and convincing argument because it is unifying. It is 
unifying because it is internalising or inclusive rather than referring to or 
relying upon the forms of unity we come across in the course of experience. 
Now we see that, for Kant, to be internalising or inclusive means 
responding to an inner problematic in relating parts to form a whole. This 
single problem is to be at the basis of Kant's architectonic, providing the 
reason for it to relate its elements so as to form an account of the cognition 
of possible experience. Kant formulates this single problem in the 
following passage:
'Much is gained already when we can bring a multitude of inquiries 
under the formula of a single problem. For we thereby facilitate not 
only our own business by defining it precisely, but also - for anyone 
else who wants to examine it - the judgment as to whether or not we 
have carried out our project adequately. Now the proper problem of 
pure reason is contained in this question: 
How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?'28
Kant here specifies the basis of his method of organising the text. This 
single and problematic question provides criteria for judging whether the 
text has presented an adequate account of experience. This account must 
elaborate only what is concentrated in this question if it is to be inclusive 
and internalising. This problematic question is then the key to providing a 
full account of experience, one that leaves nothing out and that is self- 
sufficient. It does not rely upon anything given in experience in its account 
because in this question we find sufficient basis for it to proceed. It follows 
that this particular form of judgement, synthetic a priori judgement, must be 
secured and elaborated in the course of the Critique of Pure Reason because
2«Kant 1996:59,619.
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for Kant this will secure the concepts and principles that make experience 
possible in the first place. These concepts and principles are to provide a 
complete account only because they embody the two elements concentrated 
in the synthetic a priori form of judgement. These two elements are the 
synthetic and the a priori. The account must then be unfolded on the basis 
of the relations of these two elements to the exclusion of anything external. 
In other words, the synthetic and the a priori must give rise to a complete 
and systematically organised account of experience through their relations 
at the different stages of this account.29 We must seek to understand and 
assess this starting point for an account of the cognition of possible 
experience that demands a very great deal from a single unifying problem. 
In what sense does a starting point that concentrates the elements whose 
unfolding will secure such an account provide us with what Kant calls an 
'Idea of the whole'?
We've suggested that Kant provides a single problem as a highly 
concentrated formulation of the account he wants to give. The relations
29The similarity between this presentation of Kant's architectonic method and Hegel's 
dialectical method must be noted. Everything is internal to the relation of two 
opposite poles of experience, echoing strongly Hegel's following presentation of his 
dialectic: 'Everything around us can be regarded an example of dialectic. For we 
know that, instead of being fixed and ultimate, everything finite is alterable and 
perishable, and this is nothing but the dialectic of the finite, through which the latter, 
being explicitly the other of itself, is driven beyond what it immediately is and 
overturns into its opposite' (Hegel 1998: 172). In this dialectic relations between 
opposites move thought and understanding forward and the cognition of experience is 
internal to this movement. However, the role of negation in this dialectical relation 
distinguishes Hegel's account of experience from Kant's architectonic method. As we 
shall see, the relation of the synthetic and the a priori makes it possible to include 
more and more of the concrete in the abstract structures of cognition. Kant's account 
is focused upon this positive problem rather than upon how negation determines the 
extension of experience. Thus Hegel will write that when: '...the result is conceived 
as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby 
immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the 
progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself (Hegel 1977: 52). 
We will seek to show how the relation of the synthetic and the a priori is for Kant a 
problem that is first of all positive and inclusive, that it makes possible the fullest 
extension of experience by specifying its conditions of possibility. In chapter two of 
this thesis we will develop this by exploring Deleuze's reading of Kant according to 
which Ideas enable the understanding's concepts to '... comprise more and more 
differences on the basis of a properly infinite field of continuity' (Deleuze 1994- 169)
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between two elements, the synthetic and the a priori, are to be unfolded in 
the organisation of the Critique of Pure Reason. For this to be an 
internalising and inclusive account the synthetic and the a priori have to be 
shown to represent the two poles of the cognition of experience. They 
must, in other words, together ensure that nothing is left out of the account 
and that we do not rely upon anything external to the process of accounting 
for experience. This is because, as the two poles of experience, they are 
combined in foundational judgements for all cognition of experience. In 
their unity they give us an 'Idea of the whole1 , a whole that is only realised 
through an account of the relation of the synthetic and the a priori in all 
cognition, and through the work of cognition that this makes possible. It 
gives us an Idea of the two elements that all cognition must embody.30 
We've considered the example of the judgement that applies a concept of 
cause and effect. This makes the combination of the synthetic and the a 
priori in a judgement problematic in the sense that Kant recognises and sets 
before us. Their relation in such foundational judgements is not given in 
experience but needs to be secured once and for all. These judgements 
present a combination of the synthetic and the a priori that now needs to be 
unfolded clearly and convincingly in order to secure an account of the 
cognition of possible experience. This is the problem Kant puts at the basis 
of his architectonic, presenting us not with a completed whole or sum of 
cognition but an 'Idea of the whole' that is only realised in the ongoing and 
re-founded work of cognition.
30 As we shall see, this 'Idea of the whole' must comprise a plan or something that is to 
be unfolded. Kant argues in his lectures on logic that '[i]n all sciences, especially 
those of reason, the idea of the science is the general delineation or outline of it, thus 
the extension of all cognitions belonging to it. Such an idea of the whole - the first 
thing one has to look to and to seek in a science - is architectonic, as, for example, 
the idea of the science of law1 (Kant 1988: 99). His concern is that nothing external 
should direct our activity, that the relation of the parts should be outlined or planned 
rather than the whole being developed over time and depending upon what we 
encounter in experience. This will be explored further in the next chapter of this 
thesis. For now the term 'Idea of the whole' helps us to understand how the synthetic 
and the a priori, through their relations, provide a delineation or outline of all 
cognition.
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In order to understand Kant's argument better we may consider further the 
argument whose conclusion is that 'the sun warms the stone'. We saw that 
cause and effect had to be ordered clearly and convincingly for the 
argument to work. What is the role of the synthetic and the a priori in this 
argument? One way of understanding their nature and their complementary 
roles is to define the a priori as the abstract and the synthetic as the 
concrete.31 The relation of the concrete synthetic and the abstract a priori 
poses the problem in this argument. How can we expect that effect will 
follow cause no matter how different the concrete case is? For Kant an 
experience where effect didn't follow cause would not be an experience at 
all. It would not qualify as experience because it was not made possible by 
the combination of the abstract and the concrete. Abstract and concrete 
constitute the two poles of any experience and need to be related so that
31 Kant is concerned about the relation of the abstract and the concrete when he writes of 
sensation and understanding: 'Our intuition, by our very nature, can never be other 
than sensible intuition; i.e., it contains the way in which we are affected by objects. 
Understanding, on the other hand, is our ability to think fas objects of sensible 
intuition. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other' (Kant 1996: 106- 
107, A51/B75). Being affected by concrete sensations and being able to think about 
or abstract from the concrete are equally important. We need both to account for 
experience fully. Kant adds that'... this capacity [sensibility] and this ability 
[understanding] cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot intuit 
anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their union can cognition 
arise1 (ibid: 107, A51/B75-76). However, he immediately warns that we must avoid 
confusing the influences of these different faculties so that we are not led by the 
ambitions of thought to look beyond concrete experience or led by concrete 
experience to become sceptical about the ability of the understanding to provide the 
abstract forms of cognition for experience. Does it follow that we should focus on 
the relation of sensation and understanding if we want to grasp the single problem at 
the basis of the architectonic? We should not because the complementary roles of the 
abstract and the concrete in the Critique of Pure Reason take us beyond the relation 
of these two faculties. We must remember that sensible intuition also has a priori 
forms, space and time. The passages above come after the Transcendental Aesthetic 
where these are dealt with and concentrate on the a priori forms provided by the 
understanding in contrast to the concrete contributions of sensation. This is why we 
have emphasised the difference between the synthetic and the a priori rather than the 
difference between the faculties in characterising the architectonic as a whole. The 
problem of their relation is raised before that of the relations of the faculties and on 
this basis Kant organises the text according to roles of the different faculties hi 
cognition, roles that are both abstract and concrete. As we shall see, the relations of 
the faculties respond ultimately to the problem of relating the synthetic and the a 
priori.
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their relation secures this experience in the first place, making it possible. 
We need to be able to think about or abstract from experience but also to 
refer to experience in all its concrete detail. Of abstraction and concretion 
Kant writes: 'Only from their union can cognition arise'.32 This helps us to 
understand how the relation between the synthetic and the a priori, in what 
Kant sees as the foundational judgements for all cognition, is the inner 
problematic of his architectonic account of experience. He will unify his 
investigation with this problem so that the disunity in experience of the 
parts of an argument does not obscure their ultimate unity in cognition.33 
Thus, to return to our example, if there is no necessary connection between 
the sun and the stone in the concrete this is because the concrete is 
incomplete without the abstract concept of cause and effect. As we saw, we 
need a concrete time order and an abstract concept for the argument to 
work. The relation of the abstract and the concrete must be involved even 
before the stage at which we perceive the warming of the stone.
We've sought to understand Kant's concern with a single and unifying 
problem by considering how the synthetic and the a priori represent the two 
poles of cognition. The problem that is raised is that they lack unity insofar 
as they are merely given in experience but have it insofar as they are 
concentrated in the synthetic a priori form of judgement that makes 
experience possible. This is the key to understanding the scope of synthetic 
a priori judgements for Kant. Abstract knowledge would not be effective at 
dealing with concrete situations and particularities that are presented in 
space and time. Likewise, we would be limited to the concrete if we did not 
have an abstract grasp of what holds within and across very different
32Ibid: 107, A51/B75-76. A fuller quotation is given in the previous footnote.
33Thus Onora OTsteill argues that: '...throughout the Critique of Pure Reason reason is 
depicted as an active capacity that both generates and may resolve problems' (O'Neill 
1992: 288). It raises problems by relating the elements of its own account of the 
cognition of experience.
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situations.34 In either case we would not provide a full and therefore 
convincing account of experience.35 We would either lack openness to 
concrete situations and particularities or lack the reach that the abstract has 
in encompassing different aspects of the concrete. Henry E. Allison sums 
this up when he writes that '[t]he essential point is that in order to recognize 
the possibility of judgements that are synthetic in Kant's sense, it is first 
necessary to recognise the complementary roles of concepts and sensible 
intuitions in human knowledge'.36 This is the complementarity or 
togetherness of abstract concepts and concrete sensible intuitions in forms 
of judgement that are necessary conditions for the cognition of experience. 
Thus judgements that are synthetic must reflect forms of synthesis that are a 
priori, that embody a priori forms when they unify or synthesise sensible 
intuition. At each stage of the account, in each stage of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, these two poles of the cognition of experience must be in play if
34In his lectures on logic Kant argues that concepts must be relevant to and engaged 
with the concrete if we are to account for our cognition of experience through 
concepts: The expressions of the abstract and the concrete thus refer not so much to 
the concepts in themselves - for every concept is an abstract concept - as rather to 
their use only. And this use again can have varying degrees, according as one treats a 
concept now in a more, now in a less abstract or more concrete way, that is, either 
omits or adds a greater or smaller number of determinations. Through abstract use a 
concept gets nearer to the highest genus; through concrete use, however, nearer to the 
individual1 (Kant 1988: 105-106). Then Kant asks which use, abstract or concrete, is 
to be given preference: TSfeither use is to be deemed less valuable than the other. By 
very abstract concepts we cognize little in many things, by very concrete concepts 
much in few things; what we therefore gain on the one hand, we lose on the other. A 
concept that has a large sphere is very useful hi so far as one can apply it to many 
things; but on account of this there is less contained in it. In the concept substance, 
for example, I do not think as much as in the concept oichalK (ibid: 106).
35 Another way of articulating the complementarity of the abstract and the concrete is to 
consider Kant's definition of cognition. For Kant an account of the cognition of 
experience is to make experience possible and so is not confined to a part of 
experience but must include both of its poles, the abstract and the concrete. Thus 
Kant writes that: 'Cognition is either intuition or concept [...]. An intuition refers 
directly to the object and is singular; a concept refers to the object indirectly, by 
means of a characteristic that may be common to several things' (Kant 1996: 366, 
A320/B376-377). In this way cognition includes and must account for both the 
abstract that ranges across singular objects and the concrete that presents the singular 
in all its detail. The concrete is therefore a form of cognition rather than referring to 




this complementarity is to be realised. We will now turn to the a priori and 
see how Kant characterises this pole of cognition in relation to the concrete 
or synthetic component of every foundational judgement. Thinking about 
the arguments he uses will allow us to consider how forms of argument are 
developed within the architectonic and may allow us to characterise it as a 
whole. Our concern will be with how the architectonic method moves 
forward by establishing and relating the elements of its account.
iii. Locating the A Priori
At the start of the second edition introduction to the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant commences his account by considering how cognition begins. 
He argues that cognition always begins upon the occasions presented by 
sensation.37 This is when sensation rouses the understanding or sets it in 
motion by providing the material for cognition. The understanding 
responds to sensation by comparing '...these presentations, [it] connects or 
separates them, and thus processes the raw material of sense impressions 
into a cognition of objects that is called experience'.38 Kant clarifies this 
picture so that while experience here provides the starting point for 
cognition on a particular occasion it does not give rise to cognition entirely 
from itself. He locates something independent of experience that is 
represented in the understanding's response to the promptings of sensation. 
Is he suggesting that there is something innate in the human mind, whether 
something that is already present at birth or an ability that develops through 
life? In fact he does not invoke an innate component or ability of the mind 
here because he is discussing the elements of an account of cognition. For 
Kant this account must be given in order to make it possible to cognise
37There can be no doubt that all our cognition begins with experience. For what else 
might rouse our cognitive power to its operation if objects stirring our senses did not 
do so?1 (Kant 1996: 43, Bl).
3»Ibid:44,Bl.
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something as innate or as a component of the mind, as some kind of 
container or location, in the first place.39 It is a necessary feature of his 
architectonic method that objects are to be assigned their places in a unity 
of cognition as either subjective or objective, or as innate or acquired, 
through the very account now being developed.40 The architectonic is
39Roger Scruton argues that Kant does rely upon a theory of innate ideas in giving his 
account of the role of the a priori (Scruton 1982: 26). In response Quassim Cassam 
points to Kant's words in his essay 'On a Discovery According to which Any New 
Critique of Pure Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One': '...the 
Critique [of Pure Reason} admits absolutely no divinely implanted or innate 
representations' (Kant 1973: 135; cited in Cassam 1999: 92, n!8). However, even if 
Kant does not invoke an innate component of the mind his presentation of the role of 
the a priori has led different commentators to argue that the a priori must have a 
'subjective origin'. There is surely nowhere else for the a priori to be located if it is 
not on the side of sensation. However, as we shall see, this concern to 'locate' 
elements of Kant's account of cognition in experience presupposes what is to be 
accounted for. In recognition of the importance of this issue in Kant scholarship we 
will return to it in the conclusion to this thesis. We will delay this treatment in order 
that we may first build up a case for reading Kant's account of the a priori without 
recourse to subjective origins. Unlike Scruton, readers like Philip Kitcher don't claim 
that Kant held a theory of innate ideas but they find his apparent reliance on 
subjective origins to undermine his account. Kitcher argues that Kant turns to the 
subject for the genesis of his a priori account and that we should move away from this 
subjective role of the a priori towards the role it has in extending knowledge or 
showing the objective validity of beliefs. In other words, instead of seeking the a 
priori in the subject, as some sort of unconscious to which we are subject, we should 
consider its conscious role in the extension of knowledge by the subject. For Kitcher 
then we should prefer the active subject to the passive subject in Kant's account (see 
footnote 50 of this chapter).
40This is reflected in the way that different disciplines, including psychology, and their 
objects or subject matters will be assigned their places in Kant's architectonic. Much 
caution is needed when we use terms like 'subjective' and 'psychological' when 
describing Kant's account. This is something we will return to again and again in this 
thesis because the issue of Kant's alleged 'psychologism' is a major one. Gary 
Hatfield sums up the issue when he writes that '[i]n investigating the cognitive 
faculties, the forms of intuition, the categories, and the transcendental synthesis Kant 
is seeking conditions for knowledge; his investigation is directed neither at the soul as 
simple substance nor at the phenomena of inner sense. It remains to be considered 
whether in carrying out this investigation he was forced to rely on psychology' 
(Hatfield 1992: 213). Hatfield makes the point that even if Kant seeks to provide an 
account of cognition as such, rather than a psychological account of experience, he 
might have used psychological concepts and modes of explanation to pursue this 
(ibid: 214). In other words, he might have used psychological means to pursue 
epistemological ends. Is the psychological too pervasive, too much a part of the 
process of cognition, to be excluded from an account of cognition? If so we can only 
provide an account of experience that presupposes what it is to account for. It will 
presuppose inner or psychological experience. We will argue that the architectonic 
method and its criteria prevent psychologism from establishing itself but we will have 
to keep in mind Gary Hatfleld's warning that psychologism can easily take root
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internalising and inclusive in this sense. It is an account that does not start 
with or presuppose a place where innate things could be stored but seeks to 
account for any such thing. Thus the architectonic has at its basis the 
difference between the synthetic and the a priori because through this 
difference a full account of the other differences that characterise cognition 
is to emerge. The Critique of Pure Reason is not then to be organised or 
driven forward by the difference between innate and acquired or by a search 
for the origins of cognitive activity in the subject as opposed to the object. 
Its organising principle is the relation and difference between the synthetic 
and the a priori. In order to evaluate this move we must see where it leads 
Kant.
Kant calls the non-empirical or pure component of his account of cognition, 
which we've sought to define carefully, the a priori. It must be what is 
expressed in the work of the understanding and not given in experience. In 
other words, it is expressed in the giving of experience, in how it is made 
possible, rather than in what is given and accumulated over the course of 
experience.41 While Kant calls this pure component a priori he calls the 
empirical or given component a posteriori.42 The a priori is here expressed 
in the comparison, connection and separation of what is presented a 
posteriori in sensation as the givens of experience. However, the work of 
the understanding upon what is given in sensation is not the only role of the 
a priori. These acts of the understanding actually reflect how sensation is
despite our best intentions.
41 Of a priori cognition Kant writes '...we derive the cognition not directly from 
experience but from a universal rule, even though that rule itself was indeed 
borrowed by us from experience1 (Kant 1996: 45, B2). Thus we may learn from 
experience that certain actions will regularly cause certain effects and thereby have 
knowledge of the a priori. However, what is here given in experience is a particular 
and limited example of an a priori rule but no guarantee that it is in fact a priori and 
will hold hi every case.
42'In what follows, therefore, we shall mean by a priori cognitions not those that occur 
independently of this or that experience, but those that occur absolutely 
independently of all experience. They contrast with empirical cognitions, which are 
those that are possible only a posteriori, i.e., through experience1 (ibid: 45, B2-3)
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already unified or synthesised in a priori ways when it is given to us. We 
noted the ubiquity of the a priori in the previous section of this chapter. 
This is an important point because when the understanding compares, 
connects and separates given sensations these have already been unified or 
synthesised in a priori ways. We might call this the 'silent work1 of the 
understanding, prior to when sensation prompts us to noisily compare, 
connect and separate.43 This shows that the a priori is involved with the 
unification or synthesis of sensation before we are aware of it, before we 
consciously respond to sensation's promptings. Thus the a priori does not 
merely come after the synthesis of sensation but instead the synthetic and 
the a priori are always already at work together. As a result the 
understanding's a priori forms of response to sensation reflect the ways in 
which sensation has already been unified. They reflect the 'silent work' of 
the understanding that precedes its 'noisy work' of comparison, connection 
and separation. This is something that we will continue to explore because 
it is crucial to the complementarity or togetherness of the synthetic and the 
a priori in an architectonic or unifying account of experience.
43Beatrice Longuenesse uses the phrase 'silent judgement1 in order to capture the work of 
the a priori before we are aware of it (Longuenesse 1998: 122f). Philip Kitcher 
proposes an alternative term for this role of the a priori. He refers to our 'tacit1 a priori 
knowledge (Kitcher 2006: 40). He understands this as the unconscious deployment 
of principles that secure a priori knowledge in the course of cognition. For example, 
causality is not a principle we need to think about or to articulate for it to be behind 
the knowledge that A is the cause of B. We only need to make it explicit if we want 
to justify our knowledge, such as when we are providing the foundations for different 
sciences. The disadvantage that Kitcher's terminology has is that it takes us into a 
different area of Kant's thought. In his Anthropology Kant writes that: 'The field of 
sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we 
can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, obscure representations in the 
human being (and thus also in animals), is immense. Clear representations, on the 
other hand, contain only infinitely few points of this field which lie open to 
consciousness; so that as it were only a few places on the vast map of our mind are 
illuminated1 (Kant 2006: 24, Ak. 7: 135). This contrasts with the account Kant is 
giving in the Critique of Pure Reason, an account of the conditions of possible 
experience. Only on this basis could we have access to the distinct and obscure, or 
conscious and unconscious, representations Kant writes of in the Anthropology. Thus 
Kitcher's terminology, with its reference to tacit and unconscious knowledge, risks 
jumping to an area of Kant's philosophy that deals with a psychological self already 
situated in possible experience. The Anthropology thus presupposes the account 
given in the Critique of Pure Reason rather than providing its conditions when it 
distinguishes between the conscious and the unconscious.
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Understanding compares, connects and separates in order to end up with 
concepts that extend our knowledge of experience. However, this has its 
basis in the a priori work of the understanding before sensations ever occur 
to us and prompt us to compare, connect and separate.
Kant qualifies the a priori forms of unity which are to be at work in all 
synthesis as strictly universal rules for producing concepts rather than being 
only comparatively strict.44 They are strict in the sense that they alone 
make experience possible rather than in the sense that they are stricter than 
any other possible way of securing this end. They are not then one way of 
making experience possible amongst others and thus comparatively strict, 
but the only way and thus strict because they are indispensable. They are 
also, Kant argues, absolutely necessary or necessary no matter what is met 
with on the occasions when sensation presents us with material for 
cognition.45 This reflects Kant's concern to make the a priori ubiquitious. 
It is silently at work before sensation prompts the understanding and 
therefore should always be reflected in its 'noisy' work. The a priori is then 
strictly universal and absolutely necessary because it is already at work in 
how sensations are unified or synthesised. It follows that when Kant uses 
the term 'possible experience' this reflects and projects the a priori forms of 
cognition or pure concepts of the understanding. These are secured by 
synthetic a priori judgements and are the conceptual forms of possibility 
that alone make experience possible.46 For Kant we get a full account of
44'If, therefore, a judgment is thought with strict universality, i.e., thought in such a way 
that no exception whatever is allowed as possible, then the judgment is not derived 
from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori1 (Kant 1996: 46, B4).
45 '...[I]f we find a proposition such that in thinking it we think at the same time its 
necessity, then it is an a priori judgment; and if, hi addition, it is not derived from any 
proposition except one that itself has the validity of a necessary proposition, then it is 
absolutely a priori' (ibid: 46, B3). The necessity of the a priori must be made absolute 
because it is not relative to any experience: 'In what follows, therefore, we shall 
mean by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that 
experience, but those that occur absolutely independently of all experience' (ibid: 45 
B2-3).
46'... [T]he objective validity of the categories [or pure concepts of the understanding! as
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experience only because it is possible experience, because it is always 
already given form by certain abstract and a priori forms through its 
synthesis. His argument hinges on a key claim of the architectonic method 
that if anything exceeded the grasp of synthetic a priori judgements it would 
not actually be a loss to experience. If it exceeded the basic forms of 
possible experience it would undermine the conceptual unity of experience 
that makes it possible in the first place. Thus the concrete possibilities of 
sensation really presuppose the abstract forms of possibility of the 
understanding rather than exceeding them. This is a claim we will 
interrogate further because, for Kant, it is why we must not look outside of 
the relations of the synthetic and the a priori but remain within the unified 
account formed by the unfolding of their relations.
Before we move on to consider the nature of Kant's arguments for major 
claims such as they one we've just considered it will be useful to explore a 
point that Philip Kitcher makes in an essay on the a priori.47 He argues that 
we can identify two senses of the a priori. This is something that reflects 
Kant's attempt to include all of cognitive activity within the horizon of his 
architectonic. The a priori must allow us to justify claims that form part of 
everyday knowledge. Thus while Kant wants to secure claims that are 
foundational for all cognition, such as the claim that an effect follows a 
cause, he also wants to secure claims that arise, wholly or in part, on the 
basis of experience. It doesn't undermine the possibility of experience that 
a particular event no longer causes another event, even if this has happened 
for as long as anyone can remember. However, this connection of 
particular cause and particular effect is still significant. It is significant in a 
weaker sense than the concept of cause and effect which makes possible all
a priori concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as 
far as the form of thought is concerned). For in that case the categories refer to 
objects of experience necessarily and a priori, because only by means of them can any 
experiential object whatsoever be thought at all' (ibid: 148, A93/B125). 
47Kitcher 2006.
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judgements concerning the relation of events that follow one another in 
time. Kitcher therefore distinguishes a weak sense from a strong sense of 
the a priori. He describes what Kant himself referred to as cognition 
through empirical concepts or empirical cognition as securing weak a priori 
knowledge.48 This move reflects the fact that for Kant foundational or basic 
forms of cognition, which are secured by synthetic a priori judgements, are 
only a small part of the sum total of cognition.49 Kitcher argues that in 
attaining the weak a priori the subject is active and justificatory so that f [a]s 
we undergo the stream of experience that constitutes our lives, we are able 
to engage in certain kinds of processes that justify us in holding particular 
beliefs, and we can do this whatever specific form the stream of experience 
takes'.50 A life or total stream of experience undergone by a subject is a 
sufficient basis for beliefs that can be acted upon. These are justified in a 
weaker, but still significant, sense than knowledge that is based upon what 
is independent of experience and a priori in the strong sense. Thus the 
proposition that the sun will rise tomorrow is established as long as 
someone lives for a sufficient time to observe this event frequently enough 
to form an empirical concept of the sun in which its rising is included.
48'The empirical concept springs from the senses through comparison of the objects of 
experience and receives, through the understanding, merely the form of generality. 
The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which they have been 
extracted as to their content1 (Kant 1988: 97). We will explore Kant's account of 
empirical cognition and empirical concepts further in chapters four and five of this 
thesis.
49Umberto Eco argues that Kant neglects everyday empirical cognition. He writes: 'As a 
matter of fact I talk of cats precisely because Kant brought in empirical concepts (and 
while he didn't talk about cats, he talked about dogs), after which he didn't know 
where to put them' (Eco 2000: 6-7). Kant talks about dogs in the Critique of Pure 
Reason in the schematism chapter and we will explore this hi chapter four of this 
thesis. Eco argues that Kant focuses upon the truth of propositions, such as those of 
Newtonian physics, rather than on judgements of perception that employ and develop 
empirical concepts. He neglects judgements which involve our knowledge of the 
objects of everyday experience and our ability to name them (ibid: 69). One of Eco's 
examples of such a judgement is 'This is a stone' (ibid: 77). However, Kitcher's 
notion of the weak a priori recognises the small part in the sum total of cognitions 
that pure cognition actually represents for Kant. It provides the basis for the rich 
activity of empirical cognition rather than dominating it or excluding it from the 
account. Considering whether empirical concepts are accounted for and valued by 
Kant will allow us to judge whether he includes the concrete in his account.
50Kitcher2006:31.
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While the concept of the sun and its attribute 'to rise at daybreak' is not one 
of the a priori concepts that makes the cognition of experience possible, it is 
necessary relative to everyday concerns and to disciplines such as 
anthropology and zoology that observe humans, other animals and other 
forms of life anticipating and responding to the rising of the sun at 
daybreak. This shows us how a priori concepts are the basis of all cognition 
of experience but are only a small part of its sum total.51 The majority of 
acts of cognition are empirical or a priori in the weak sense. This gives us a 
greater sense of the ambitions of the architectonic and their relation to the 
concrete concerns of cognition. In the next section we will interrogate more 
closely the arguments we have seen Kant making in his attempts to secure 
the a priori.
iv. The Architectonic and Forms of Argument
In order to assess Kant's claims about the role of the a priori we will seek to 
define the form of argument that characterises the architectonic account 
within which they arise. We note that he is not just making the claim that 
we need both abstract and concrete as elements of a full account for 
experience, as its two poles. We've considered how we can defend this 
claim by arguing that experience involves both concrete cases and abstract 
unities that range across these cases. However, Kant is also asserting that 
we cannot have the concrete without an a priori that has a certain character. 
This a priori places certain systematic limitations upon what is possible in 
experience that are strictly universal and absolutely necessary. He seeks to 
establish the basic or foundational forms of the a priori once and for all in
51 Thus Kant distinguishes pure a priori cognition from a priori cognition that is mixed or 
involved with empirical cognition: 'But we call a priori cognitions pure if nothing 
empirical whatsoever is mixed in with them. Thus, e.g., the proposition, Every 
change has its cause, is an a priori proposition; yet it is not pure, because change is a 
concept that can be obtained only from experience' (Kant 1996: 45, B3).
his architectonic account rather than leaving open the nature, organisation 
and number of these forms. The architectonic method now needs to provide 
the criteria of a form of argument if we are to defend it against the charge 
that it is rigid and artificial. These criteria need to be identified through the 
unfolding of the architectonic if we are to show that this method is inclusive 
and internalising.
One form of argument that we encounter already in the introduction to the 
Critique of Pure Reason explores what we might call the ingredients of an 
account of cognition. Kant later refers to this as a process of transcendental 
deliberation. He writes that '...every presentation is assigned its place in the 
cognitive power appropriate to it, and whereby the influence of sensibility 
on understanding is therefore also distinguished1 . 52 As well as locating the 
influence of different cognitive faculties it is to distinguish their 
contributions according to whether these are a priori or a posteriori. Thus, 
if the understanding contributes a concept to our cognition of experience, is 
this an empirical and a posteriori concept or a pure and a priori concept? 
Quassim Cassam refers to this as an 'isolation argument' because it isolates 
the a priori ingredients of cognition in order to establish the elements of an 
account of cognition.53 We can see it at work in the following passage from 
the introduction to Critique of Pure Reason: '... if from your empirical 
concept of any object whatever, corporeal or incorporeal, you omit all 
properties that experience has taught you, you still cannot take away from 
the concept the property through which you think the object either as a 
substance or as attaching to a substance (even though this concept of
52Ibid: 348, A295/B351. Kant is writing here in the Transcendental Dialectic about how 
to uncover transcendental illusions and this leads him to paint a dynamic picture of 
the relations between cognitive faculties using an analogy with natural science. He 
writes that when sensibility influences the understanding it is '...just as [when] a body 
in motion would indeed by itself keep to a straight line in the same direction, but is 
deflected into curvilinear motion if influenced at the same time by another force 
acting in another direction1 (ibid: 348, A294-295/B351). We will need then to be able 
'...to resolve this composite action into the simple ones of understanding and 
sensibility' (ibid: 348, A295/B351).
53Cassam 1999: 86.
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substance is more determinate than that of an object as such). Hence you 
must, won over by the necessity with which this concept of substance forces 
itself upon you, admit that this concept resides a priori in your cognitive 
power'.54 We isolate a priori ingredients by inspecting the products of 
cognition and seeing which have the character of the a priori. Thus when 
we consider again the stone that is warmed by the sun we are led to think 
about the forms of judgement that have unified this experience. We find 
that we are always presupposing the application of the concept of substance 
and the concept of cause and effect. Once we have applied the concept of 
substance we can then attribute predicate-concepts to a subject-concept. 
We attribute things to a subject because we secure it using this a priori 
concept. This allows us to continue to unify this experience by locating the 
role of cause and effect. We thus isolate the roles of a priori concepts as 
well as the concrete time order of events in organising this situation. We 
orientate ourselves in a particular experience or concrete situation by 
deliberating on what makes it possible in the first place. Instead of being 
confused by changes of state we make a judgement anchored in a subject- 
concept, converting our beliefs about causality into knowledge grounded in 
a priori forms as well as in concrete details like the time-order of events. 
We are locating the force or influence of the understanding in realising 
certain a priori concepts in the spatio-temporal synthesis of sensation before 
sensation actually occurs to us. This force is also at work in the argument 
that convinces us that the heat of the stone is the effect of the sun's rays. 
Such an isolation argument takes us from the object of cognition to the 
forces or cognitive faculties that are at work in the synthesis of our 
sensations of this object.55
54Kantl996:48,B6.
55We rely here upon our earlier argument that Kant is not trying to find a source for the 
a priori in a subjective container or location, as some have claimed (see footnote 39 
of this chapter). Rather than seeking an origin or location Kant is here isolating the 
elements of an account of cognition that will make possible our cognition of origins 
and locations within possible experience and rule out any search for such things 
outside of possible experience.
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Quassim Cassam argues that such isolation arguments present a weaker 
form of argument than others that we find in the Critique of Pure Reason.56 
He claims that the isolation argument is weaker because it is not validatory. 
Rather than justifying our use of a concept it inspects the work of cognition 
and reveals its ingredients or the forces at work in its synthesis. It might 
show that the understanding's concept of cause and effect was at work in 
this case but does not tell us that it must have been so. We are here directly 
inspecting the work of cognition on the basis of finished concepts of objects 
without this providing any justification of the a priori elements this reveals. 
They form a list of conditions that is neither shown to be complete or 
indispensible for the cognition of possible experience. The argument is not 
then inclusive or internalising because it leaves open the possibility of other 
ways of securing the synthesis of possible experience. Cassam argues that 
the alternative form of argument to be located is one where: Their aim is 
not just to tell us how we do in fact think of and experience the world, but 
to show that we are justified in operating in the ways in which we actually 
operate when thinking about or experiencing the world1 .57 Isolation 
arguments are too limited in their scope, referring to the actual operations 
and outcomes that we have observed over the course of experience. They 
reveal the structure and contributions of our cognitive faculties in these 
actual cases rather than establishing conditions of possibility that are 
indispensible and form a system.58 The form of argument that would 
characterise the architectonic must include every possible act of cognition 
in its horizon if it is not to be liable to revision. This seems to be a valid 
way of reading Kant's notion of the architectonic method. It concerns an 
internal justification in the sense that we do not presuppose the givens of 
experience that are to be accounted for, including any outcome or




achievement of cognition. The architectonic must include every condition 
of the possibility of experience rather than isolating some of these 
according to what is given to us in the course of experience. It must 
therefore not wait for the situation to arise which allows us to form an 
isolation argument. Instead the architectonic must present these conditions 
all at once in a system, re-founding cognition once and for all without this 
being vulnerable to the haphazard discovery and isolation of conditions. 
Therefore, while an isolation argument may have a role in showing how the 
a priori has been at work in cognition it cannot characterise Kant's 
architectonic and its scope. Insofar as this is to account for the very 
possibility of experience, to justify its a priori forms in an inclusive and 
internalising way, isolation arguments could only play a supporting role 
within its unfolding.
We are moving closer to a positive definition of transcendental arguments 
or arguments that for Kant characterise his architectonic method in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. If we consider isolation arguments further and 
why they in fact do not meet the criteria of a transcendental argument this 
will brings us closer to our goal. Gary Hatfield characterises arguments that 
seek to isolate the a priori as starting from 'bodies of knowledge' or 
'cognitive achievements' and then seeking to find out how these are 
possible.59 They ascend from what has been achieved in cognition to the 
cognitive processes that make this achievement possible. Kant defines what 
we are calling isolation arguments in this way in his Prolegomena to Any 
Future Metaphysics where he writes that: They must rest therefore upon 
something already known as trustworthy, from which we can set out with 
confidence and ascend to sources as yet unknown, the discovery of which 
will not only explain to us what we knew but exhibit a sphere of many 
cognitions which all spring from the same sources'.60 Here Kant calls this
59Hatfield 1990: 79; cited in Cassam 1999: 83. 
60Kant 1977: 19-20, Ak. 4: 275.
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method of investigation 'analytic' insofar as it is to analyse the achievements 
of cognition, working back from these to the ingredients of the process of 
cognition that achieved them. Its focus is upon achievements that are for 
Kant indisputable and its horizon is the possibility of these particular 
achievements.
In what sense could isolation arguments or analytic investigations play a 
role in the architectonic of the Critique of Pure Reason! A starting point 
for an isolation argument that is very much in evidence in Kant's text is 
Euclidean Geometry. Georges Dicker writes that for Kant:
'It is because of the nature or structure of space that a straight line not 
only is but also must be the shortest distance between two points. 
More generally, it is the nature or structure of space that accounts for 
the necessity or strict universality of all geometrical propositions. 
Furthermore, geometry is the science of space, in that geometrical 
principles describe the nature or structure of space'.61
Mathematics here isolates and exhibits the a priori and it does this because 
it constructs or synthesises sensations under the rule of the a priori.62 It is 
thus involved in certain spatio-temporal syntheses that are otherwise always 
at work silently. It shows that these are constrained by a priori rules, rules 
that form the axioms of Euclidean geometry, and in this way tells us about 
the nature of space. According to Kant mathematics constructs or 
synthesises space in the only ways possible, in the a priori ways that 
sensations are always being constructed or synthesised in space and time. It 
is clear that he has a particular view of mathematics, one that makes it the 
starting point for an isolation argument. He has what has become known as 
an intuitionist or constructivist view of mathematics, seeing its role as 
constructing sensations in space and time and thus exhibiting its a priori
6 lDicker2004:27.
62rNow it is true that mathematics deals with objects and cognitions only to the extent 
that they can be exhibited in intuition' (Kant 1996: 49, A4/B8). As Kant puts it in his 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science: '...that which grounds its cognition 
only on the construction of concepts, by means of the presentation of the object in a 
priori intuition, is called mathematics' (Kant 2004: 5, Ak. 4: 469). ^
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truths or rules in sensible intuition rather than in abstraction.63 It tells us 
about abstract a priori rules and the concrete or synthetic ways in which 
they are realised because it actually exhibits the togetherness or 
complementarity of the a priori and the synthetic. Mathematical cognition 
is not then made up of merely a posteriori ingredients that can be revised on 
the basis of experience but neither is it formalistic as it would be if its 
axioms or starting points were not derived from how sensation is 
constructed or synthesised.64 It embodies the togetherness of the abstract 
and the concrete in the spatio-temporal synthesis of sensible intuition. This 
leads Kant to argue that sciences need a mathematical component to ensure 
that they can deal with their subject matter on the basis of a priori synthetic 
cognitions.65 The force of this argument for the necessary role of the a 
priori is drawn from the cognitive achievement of mathematics in exhibiting 
the a priori ways in which space and time actually construct or synthesise 
sensations. It isolates the a priori ingredient, the ingredient that constrains 
mathematics and provides its axioms. It thus reflects how all synthesis is 
constrained or ruled by the a priori. This is clearly a huge claim concerning 
the nature of mathematics and relies upon a Euclidean geometry that has 
now been supplemented by non-Euclidean hyperbolic and elliptic
63Morris Kline sketches the view of mathematics current in Kant's time: 'As of 1800 
[Kant died in 1804], mathematics rested upon two foundations, the number system 
and Euclidean geometry' (Kline 1981: 445). He adds that'... mathematicians would 
have emphasised the latter because many facts about the number system, and about 
irrational numbers especially, were not logically established nor clearly understood. 
Indeed, those properties of the number system that were universally accepted were 
still proved by resorting to geometric arguments, much as the Greeks had done 2500 
years earlier. Hence one could say that Euclidean geometry was the most solidly 
constructed branch of mathematics, the foundation on which many other branches 
were erected, the surest body of knowledge man possessed* (ibid: 445).
64By formalism hi the foundations of mathematics we mean the view that axioms are not 
seen to have any meaning or to be open to interpretation. There is a syntax that 
ensures that these propositions are well formed but no semantics as there is in Kant's 
understanding of the foundations of mathematics, according to which axioms have a 
well-founded physical meaning. For Kant they find their meaning in how space is 
constructed or synthesised. Morris Kline argues that 'The axioms of Euclidean 
geometry were accepted as self-evident truths because they asserted facts about 
physical space that observation and experence immediately confirmed' (ibid: 446).
65'I assert, however, that in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much 
proper science as there is mathematics therein' (Kant 2004: 6, Ak. 4: 470).
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geometries.66 However, our overriding concern is to place such an 
argument as a supporting argument in Kant's architectonic of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, one that is not relied upon by the text as a whole. We will 
now consider how the isolation argument is distinguished from the form of 
argument we are seeking to define.
In seeking to compare the role of different arguments in characterising the 
Critique of Pure Reason as a whole it is worth turning again to Kant's 
Prolegomena where he reflects upon this issue. He explicitly contrasts the 
isolation argument or analytic investigation that characterises and unifies 
the Prolegomena with the type of argument and investigation that does the 
same for the Critique of Pure Reason. He refers to the Critique of Pure 
Reason as performing an inquiry into '...a system based on no data except 
reason itself, and which therefore seeks, without resting upon any fact, to
66Morris Kline defines the axiom that was challenged by non-Euclidean geometries after 
Kant's death in the following way:'... this axiom asserts that the lines / and m [two 
parallel lines with a common perpendicular] will never meet despite the fact that 
these lines extend indefinitely far on either side or, as we say, extend to infinity. 
Since experience and observation are confined to a limited region about the earth's 
surface, there is some question as to what happens indefinitely far out in space* (Kline 
1981: 446-447). Hyperbolic and elliptic geometries supplement Euclidean geometry 
by characterising lines with a common perpendicular differently. In hyperbolic 
geometry the two lines curve away from each other whilst they will curve towards 
each other and eventually intersect in elliptic geometry. Kline credits Karl Friedrich 
Gauss, Nicholas I. Lobatchevsky and John Bolyai with independently arriving at non- 
Euclidean geometry in the first half of the nineteenth century (ibid: 450). He also 
opposes the physical meaningfulness of Euclid's parallel axiom to an emerging view 
of mathematics that again differs from Kant's view: 'The subject [of mathematics] is 
concerned with the logical development of the implications of sets of axioms' (ibid: 
452). This means that we must see if the theorems that are derived from a set of 
axioms help us to found mathematics and judge the adequacy of these axioms in this 
way. It doesn't matter if these starting points do not fit in with our experience or find 
meaning within it. Although our concern is to focus upon the form of argument that 
characterises Kant's architectonic as a whole, an argument that does not rely upon 
cognitive achievements like Euclidean geometry, this move in the history of 
mathematics is significant. In the conclusion to this thesis we will seek to engage 
with the contemporary debate over the nature and scope of transcendental arguments. 
The move of mathematics away from human experience, and the meaning that 
axioms have within it, to distances in space that cannot be experienced by human 
beings challenges the scope of transcendental arguments. As we shall see, this means 
that if transcendental arguments do not have the scope of possible experience as such 
they are not worthy of being called 'transcendental' in the sense Kant would use the 
term.
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unfold knowledge from its original germs'.67 Here Kant makes it clear that 
his method is inclusive and internal, that it is to leave nothing out and to 
work by relating the elements internal to the account it is giving. This is not 
to suggest that the Critique of Pure Reason employs only one type of 
argument but it puts isolation arguments in context. They are supporting 
arguments. Their place in the text and in an account of cognition is to be 
assigned by the architectonic. Kant is here counselling us to seek the unity 
of his Critique of Pure Reason in an overall method even though we find 
different forms of argument in this text. He also makes it clear that the 
Prolegomena does not provide a competing form of argument to that of the 
Critique of Pure Reason. In its preface he explains why he published this 
1783 text in between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. The Critique of Pure Reason is '...dry, obscure, opposed to all 
ordinary notions, and moreover long-winded'.68 The Prolegomena is 
therefore to be presented differently but not, Kant asserts, in a competing 
form. We cannot do the work of the Critique of Pure Reason in a variety of 
different ways or by using now this cognitive achievement and now that 
one. Thus Kant writes that the Critique of Pure Reason, '... which discusses 
the pure faculty of reason in its whole extent and bounds, will remain the 
foundation, to which the Prolegomena, as preliminary exercise, refer; for 
that critique must exist as a science, systematic and complete as to its 
smallest parts, before we can think of letting metaphysics appear on the 
scene, or even have the most distant hope of so doing'.69 Kant here affirms 
the integrity of the Critique of Pure Reason as something indispensable for 
re-founding cognition and subsequently assigning places to bodies of 
knowledge like metaphysics and natural science. He argues that the
6<7Kantl977:19,Ak.4:274.
68Ibid: 6, Ak. 4:261. As we shall see over the course of this thesis, Kant makes it a 
virtue of any argument that it is not dry and tedious. Despite his self-criticism in the 
Prolegomena he seeks to present arguments that are neither dry nor tedious at key 
points in the unfolding of the architectonic of the Critique of Pure Reason. In chapter 
three of this thesis we will consider how the Metaphysical Deduction can be 
understood in this light.
69lbid:6-7,Ak.4:261.
50
Prolegomena makes it easier to grasp the Critique of Pure Reason's account 
of experience because it is a more popular work. Some people find it easier 
to think on the basis of what is presented in sensible intuition rather than 
beginning with abstract concepts and their role in a system.70 Isolation 
arguments simply suit them better but do not replace the foundational work 
of the Critique of Pure Reason which they seek to make accessible.71 Thus 
the integrity of the systematic account presented in this text is not 
questioned but its role in all cognition demands that this account be grasped 
in different ways to suit different minds.
Kant defines the type of argument that is to characterise his architectonic in 
the following passage from the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Here he significantly discards any reliance upon examples of cognitive 
achievements or from everyday understanding in the type of argument he is 
going to pursue:
'But we do not need such examples in order to prove that pure a priori 
principles actually exist] in our cognition. We could, alternatively, 
establish that these principles are indispensable for the possibility of 
experience as such, and hence establish [their existence] a priori. For 
where might even experience get its certainty if the rules by which it
7°'The art of popularity consists in bringing about, in the same cognition, that proportion 
between presentation in abstracto and in concrete, of concepts and their exhibition 
[in intuition], by which the maximum of cognition is achieved both as to extension 
and intension' (Kant 1988: 106, the addition hi square brackets was made by the 
translator).
71 Kant 1977: 8-9, Ak. 4: 263-4. In his biography of Kant Manfred Kuehn tells us of the 
negative critical reactions to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that led 
Kant to write a text that would make his arguments more accessible and answer his 
critics. We noted the danger of historicising Kant's arguments but in the case of the 
Prolegomena we have a text that was offered as a popular work. Kuehn argues that it 
ended up as a sustained polemic against a review of the Critique of Pure Reason in 
the Gothaische gelehrte Anzeigen of 1782. Although this review was positive in 
many ways it judged that for most readers its content would be incomprehensible 
(Kuehn 2001: 254). Kuehn notes that there is a much greater role for Berkeley and 
Hume in the Prolegomena than in the Critique of Pure Reason (ibid: 255). This gives 
the Prolegomena a quite different character, one that is outward looking and that 
responds to its philosophical context. Kant's strategy is to draw upon cognitive 
achievements that his critics would accept, critics who have been commenting on his 
Critique of Pure Reason, and show how they presuppose his own account for their 
very possibility.
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proceeds where always in turn empirical and hence contingent, so 
that they could hardly be considered first principles?'72
We see that the scope of such an argument is to be 'the possibility of 
experience as such'. Such an argument concerns the conditions of 
possibility of all experience and it challenges anyone who is a sceptic about 
the a priori nature of the foundations of cognition. As Robert Stern puts it...
'...they set out to show that something the sceptic takes for granted as 
a possibility (for example that we have direct access to our inner 
states but no direct access to the external world, or beliefs but no 
reliable belief-forming methods) must be abandoned, as the one is in 
fact impossible without the other, for reasons he has overlooked (for 
example, inner states alone cannot provide the basis for time- 
determination, or that beliefs by their nature must be generally 
true)'.73
What the sceptic must come to accept for the argument to work is that 
experience as a whole is unified in certain ways. The example Stern gives 
in parenthesis shows how the conceptions the sceptic might have gained 
through their inner states or inner experience are inseparable from a wider 
system in which all conceptions of possible experience arise.74 These 
include inner and outer experience. Thus if, as in the example we've been 
considering, the sun warms the stone this can never be an isolated 
experience, one confined to an inner state. It refers to a whole system that 
is the condition of possibility of this experience in the first place, that makes 
possible both inner and outer experience through a priori synthesis. Cause 
and effect form part of a wider system and the architectonic of the Critique 
of Pure Reason forms an argument that seeks to make this system the 
condition of possibility for 'experience as such'. Thus our access to the
72Kant 1996: 47, B5, additions in square brackets were made by the translator.
73RobertSternl999a:4.
74Stern's first example in the above quotation is the argument that forms Kant's
'Refutation of Idealism' in the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1996: 289-292, B275- 
B279). It argues on the basis of the work on time-determination that precedes it in 
the Analytic of Principles which itself relies upon the Table of Categories established 
in the Metaphysical Deduction. Therefore, this transcendental argument relies upon 
Kant's systematic account of experience as a whole to argue that inner experience and 
outer experience are inseparable. This systematic account is something we will 
continue to explore in chapters two, three, four and five of this thesis.
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external world is not something we must establish after having had 
experiences like that of the sun warming the stone but is a condition of 
possibility of this very experience. The theory of time-determination 
referred to by Stern, which allows Kant to argue in this way, will be 
explored in chapters four and five of this thesis. How does this differ from 
an isolation argument? The difference is first of all one of scope or horizon. 
Kant is concerned to argue without the aid of examples, even if these 
examples are as unique and powerful for him as Euclidean Geometry. He 
wants to think about 'experience as such' and its conditions of possibility. 
This means avoiding reference to its outcomes, no matter how venerable, or 
to anything whatever that has been given in experience.
Let's summarise what we've learnt about the form of argument that is to 
characterise Kant's architectonic. Its criteria are as follows:
1. The argument must be validatory rather than revelatory.
2. The argument must be indispensable.
3. The argument must not assume what it is to account for and thus 
leave it out of its unifying account.
4. The argument must not rely upon cognitive achievements or bodies of 
knowledge to re-found cognition.
5. It follows from the previous criteria that the argument must be 
inclusive and internalising, providing the conditions of the possibility 
of experience exhaustively and so without remainder. In this way it 
relies only upon its own elements and upon its way of relating them 
in order to carry forward its argument.
From what we've discovered so far we can see that isolation arguments are 
closer to these criteria than arguments from experience or from the a 
posteriori. Thus if an argument starts with cognitive achievements that 
exhibit or reveal a priori truths this is more productive for Kant's
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architectonic than one starting with the facts or givens of experience like 
arguments from resemblance or regularity. Arguments from experience can 
locate patterns of resemblance and regularity that secure what we saw 
Philip Kitcher referring to as the weak sense of the a priori. However, these 
arguments cannot account for resemblances or regularities, or justify the 
assertion of their absolute necessity and strict universality on the basis of 
certain a priori syntheses. In contrast, a cognitive achievement like 
Euclidean Geometry does reveal the a priori syntheses that exhibit basic 
propositions or a priori truths that ground its activity and ground the activity 
of all proper sciences according to Kant. However, what is needed is the 
horizon or scope of all a priori synthesis, of possible experience as such and 
a validatory argument that holds it together. This account must be unifying 
or internalising to the extent that it is based upon the horizon of possible 
experience as such. We will call arguments that meet these criteria 
transcendental arguments on the grounds that they are concerned with 
conditions of the very possibility of experience.75 The architectonic, as a 
transcendental argument, draws only upon its own parts and their relations. 
It is because this whole is greater than its parts that it cannot focus upon a 
part of experience like isolation arguments do. It includes all of experience 
within its horizon, from everyday experience to venerable cognitive 
achievements that are founded upon mathematical truths. This reveals the 
overriding ambition of Kant's architectonic, its aim of securing the 
conditions of possibility for the cognition of experience once and for all. 
Over the following chapters of this thesis the nature and unfolding of this
75 Another name that suggests itself is 'conditions argument1 but this has become
associated in the secondary literature with the notion that the conditions of possibility 
that are being argued for have a 'subjective origin'. Quassim Cassam defines 
conditions arguments as starting from the claim that a condition of experience cannot 
be derived from experience. If it is not located in experience, the condition must be 
part of the cognitive apparatus of the mind. Hence we have what he calls a 'self- 
directed transcendental argument'. Such an argument is inseparable from a notion of 
subjective origin because it chooses to be self-directed rather than world-directed 
(Cassam 1999: 92-93). We've argued that this is a false choice between either 
locating the a priori 'in us' or 'in the world1 and we will continue to develop this 
argument. We will return to Cassam's account in the conclusion to this thesis.
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account in the Critique of Pure Reason will be explored and assessed.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have been able to offer some justification for the textual 
focus of this thesis. We've sought to show that for Kant the synthetic a 
priori form of judgement presents us with the basis of the architectonic 
because it prompts, unifies and organises its activity. Thus, while we have 
to wait until sensation prompts us before we engage in 'noisy' cognitive 
activity, the 'silent' work of a priori synthesis is always already underway. 
This demands a fuller treatment than we would be able to give if our textual 
focus was wider because it must be explored in the moves made in the 
Critique of Pure Reason as a whole. We must continue to make the case for 
this textual focus as we explore Kant's architectonic in the chapters that 
follow. We will consider how Kant's transcendental arguments, as these are 
formed and unified through the unfolding of his architectonic, construct a 
system that is to be the condition of possibility for 'experience as such'.
Many significant questions concerning Kant's architectonic method have 
not been answered. These further test our understanding of his way of 
arguing over the course of the unfolding of his architectonic. The concrete 
nature of synthesis is something we've specified as spatio-temporal but this 
definition is something we will need to explain and develop further. 
Synthesis is always performed in and through space and time, through the a 
priori forms or relations they offer. As we've seen, rather than being given 
in experience they are involved in the giving of experience and so form part 
of an account of experience. Thus we move from the warmth of the stone 
in direct sunlight, from it being possible for it to be in the right place at the 
right time to be warmed by the sun, to considering the a priori concepts that 
apply to it. As we've seen, spatio-temporal synthesis must make the
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application of an a priori concept possible because it is always already 
related to the a priori.76 We need to consider further how for Kant the a 
priori is involved in synthesis and is not simply applied to experience after 
the event of its synthesis. We will pursue this in chapters four and five of 
this thesis where we will seek to understand how the a priori is not just 
relevant or applicable to possible experience but is always already involved 
in its synthesis.
For Kant we need both the abstract and the concrete to make possible the 
rich activity of the cognition of experience, such as when heat is rigorously 
defined by chemistry or when the heat of the stone is recognised and can 
then be harnessed for different practical ends.77 These two elements are 
concentrated in the form of judgement that for Kant is basic to all cognition 
precisely insofar as at every stage and movement of his account of 
cognition, in every part of the Critique of Pure Reason, the relations of the 
synthetic and the a priori are at stake. Thus, as Kant puts it, '[tjhoughts 
without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. Hence it 
is necessary that we make our intuitions understandable (i.e., that we bring 
them under concepts)'.78 Understanding this will be our concern in the rest 
of this thesis as we seek to grasp the unity of the Critique of Pure Reason 
and its relation to Deleuze's thought. In the next chapter of this thesis we 
will consider, on the basis of what we've learnt so far, how a single and
76This is not to deny the role of the schematism, which we will consider in chapter four 
of this thesis, in mediating concepts and sensations. However, the schematism is not 
a notion or a solution that comes from outside of the architectonic and it's unfolding. 
Rather, it arises because of the internal problem of relating the synthetic and the a 
priori. For Kant the synthetic and the a priori are related in the 'silent work1 of the 
synthesis of experience, as mathematics shows, but they need to be related in the 
'noisy work' of empirical cognition if we are to respond to the single and unifying 
problem of their relation.
77Given Kant's negative view of chemistry, this may seem a bad example. However, in 
footnote 12 of this chapter we argued that the progress of chemistry in attaining a 
mathematical foundation can be seen as the extension of the architectonic in its 
broader sense. Chemistry joins the ranks of 'proper' sciences because it now meets 
Kant's criteria.
7«Kant 1996: 107, A51/B75.
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unifying problem actually organises the Critique of Pure Reason. We will 
then take our first steps in seeking to relate this architectonic method and its 
precepts to the work of Gilles Deleuze.
CHAPTER 2
Ideas and Method in Kant and Deleuze
'We may say that the object of a mere transcendental idea is something of which 
we have no concept, although this idea has been produced in reason quite 
necessarily and according to reason's original laws. For in fact no concept of 
understanding - i.e., no concept that can be shown and made intuitive in a 
possible experience - is possible for an object that is to be adequate to reason's 
demand. Yet we would express it better, and with less risk of being 
misunderstood, if we said that we cannot become acquainted with the object 
corresponding to an idea, although we can have a problematic concept of it'. 
(Kant 1996: 380, A338-9/B396-7)
In the previous chapter of this thesis we found that the basis of the 
architectonic, the starting point from which it unfolds, is the problem of the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgement. We also considered how an 
argument that relied upon cause and effect - allowing us to conclude that 
'the sun warms the stone1 - makes use of a concept that forms part of a 
system for accounting for the cognition of possible experience as such. 
Such arguments are ordered, with effect necessarily following cause in each 
case, only as part of the whole system that forms the architectonic of the 
Critique of Pure Reason. In this chapter we will consider how this system 
is actually constructed on the basis of the problem of securing synthetic a 
priori cognition. We have investigated the form of argument that 
characterises the architectonic but need to consider the relation of this form 
of argument to the presentation and organisation of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. We will do this in the first section of this chapter and this will 
involve introducing a number of new terms and engaging further with the 
issues that confront Kant's architectonic.
The first new term is 'problematic Idea', a term which we will use to further 
define the single and unifying problem Kant is concerned with in his
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architectonic and its role in the construction of systems. By exploring this 
term in some depth we will seek to understand how Kant's presentation of 
the Critique of Pure Reason is inclusive and internalising in the 
construction of a system for accounting for the cognition of possible 
experience. We will ask how it can secure such an account without relying 
upon anything external. We will then explore Kant's response to certain 
critical questions by considering how his notion of a problematic Idea can 
make clear and convincing his construction of an inward-looking system. 
We find that this system is to be complete. To evaluate this claim we will 
need to situate and define completeness carefully within the architectonic 
method. We will see that Kant is able to defend his complete Idea of a 
system against charges of being rigid or artificial, of over-determining what 
it seeks to account for, because it is also a problematic Idea. Finally we will 
ask how he grounds the activity of system building in a problematic Idea. 
How can we be sure that the system we are constructing provides a valid 
account of the cognition of possible experience if we cannot assume 
anything external to its own unfolding?
Having grappled with these critical questions we will turn, in the second 
section of this chapter, to Deleuze's account of problematic Ideas. We will 
recognise the major differences between their accounts but will focus upon 
their common ground. We will find this in the methodological role of 
problematic Ideas and will seek to show that their relation can be broadened 
and deepened on this basis. Thus whilst Deleuze's account of Ideas draws 
upon thinkers other than Kant it takes from him the methodological and 
unifying function of Ideas. This common ground will be the basis of the 
comparison between Kant and Deleuze that we will develop over the 
remainder of this thesis.
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i. Idea and System in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
We noted at the start of the previous chapter that the basis upon which the 
systematic unfolding of Kant's architectonic proceeds is unknown and 
unknowable. It follows that we must seek to understand this basis through 
its role in the construction of systems. The final section of the second 
edition introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason provides insight into the 
way in which this text is to be presented architectonically. This section 
bears the following title: 'Idea and Division of a Special Science under the 
name of Critique of Pure Reason1 . 1 The terms 'idea1 and 'division' suggest 
that it will show how the presentation or organisation of the Critique of 
Pure Reason can be said to be internal to an argument which is based upon 
an Idea. We've seen how a single and unifying problem is put at the basis 
of the activity of the architectonic method. Here this activity is specified as 
the division of the Critique of Pure Reason. There is an Idea behind the 
division of this text. Our understanding of these terms is crucial to our 
conception of Kant's account as a whole. Do we have a rigid and artificial 
division of the text based upon an Idea that determines the outcomes to all 
the problems cognition might face? In other words, does the Idea over- 
determine possible experience by leading us to formulate solutions to any 
possible problem? For Kant an argument is to unfold on the basis of the 
relation of the synthetic and the a priori in judgements that are foundational 
for all cognition of possible experience. The text as a whole is to represent 
a dynamic and convincing response to a problematic Idea when it 
formulates these synthetic a priori forms. To understand Kant's argument 
we have to distinguish the completeness of a system based upon a 
problematic Idea from a completeness that over-determines the outcomes of 
cognition. For Kant completeness must not tell us what to think or what to 
expect beyond the most basic conditions, those that make experience 
possible in the first place. He must therefore show that his account is
iKant 1996:63,324.
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'complete' in providing the conditions of the cognition of possible 
experience but not in specifying its outcomes. In what sense can 
completeness give rise to an open-ended cognition of possible experience?
We learnt in the previous chapter that for Kant the Critique of Pure Reason 
is a propaedeutic. He develops this further when he writes of what it is to 
prepare for: Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science for which 
the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., 
from principles, with full guarantee of the completeness and reliability of all 
the components that make up this edifice. Transcendental philosophy is the 
system of all principles of pure reason'.2 Here Kant distinguishes 
transcendental philosophy as being concerned with what we've called the 
architectonic in the broad sense, the organon of principles for all branches 
of cognition. The Critique of Pure Reason does not offer a complete 
system of all the a priori principles of cognition because it does not include 
'...a comprehensive analysis of the whole of human a priori cognition1 .3 
Instead it provides '...a complete enumeration of all the root concepts that 
make up that pure cognition'.4 Such concepts are then to be the source of 
the growth of cognition, the only roots that can be at the basis of all 
cognition because they are conditions of its possibility. In this way Kant 
envisages the outcomes of the cognition of possible experience as 
inexhaustible.5 Onora CWeill understands this in the following way: 'The 
construction of reason is to be seen as process rather than product, as 
practices of connection and integration rather than as once and for all laying
2lbid: 65-66, A13-B27. 
3lbid:66,A13-B27.
5 'What here constitutes the object is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but 
the understanding that makes judgments about the nature of things, and even this 
understanding, again, only in regard to its a priori cognition1 (ibid: 65, A12-13/B26). 
Elsewhere Kant argues that '...often those who have a wealth of knowledge are least 
enlightened in the use of these capacities' (Kant, 'What is Orientation in Thinking', 
cited and translated in CWeill 1992: 300 from Ak. 8: 146-7). Thus rather than the 
sum of knowledge it is the system for realising the inexhaustible richness of 
experience through cognition that is important.
61
foundations'.6 The process referred to here is one that continues to respond 
to problems, including the founding problem of the architectonic, rather 
than seeking to solve them once and for all. Thus the relation of the 
synthetic and the a priori is always a problem because cognition deals with 
new sensations and needs to relate them to a priori concepts. However, we 
need to consider Kant's concern to set out the root concepts that make 
possible the open-ended process O'Neill refers to. For Kant we cannot be 
open to experience and extend cognition unless certain conditions of 
possibility make experience possible in the first place. We need to consider 
why, contrary to what O'Neill suggests, he understands the complete 
formulation of these conditions in the architectonic as the necessary 
foundation of all openness to experience. In other words, how is a complete 
Idea to ensure openness to experience in a meaningful sense?
How is the completeness of Kant's architectonic system to be secured 
without seeking to solve all problems and thus over-determine the cognition 
of possible experience? How can the inexhaustible and rich possibilities of 
the cognition of experience be realised? If we return to Kant's outline of the 
two senses of the architectonic, as propaedeutic and as organon, we will be 
able to see how he responds to this concern. In dividing these two senses 
Kant introduces a problem. If we ask why he does not seek to produce an 
organon right away, in the Critique of Pure Reason itself, he responds in the 
following way:
'First, this dissection of concepts would not serve our purpose; for it 
lacks that precariousness which we find in synthesis, [the 
precariousness] on account of which the whole critique is in fact 
there. Second, taking on the responsibility for the completeness of 
such an analysis and derivation (a responsibility from which we 
could, after all, have been exempted in view of our aim) would go 
against the unity of our plan'.7
The precariousness of synthesis is its difference from the a priori, it is the
1992: 292. 
7Kant 1996: 66, A14/B28, the addition in square brackets was made by the translator.
challenge presented by concrete synthesis to the completeness of a priori 
concepts and principles. It is something that must be responded to by the 
architectonic as propaedeutic before we can think about constructing a 
complete organon of the a priori principles of all cognition. Thus while the 
relation of synthetic and a priori gives us a 'complete idea'8 of the horizon of 
the activity of all cognition of possible experience this completeness has to 
be qualified in a crucial sense. The completeness of the architectonic goes 
together with the precariousness of the relation of the synthetic and the a 
priori. In the above quotation Kant refers to a 'unified plan'. We plan to 
respond to the precariousness of the relation of the synthetic and the a 
priori, and this plan takes the form of a system constructed by their 
relations. For Kant then it is not outside his architectonic that we find the 
challenge that ultimately characterises it and ensures that it makes cognition 
an ongoing process of responding to the problem of relating the synthetic 
and the a priori. It is to 'include' what challenges it rather than excluding 
this and then being undermined by what it has excluded. However, the 
notion that a system can include what challenges it does lead us to a serious 
criticism. If a challenge can be included within a system does it really 
challenge that system? Does it not need to be external to have a genuinely 
challenging role? In assessing Kant's arguments so far we've seen that he 
makes his account inclusive or internalising on the grounds that otherwise 
we fail to provide a transcendental argument. Without an inclusive and 
internal system experience would never make itself known to us but be 
undermined by something external. Therefore, any challenge must be 
included in the system and provide its internal dynamic or inner 
problematic. We will now consider whether Kant's inclusion of 
precariousness is convincing by seeing how this characterises his systematic
^Accordingly, the critique of pure reason [in a way] includes everything that makes up 
transcendental philosophy; it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy. But 
the critique is not yet that science itself, because it carries the analysis [of a priori 
concepts] only as far as is required for making a complete judgment about synthetic a 




We've seen that if we combine completeness and precariousness at the basis 
of Kant's architectonic, in the term 'problematic Idea', we can better 
understand how it unfolds without being rigid or inflexible. How does this 
division according to a problematic Idea actually take place in the text of 
the Critique of Pure Reason? If we remain in the final section of the second 
edition introduction to the text we find Kant declaring: 'If, then, the 
division of the science being set forth here is to be performed in terms of 
the general viewpoint of a system as such, then this science must contain in 
the first place a doctrine of elements, and in the second a doctrine of 
method, of pure reason'.9 This is the viewpoint of a system that relates the 
elements of an account of the cognition of possible experience. It relates 
the contributions of the different faculties of cognition in the Doctrine of 
Elements so that an account of the cognition of possible experience is 
formed first of all. Sensible intuition contributes sensible intuitions, 
understanding contributes pure concepts, imagination contributes schemata, 
judgement contributes principles and reason contributes Ideas. 10 At each 
stage we have a precarious and problematic Idea of the relation between the 
synthetic and the a priori at work in relating these elements. Over the 
course of the Critique of Pure Reason this forms a system for accounting 
for the cognition of possible experience. This system is to be complete 
insofar as it includes and responds to the precariousness or inner 
problematic in question. We see that the Doctrine of Method must appear 
only after the Doctrine of Elements has responded to the problem of the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. This is because it concerns 
itself with the cognition of possible experience that now has its foundation
9lbid:67,A15/B29.
10The notion that imagination is a faculty or power is in fact rejected by Kant in the 
second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1996: 191, B152). We will 
discuss this in chapter four of this thesis, which will be concerned with the 
imagination's power of schematism. However, in both editions of the text Kant refers 
to its role in mediating concepts and sensible intuitions through schematism.
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in the account of synthetic a priori cognition secured in the Doctrine of 
Elements. It must reflect the unity of the a priori and the synthetic at the 
basis of all cognition. Kant's projected division of the text continues when 
he writes that in the Doctrine of Elements sensation comes before the 
understanding as a source of the unity of the synthetic and the a priori. The 
a priori emerges in sensation first because objects of cognition are given to 
us before they are thought. 11 We encounter the a priori in the syntheses 
exhibited by mathematics before we can consider the role of a priori 
concepts of the understanding by reflecting on such things as the order of 
events in experience. Thus the Transcendental Aesthetic comes before the 
Transcendental Analytic in the Doctrine of Elements because of the order of 
our encounters with the a priori. Kant goes no further in his sketch of the 
division of the text but he has provided the dynamic. This is the response of 
this organisation to a problematic Idea of the unity of the synthetic and the a 
priori at different stages of the account he is giving.
We can see that this unfolding has its reasons within Kant's architectonic, in 
the problematic Idea it raises. However, we must continue to confront 
important questions that arise about any account that is internalising and 
inclusive, that is complete in the sense we've defined this term. The 
architectonic must provide us with reasons for its internal focus. For Kant 
the synthetic and the a priori are not unproblematically related but related in 
a way that needs to be accounted for through a well-presented argument. 
This means that, in the presentation of the Critique of Pure Reason, we first 
show where they are exhibited together, in the mathematical truths 
considered in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This part of the text is divided 
from the rest in order to be clarified and to convince us of the relation of the 
synthetic and the a priori through an isolation argument. As we saw in the
1 !'And since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given 
to us precede the conditions under which these objects are thought, the transcendental 
doctrine of sense would have to belong to \hefirst part of the science of elements' 
(ibid:68,A16/B30).
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previous chapter of this thesis, the work of mathematics allows Kant to 
isolate certain a priori ingredients of cognition. The work done by the 
Transcendental Aesthetic can then support a transcendental argument that 
begins in the Metaphysical Deduction of the Transcendental Analytic. Here 
the abstract use of the understanding in General Logic does not exhibit any 
connection with concrete experience. However, the need to relate it to the 
concrete is supported by the unity of the synthetic and the a priori as 
exhibited in the Transcendental Aesthetic and founded upon the 
problematic Idea represented by synthetic a priori judgement in the 
introduction to the text. The abstract a priori is isolated from the concrete 
synthetic in General Logic and this is a problem because Kant is 
investigating the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. He needs to account for their closer relations as these have 
already been exhibited in the Transcendental Aesthetic but now must be 
secured using a different type of argument in an account of possible 
experience as such. It also follows that the schematism chapter of the 
Transcendental Analytic, which is concerned with involving the abstract 
directly in the concrete work of synthesis, must come later. Only in this 
way can it respond to this problematic without pre-empting the earlier 
stages of the argument that seek to justify the conclusion that the a priori is 
at least relevant to the synthetic. Kant seeks in this way to clarify the 
different stages of his account, to divide them in a way that convinces us 
that the a priori needs to be related to the synthetic in order to account for 
possible experience. However, while this allows us to make sense of Kant's 
division of the text it still does not allow us to fully understand the basis 
upon which it proceeds. How is a problematic Idea the basis of the 
construction of a system for accounting for the cognition of possible 
experience?
We need to understand how the division of the stages of the Critique of 
Pure Reason is convincing precisely because it is systematic and based
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upon a problematic Idea. If this Idea unifies and organises an account of 
cognition then for Kant it does this systematically. If it did not do this it 
would not be clear and convincing, it would not be a process in which we 
could have absolute confidence because it is a priori rather than a posteriori. 
Kant therefore begins his chapter on the architectonic in the Doctrine of 
Method by declaring: 'By an architectonic I mean the art of systems1 . 12 As 
we've seen, the Critique of Pure Reason can be read and understood as 
Kant's attempt to construct a system for accounting for the cognition of 
possible experience that unfolds through the relations of the synthetic and 
the a priori at different stages of this account. The system constructed here 
is for Kant a condition of possibility for the cognition of possible 
experience as such. It is a propaedeutic that makes explicit the whole set of 
root concepts always already at work in its synthesis. Thus if cause and 
effect is part of this system, one of the root concepts it formulates, it must 
play a systematic part in making the cognition of experience possible. It 
does this only as one root concept amongst a system of root concepts. It is 
a condition of possibility but only as a part of a whole system. Thus, as 
Kant puts it, it is part of an architectonic unity rather than a technical unity 
that responds to problems as they arise in the course of experience. 13 Thus
12Ibid: 755, A832/B860. Robert S. Hartmann and Wolfgang Schwarz argue that the 
Doctrine of Method must be used to understand the Critique of Pure Reason as a 
whole: Tew scholars have bothered to take part Two seriously, even though it 
represents the methodology within which the elements of pure reason have their 
place. It is, so to speak, the meta-critique explaining the purpose of the Critique and 
the terms it uses' (Hartman and Schwarz 1988: xv). While it presupposes the 
systematic account of experience given in the Doctrine of Elements, the Doctrine of 
Method presents the method at work in this account. The Elements are related in a 
system and the Method tells us about the construction of systems or architectonics. In 
the Method we find a chapter defining the architectonic as both propaedeutic and 
organon.
13 'A schema that is drawn up not in accordance with an idea - i.e., on the basis of 
reason's main purpose - but empirically, in accordance with aims that offer 
themselves contingently (whose number we cannot know in advance), yields 
technical unity. But a schema that arises only in conformity with an idea (where 
reason imposes the purposes a priori and does not await them empirically) is the basis 
for architectonic unity' (ibid: 756, A833/B861). Kant here speaks of the schema of an 
Idea that is required for it to be realised in the cognition of possible experience. We 
will consider Kant's doctrine of schematism in chapter four of this thesis although we
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if we had a concept of cause and effect but no concept of substance then for 
Kant we would not have experience at all because we could not keep hold 
of an unchanging substance which would form part of a chain of cause and 
effect. We could not construct a technical unity of root concepts that 
responded to problems that arise in experience because without the whole 
system of root concepts experience as such would not be possible. Thus an 
architectonic unity or system focuses upon making experience possible and 
for Kant this means that it responds to its own inner problematic or 
problematic Idea. If it looked outside to what is given in experience it 
would presuppose what it was to account for and form a technical unity or 
aggregate of responses to problems that arise in the course of experience. 
This allows us to better understand the role of a system as a condition of 
possibility for experience and how for Kant problematic Ideas are 
distinguished from contingent problems that arise in the course of 
experience.
We see that Kant seeks not merely a more convenient or more effective way 
of responding dynamically to the problematic Idea but the only way of 
doing so if we are to provide an account of the cognition of possible 
experience. We remember that transcendental arguments are to be 
indispensable and the system Kant proposes in the Critique of Pure Reason 
is to form such an argument. This helps Kant to respond to a critical 
question that now arises. Can we really walk confidently on solid ground 
when we proceed on the basis Kant proposes? In the remainder of this 
section we will consider how his art of constructing systems seems to lack
will there be concerned with the realisation of understanding's concepts in the 
synthesis of possible experience. However, with the schema of an Idea we are still 
realising something abstract in the concrete. We are translating the abstract into 
something involved in the ongoing cognition of experience because an Idea is 
realised in a system that make the cognition of experience possible. Kant here refers 
to the concrete as an 'essential manifoldness' that can only be realised on the basis of 
an Idea. Without an Idea providing the plan for a system where abstract and concrete 
are related through the work of the faculties of cognition there would be no mediation 
or schematism of abstract Idea and concrete sensation.
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any grounding given that it is focused upon its own unfolding, upon its own 
internal problematic. Kant is concerned to show that we cannot know the 
basis of our systematic activity and this means that we do not stand upon 
the 'solid ground' offered by something already known or given in 
experience. There is nothing known or knowable to support our 
construction of a system. However, for Kant we nevertheless proceed to 
treat nature as something that can be systematically unified. We 'walk on 
solid ground' and don't need to always worry that our system of a priori 
concepts and principles will be undermined or might not actually 
correspond to 'reality'. His overall transcendental argument in the Critique 
of Pure Reason is that experience is only possible if it proceeds within the 
framework of a system. This system must be unfolded on the basis of the 
problematic Idea we have been concerned with. It must be the only 
possible system for accounting for the cognition of experience because 
otherwise we would always be unsure about whether it has any contact with 
reality. If it left anything out or left open the possibility of other methods 
for securing possible experience then it would not provide the solid ground 
that is needed for cognition to be re-founded. For Kant, our construction of 
systems would be plagued by uncertainty if it were not focused solely upon 
its own unfolding. We must consider whether, as a result of this focus, his 
construction of systems loses touch with the concrete reality it must secure 
and account for. Does his abstract system float free of reality, of the 
concrete pole of our cognition of possible experience?
We've raised the question of the 'solid ground' walked upon by the 
architectonic in its construction of systems. If we are constructing an a 
priori system we must reflect the completeness, universality and necessity 
of the a priori in how we proceed. Therefore, Kant's art of constructing 
systems must be characterised by certainty and confidence rather than
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experimentation or doubt. 14 However, this system must be internally 
grounded, through the relations of its parts, rather than referring to a ground 
external to itself. How does Kant respond to the problem of grounding his 
systematic account? He rejects certain possible grounds for his construction 
of a system as being external to his account. These are things we need to 
account for rather than presuppose. In a paper entitled 'Projecting the Order 
of Nature1 Philip Kitcher explains Kant's approach by considering two 
alternative ways of ordering experience that are rejected. One is realist and 
the other is pragmatist. The realist alternative is a system that seeks to 
recapitulate the order of nature itself. 15 It provides the principles that 
structure nature and this allows us to derive laws of nature, the laws of 
objective natural necessity. This, Kitcher argues, is an Aristotelian concern 
with the 'order of being' rather than with the 'order of thought'. 16 This is 
precisely the 'solid ground' or basis in reality that Kant seems to be lacking 
when he focuses upon an internal problematic to the exclusion of anything 
external.
The other alternative, associated with pragmatism, concerns itself with an 
'order of thought', with how we think about nature. It seeks the best or most 
pragmatic way of thinking about reality rather than seeking to grasp the 
order of a reality independent of our thought. This pragmatist alternative 
would lead us to understand the architectonic as providing '...a manual for 
anticipating experience. It is full of useful information about general 
regularities involving familiar characteristics of familiar things'. 17 The 
pragmatic aim is to make anticipating future experience as easy and reliable
14 We saw in the previous chapter of this thesis that Diane Morgan sees the Critique of 
Pure Reason and Kant's critical writings as a whole as engaging in a process of 
experimental construction (see pages 24-28 of chapter one of this thesis). However, 
as a transcendental argument the architectonic must present a system that makes 
experience possible once and for all, thus making experimentation within experience 





as possible by considering how we deal with experience, how we 
systematise our thought. This establishes a seemingly inescapable 
dichotomy between an objective 'order of being' and a subjective 'order of 
thought'. Whilst the pragmatic alternative sounds closer to Kant's approach 
Kitcher argues that neither fit Kant's project of re-founding and re- 
organising the cognition of experience on the basis of its conditions of 
possibility. Instead a middle way is followed in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Kitcher argues that: 'Central to Kant's thinking about science is his 
conception of inquiry as guided by principles that enjoin us to introduce a 
certain kind of order into our beliefs'. 18 This has to be distinguished from 
the pragmatic alternative. What distinguishes it is the idea that we are 
'enjoined' to introduce order into our beliefs. This ordering is necessary as 
part of a system for all cognition of experience rather than being in any way 
provisional or open to revision. Thus cause and effect is a concept and 
principle within a system that holds for all cognition, it enjoins us to order 
our beliefs so that they form valid arguments as part of a greater whole. We 
are thus enjoined by a system whose necessity and completeness grounds 
the valid arguments we make about such things as the role of cause and 
effect in situations where a certain order of events is observed.
For Kant we cannot rely upon a reality external to an account of synthetic a 
priori cognition but we also cannot rely upon a subjective order of thought 
if we want to include the objective side of experience in our account. 19 As
l*Ibid:221.
19Onora O'Neill implies a degree of pragmatism in Kant's construction of systems: 'If 
we view principles of reason as precepts for the conduct of thinking, acting, and their 
coherent connection, hence as ways of achieving an active grasp rather than a passive 
response to the manifold of life, then although we will never regain the height that 
rationalist concepts of reason claimed to conquer, we can unite a wide range of our 
experience and actions without lapsing into contradiction' (O'Neill 1992: 287). This 
is something we can agree with insofar as nothing given in experience is the 
foundation of the systematic activity of the architectonic. However, while such 
external and 'knowable' starting points are rejected, a problematic Idea, something 
unknown, is the foundation of the activity of the architectonic in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. For Kant then we must not embrace pragmatism just because we cannot
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Kant puts it in the Critique of Pure Reason's Appendix to the Ideal of Pure 
Reason:
The unity of reason is the unity of a system and this systematic unity 
serves reason not objectively, as a principle for extending reason over 
objects, but subjectively, as a maxim for extending reason over all 
possible empirical cognition of objects. Nevertheless, the systematic 
coherence that reason can give to the understanding's empirical use 
not only furthers the extension of this use, but at the same time 
verifies the correctness thereof. And thus the principle of such a 
systematic unity is also objective, but in an indeterminate way [...]. 
I.e., it is objective not as a constitutive principle for determining 
something in regard to its direct object, but as a merely regulative 
principle and maxim for furthering and solidifying ad infinitum 
(indefiniturri) reason's empirical use - viz., by opening up new paths 
unknown to the understanding, while yet never going in the least 
against the laws of this empirical use'.20
Kant is re-defining subjectivity and objectivity. He seeks to avoid the 
dichotomy of a subjective 'order of thought' and an objective 'order of 
being'. As we saw in the previous chapter of this thesis, subjectivity and 
objectivity are assigned their places and roles, and defined as such, by the 
architectonic method. For Kant they must not precede the work of this 
method and show us how it is to be understood. It is not then a question of 
an alternative between what is 'in us' and what is 'in the world' because 
these locations have not been assigned by an account of the cognition of 
possible experience as such. In the passage quoted above we see that the 
architectonic is to secure an account of objective experience but without 
over-determining it. The objectivity secured by this system is qualified 
because it does not constitute the objective outcomes of cognition, it does 
not tell us what objects we will come across, but makes possible the 
inclusion of these outcomes in experience. The system is therefore
have knowledge of the foundations of our thought. Instead the ground of system 
building and the reality we seek to keep in touch with must both be secured by the 
account of experience being presented. We will return to the problem of 'keeping in 
touch with reality' in the conclusion to this thesis where the contemporary debate over 
transcendental arguments will be explored and responded to on the basis of the 
reading of the Critique of Pure Reason we are developing. 
20Kant 1996: 645-646, A680/B708.
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objective 'in an indeterminate way'. This follows from the need for the 
architectonic to be inclusive but without over-determining the outcomes of 
cognition, something that would make its concepts and principles 
'constitutive'. The system is to make it possible to convert subjective beliefs 
into objective knowledge but not determine the objects thus secured beyond 
the conditions of their possibility. Thus Kitcher writes: 'This distinction 
[between belief and knowledge] is to emerge from our efforts to 
systematize our beliefs in accordance with the principle of unification. 
Certain claims come to be regarded as lawlike because they play a 
particular role in the systematization of belief.21 We can therefore use 
cause and effect to solidify beliefs into knowledge because this concept is 
one that makes experience possible as part of a system of such concepts. If 
we want to ground the system we are constructing, and ensure that it is 'in 
touch with reality', we must build a system out of a priori elements, out of 
conditions of the possibility of experience as such. For Kant this accounts 
for and includes the subjective and the objective rather than being on the 
side of one or the other.
We've seen that Kant's architectonic seeks to formulate only the conditions 
of possibility for the cognition of experience but not the outcomes of this 
cognition. It seeks a priori concepts which are the root concepts of 
cognition rather than empirical concepts that embody the outcomes and 
achievements of cognition. In this way Kant seeks to open experience to 
cognition on the basis of certain necessary conditions. Thus he considers 
how we are enjoined to systematise our experience in certain necessary 
ways when we pursue the rich and inexhaustible work of empirical 
cognition. In the next section of this chapter we will consider how these 
methodological concerns provide a link to Deleuze's account of experience 
despite their many differences.
2lKitcher 1998: 236.
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ii. Ideas and Concrete Cases in Deleuze's Difference and Repetition
We have so far focused upon the unifying method that Kant employs in the 
Critique of Pure Reason and postponed any consideration of his relation to 
Deleuze in order to pursue this. In the introduction to this thesis we argued 
that, rather than looking at the particular concepts they employ, we should 
consider the overall method behind their accounts of experience. We may 
explore this by turning to their respective notions of'critique'. This refers to 
a genuinely critical account of experience insofar as it avoids assuming 
what is to be accounted for. It subjects all potential elements of its account 
to a critique that prevents anything given in experience from being 
presupposed. As we've seen, the architectonic of Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason is intended as just such an account. Critique must embody certain 
criteria that unify thought by ensuring that it is genuinely and consistently 
critical in its account of experience. However, lan Mackenzie represents 
Deleuze's view of Kant's critique in the following terms: 'In Kant, reason 
transcends critique such that both the totality and immanence of critique 
itself are unrealizable'.22 In other words, if certain ends of critique, such as 
the ends of reason, are not subject to critique like everything else we do not 
have a total critique or one to which everything is immanent. These ends 
are transcendent because they rise above the critical interrogation to which 
all potential elements of an account of experience must be subject. We 
have used the terms 'internal' and 'inclusive' to characterise Kant's 
architectonic and these have a great deal in common with the terms 'total1 
and 'immanent'. A total account leaves nothing out, it leaves nothing 
uncriticised. It is immanent because it draws upon the internal relations of 
its parts rather than relying upon anything transcendent or external when it 
gives its account. Deleuze emphasises the potentially destructive nature of 
critique because, if we are to have a genuinely internal or immanent focus, 
the external or transcendent must not get in the way. The ground must be
22Mackenzie 2004: 20, in italics in the original.
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cleared so that our account is a critical one.23 Kant and Deleuze therefore 
have similar concerns but Deleuze proceeds to accuse Kant, as Mackenzie 
suggests, of failing to live up to his own standards.
We find that Deleuze shares Kant's concern with the transcendental and the 
critical standards it embodies but seeks to go further: 'The transcendent is 
not the transcendental. Were it not for consciousness, the transcendental 
field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes all 
transcendence of the subject and of the object. Absolute immanence is in 
itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an object 
or belong to a subject'.24 For Deleuze we need to account for the subject 
and the object, to understand them as being produced at the same time or 
immanently. One does not come before the other and they both emerge 
through an account of experience rather than preceding this account. This 
is the sense in which for Deleuze critique is totalising and inclusive. The 
subject and the object must not transcend our account and be imposed upon 
it from the outside. He argues that to realise Kant's critique, to make it total 
and immanent, we must be so rigorous that there is no uncriticised 
remainder. Insofar as Kant preserves anything of the subject and object of 
knowledge we are familiar with, in the concepts he makes a priori, he has 
failed to live up to the standards of critique. Deleuze accuses him of 
'redoubling1 the empirical when he preserves ends of reason which are in 
fact always given in experience.25 Reason seeks to understand the subject
23Deleuze argues that Friedrich Nietzsche goes beyond Kant in pursuing an immanent 
and total critique, and that this necessarily culminates in destruction: 'Critique is 
destruction as joy, the aggression of the creator. The creator of values cannot be 
distinguished from a destroyer, from a criminal or from a critic: a critic of established 
values, reactive values and baseness1 (Deleuze 1983: 87).
24Deleuze 2001:26.
25Ibid: 27. In Nietzsche and Philosophy Deleuze writes that: 'We require a genesis of 
reason itself, and also a genesis of the understanding and its categories: what are the 
forces of reason and of the understanding?' (Deleuze 1983: 91). This echoes the form 
of argument Kant called transcendental deliberation and that has more recently been 
defined as an isolation argument, something we explored in the fourth part of the 
previous chapter of this thesis. In that case Kant sought to isolate the forces of
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and the object in certain ways but for Deleuze these ends of reason always 
have an empirical origin. We must therefore move away from Kant's 
attempt to preserve the objects and subjects reason recognises, we must 
abandon this understanding of experience in order to account for it fully.26
This negative assessment of Kant is balanced somewhat by Deleuze's 
positive references to the notion of problematic Ideas he finds in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. These are both transcendent and immanent.27 
Insofar as they refer to a regulative triumvirate of self, world and God they 
are transcendent. However, insofar as they refer to a certain methodology 
they are immanent and embody values that Deleuze shares. We will now 
seek to explain this distinction. Kant's Ideas regulate our cognition by 
leading us to proceed 'as if there is a self, a world and a God. These are the 
transcendent ends of reason, giving us an Idea of what the subject and 
object must be like. They are not in fact objects of our cognition, they are 
unknowable like all problematic Ideas, but we must proceed 'as if they do 
exist in order to coherently relate the objects we do cognise. They form 
part of Kant's method for systematically unifying experience so that, for 
example, we see the self as a simple and unified thing. We proceed as if a 
subject or 'thinker' thinks the thoughts we encounter in inner experience just
different faculties and their a priori contributions to a certain cognitive achievement. 
For Deleuze this process needs to be extended so that we account for the force of the 
contributions of reason and understanding themselves. As we saw, for Kant there is 
no force external to the architectonic and to the faculties of cognition that it relates in 
the course of accounting for experience. Therefore, he would not recognise Deleuze's 
concern to account for the forces of reason and understanding. As we saw in the 
introduction to this thesis, Deleuze seeks to account for the intelligible through the 
sensible. This is something we will shortly explore further.
26'Three ideals are distinguished: what can I know? what should I do? what can I hope 
for? Limits are drawn to each one, misuses and trespasses are denounced, but the 
uncritical character of each ideal remains at the heart of Kantianism like the worm in 
the fruit: true knowledge, true morality and true religion' (Deleuze 1983: 89-90). 
Deleuze here refers to the second chapter of the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of 
Pure Reason where Kant poses these three questions (Kant 1996: 735, A805/B833). 
He argues that experience is ultimately determined, or rather over-determined, by the 
ends of reason with which Kant answers these questions.
27Smith 2006: 48. We will turn to Daniel W. Smith's understanding of the role of Ideas 
in Kant and Deleuze later in this section.
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as an object causes events we encounter in outer experience. However, 
only in the latter case do we actually cognise the object referred to. This 
returns us to Kant's concern with constructing systems but gives more 
personality to the problematic Ideas that guide systematic cognition. If we 
understand the self as the thinker of the thoughts we encounter in inner 
experience this makes experience more coherent or systematic but this does 
not mean that we actually cognise this thinking subject.28 However, we've 
seen that Deleuze does not want critique to preserve a subject and an object 
because it should 'not depend on an object or belong to a subject1 . We will 
seek to develop Deleuze's relation to the immanent and methodological role 
of Ideas in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason despite their disagreement over 
the ends these Ideas embody. In chapter four of Deleuze's 1968 work 
Difference and Repetition we find a theory of problematic Ideas whose 
lineage is broad and varied. Readings of this chapter explore and 
emphasise the very different influences that shaped it.29 We argued in the
28Kant 1996: 647, A682-3/B710-11. We will give a fuller consideration of this passage 
later in this section.
29If we ask who has priority or most influence on Deleuze's theory of Ideas among the 
many names mentioned in chapter four of Difference and Repetition we will find 
many answers in the secondary literature. Paul Patton argues that Deleuze 
'...develops his own concept of Ideas which owes as much to Leibniz and 
contemporary structuralism as it does to Kant or Plato' (Patton 1994: xii). The field is 
widened considerably by Christian Kerslake when he locates Deleuze's theory of 
Ideas within a 'Kantian-Jungian synthesis' of Difference and Repetition (Kerslake 
2007: 70). For Ronald Bogue the main inspiration is the mathematician and 
philosopher Albert Lautman (Bogue 1989: 59) and this reflects Deleuze's concern 
with the theorists of differential calculus. Alongside Kant differential calculus would 
seem to have the biggest claim to being the major influence on Deleuze's account of 
Ideas. He draws upon it in order to incarnate Ideas in sensation. It is understood as a 
way of thinking the genesis of the intelligible in the sensible. The abstract must come 
to embody the detail and diversity of the concrete by being incarnated and realised 
within it. This case is strengthened by Deleuze's conclusion that'... Kant held fast to 
the point of view of conditioning without attaining that of genesis' (Deleuze 1994: 
170). The genesis of the intelligible in the sensible is what differential calculus 
provides and thus takes us beyond what Kant has to offer in his theory of Ideas.
In chapter six of this thesis we will explore the dramatisation of the intelligible in the 
sensible and how this provides an account of individuation. We will draw upon 
Kantian resources rather than those of differential calculus. However, it is important 
to note that differential calculus is for Deleuze a means of thinking what Morris Kline 
has called 'the pervasiveness of change' (Kline 1981: 363). Kline adds that' the
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introduction to this thesis that if we merely ask where Kant's influence ends 
and base our inquiry on this type of question we cannot gauge the scope of 
his relations to Deleuze. Our focus will not be upon how Deleuze selects 
from Kant's work and then moves away from Kant to the various other 
influences that shape the fourth chapter of Difference and Repetition. 
Instead we will consider how his interest in Kantian Ideas expresses a 
broader relation and a common ground when it comes to the methods that 
unify thought. Their shared methodological concerns are a unifying theme 
rather than limiting their relations to particular concepts or aspects of their 
respective accounts of experience.30
problem which scientists since the seventeenth century have faced is not just that of 
treating instantaneous speed and acceleration but also instantaneous rates of change 
offerees, intensities of light and sound, energies, and hundreds of other instantaneous 
rates of change' (ibid: 366). We need to account for the 'physical meaningfulness' 
(ibid) of these instantaneous changes. They are real and concrete despite our inability 
to formulate them in the abstract. They produce measurable changes which are of 
great practical use but elude rigorous analysis. This very concrete differentiation of 
experience effected by sensation accounts for abstract and measurable quantities. In 
what sense is an instantaneous rate of change too concrete to be formulated in abstract 
terms? If we take an object travelling through space and time we might want to 
measure the speed it is travelling at a particular instant. We seek its speed at an 
instant rather than its average speed over the period of time in which it is travelling. 
However, at any particular instant no distance is actually travelled. The dilemma is, 
as Klein puts it, that '[p]hysically we have every reason to believe that there is such a 
thing as an instantaneous speed; yet we cannot define and calculate it mathematically' 
(ibid: 365). Does this mean that differential calculus is of no use? In fact it is 
extremely useful because it allows us to calculate the average speed of a body in 
motion despite our inability to calculate its instantaneous speed. Therefore, we seem 
to secure an abstract measurement through a process occuring in sensation that is not 
open to abstract formulation. We know the average speed of something whose 
instantaneous speed remains unintelligible. This very brief consideration of 
differential calculus makes it plain that the debate over the priority to be assigned to 
the different influences on Deleuze's theory of Ideas is wide ranging and would 
demand a lengthy investigation. Our concern is not to settle this question but to 
consider the nature of Kant's relation to Deleuze more widely. The overall method of 
Kant's thought in the Critique of Pure Reason has been our focus so far and we will 
avoid limiting our consideration of his relation to Deleuze by focusing upon the parts 
that Deleuze selects from Kant's thought.
30Christian Kerslake develops such an approach when he writes that: 'I don't want to 
suggest that everything important in Deleuze comes back to Kant - but I do think that 
none of his explorations of other philosophers (Spinoza, Hume, Leibniz, Bergson) is 
comprehensible without a framework of Kantian and post-Kantian questions' 
(Kerslake 2002: 33, n4). If we consider Kant's account as a whole, how it is unified 
by setting problems and arguing in certain way, this will enable us to locate a Kantian 
methodological framework that is shared by Deleuze.
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We've seen that for Kant a problematic Idea at the basis of the architectonic 
must embody both the abstract and the concrete. If we consider Deleuze's 
account of experience we find that he first of all emphasises the concrete. 
In the introduction to this thesis we noted that some commentators 
understand his project in Difference and Repetition as a version of the 
Critique of Pure Reason. He re-writes Kant's text by folding the intelligible 
into the sensible or the Transcendental Dialectic into the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. This does echo Kant's concern with synthesis, with how the 
abstract is related to, and realised through, its relation to the concrete. 
However, Deleuze criticises Kant for failing to account for the intelligible 
through its relation to concrete synthesis. Instead of securing the abstract 
and then relating it to the concrete he wants to start by paying closer 
attention to the concrete and see what this produces. This seems to put the 
methods of these two thinkers at odds, suggesting that for Deleuze Ideas are 
realised in concrete cases while for Kant, as we saw, an Idea is realised in a 
system for accounting for all cases of experience as such. Jean-Clet Martin 
develops Deleuze's concern with the concrete when he writes: To have 
difficulty, or rather to be in difficulty, is the position of philosophy mired 
up to its neck in the detail of the concrete'.31 Thus, rather than securing an 
ability to deal with concrete particularities in certain abstract and a priori 
ways, Deleuze is concerned with how we are put 'in difficulty' by the 
concrete. He is concerned with how we are overwhelmed and amazed by it, 
with how we are made idiotic by the failure of abstract abilities and forms 
of unity.32 Martin argues that Deleuze replaces a concern with how the
31 Martin 1999: 241.ATxCLL m.1 A .^^ .7 ^   ^*^T X  
32Deleuze locates the figure of the idiot in moments when we think about experience 
without presupposing what 'everybody knows' about experience, when we learn mon 
from experience because we think about it without such presuppositions: The 
philosopher takes the side of the idiot as though of a man without presuppositions' 
(Deleuze 1994: 130); 'Someone who neither allows himself to be represented nor 
wishes to represent anything. Not an individual endowed with good will and a 
natural capacity for thought, but an individual full of ill will who does not manage to 
think, either naturally or conceptually. Only such an individual is without
abstract is secured and then applied to the concrete with a concern with how 
the concrete produces its own forms of unity.33 Thus conceptual forms of 
possibility do not precede and make intelligible what we encounter in 
sensation. The concrete and its ability to make things unintelligible must be 
able to account for the abstract and intelligible forms of unity we recognise. 
Moments when we are put 'in difficulty1 are therefore more instructive and 
significant for an account of experience than moments when we find 
sensation intelligible. In this way Deleuze seeks to account for experience 
in its abstract forms by relating them to something they don't resemble, to 
moments when the abstract fails to grasp the concrete.
This concern to learn from the concrete leads Deleuze to argue that: 'It is 
the excess in the Idea which explains the lack in the concept'.34 In other 
words, insofar as Ideas are incarnated and realised in concrete sensation 
they exceed concepts that we seek to apply to concrete cases. They show us 
a different form of the abstract, one richer than conceptual forms of 
possibility because it actually emerges through the concrete. At this point 
we must note that Deleuze is not suggesting that we acquire Ideas from 
what is given in experience. As we've noted, he agrees with Kant in this 
respect and is particularly concerned that this would lead us to focus 
wrongly on what is familiar and recognisable in experience. If we confined 
ourselves to what is given in experience we would focus upon patterns of 
resemblance rather than upon unintelligible and unrecognisable moments 
that produce new patterns or forms of unity.35 If we stick to what is
presuppositions. [...] At the risk of playing the idiot, do so in the Russian manner: 
that of an underground man who recognises himself no more in the subjective 
presuppositions of a natural capacity for thought than in the objective presuppositions 




35As Todd May puts it, Deleuze seeks '...concepts through which the world becomes 
strange to us again, through which borders between things become porous and their 
identities fluid' (May 2005: 72-73).
80
familiar and recognisable then for Deleuze we do not learn about how 
experience is produced and we are not able to account for it. Instead we 
must be open to the unintelligible work of concrete synthesis but, unlike in 
Kant, this work of synthesis exceeds the grasp of concepts. This at once 
echoes and strongly differs from Kant's account. Deleuze wants to include 
what exceeds concepts while for Kant the coherence and continuity of a 
priori concepts in a system makes experience possible. However, Deleuze 
echoes Kant's concern that we do not rely upon what is given in experience 
in order to account for it. This shows how similar these two thinkers are 
when it comes to the methods by which they account for experience but 
also Deleuze's concern that Kant didn't go far enough in his critique.
The methodology that is associated with problematic Ideas in Deleuze's 
account of experience must be explored further if we are to develop the 
common ground he shares with Kant. If a problem were destined to be 
erased by its solution then, as Christian Kerslake notes, a problem would be 
a very general thing.36 Anything could be a problem because all it would 
have to do is elude cognition for some period of time. However, the 
problem Kant and Deleuze are concerned with is not simply lacking a 
solution. It is something that gives rise to different solutions which never 
erase the problem but do show us how productive it can be. We can 
illustrate this by considering the distinction between the problem of finding 
an object and the problem of learning more about an object. In the former 
case we erase the problem when we find the object while in the latter case 
we have an open-ended process of providing different solutions to the 
problem. Another way of putting this is to say that the former object is 
determined in advance, we know what it is and will recognise it when we 
find it, but the latter object is undetermined by its very nature. As the 
undetermined object of a problematic Idea it gives rise to different 
solutions. It is the unifying theme of these solutions, the theme that leads us
36Kerslake 2007: 98.
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to continue to explore concrete cases. Thus, for example, if our object is a 
particular zebra we would be able to erase the problem given sufficient time 
and resources. It is a determinate object that we can find and recognise, 
thus solving the first type of problem. However, if we are engaging with 
the second type of problem we would never exhaust the solutions to the 
problem of the zebra. To learn about this animal or about animal life in 
general is potentially a lifetime's work. It is potentially the unifying and 
inexhaustible theme of a life. Deleuze shows how the two kinds of 
problems are related when writing about Kant's theory of problematic Ideas: 
'In effect, the undetermined object, or object as it exists in the Idea, allows 
us to represent other objects (those of experience) which it endows with a 
maximum of systematic unity'. 37 In other words, the problems that are 
erased by their solutions occur within the context of problems that are never 
erased but which can organise and sustain a whole life of activity. Thus we 
may discover a determinate object, the zebra, but as part of a life unified by 
a problem that has no determinate object, such as the life of the zoologist. 
Deleuze's reading reflects the way in which, for Kant, Ideas must assist 
understanding's cognition of objects; they must be the basis for a systematic 
investigation into concrete cases. Thus, interacting with a zebra, observing 
it or reading books about its way of life are concrete cases but they form 
part of an abstract system for responding to an inexhaustible problem or 
problematic Idea. Deleuze's appreciation of this methodological role of 
Ideas in Kant's account shows us how we may relate them more closely. 
Let's see if their divergent accounts of experience can be drawn together if 
we focus upon the methods that unify them.
Deleuze refers to Veal experience' as the object of his account in contrast to 
Kant's concern to account for 'possible experience'.38 Instead of conceptual
3 ?Deleuze 1994: 169.
38In his Foucault book Deleuze contrasts Kant and Foucault in the following way: '... 
Foucault differs in certain fundamental respects from Kant: the conditions are those 
of real experience (statements, for example, assume a limited corpus); they are on the
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forms of possibility mediating the relation of the sensible and the 
intelligible, the intelligible is to be directly incarnated and realised in the 
sensible. Hence the importance of unintelligible moments in the synthesis 
of sensations. These are moments when a problem forces us to look for 
solutions that extend Ideas by engaging more closely with the concrete. 
Thus, in the example we gave, we engage with the ways in which an animal 
occupies space and time rather than considering the possible ways in which 
such an object could occupy space and time given the concepts we possess. 
We do not begin by considering how experience can be made intelligible 
but learn from how it becomes unintelligible. This leads Daniel W. Smith 
to argue that '...whereas Kantian Ideas are unifying, totalising and 
conditioning (transcendent Ideas), for Deleuze they will become multiple, 
differential, and genetic (immanent Ideas)'.39 The mediation and 
conditioning provided by concepts in Kant's account distances him from 
Deleuze. Smith points to the 'multiple, differential, and genetic' nature of 
Ideas that are incarnated in the sensible. To follow an Idea in sensation is to 
follow the differentiation of an Idea in and across concrete cases. For 
Deleuze this is what constitutes and unifies real experience. A way of 
understanding this is to say that an Idea is a common theme of different 
concrete situations. It is the object we study across different cases but is an 
undetermined object, one that produces different things in sensation rather 
than producing resemblance or uniformity. It does not tell us what concrete 
situations will be like, or what is possible in sensation, but is realised in the
side of the "object" and historical formation, not a universal subject (the a priori itself 
is historical); all are forms of exteriority' (Deleuze 1988: 60). We see Deleuze 
contrasting Kant to a thinker who emphasises real rather than possible experience and 
does this on the basis of an a priori that is not internal or located in the subject but 
external and historical. This means that experience can be extended through its real 
relations, through Ideas incarnated in sensation, rather than on the basis of subjective 
conditions of possibility that are imposed upon it. Like other readers of Kant that 
we've so far encountered Deleuze argues that Kant's account has 'subjective origins' 
(see pages 35-37 and footnote 39 of chapter one of this thesis). This is something we 
will challenge in this thesis as well as seeking to locate their common ground in the 
methods they employ in accounting for experience. 
39Smith 2006: 48.
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differences that emerge. We have a differentiating theme or Idea but one 
that is differentiated and extended by sensation itself. We can explain this 
further by considering Deleuze's exploration of biological Ideas in 
Difference and Repetition. He is not talking about the identity of 'the 
biological' as some kind of classificatory category abstracted from 
experience.40 'The biological' is a theme of different concrete situations, 
one that is realised in the emergence of different cases in sensation. Human 
beings and zebras are different cases of 'the biological' and it is through 
their common Idea that they are both unified and differentiated. In this way 
we find that Deleuze develops Kantian Ideas so that they can be realised in 
sensation and in the way we engage with experience without concepts 
playing a mediating role.
A further difference between the two accounts must also be registered. For 
Deleuze there are as many varieties of Ideas as can be realised in the 
synthesis of sensation. Thus, if sensation produces biological differences 
between animals it incarnates biological Ideas. It is the variety that the 
concrete presents us with that dictates the variety of Ideas. Likewise, social 
differences are to be seen as the realisation of social Ideas.41 They imply a
40Deleuze finds a means of understanding biological Ideas in the science of genetics. In 
the following passage he uses this to explore the incarnation of biological Ideas in 
sensation: '... genes express differential elements which also characterise an organism 
in a global manner, and play the role of distinctive points in a double process of 
reciprocal and complete determination; the double aspect of genes involves 
commanding several characteristics at once, and acting only in relation to other 
genes; the whole constitutes a virtuality, a potentiality; and this structure is incarnated 
in actual organisms, as much from the point of view of the determination of their 
species as from that of the differenciation of their parts, according to rhythms that are 
precisely "differential", according to comparative speeds or slownesses which 
measure the movement of actualisation1 (Deleuze 1994: 185). As we've noted, the 
incarnation of Ideas in the concrete syntheses that account for experience is 
something that distinguishes Deleuze from Kant. We are focusing instead upon how 
they share a methodological conception of Ideas. Deleuze's use of genetics here 
refers us to a very concrete genesis of Ideas, their realisation in relations that are 
internal to sensation. Ideas are developed in the depths of matter without any 
mediating role for concepts hi this process.
41 'The social Idea is the element of quantitability, qualitability and potentiality of
societies. It expresses a system of multiple ideal connections, or differential relations
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further variety of Ideas. As we've noted, Kant presents three Ideas in the 
Critique of Pure Reason's Transcendental Dialectic. We cannot know that 
there is a self, a world or a God but we pursue the work of cognition 'as if 
these things exist beyond the realm of experience. There is less variety of 
Ideas here and for Deleuze this follows from the transcendent role of Ideas 
in Kant's account. Ideas embody ends that are respected and transcend 
critique, with the result that the concrete cannot make us aware of many 
more Ideas. However, we've seen that the methodological role of Ideas is 
developed by Deleuze, leading us to use the example of the zoologist's 
inexhaustible engagement with animal life. He or she learns from the 
concrete ways biological Ideas are realised, the ways in which concrete 
cases tell us more about animal life than we can understand in advance. We 
never know or determine the object of an Idea but for Kant and Deleuze this 
is what makes it problematic and thus rich and inexhaustible. Therefore, 
despite the differences we keep encountering between their accounts we are 
able to keep sight of their common ground. As we noted, Kant develops the 
immanent, methodological role of an Idea of the self in cases of 
introspection or inner experience. He writes that, while we proceed as if 
there is a thinking subject behind our thoughts, it remains the case that'... 
with this experience I never arrive at a systematic unity of all appearances
between differential elements: these include relations of production and property 
relations which are established not between concrete individuals but between atomic 
bearers of labour-power or representatives of property. [...] More precisely, the 
solution is always that which a society deserves or gives rise to as a consequence of 
the manner hi which, given its real relations, it is able to pose the problems set within 
it and to it by the differential relations it incarnates1 (ibid: 186). TTiis is a very 
complex and rich passage from Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, It opens the 
prospect of an understanding of politics that we will not explore here. However, we 
may note that social Ideas refer not to relations between 'concrete individuals' but to 
something more abstract. They are made up of abstract relations that form parts of a 
structure that accounts for the more concrete relations that hold between members of 
a society and must not be confused with them. We also see that for Deleuze a society 
is judged according to its ability to pose problems. This raises many issues relevant 
to political philosophy that exceed the scope of this investigation but it is important to 
note Deleuze's concern with the productive role of Ideas in different areas of 
experience. Just as concrete experience is diverse and various, so Ideas must show 
variety in the abstract structures they form.
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of inner sense'.42 It does not provide us with something that could become 
an object of cognition and that we might call a simple and unified self. For 
Kant this lack of an object of cognition is more than made up for by the role 
of a problematic Idea in cognition. We have:
'...the idea of a simple independent intelligence. In so doing, 
however, reason has before it nothing but principles of systematic 
unity that are useful to it in explaining the appearances of the soul. 
These principles tell us, viz., to regard all determinations as [united] 
in a single subject; to regard all powers as much as possible as 
derived from a single basic power; to regard all variation as 
belonging to the states of one and the same permanent being; and to 
present all appearances in space as entirely different from actions of 
though?**
Kant argues that to proceed 'as if there is a 'simple independence 
intelligence' is a valid method and is indispensable for the systematic work 
of cognition. However, our use of this Idea must be relative to '...reason's 
systematic use regarding our soul's appearances'.44 As we saw, it is not an 
'order of being1 or a pragmatic ordering of our thought that grounds this 
activity. Therefore, we proceed 'as if there is a 'simple independent 
intelligence' behind inner experience but cannot determine it as an object of 
cognition. We then allow this assumption to regulate our practice for the 
sake of the system as a whole, for the sake of a system where a 'simple 
independent intelligence' is an indispensible and productive Idea. Thus if, 
instead of the sun warming the stone, a person throws a stone we do not 
have an object of cognition that can be located as the cause of this event. 
However, to make sense of this case and include it in our cognition of 
experience as a whole we need to proceed as if a 'simple independent 
intelligence' exists who can recognise a stone, decide to throw it and then do 
so. In other words, to systematically organise experience using cause and 
effect, one of the conditions of possibility of experience, we need a
42Kant 1996: 647, A682/B710.




problematic Idea of the self. The unity of the system, a methodological 
unity, allows something unknown and undetermined to have a necessary 
role in the cognition of experience. For Deleuze this role of Ideas is 
immanent and valid within a critical account of experience even if Kant's 
Ideas are also transcendent ends of reason and too limited in their variety.
Conclusion
We may now remind ourselves of the common ground we have uncovered. 
What concerns do Kant and Deleuze share when it comes to the 
methodological role of Ideas? Ideas must ensure that the cognition of 
experience is productive and must allow us to account for it without 
presupposing what we are seeking to account for. Deleuze recognises that 
he shares with Kant an understanding of the role of Ideas in producing 
different cases of experience. He writes in Difference and Repetition that 
for Kant '...the concepts of the understanding find the ground of their 
(maximum) full experimental use only in the degree to which they are 
related to problematic Ideas: ,..'45 He adds that it is on the basis of Ideas 
that concepts are able to '...comprise more and more differences on the basis 
of a properly infinite field of continuity'.46 By setting problems, Deleuze 
argues, Kant has set thought the task of realising the scope of problematic 
Ideas in experience. Since they have no determinate object or final solution 
these Ideas lead us to explore the richness of experience, to engage with 
differences that arise in sensation. There is a 'properly infinite field of 
continuity' because problematic Ideas are at the heart of a method for 
dealing with experience. They ensure that we continue to leam from the 
ability of sensation to differentiate experience because they are unsolvable. 
It is insofar as Ideas keep experience open in this way for Kant, allowing us 





In the following chapters of the thesis we will seek to show how the 
problematic Idea of synthetic a priori judgement is realised in the system 
constructed in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the next chapter we will see 
that the Table of Categories relates the abstract and the concrete in a 
Transcendental Logic. It responds to the problematic Idea of the relation of 
the synthetic and the a priori because its starting point is the abstract use of 
the understanding but this is shown to be relevant to the concrete synthesis 
of sensation. This combination of abstract origin and relevance to the 
concrete is problematic for Kant and must therefore organise the account he 
is giving in the Critique of Pure Reason so that it forms a system. In the 
fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis we will see how the schematism of 
the Table of Categories again seeks to relate the abstract and the concrete 
but at a different stage in this account. The a priori is now shown to be 
involved in synthesis from the start rather than relating to it from a distance. 
However, at all stages of the account it is a system that is being constructed, 
a system that from the Metaphysical Deduction onwards is embodied in a 
Table of Categories. For Kant, as we've seen, putting systematic limitations 
or conditions upon what can form part of experience is absolutely 
necessary. He seeks to project a systematic unity of possible experience. 
We will continue to be concerned with how, rather than simply arguing that 
we must relate the abstract and the concrete, Kant is also arguing that the 
abstract must comprise a particular system. We will explore the way in 
which Kant argues in favour of this system, one embodied in a Table of 
Categories, over the next three chapters of this thesis. This will allow us to 
return to Deleuze in the sixth chapter. We will there consider how he 
shares a concern not only with problematic Ideas but also with the form of 
argument that, over the next three chapters, we will see Kant using in the 




'High towers and metaphysically great men resembling them, round both of 
which there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful 
bathos of experience; and the word "transcendental", the meaning of which is so 
often indicated by me [...] , does not signify something passing beyond all 
experience but something that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended 
simply to make cognition of experience possible1 . 
(Kant 1977: 113, n48, Ak. 4: 373)
Tor behind the deceptive fixity of the numerous tables (of logical forms, of 
categories, of schemata, of principles), we can discern the acts of thought that 
give them their meaning'. 
(Longuenesse 1998: 14)
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant formulates a Table of Judgements and 
a Table of Categories. 1 He claims that the Table of Judgements presents the 
basic logical abilities or functions of the faculty of understanding.2 From 
these basic abilities he derives a Table of the basic conceptual forms or 
categories under which all of possible experience must be unified. This 
process of unification through judgement and under categories is to make 
experience possible. His claim in this Metaphysical Deduction is that we 
can derive the basic conceptual ways in which experience can and must be 
cognised solely from what understanding can do entirely by itself. 3 He is 
therefore concerned with the pure use of the understanding and with its pure
1 These tables are included in an appendix to this thesis for ease of reference.
2Kant writes that 'By function I mean the unity of the act of arranging various 
presentations under one common presentation. Hence concepts are based on the 
spontaneity of thought, whereas sensible intuitions are based on the receptivity for 
impressions' (Kant 1996: 121, A68/B93).
3 'By analytic of concepts I do not mean the analysis of concepts, i.e., the usual procedure 
in philosophical inquiries of dissecting already available concepts in terms of their 
content and bringing them to distinctness; rather, I mean the hitherto rarely attempted 
dissection of the power of understanding itself. The purpose of this dissection is to 
explore the possibility of a priori concepts, by locating them solely in the 
understanding, as their birthplace, and by analyzing the understanding's pure use as 
such' (ibid: 118-19, A65-6/B90-91).
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concepts or categories.4 It will not then be possible to revise or add to these 
tables because they are established solely by exploring the abilities of the 
understanding and establishing these once and for all. Kant later refers to 
this account in the following terms: 'In the metaphysical deduction we 
established the a priori origin of the categories as such through their 
complete concurrence with the universal logical functions of thought'. 5 
Despite the huge ambitions of this deduction chapter one of the Analytic of 
Concepts, where both tables are presented, is only twenty six pages in 
length. This includes six pages which were added in the second edition of 
the Critique of Pure Reason but there is little explanation and discussion of 
individual judgements and categories.6 However, many readers have 
wondered why this deduction is so brief. They argue that it must be 
supplemented either by later sections of the Critique of Pure Reason or by 
more recent discoveries concerning the logical abilities of thought. The 
task in this paper will be to grasp the reasons why Kant found this brief but 
hugely ambitious deduction of the categories necessary and convincing. 
For Kant the ways in which experience is to be unified in cognition, in 
order to make experience possible, must be given a priori, systematically 
and all at once. He therefore presented these two tables with little 
discussion of the individual uses and merits of their parts. This very 
puzzling method will be the concern of this chapter and will add further to 
our understanding of the architectonic method of which it forms a major 
part.
In the previous two chapters of this thesis we concentrated on the 
Introduction and Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason. The
4 As P. F. Strawson puts it 'He was claiming that he has a complete list of the primitive or 
underived pure concepts of the understanding. Only these deserved the name of 
categories; for their derivatives he reserved the name "predicates'" (Strawson 1966: 
79-80).
5Kant 1996:197,3159.
6lbid: 118-140, A65-83/B90-116. The chapter is entitled 'On the Guide for the 
Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding'. Subsections 11 and 12 were 
added in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.
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move is now made from the faculty of reason, whose problem-setting we've 
focused on, to the faculty of understanding and its singular response to the 
problem raised. The single problem of relating abstract and concrete is now 
re-cast by Kant's use of the phrase '...an idea of the whole of understanding's 
a priori cognition...'.7 The concern is with what understanding can do, with 
forming an Idea of its basic abilities and embodying this in a Table of 
Judgements. This draws us towards the abstract pole of cognition, towards 
a concentration upon the abstract abilities and forms of unity that the 
understanding must contribute in order to make experience possible. Thus 
in the Metaphysical Deduction we are not focusing upon synthesis and its 
concrete concerns but upon the abstract that is nevertheless presupposed by 
the concrete in a full account of experience. The architectonic method and 
its criteria are at work in this exploration of the pure understanding. This 
brings with it an internal focus, a focus upon the understanding and its 
abilities to the exclusion of anything given in the course of experience. In 
this chapter we will argue that Kant sees it as vital to the success of his 
deduction that we limit inquiry to what understanding alone is able to do 
and that the deduction is a brief one because it is limited and focused in this 
way. However, the Metaphysical Deduction has proved an obscure and 
unconvincing form of argument for many readers. We only have to dip into 
one commentary, by Karl Aschenbrenner, to find it described as far-fetched 
and artificial.8 Responses to the Metaphysical Deduction often have in 
common a rejection of Kant's 'idea of the whole of understanding's a priori 
cognition1 . For many readers the parts do not refer to a whole that precedes
7Ibid: 117-118, A64-65/B89: 'Hence this completeness is possible only by means of an 
idea of the whole of understanding's a priori cognition, and through the division, 
determined by that idea, of the concepts amounting to that cognition; and hence this 
completeness is possible only through the coherence of these concepts in a system1 .
8 Aschenbrenner 1983: 117,119. Aschenbrenner grants that '[tjhere is of course no 
denying that even in this somewhat superfluous section Kant's thoughts are 
stimulating' (ibid: 119). Thomas Kaehao Swing is equally blunt: 'Kant never 
explains how the Table of Categories is derived from the Table of Judgements. He 
simply presents the two tables one after the other, apparently assuming that the 
derivation of one from the other is obvious. But it is one of the most baffling affairs 
in the Critique [of Pure Reason} (Swing 1969: 19).
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them and justifies their deduction.
One response to the puzzling nature of the Metaphysical Deduction is to 
update Kant's tables of judgements and categories. We may draw upon the 
modern, post-Fregean logic that has replaced the logic that was generally 
accepted in Kant's time.9 This assumes that Kant's Metaphysical Deduction 
relies upon the logic of his day, it historicises the argument he makes. The 
history of logic has seen general or formal logic become more abstract. 
This means that it is even less concerned to provide abstract abilities and 
forms that are in any way relevant to the concrete and synthetic content of 
cognition. We can therefore be selective about Kant's Table of Categories 
on the basis of a superior grasp of the abstractness of thought as it is 
formulated in logic. 10 Logic no longer presents rules for the understanding
9P. F. Strawson argues as follows: 'And this, especially hi the light of post-Kantian 
developments in logic, should make us more seriously critical of Kant's list of logical 
forms or formal features. For a form or feature to deserve a place in the list, it is not 
sufficient that it should be a possible logical form or feature, one which a logician can 
frame out of his fundamental resources or describe in terms of them. It must be an 
essential form or feature, one which exhibits, as no other can, some part of those 
fundamental and indispensable resources themselves. [...] But it is by no means clear 
that this condition is satisfied by all the terms in Kant's list. For instance, that list 
includes the hypothetical and disjunctive forms, the analogues of which in modern 
logic are interdefmable with the help of negation. It is not enough that these are 
forms which the logician can frame, or even forms which we in fact use. For if the 
form is derivative, then any pure concept the use of which is involved in the use of 
the form is derivative also and hence not a category1 (Strawson 1966: 80). Strawson's 
adds that: 'We must ask what is the minimum that the logician must acknowledge in 
the way of logical forms' (ibid). This concurs with Kant's distinction between 'root 
concepts' and 'derivative concepts' that are also part of pure cognition but not part of 
the Table of Categories (Kant 1996: 133, A81/B107). This refers us to the concern of 
his architectonic to provide both a propaedeutic and an organon. Derivative concepts, 
which for Kant include action and passion, will be secured in the organon of pure 
reason in order to provide the sciences with a priori principles for dealing with such 
relations between agents. Such a concept would be derived from the root concepts 
provided in the Table of Categories. As we shall see, Kant is not in fact concerned 
with what a logician must acknowledge as Strawson claims. He is concerned with 
what anyone who has cognition of experience must acknowledge as the root concepts 
of all their cognition.
10Karl Aschenbrenner argues that Kant was concerned with the study of language but 
that '[a]las, his study of it is too sketchy and superficial to draw the conclusion he 
draws from it. One hastens to add that this is largely owing to the moribund state of 
logic and linguistics in his day' (Aschenbrenner 1983: 94). He also points to Bertrand 
Russell and A. N. Whitehead's formulation of the sentential calculus in order to make
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but is now '...the science of objective relations of implication between 
thoughts...'. 11 It is now logical inference or truth functionality that is the 
concern, leading to the exclusion of judgements and categories that are 
relevant in any way to the concrete content of cognition. We can then drop 
components of Kant's two tables that express his concern to relate the 
abstract and the concrete. 12 On this reading any Idea of the whole we might 
have, one that would precede and relate its parts, is dependent on the history 
of other disciplines. 13 We saw in chapter one of this thesis that the history 
of mathematics threatens the integrity of Kant's architectonic. Now the 
history of logic threatens to re-formulate the two tables that for Kant are to 
be complete and exhaustive. However, we found in chapter one that we 
should be wary of reducing Kant's arguments to the history of any 
discipline. We saw that isolation arguments based on the achievements of 
mathematics support Kant's transcendental arguments but are not 
indispensable. Beatrice Longuenesse points out that Kant's logic, as this is 
expressed in the two tables, does not agree with any of the logic text books 
of his day. 14 We will explore further the supposed dependence of Kant's
a further historical point: 'If Kant had had this logical scheme at hand his choice of 
categories would presumably have reflected it and a very different kind of Critique 
would be the result' (ibid: 103).
11 Longuenesse 2006: 158.
12It follows that singular and infinite judgements are to be left out of Kant's Table of 
Judgements (ibid: 159). As we will see, they were included because this table is 
concerned with securing an object of cognition. For Frege we should reject the role 
of ordinary language in logic and, according to Beatrice Longuenesse, this would rule 
out Kant's categories of relation which he understands as being reducible to the 
grammar of sentences: 'And ordinary language itself is governed by the subjective, 
psychological intentions and associations of the speaker addressing a listener1 (ibid: 
158; cf. Frege 1970).
13For Kant logic was not another discipline but a part of philosophy. However, it has 
today become the concern of disciplines like mathematics and computer science as 
well as philosophy because it has moved further away from a philosophical concern 
with relating the abstract and the concrete in the cognition of experience. It is in 
effect another discipline from the perspective of Kant's system insofar as it does not 
share what for him are philosophy's central concerns.
14Longuenesse 1998: 3. The reason for this difference will become clear as we explore 
the distinction between general logic and Kant's transcendental logic. In their 
introduction to Kant's lectures on logic Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwartz 
write that '[c]ompared to a textbook in symbolic logic the Kantian Logic shows a 
marvellous philosophical richness. In particular, we find fully treated here the
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'idea of the -whole of understanding's a priori cognition' upon another 
discipline as the nature of his Metaphysical Deduction becomes clearer.
Another approach that we will assess is a concern to bring the categories 
'closer' to experience and to ordinary knowledge claims. This follows from 
the apparent need to overcome the abstractness of Kant's two tables, their 
distance from the concrete and its concerns. Rather than making the Table 
of Categories more abstract, like the history of logic would seem to do, we 
must relate it more closely to the concrete. We do this by dropping the 
criteria of the architectonic method that conditions of possibility must be 
complete. It could be argued that this would allow the understanding to 
respond dynamically to the concrete. Sebastian Gardner argues that 'Kant 
need only show that the conceptualisation of an objective order plays some 
transcendental role. On this reading, Kant does not need to rule out other, 
logically possible metaphysics of experience'. 15 It follows that we should 
treat the two tables as lists of a priori judgements and categories that could 
be added to in response to experience. We must seek to understand why for 
Kant it is more convincing to argue that these two tables form a whole to 
which no addition is possible. We will consider whether being related 
dynamically to the concrete requires that abstract conditions be open to 
revision. We've seen that Kant is concerned to relate the abstract and the 
concrete at every stage of the unfolding of his architectonic. On this basis 
we will argue that Kant does not begin from a wholly abstract standpoint in 
the Metaphysical Deduction but one that is related to the concrete concerns 
of cognition as these emerge through synthesis. He argues that the 
timelessness of conditions for the cognition of possible experience, their
fundamental concept of any logic, the concept of concept, which cannot be found in a 
modern text on symbolic logic -just as one cannot find the concept of psyche in a 
modern psychology text1 (Hartman and Schwartz 1988: xx-xxi). 
l 5Gardner 1999: 121. For Gardner a successful Metaphysical Deduction should
'...specify a conceptual form which corresponds to that which our experience actually 
exhibits' (ibid: 123). He calls this a 'modest interpretation' of the Table of Categories 
(ibid: 133).
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being impervious to change, is not opposed or closed to the concrete. We 
will consider how these critical approaches to the Metaphysical Deduction 
could be responded to. The relation of abstract and concrete that for Kant 
must characterise the different parts of the Critique of Pure Reason must be 
brought into play. This relation emerges within his architectonic rather than 
through the relation of his arguments to something external, to what is 
given in experience or in the history of other disciplines.
i. The Ambitions of the Metaphysical Deduction
In our account of Kant's architectonic method we've emphasised his 
concern to avoid any reference to what is given in experience. His 
argument is that we have to avoid making reference to the empirical in 
order to fully account for it. This is a concern we would therefore expect to 
see reflected in the formulation of the tables of judgements and categories. 
We expect to see another inward looking argument, one responding to the 
single and unifying problem that Kant re-names an 'idea of the whole of 
understanding's a priori cognition1 . How does Kant here relate what the 
pure understanding can do, and the conceptual forms this involves, to the 
concrete side of experience? Kant argues that cognition always produces an 
object, that this is the way in which judgements and categories are extended 
or realised. They secure more and more objects in cognition, objects made 
possible by the input of both the abstract and the concrete. However, the 
term 'object' is not intended to provide an empirical basis for the Table of 
Categories. In his Reflexionen Kant writes that: 'An object, therefore, is 
only something in general which we think to ourselves through predicates 
which constitute its concept'. 16 This term 'something in general' captures 
the strange notion of the categories accounting for experience without
l 6Kant 1882: Ak. 17: 616-17; cited and translated by Henry E. Allison in Allison 2004: 
86.
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referring to anything actually given in experience. They have the horizon of 
'something in general', of something that is both abstract and concrete so 
that both poles of experience are realised in it. This object of cognition is 
their focus, leading Beatrice Longuenesse to write of '...the objectifying 
function manifested in the very form of judgment...'. 17 We can begin to 
understand this by considering the way in which Kant goes on to include 
this 'something in general' in every synthetic a priori judgement as one of 
two concepts that are compared with one another. This 'something in 
general' is the logical subject of a judgement. Kant writes: 'When I say "a 
body is divisible" this means that something x, which I cognize through the 
predicates that together constitute a concept of body, I also think through 
the predicate of divisibility'. 18 Thus 'something in general', renamed here as 
'something x\ is referred to in every judgement or has a role in how 
cognition works. Cognitions are secured by judgements that refer to a 
logical subject that is never anything in particular. 19 What are we to make 
of this strange something that is 'something in general' or 'something jc', and
17Longuenesse 1998: 83. Longuenesse develops this process by writing that '[t]o relate 
representations to an object [...] is to strive toward a combination of representations 
that would prove to be in conformity with the object, that is to say, true. In other 
words, objectivity, in the full sense of a conformity to the object of the combination of 
representations is what the activity of judgment tends to achieve. This is the 
immanent norm, as it were, of judgment, rather than a state of representations one can 
suppose to be present in judgment from the outset' (ibid: p. 82). She adds'... its goal 
or its immanent norm is to express the relation of concepts by expressing also their 
relation to objects' (ibid: 90). This striving to realise the abstract in an object of 
cognition that is to be both abstract and concrete suggests the source of the argument 
in the Metaphysical Deduction. We will seek to show that this focus upon combining 
abstract and concrete, realising them both in the form of'something in general' or an 
object of cognition, is what drives the argument.
18This is a continuation of the quotation from Kant's Reflexionen referenced in footnote 
16. The role of an V in cognition is developed in the first edition Transcendental 
Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant relates the work of a 
transcendental subject or transcendental unity of apperception in applying categories 
to the transcendental object orobject=x. This ensures that the work of the 
transcendental subject and the forms provided by the categories are realised in the 
form of an object of cognition (Kant 1996: 156-60, A103-10).
19Beatrice Longuenesse argues that Kant is guided in formulating his Table of
Judgements by the question '...which logicodiscursive forms must we presuppose to 
be at work for the infinite manifold of our sensible impressions to result in 
representations of things capable of providing substitutional instances of the term 'V 
in the logical forms of judgements?' (Longuenesse 1998: 397).
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is always involved in cognition?
Synthetic a priori judgements refer to experience but not in any specific 
sense. If such judgements, which make experience possible, specify what 
will occur in experience they either presuppose what they are to account for 
or over-determine it. We've seen in the previous two chapters of this thesis 
that for Kant these are two dangers to be avoided. In order to explore this 
we will be developing Kant's terminology by introducing the term 
'situation'. This will allow us to explore the depth and complexity of the 
notion of 'something in general' or 'something jc'. This is a move we must 
justify by showing how the Table of Categories for Kant presents the basic 
forms of any situation. It refers to concrete situations or situations that 
emerge through synthesis but it does so in an abstract way, without 
specifying situations beyond the conditions of their possibility.20 
Categories are the basic forms of all objects of cognition, they therefore 
secure the objective situations we find ourselves in. They are the basic 
forms of 'something in general' or 'something jc'. In chapter one of this 
thesis we used the example of a situation where we are able to make the 
judgement 'the sun warms the stone'. This situation is marked out by a pure 
concept of the understanding, the category of cause and effect. The 
'something in general' that arises through cognition is always a situation 
made up of objects of cognition and their objective relations, such as cause 
and effect. In this way, the term 'situation' helps us to capture the 
complexity of objects secured by judgements and categories. They are 
objects of cognition but not simple and self-contained objects. The 
'something* referred to is also indeterminate in scale. It is more complex 
than could be captured by talking about this or that object. Thus common
20As Beatrice Longuenesse puts it: 'Having discovered that the objectifying function of 
these forms [of judgement] provided him with the solution he was seeking to the 
problem of the categories, Kant retained as primitive only those forms which he 
thought indispensable for generating the relation of our representations to an object1 
(Ibid: 78).
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philosophical examples such as 'the desk at which I am sitting' or 'the book I 
am reading' do not capture the full scope or scale of this 'something in 
general'. The situation could be this room, this land mass, this planet or this 
universe. It would include both individuals and crowds as objects of 
cognition. The point is that these things must be left indeterminate if we are 
to realise an 'idea of the whole of understanding's a priori cognition'. If we 
view the horizon of the categories in terms of objects of a particular scale 
then they are reduced to, for example, the common experience of a scholar 
who tends to use as an example his desk or the book he is reading.21 Kant 
wants to account for such ordinary experiences rather than assuming them 
or suggesting that they are more significant than any other. He therefore 
has in mind the openness, dynamism and potential for extension of concepts 
when he refers to 'something in general' as the logical subject of every 
judgement.
We've seen that Kant wants to refer only to the abilities of the pure 
understanding in the Metaphysical Deduction. He also wants to leave open 
the ways in which the abstract and concrete can be realised in an object of 
cognition. How is openness to the concrete secured by focussing upon the 
abstract in this way? We saw Sebastian Gardner arguing that we cannot get 
closer to concrete experience if we cannot revise our abstract ways of 
understanding it. However, Kant writes of the categories he seeks to secure 
in the Metaphysical Deduction that: '... proofs based on experience are 
insufficient to establish the legitimacy of using them in that way; yet we do 
need to know how these concepts can refer to objects even though they do 
not take these objects from any experience'.22 These concepts are not based 
on experience but are nevertheless 'open' to experience in the sense of
21This is not to suggest that these things are not objects of cognition but to focus upon 
them is to simplify the notion of an object of cognition and borrow from the habits 
and practices of a scholar. These are quite different from, for example, those of a 
mountain climber for whom the mountain is his overwhelming object of cognition.
22Kant 1996: 142, B117/A85.
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providing the basic forms of the cognition of any situation. They refer to 
objects and their relations in the widest possible sense by providing the a 
priori forms of objectivity as such.23 Thus any talk of openness to 
experience must be qualified because for Kant this openness can only be 
realised by the reference of abstract judgements and categories to an object 
that will be concrete as well as abstract. We must then refer to the abstract 
on its own terms in the Metaphysical Deduction but only as a stage in the 
architectonics attempt to relate the abstract and the concrete. Henry E. 
Allison develops the concrete meaning of Kant's reference to 'something in 
general* when he writes that: '... every judgement involves a synthesis or 
unification of representations in consciousness, whereby the representations 
are conceptualized so as to be referred to or related to an object'.24 The 
synthetic a priori judgement is derived by concentrating on the pure 
understanding alone but also by locating its outcome as an object that is 
both abstract and concrete. In the object of cognition the abstract abilities 
and forms of the understanding are realised and without it they are empty.25 
With this in mind we will turn again to role of general logic in Kant's 
Metaphysical Deduction.
Since we raised the issue of the relation between the Metaphysical 
Deduction and the history of logic we've seen that Kant's synthetic a priori 
judgements refer to the concrete in a certain way. They refer to it without 
specifying it, as 'something in general' or 'something jc'. For Kant, the basic 
abilities of the understanding are presented in general logic and give a
23In the Lectures on Metaphysics Kant sums this up when he defines ontology as '...the 
science of the properties of all things in general...' (Kant 1997: 140). The result is that 
this science '... has as an object nothing but a thing in general, i.e., every object of 
thought, thus no determinate object. Thus nothing remains for me other than the 
cognizing, which I consider1 (ibid). This is useful because if Kant is identifying 
ontology so closely with epistemology he avoids suggesting that there are objects that 
precede cognition. Instead objects are the outcomes of cognition, they are the realisation 
of the abstract and the concrete that the architectonic method seeks. 
24Allison 2004: 87.
25The passage where Kant refers to the emptiness of categories in the absence of 
concrete content is quoted on page 56 of chapter one of this thesis.
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complete account of what the understanding can do.26 We move from the 
purity and completeness of understanding's basic abilities, as presented in 
general logic, to the purity and completeness of an account of how they 
unify experience in the most basic ways. Kant writes: Tor these functions 
of the understanding are completely exhaustive and survey its power 
entirely'.27 In his Lectures on Metaphysics Kant is concerned to focus upon 
the understanding to the exclusion of anything external: 'It is not research 
into a thing, but rather into an understanding, whose basic propositions and 
concepts must be open to study, for it all lies within me'.28 This makes it 
worthwhile to follow the example of general logic which has studied the 
understanding without any input from experience: Tor general logic, being 
merely formal, abstracts from all content of cognition (pure and empirical) 
and deals merely with the form of thought (i.e. discursive cognition) as 
such'.29 General logic is focused upon what understanding can do without 
referring to experience or even to the pure cognition of the understanding 
that makes experience possible. By avoiding any such reference it never 
relies upon something that can undermine our conclusions and be a source 
of doubt. General logic guides us by referring only to the understanding 
and for Kant this is something that we need to do before we relate the 
abstract to the concrete.
Kant's remarks on the history of general logic, located in the second edition 
Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, suggest that this history comprises 
only one significant event. This is not then a history in the sense of a 
development over time but presents the discovery of what understanding 
has always 'silently' been doing.30 For Kant we can get a complete Idea in 
general logic of what the understanding is capable of because of the one
26See the quotation given in footnote 3, page 89. 
27Ibid:131,A80/B105.
28Kant 1997: 138, in parenthesis in the original. 
29Kant 1996: 204-205, A131/B170.
30 We defined and explored the 'silent' role of the understanding in the third section of 
the first chapter of this thesis.
significant event in its history. He writes:
'Logic has been following that secure path [of a science] from the 
earliest times. This is evident from the fact that since Aristotle it has 
not needed to retrace a single step, unless perhaps removing some of 
its dispensable subtleties, or setting it forth in a more distinct and 
determinate way, were to be counted as improvement of logic, even 
though they pertain more to the elegance of that science than to its 
being secure. Another remarkable fact about logic is that thus far it 
also has not been able to advance a single step, and hence is to all 
appearances closed and completed'.31
Kant considers general logic to be complete because it formulates abilities 
of the understanding that were always already at work in the a priori 
syntheses of experience. It reflects the completeness of the understanding's 
role in making experience possible. General logic thus presents the basic 
abilities of the understanding just as we saw that Euclidean geometry 
presents a priori truths about space. Both refer to forms of the a priori that 
were already at work but by presenting them in abstraction they establish 
themselves as sciences with a priori foundations. Kant writes: That logic 
has been so successful in following the secure path of a science is an 
advantage that it owes entirely to its limitations. They entitle it, even 
obligate it, to abstract from all objects of cognition and their differences; 
hence in logic the understanding deals with nothing more than itself and its 
form'.32 Logic has the virtue of presenting the basic abilities of the 
understanding in complete abstraction and without reference to experience. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant wants to use this cognitive 
achievement in order to grasp the abstract pole of cognition in the most 
effective way. However, he does not rely upon this discipline for his 
account of a priori synthetic judgement. These forms would be at work
31 Kant 1996: 15, Bviii, additions in square brackets were made by the translator. Kant 
calls Aristotle 'the father of logic' in his lectures on logic and again argues that logic 
has gained little content since his formulation of it: 'But it may well gain in 
exactness, definiteness and distinctness. There are but few sciences that can come 
into a permanent state beyond which they undergo no further change. [...] Aristotle 
has omitted no moment of the understanding; we are herein only more exact, 
methodological, and orderly' (Kant 1988: 23).
32Kant 1996:16, Bix.
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even if no discipline had formulated them and presented them so 
effectively. It is for this reason that the problem of the possibility of 
synthetic a priori judgement, of relating the abstract and the concrete, 
occurs to reason. It follows that we do not have to dispute the validity of 
the post-Fregean understanding of logic in order to show that Kant's 
Metaphysical Deduction is complete. If logic no longer guides and supports 
Kant's account it also does not challenge it. Having gone in a more abstract 
direction, logic remains silent on matters that concern Kant in the 
Metaphysical Deduction. His logic, set out in the two tables, is a 
transcendental logic. It responds to the relation of the abstract and the 
concrete that unifies his architectonic.
We have then a transcendental logic that is not to be confused with a 
general logic. It is made distinct by referring the abstract abilities of the 
pure understanding to the form of an object of cognition. This 
transcendental logic is concerned with realising the concrete content of 
cognition in the abstract forms that an object must take. How is this 
effective in a concrete situation? Thomas Kaehao Swing argues that: 'What 
is not so well known among Kant scholars is that he claims the merit of 
making the first systematic attempt to construct the science of material 
logic'.33 This way of characterising Kant's transcendental logic emphasises 
the difference between a general or formal logic and a transcendental or 
material logic.34 The latter refers to the concrete pole of cognition without
33 Swing 1969: vii. However, Swing does not see this as a positive aspect of Kant's 
Metaphysical Deduction: 'We have repeatedly noted that there is a generic difference 
between formal and material concepts. Kant mistook their generic difference for a 
mere functional one. The entire Metaphysical Deduction hinges on this mistake' 
(ibid: 43). We will argue that Kant formulates a transcendental and material logic not 
through neglect or ignorance of the nature of logic but because he seeks to account 
for experience in this way.
34Henry E. Allison argues that this also helps us to distinguish analysis from synthesis. 
Judgements that analyse concepts are not the concern of Kant's transcendental logic 
because it concerns the concrete or material 'x' that is referred to by judgements using 
concepts. Therefore:'... in order to distinguish between analytic and synthetic 
judgments one must recognise a class of judgments that involve a material extension
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specifying its nature; it refers to it as the object of cognition or 'something 
in general1 that must be secured by the two tables. Judgement now refers to 
the material constraints of a situation, to the forms an object of cognition 
must take. It is then a logic that is related to the matter or concrete content 
of experience but only in ways that make experience possible. Swing 
illustrates the difference between a formal and a material logic by 
considering the role of the term 'every' in a proposition.35 This makes a 
proposition into a universal judgement, which is the first judgement of 
quantity in Kant's Table of Judgements. This concerns the whole 
proposition and not its subject-concept. Swing gives the following 
example: 'Every horse is an animal'.36 In contrast, 'five' and 'a' are terms 
that concern the subject-concept and not the proposition. For example: 
'Five horses are now running' or 'A horse is missing'. Swing argues that 
these quantitative terms have material functions while the quantifiers of 
predicate calculus, a post-Fregean form of logic, do not.37 They are not 
concerned with the content of knowledge, with marking out a situation in 
material ways, but only with the relations of judgements: 'Their function is 
not to represent any objects but to bring together the descriptive terms into 
propositions, and simple propositions into complex ones. Theirs is a 
connective function'.38 In formal logic we are concerned with the universal 
character of the judgement or proposition and not with making a subject 
universal. However, for Kant pure cognition, with its two tables, makes 
possible the empirical cognition that grasps the details and particularities of 
the concrete. This means that any argument seeking to establish a 
transcendental logic must form part of an account of cognition that includes 
both its abstract and its concrete poles. It makes a material difference that 
the proposition has more or less abstract reach, that it includes more or less





quantity. This is not to suggest that judgements themselves become 
concrete or seek to make a specific difference. Instead they mark out and 
secure a situation where it is possible for concrete things to be specified and 
developed. They remain abstract conditions of possibility for the concrete 
specification of possible experience. Therefore, what matters is that 
material situations are secured in the most basic and abstract ways so that 
an open ended empirical specification of the concrete can take place.
ii. Understanding the Metaphysical Deduction as an Argument
In chapter one of this thesis we discussed the forms of argument that Kant 
employs in the Critique of Pure Reason. We may develop this by 
considering the following passage from the Metaphysical Deduction:
'In this treatise I deliberately refrain from offering definitions of these 
categories, even though I may possess them. I shall hereafter dissect 
these concepts only to a degree adequate for the doctrine of method 
that I here produce. Whereas definitions of the categories could 
rightly be demanded of me in a system of pure reason, here they 
would only make us lose sight of the main point of the inquiry. For 
they would give rise to doubts and charges that we may readily 
relegate to another activity without in any way detracting from our 
essential aim'.39
Here Kant refers us to the role of the Critique of Pure Reason as 
propaedeutic that we discussed in chapter one of this thesis. He wants to 
make possible the cognition of possible experience as such rather than 
present a detailed organon of pure reason.40 We now find that this demands 
that we are brief in our arguments. We are to avoid doubt by not breaking 
up the two tables into their component parts. How does this help us define 
Kant's form of argument in the Metaphysical Deduction? Jill Vance 
Buroker offers a reason why Kant wants to be brief: 'Kant believes that it is 
simply a brute fact about humans that we judge by these logical forms. [...]
39Kant 1996: 134, A82-83/B108-109. 
40See chapter one of this thesis, pages 17-21.
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Just as we cannot explain why we intuit objects in three-dimensional 
Euclidean space and one-dimensional time, so we cannot explain why our 
judging has exactly these logical characteristics1 .41 If the Metaphysical 
Deduction relies upon a 'brute fact1 it can be compared to the argument 
based on Euclidean geometry that we considered in chapter one of this 
thesis. These both form what we defined as an isolation argument. We 
isolate the a priori ingredients of cognitive achievements in cases where we 
have the opportunity to investigate them. However, we noted that this 
means that no set of conditions can be indispensable, as the architectonic 
method demands, because we might uncover others in the course of 
experience. We've emphasised Kant's concern with completeness and with 
giving an exhaustive account. The brevity of his Metaphysical Deduction 
cannot then be explained by his reliance on a 'brute fact' that is already 
given to us and so needs no detailed explanation. How else can we 
understand Kant's concern to be brief?
Kant draws a distinction that adds a great deal to our understanding of his 
method of argument in the Metaphysical Deduction:
'When teachers of law talk about rights and claims, they distinguish 
in a legal action the question regarding what is legal (quid juris) from 
the question concerning fact (quidfacti), and they demand proof of 
both. The first proof, which is to establish the right, or for that matter 
the legal entitlement, they call the deduction'.42
Deduction is tasked with establishing a right or legal entitlement. How is it 
distinguished from the question 'quidfactfl If we build up a picture of the 
abilities of the understanding based on observations of matters of fact this 
would not establish a right or entitlement to use them in all cases. Kant 
seems to be concerned that doubt creeps in when we spend more time over
41 Buroker2006: 100.
42Kant 1996: 141, A84/B116. We note that this passage comes after the Metaphysical 
Deduction and at the beginning of the first edition Transcendental Deduction. 
However, Kant here speaks of'deduction1 rather than specifically of'transcendental 
deduction'. We may therefore apply this to the Metaphysical Deduction in order to
understand it better.
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a deduction in order to refer to facts. By referring to past experience we 
refer to what can always be doubted. Kant therefore defines deduction 
using the legal term 'quid juris'. If we are to learn from this the reason for 
the brevity of the Metaphysical Deduction we have to relate it to the way 
Kant argues. We might wonder whether in legal practice it is not the case 
that precedent plays the major role. Something that precedes the present 
case may provide an authoritative example. Precedent, according to 
particular systems of law, must be worked through at length, building upon 
the achievements of legal practice just as isolation arguments build on what 
has been achieved by cognition. Can we then isolate the question of 
legality from the question of fact in legal practice as Kant suggests? We 
can do this if we uncover the true import of Kant's reference to what is now 
an obsolete form of legal practice.
Dieter Henrich provides much needed clarification of Kant's reference to 
legal practice.43 He points to Kant's engagement with theories of legal 
deduction during his lectures on natural law at the University of 
Konigsberg.44 He uncovers in this literature a legal notion widely held in 
the eighteenth-century Holy Roman Empire:
'Since a deduction is not a theory for its own sake, but rather an 
argumentation intended to justify convincingly a claim about the 
legitimacy of a possession or a usage, it should refrain from 
unnecessary digression, generalizations, debates about principles, and 
so forth, which are of interest only to the theoretician. A deduction 
should be brief, solid but not subtle, and perspicuous'.45
This is a legal practice that does not rely upon the authority of precedent but
43Henrich 1989: 29-46.
^'The most admired deduction writer of Kant's time was J. S. Putter, professor of law at 
Gottingen and coauthor of the textbook that Kant used in his frequent lectures on 
natural law' (ibid: p. 33). Henrich argues that Kant seems to have learnt from Putter's 
method of deduction writing. Putter followed one of his legal deductions with a note 
entitled 'Brief Outline of the Zedwitz Case'. This method of presentation is echoed in 
Kant's second edition Transcendental Deduction which is followed by a similar 
summary entitled 'Brief Outline of the Deduction1 (Ibid: 34; Kant 1996: 203, B168-9).
45Henrich 1989: 33-34. Henrich attributes the description to a legal text from 1752 but 
gives no further reference.
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is focused upon a claim to possession or usage. By being brief, by avoiding 
explanation and not drawing upon precedent, we are to attain solidity. This 
will make sense only in its historical context, the context in which 
precedent was not a sufficient basis for a legal claim. We will seek now to 
show the relevance of this to Kant's Metaphysical Deduction without 
seeking to historicise his argument or render it outdated. In this sense we 
will take issue with Henrich's claim that: 'With regard to the Critique and its 
deductions, we can thus understand in a new light the old saying that books, 
too, have their destiny'.46 This seems to be a valid conclusion because this 
method of legal deduction writing became redundant following Napoleon's 
dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, two years after Kant's 
death.47 It was a practice based on competing claims over things like 
inheritance and rights of succession between the many states that made up 
this loose confederation during Kant's lifetime. However, this is not the 
only reason to avoid reducing Kant's argument to its historical context. He 
claims for the Table of Categories the dignity of embodying 'an idea of the 
whole of the understanding's a priori cognition' and this would make it non- 
historical. Its source is a problem posed by reason, a problem concerning 
the a priori synthesis of possible experience. It thus precedes and makes 
possible all historical cognition.48
We have a historical context and a form of legal practice that responds to it. 
This provides a way of making sense of the philosophical method Kant 
employs but we cannot reduce this method to its historical context without 
undermining its claims. Henrich sketches the philosophical significance of 
Kant's reference to the legal methods of his time:
'A legal dispute originates when a party's claim has been challenged 
by an opponent, so that a court must be opened. This happened in 
philosophy when the sceptic challenged the claim of reason to be in
id: 33. 
47Hassall 1929: 33.
48Kant's distinction between historical and rational cognition is explored in footnote 54 
of this chapter.
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possession of a priori knowledge of objects. [...] To the extent to 
which a deduction can be produced, the claim of reason becomes 
definitely justified and the challenge of the sceptic is rejected. This is 
the aim of the Transcendental Analytic'.49
This concern is reflected in Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics when he writes 
that: 'Enough systems have been composed which, even when they are in 
agreement, cannot withstand the onslaught of a mischievous sceptic1 .50 His 
concern here is with defending an entitlement against"... an opponent who 
is no system maker'.51 We saw in chapter one of this thesis how Kant sought 
to construct arguments that began with what a sceptic must accept. The 
argument then moves to show the reliance of something they accept upon 
something they doubt. Thus, by being system makers, we relate what is 
accepted and what is doubted as parts in a wider system. We make them 
parts of a whole. We show that a sceptic may be no system maker but relies 
upon a system in order to have cognition of experience in the first place. 
The legal deduction writers of Kant's time worked on the basis that a right 
needed to be deduced in a situation where to do anything else would give 
rise to fatal scepticism regarding a claim. There is an emphasis upon 
securing a verdict in the context of the competing claims and lack of 
certainty in the political life of the Holy Roman Empire. There was no 
national unity in the Empire that would precede the work of legal deduction 




52Arthur Hassell writes that 'Germany was divided into some three hundred petty states, 
the rulers of each of which had the right not only to tax, to impose custom duties, but 
also to make treaties, and to decide upon the form of religion to be professed within 
their respective dominions. [...] The [Holy Roman] Empire has become a nominal 
federation of independent princes, and the victory in the long struggle between the 
centrifugal and centripetal tendencies, between monarchy and aristocracy, rested with 
the centrifugal principle. [...] Germany, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
has lost all national feeling, a degradation of manners had set in, and the dominant 
tone in the small states was fatal to the domestic life which, previous to the Thirty 
Years' War [1618-48], had proved the strength of the country' (Hassell 1929: 10-11). 
What's more 'All sense of German unity was lost; the French had taken Strassburg 
and Alsace; they were about to take Lorraine. The Imperial army could not defend
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precedent to rely upon because no previous example or case has any source 
of permanent authority. That the power of the Emperor of the Holy Roman 
Empire was merely nominal and the role ornamental contributed to this 
situation.53 Deduction writers were concerned with securing something 
against the tide of competing claims and lack of established authority. They 
could not appeal to facts and had to be brief in order to avoid relying upon 
anything outside of the argument they were making.54 A right or 
entitlement had to be justified on the authority of this argument alone. This 
gave rise to a method of deduction that Kant was very well aware of and 
that reflects his concerns. If we are to be system makers who defeat the 
sceptic we must construct systems by carrying out deductions that cannot be 
undermined by any reliance upon the givens of experience.
We've seen that if we take general logic as a precedent upon which to 
construct a deduction we are vulnerable to the history of logic. We have 
given too lengthy a deduction because we have taken the time to use 
general logic as the basis for our argument. When the history of this 
discipline moves forward the argument is undermined. We've seen that 
Kant did not think that general logic could be reformulated because he held 
it to be complete. However, since he did not rely upon it as the basis of his 
deduction his account is not undermined by its subsequent history. In the 
Metaphysical Deduction he ultimately refers to the basic abilities of the
Germany from attack, nor could the Imperial forces put down internal disorder. The 
Seven Years' War [1756-63] exemplified the weakness of the Germanic body, the 
utter decay of the Holy Roman Empire, and the general confusion prevalent among 
all the Imperial institutions' (ibid: 13).
53lbid:ll.
54In his lectures on logic Kant argued that in disciplines such as law '[i]t is harmful to 
know some rational cognitions merely historically; this does not matter with others. 
For example, the navigator knows the rules of navigation historically from his tables, 
and that is enough for him. But if a lawyer knows jurisprudence merely historically, 
he is completely ruined for being truly a judge, let alone a legislator' (Kant 1988: 26). 
Historical cognition has a chronology; it is the gathering of instruction from 
experience. For Kant a lawyer must have a system that is given all at once, not one 
that is added to or constructed from experience. This system must support itself 
without relying upon anything external.
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pure understanding and not to the discipline that had formulated these with 
apparent completeness. If we return to his concern with an Idea of the 
whole we will gain a better understanding of why this internal focus is 
important: 'Hence this completeness is possible only by means of an idea of 
the whole of understanding's a priori cognition, and through the division, 
determined by that idea, of concepts amounting to that cognition; and hence 
this completeness is possible only through the coherence of these concepts 
in a system'55 It is philosophy, as architectonic, that considers how abstract 
and concrete are always already related in order to provide an account of the 
cognition of possible experience. If we are not sceptics then for Kant this is 
because we practice architectonics which, as we saw in the last chapter, is 
the art of constructing systems on the basis of a problematic Idea of the 
whole. The two tables formulated in the Metaphysical Deduction are a 
complete system insofar as they secure the relation of the synthetic and the 
a priori in the basic forms of cognition once and for all. Kant argues that 
this provides: '...a unity that is self-subsistent, sufficient to itself, and that 
cannot be augmented by supplementing it with any extrinsic additions. 
Hence the sum of pure understanding's cognition will constitute a system 
that can be encompassed and determined by an idea'.56 It is brief in order to 
avoid the extrinsic, in order to formulate the abilities of the pure 
understanding rather than looking outside of the response of this faculty to a 
problem raised by pure reason. As we saw in the previous chapter of this 
thesis, a system is to secure and make possible the cognition of experience. 
We now see that in order to prepare for all such cognition it must be briefly 
formulated and so maintain the internal focus of the architectonic method. 
As we shall now see, being brief and systematic translates into the lay out 
of the two tables. It is for Kant a sign that the understanding's own abilities 
are being realised without any external interference. In the next and final 
section of this chapter we will consider whether the two tables show Kant's
55Kant 1996: 118, A64-5/B89. 
56lbid:118,A65/B89-90.
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argument to be convincing. We will ask whether brevity can secure solidity 
or whether it leaves the tables vulnerable to the tides of history and 
experience.
Hi. The Two Tables
The unity of the two tables will help us to understand why they are 
presented all at once rather than piece by piece. Beatrice Longuenesse 
argues that '...each of the two tables sheds light on the other. The strength 
and coherence of each is established and buttressed by the other'. 57 If we 
evaluate them or their components singularly we neglect the sense in which 
a system is being constructed on the basis of 'an idea of the whole of 
understanding's a priori cognition'. They are at the centre of a system for 
accounting for the cognition of possible experience and will be involved in 
the unfolding of the architectonic in the remainder of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Their systematic organisation will direct this unfolding, it will 
direct the stages of the account where the abstract and the concrete are more 
closely related.58 How are these tables systematic? They each have twelve 
members and are both divided into four corresponding divisions. Kant is 
clearly concerned with proceeding systematically but how can this be 
related to the pure and basic abilities of the understanding? Henry E. 
Allison suggests a way of understanding this in the following passage:
'Appealing to a biological analogy, one might say that just as the 
function of the eye, namely, to see, may be broken down into 
several sub-functions, such as color, shape, and distance vision, so the 
function of the understanding, namely to judge, may be broken down 
into four (and only four) types of sub- function: quantity, quality, 
relation, and modality'. 59
57Longuenesse 1998: 77.
58In chapter five of this thesis we will consider how the Analytic of Principles of the




This might suggest that, like Jill Van Buroker, Allison sees the two tables as 
expressing a 'brute fact' about the nature of cognition. However, this does 
not necessarily follow from the analogy given. The Idea of an eye is an 
Idea of the whole that precedes all vision and opens the horizon of vision as 
such through the co-ordination of certain basic abilities. We ask what 
understanding can do and, just as when we ask this of an eye, this turns out 
to be a question with a brief but solid answer. It leads us to formulate a 
system of abilities, something co-ordinated and unified in purpose, which is 
briefly elaborated but is also very full and open ended in its account of 
experience. We rely for this not upon a empirical study of cases of the 
organ's use but purely upon a highly concentrated notion of this organ's 
basic abilities. These are complete because if they were added to this would 
disrupt the coherent, systematic organisation of the eye that makes its 
functioning possible as such. It might be objected that scientists have been 
learning about the eye bit-by-bit and continue to do so. However, the 
analogy ultimately refers us to the conditions of possibility located in the 
understanding without which the activity of any science could not take 
place. Kant is seeking to provide a transcendental account of all scientific 
or naturalistic cognition, as we saw when we explored the broader role of 
his architectonic method in chapter one of this thesis. The analogy suggests 
that if we think about the basic abilities of an organ, something which forms 
a system, we will find this to be a brief and solid notion. The possibilities 
opened by this are inexhaustible because we can never see everything there 
is to see, or know everything there is to know, but the foundation of seeing 
or knowing is exhausted briefly in a system of basic abilities. This analogy 
helps us to understand why Kant offers so little elaboration of the 
judgements and categories he presents in the Metaphysical Deduction.
Whilst Kant's concern to be systematic in the formulation of the two tables 
can be understood in the way we've just considered, the particular system he
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offers has been the source of much puzzlement. The third judgement or 
category under each division is derived from the combination of the first 
two. This comes in for the charge of artificiality from many commentators 
and this reflects attitudes towards the architectonic method as a whole. 
Thomas Kaehao Swing describes this as a 'pervasive triadic obsession1 .60 
We've seen that Kant moves swiftly against scepticism on the grounds that 
it does not include more of experience in its viewpoint but undermines the 
very possibility of experience by having no system. If it is to be possible, 
experience must be included in an abstract system as well as being extended 
by all the detail and particularity of the concrete. Without a system there is 
no experience and without an Idea of the whole there is no system. Kant is 
arguing from within 'an idea of the whole of understanding's a priori 
cognition' that relates the abstract and the concrete from the perspective of 
understanding's pure use. It relates them in synthetic a priori judgements 
that refer to an object of cognition. However, being systematic is one thing 
while making one particular system complete and indispensible is quite 
another. Having considered the argument for being brief and systematic we 
will now interrogate the system Kant provides in detail. We will consider 
whether it responds to the need to relate the abstract and the concrete in an 
object of cognition.
The first division of the tables of judgements and categories is quantity and 
the first judgement of quantity is the universal judgement. An example of 
this judgement is the proposition 'All human beings are mortal'. This is a 
judgement where the predicate (mortality) contains all of its subjects 
(human beings). A predicate-concept subsumes a subject-concept. The role 
of 'something in general' or 'something *' in this judgement ensures that it 
refers to the material terms of an objective situation. These are the objects 
of cognition we know from experience to be human beings. Thus we know 
in the abstract that in different concrete situations anything we recognise as
60Swingl969:21.
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a human being is mortal. This particular fact is not necessary to account for 
experience because human beings do not all have to be mortal to make 
experience possible. However, the logical function is necessary. This 
synthetic a priori judgement makes experience possible. It corresponds to a 
category of unity that expresses the ability of the understanding to unify 
objects of cognition in the abstract despite the fact that they are also 
concrete objects. This abstract ability and corresponding conceptual form 
make it possible to include something concrete, such as a human being, in 
experience as a whole. The category derived from the judgement must 
provide an empty and abstract way of marking out concrete situations in 
terms of their quantities. We must be clear that this does not specify what 
the concrete will be, such as that human beings and mortality are involved, 
but it does specify the logical function that makes it possible to include 
human beings and mortality in experience. We can now abstract from 
concrete cases where we encounter humanity or mortality even though these 
might appear under very different guises. The second judgement of 
quantity is the particular judgement. An example is 'some human beings 
are mortal'. This is a judgement in which the predicate-concept (mortality) 
contains some of its subject-concepts (human beings). To this synthetic a 
priori judgement there corresponds the category of plurality. Again the 
understanding's ability to abstract from concrete experience is at the basis of 
experience. Although we meet with many objects of cognition that we class 
under the concept of a human being, we must be able to distinguish those 
who share a particular predicate and those who do not. For Kant we take 
this ability for granted because otherwise experience would lack the 
coherent and systematic organisation that makes it possible in the first 
place.
The third judgement of quantity is the singular judgement, an example of 
which is the proposition 'Socrates is mortal'. In this synthetic a priori 
judgement the predicate (mortality) contains one of its subjects (Socrates).
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This gives rise to the category of totality or allness.61 As we've remarked, 
Kant derives the third judgement and category in each division from the 
combination of the first two, leading some to find his system artificial. We 
must also note the difference between a general logic and a transcendental 
logic when it comes to the make up of the two tables. This third judgement 
of quantity faces the charge of being both artificial, because every division 
of the two tables must have a third member, and outdated, because logic has 
developed in a different direction. Kant writes that singular judgements f ... 
deserve a separate place in a complete table of the moments of thought as 
such (although it does indeed not deserve a separate place in the logic that is 
limited to the use of the judgments merely in relation to one another)'.62 If 
the inclusion of a third judgement and category is to be convincing it will 
have to be shown to be a response to the difference between general and 
transcendental logic. It would then be a response to the need to account for 
both the abstract and concrete in a transcendental logic rather than 
expressing a rigid and artificial method of systematically presenting two 
tables. As we've seen, a transcendental logic must refer to the concrete 
content of experience without specifying it and in this way make a material 
difference. Kant argues that the singular judgement must be considered 
'...in terms of the quantity it has by comparision with other cognitions'.63 
Thus we ask what material difference the first two judgements and 
categories of quantity make and then see what else is demanded. The 
category of totality reflects the fact that in the concrete we can refer to one 
subject, such as Socrates, whilst in general logic we never encounter this 
need. It is compared to other cognitions of quantity and distinguished 
because in this case we commit ourselves to a single subject. Any 
predicates will be referred to this subject so that we have the unity in one
61 Werner S. Pluhar translates allheit faithfully as allness but admits in a footnote that 
totality does sound better after unity and plurality. He reserves totality for totalitat in 




subject of a potential plurality of predicates. It thus combines the first two 
categories, unity and plurality, but does this in a unique and indispensible 
way. It ensures that we can recognise and abstract from concrete situations 
in order to make many singular claims about a subject. This third 
judgement and category therefore responds to the problem of referring in 
the abstract to complex, concrete situations that arise in the course of 
experience.
The judgements and categories of quality form the second division of both 
tables. Kant explains that transcendental logic here considers what Value or 
content' is to be secured.64 Unlike in general logic judgements are 
considered '... in terms of what gain for cognition as a whole is provided 
,..'.65 The first judgement is affirmative and an example is 'Socrates is 
wise'. The corresponding category is that of reality. James Luchte argues 
that this ensures that each object'... has its own kind of being or existence, 
its reality'.66 The notion of a unique 'kind of being or existence' is very rich 
without being attached to what is given in experience or the concrete details 
of experience. The Value or content' secured by a judgement of quality 
refers us to the reality encountered in an object of cognition that is wise or 
not wise, hot or cold, red or blue. This extends experience but for Kant this 
is always coherent and systematic because the two tables provide the 
abstract abilities and forms that make experience possible. A change in the 
value or content secured by judgement can make a significant material 
difference but it does this only because we can first of all affirm the reality 
of a quality in the abstract. The second judgement of quality is the negative 
judgement, an example of which is 'Socrates is not wise'. The 
corresponding category is negation. In the abstract we must be able to rule
64Ibid: 125, A72/B97: 'But transcendental logic considers the judgment also in terms of 
what value or content there is in this logical affirmation made by means of a merely 
negative predicate, and in terms of what gain for cognition as a whole is provided by 
this affirmation'.
65Ibid. The full sentence is given in the previous footnote.
66Luchte 2007: 53.
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out concrete realities that might crowd out our clear understanding of a 
particular subject. For Kant something is an object of cognition only if its 
qualities can be distinguished from anything that would cancel them out or 
make them unclear. In the example we've given the wisdom of Socrates 
must stand out from other possible qualities that we might predicate. If we 
cannot know whether Socrates is or is not wise, given sufficient experience, 
then the lack of this ability would undermine experience as such. The third 
member of the second division of both tables refers to how the qualitative 
content of a judgement is secured in the context of a wider domain of 
qualities. The infinite judgement and the category of limitation are these 
third members. They allows us to '...limit the infinite sphere of all that is 
possible, ... f .67 Kant continues: 'Hence although such judgments are infinite 
as regards logical range, they are actually merely limitative as regards the 
content of cognition as such'.68 An example of the judgement of infinity is 
'Socrates is non-wise*. This sounds like negation, the second category of 
quality, but for Kant it is the combination of a negative predicate and 'the 
infinite sphere of all that is possible' that makes this a unique and necessary 
judgement and category. It is a combination of the infinite sphere of what 
is 'non-wise' and the negation that distinguishes a subject from this infinite 
sphere. This is to consider the background against which objects of 
cognition must be secured. As Beatrice Longuenesse puts it, '...what they 
are is thought only against the background of what they are not'.69 In this 
way the third judgement and concept of quality reflect the concrete pole of 
experience, the range of possible qualities that characterise the concrete and 
so need to be dealt with a priori in the abstract. Again it is the ability to 
abstract and to provide the abstract forms of every concrete situation that 
makes the pure understanding indispensible.
67Kant 1996: 126, A72/B97. 
68lbid: 126, A73/B98. 
69Longuenesse 1998: 310.
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If we turn to the third division of both tables we find that Kant is concerned 
with '... all the relations of thought in judgments1 . 70 These are abstract 
relations that, in common with the other members of the two tables, refer to 
the concrete in abstract ways. They concern the relation of the predicate- 
concept to subject-concept in synthetic a priori judgements. Kant names the 
first judgement of relation the categorical judgement, an example of which 
is 'This is snow1 . The category that corresponds to the categorical 
judgement is the category of inherence and subsistence or substance and 
accident. Kant is concerned with whether the predicate is inherent in the 
subject, whether it forms part of its definition or is merely accidental. If it 
is true that 'This is snow' then it is true that the predicate, being what we 
recognise as snow, inheres in the subject referred to. Kant is concerned 
with securing this in the abstract or in the pure use of the understanding and 
not solely on the basis of experience. An example given in his Lectures on 
Metaphysics shows the systematic relation of the first and second categories 
of relation. It shows how judgements and categories form a system and 
work together in securing the cognition of possible experience. The 
example is 'Snow has fallen' and Kant writes:
'Herein lies that snow is, substance; fallen means an accident, upon 
the earth means an influence, that is action <actio> thus belongs to 
cause <causa>. Today refers to time, fallen to space. If we omit all 
sensations, as well as space and time, substance remains, which acts 
in a certain way, thus they must be connected so that the concept of 
experience arises. If we posit that we had no such pure concepts of 
the understanding [or categories], then we could not think or speak at 
all'.7 '
For Kant synthetic a priori judgement has been at work here, systematically 
making possible the empirical course of events by securing an inhering 
substance and a sequence of cause and effect. Substance remains because it 
is an abstract form and is not secured on the basis of experience.72 For Kant
7°Kant 1996: 126, A73/B98. 
7 *Kant 1997: 158.
72Georges Dicker contrasts Kant's notion of substance with 'bundle theory', for which 
' a thing is nothing but a collection of coexisting properties. By contrast, the
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we could never extract from experience a notion of substance that makes 
this very experience possible. The second judgement of relation is the 
hypothetical judgement and the second category is causality and 
dependence or cause and effect. Kant gives the following example of a 
hypothetical judgement: 'If there is a perfect justice, then the persistently 
evil person is punished1 .73 He argues that this hypothetical judgement only 
gives us a relation of implication between two propositions. That the 
persistently evil person is punished if there is perfect justice follows from 
the coherence of a system of perfect justice. This only shows what is 
implied in a logical sense and refers to the logic that makes a system of 
justice coherent. However, it does not tell us whether these two 
propositions are true in a sense that is both abstract and concrete.74 The 
example of the fallen snow showed how relevant to concrete experience this 
hypothetical judgement can be when combined with the category of cause 
and effect. It makes a material difference whether or not something causes 
it to snow. It matters for meteorology that this holds in the case of snow 
and for all experience that effect follows cause in any situation whatever. 
Now we must consider whether there are convincing reasons to move to a 
third member of this third division of both tables. For Kant we need to 
construct a system that makes experience possible and, because this system 
must relate the abstract and the concrete in order to do this, we need to 
show that their relation provides reasons for the construction of this system. 
As we've seen, for Kant the problematic relation of the synthetic and the a 
priori is at the basis of all construction of systems. This is what would 
allow him to claim that his tables are not rigid and artificial but engaged in 
fully accounting for experience.
substance theory says that a thing is composed not just of its various properties but 
also of a substance (often also called "substance" or "substratum") distinct from all 
those properties, to which the properties all belong1 (Dicker 2004: 73). Kant's notion 
of substance will be explored further in chapter five of this thesis.
73Kant 1996: 126, A73/B98.
74'Whether these two propositions are in themselves true remains undecided here; only 
the implication is thought through this hypothetical judgment' (ibid: 126-127, 
A73/B98).
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From the third judgement of relation, disjunctive judgement, Kant derives 
the category of community. He qualifies this category as 'Interaction 
between Agent and Patient'.75 The apparent lack of fit between disjunction 
and community has been noted in the secondary literature. There seems to 
be no relation between a judgement that excludes things through disjunction 
and a category that includes things in a community. Paul Guyer is one such 
critic and he argues that:
'...what Kant has in mind by the disjunctive form of judgment, that is, 
"Either p or not-/?," e.g., "Either the world is just or the world is 
unjust" (cf. A74/B99) seems to be the exact opposite of what he has 
in mind with the category of "community" or "reciprocity": in the 
case of a disjunctive judgment, the truth of one disjunct is supposed 
to entail the falsehood of all the others, while in the case of 
community, the condition of one's object is supposed to entail that 
of another and vice versa, that is, we might say, the truth about one 
object is supposed to entail and be entailed by the truth of the 
other'.7*
Kant's alleged 'pervasive triadic obsession' could be used to explain why he 
insists on a third category of relation but this would neglect the 
philosophical reasons he offers for putting together these two apparently 
mis-matching things. Kant relates disjunctive judgement and the category 
of community in the following way: This community consists in the fact 
that the cognitions reciprocally exclude one another, and yet as a whole 
determine thereby the true cognition; for, taken together, they constitute the 
whole content of a single given cognition'.77 This reflects the 
complementarity of both tables that we saw Beatrice Longuenesse 
proposing. Kant argues that disjunction needs a community of substances if 
it is to do its work and community needs to be defined by the work of 
disjunction so that we are not confused about its nature because of the 
different concrete things it includes. Longuenesse writes that '[a]




disjunctive judgment presupposes that concepts are already formed1 . 78 It 
relies upon a community or whole that exhausts all the possibilities for 
disjunction and can be divided by it.79 It then provides community with a 
disjunctive definition, with the clarity this brings when it comes to defining 
a community of substances. Thus whilst Guyer's claim is valid when it 
comes to the generally accepted definitions of disjunction and community 
in logic it does not recognise the nature of the transcendental logic 
presented in two co-ordinated tables. This third member again combines 
the first two. It combines inhering substances and the relations of 
determination between such substances. However, it shows the Table of 
Categories to be concerned with how substances can be related in other 
ways than the second category, cause and effect, will allow. A community 
presents relations of determination between substances but these are not 
relations where an effect depends upon a cause. Substances are equal rather 
than dependent upon one another when they interact and determine one 
another reciprocally. We will return to this issue in chapter five of this 
thesis where the close involvement of this judgement and category in the 
synthesis of possible experience will develop the relation of disjunction and 
community.
The judgements of modality, the fourth and final division of the Table of 
Judgements, could be said to be concerned with the way in which an object 
exists. If our judgement is 'Maybe Socrates is a philosopher' it is a 
problematic judgement or claim about an object of cognition. It is possible
78Longuenesse 1998: 105.
79Kant locates the role of community in disjunctive judgement by making it the whole 
which is divided by disjunction:'... [A] disjunctive judgment contains a relation of 
two, or of several, propositions to one another. But this relation is not one of 
sequence. Rather, it is a relation of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of the 
one proposition excludes the sphere of the other; yet it is at the same time a relation 
of community, insofar as the two propositions together occupy the sphere of the 
proper cognition involved. Hence the relation of the propositions in a disjunctive 
judgment is a relation of the parts of a cognition's sphere. For the sphere of each part 
complements the sphere of the other part, to yield the whole sum of the divided 
cognition' (Kant 1996: 127, A73-4/B99).
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that Socrates is a philosopher but experience has not established this. If, 
however, we say that 'It is the case that Socrates is a philosopher' we make 
an assertoric judgement that has a basis in experience. We have read books 
by Plato, Xenophon and others that claim to report Socrates' words and 
classify them as philosophy according to what we know of the subject. 
However, if we say that 'It is necessarily the case that Socrates is a 
philosopher' we make an apodeictic judgement. In the example we are 
using we would have an idea of what philosophy is and if we did not 
classify Socrates as a philosopher this would be undermined. We would no 
longer know what philosophy is if Socrates were not classed as a 
philosopher. Of course it is not necessary to the possibility of experience 
that Socrates is a philosopher but there are certain conditions which are 
necessary in this sense. These conditions include categories but also 
include things like the laws of motion that we found to be a concern of 
Kant's architectonic in chapter one of this thesis. The three categories of 
modality are possibility, existence and necessity. They pick out in turn 
those things that are possible but not established as part of experience, those 
that exist because they form a recognisable part of experience and those 
things that are necessary to the very possibility of experience. In this way 
we find that something can exist in different ways according to its role in 
cognition as a whole. This final division of the two tables allows us to 
distinguish in the abstract the role of different objects in our cognition. The 
first three divisions of both tables are the basis for these judgements of 
modality. We can then proceed to investigate experience and establish the 
possibility, existence and necessity of objects. We recognise an a priori 
principle as necessary and thus distinct from one that is established by 
experience and open to disproof, or from one that is merely possible and 
demands further investigation. In this way the judgements and categories of 
modality extend the Table of Categories as a whole into all our cognition of 
experience. They do not mark out situations like the previous three 
divisions of the two tables but organise our cognition of such situations in
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the course of experience. Their role should not be downplayed because for 
Kant empirical cognition must reflect the system that makes experience 
possible. His architectonic method demands that we do not simply 
acknowledge the foundational role of the Table of Categories and then 
forget about them. As an indispensable response to the problem at the basis 
of the architectonic this table must shape all of the understanding's 
empirical cognition.
Conclusion
We've found that the interpretations of the Metaphysical Deduction we 
considered at the start of this chapter have their limitations. The history of 
logic goes in quite a different direction to Kant's transcendental logic and 
does not directly challenge its completeness. The other approach, to make 
the categories reflect experience more closely, neglects Kant's 
understanding of how the abstract and the concrete are to be related in his 
architectonic. His argument in the Metaphysical Deduction is that openness 
to experience is made possible by synthetic a priori cognition in its 
systematic completeness. We have sought to show the link between 
completeness and openness in the two tables he presents. James Luchte 
sums up the role of categories in making openness possible: 'Any "thing" 
that we may experience can suddenly be illuminated in light of this 
conceptual schema. A class room, society, or an artwork, for instance: the 
quantity of students, citizens or aspects, their qualities, their relations, and 
the way of being of the group, its state or composition as such1 . 80 The 
divisions of both tables makes possible the open-ended and rich cognition 
of experience insofar as they are complete. For Kant the abstraction and 
emptiness of the two tables means that they specify the forms experience
SOLuchte 2007: 54.
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can take only insofar as this makes experience possible. As we've seen, he 
argues for completeness in order to defeat the sceptic who would always be 
able to undermine the system if we left it incomplete or founded it upon 
givens of experience that are liable to change.
We have now considered the architectonic at its most abstract. We saw the 
relevance of the abstract to the concrete but emphasised that for Kant the 
two must not be confused. How should we pursue this unfolding of the 
architectonic? Kant does not refer to the members of his two tables in the 
first and second edition Transcendental Deductions which follow the 
Metaphysical Deduction. In order to explore the case he makes for his 
deduction of the two tables we will turn instead to the Analytic of Principles 
and thus miss out the two Transcendental Deductions. This is a major 
omission because in these two deductions we find something that Beatrice 
Longuenesse has described in the following way: 'There is no unity of self- 
consciousness or "transcendental unity of apperception" apart from this 
effort, or conatus toward judgement, ceaselessly affirmed and ceaselessly 
threatened with dissolution in the "welter of appearances [Gewtihle der 
Erscheinungen] '. 81 Longuenesse locates the unity of Kant's 
Transcendental Analytic by drawing upon the Transcendental Deductions. 
These present an impersonal subject which is behind the use of the 
categories. As we've seen, the a priori is at work silently before we are 
aware of it and so this subject is not a personal one. The transcendental 
unity of apperception is the impersonal operator of the apparatus Kant 
presents in the two tables with the end of securing objects of cognition.82
81 Longuenesse 1998: 394; Kant 1996: 161, Al 11, where Werner S. Pluhar translates 
Gewuhle der Erscheinungen as crowd of appearances rather than welter of 
appearances: 'And if empirical concepts did not rest on a transcendental basis of 
unity, then it would be possible for our soul to be filled with a crowd of appearances 
that yet could never turn into experience'. It would also be possible to translate it as 
throng of appearances and capture the threat posed to cognition by appearances. As 
we noted in the previous chapter, the relation between the synthetic and the a priori is 
always precarious or problematic.
82Kant links the cognition of objects of experience to our awareness of an identical
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For Longuenesse apperception is the effort towards judgement that makes 
possible the cognition of objects of experience.83 In neglecting this part of 
the text we offer the justification that the Analytic of Principles that follows 
it is concerned with the Table of Categories and its make up. While the 
Transcendental Deductions are concerned with the operator of these two 
tables they do not engage with the particular system they provide.84 If we 
are to see how the architectonic method gives rise to an argument like the 
Metaphysical Deduction and then secures its place in an account of the 
cognition of experience as a whole we will need to concentrate on the role 
of these two tables in the text. To this end we will jump to the Analytic of 
Principles and in the next two chapters consider how Kant's schematism 
relates concepts to the synthesis of possible experience. We will see how 
these concepts are first of all those presented in the Table of Categories and 
that we cannot understand this part of the text without referring to this table. 
This will allow us to deepen our understanding of Kant's architectonic 
method in one of its most contentious moves, in the formulation of two 
tables and their continuing role in an account of the cognition of possible
subject possessing the abilities and forms presented in the two tables: 'Hence the 
original and necessary consciousness of one's own identity is at the same time a 
consciousness of an equally necessary unity of all appearances according to concepts 
- these concepts being rules that not only make these appearances necessarily 
reproducible, but that thereby also determine an object for our intuition of these 
appearances, i.e., determine a concept of something wherein these appearances 
necessarily cohere' (ibid: 159, A108).
83Longuenesse 1998: 395. 'For behind the deceptively rigid parallelism between logical 
forms of judgment and categories, what emerges is the cognitive effort of discursive 
beings confronting what is given to them in sensibility' (ibid: 396). Longuenesse 
offers this as a way of unifying our reading of the Transcendental Analytic of the 
Critique of Pure Reason just as Martin Heidegger, as we shall see in the next chapter 
of this thesis, locates the imagination and its schematism as the source of a unified 
reading of the text.
84It will be noted that chapter two of the Analytic of Concepts, which contains both 
Transcendental Deductions, is entitled 'On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of 
Understanding'. However, the categories or pure concepts of the understanding that 
actually make up the Table of Categories are not specifically referred to. Therefore 
the Transcendental Deduction would be valid even if we revised the Table of 
Categories but the Analytic of Principles is organised according to this table. As we 
shall see in chapter five of this thesis, the four parts of the third section of the second 
chapter of the Analytic of Principles correspond to the four divisions of the Table of 
Categories.
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experience. If we are to fully assess a deduction that is brief but very 
particular in the system it proposes we must consider how this system is 




'The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards 
investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn 
hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant. Only when we have 
established the problematic of Temporality, can we succeed in casting light on 
the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. But this will also show us why 
this area is one which had to remain closed off to him in its real dimensions and 
its central ontological function1 .
(Heidegger 1962: 45)
'We are already at the heart of the problem of time'.
(Deleuze 1978a: 10)
Kant's chapter on the schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason demands 
much attention in its own right as an argument concerning the relations 
between pure concepts of the understanding and sensible intuition or 
sensation. However, it is not an isolated argument and its role in the text as 
a whole foreshadows any engagement with it. In the first chapter of this 
thesis we sought to put all the moves made in the Critique of Pure Reason 
in the context of a single and unifying problem, that of synthetic a priori 
judgement. The title of the schematism chapter is 'On the Schematism of 
the Pure Concepts of Understanding'. 1 Kant has clearly not lost sight of the 
Table of Categories or pure concepts of the understanding and the 
problematic Idea or 'Idea of the whole' that this embodies. It builds upon 
the response of the Metaphysical Deduction to the single and unifying 
problem of the architectonic. Kant continues to pursue the systematic 
presentation of his arguments that we've analysed in the previous chapters 
of this thesis. The schematism takes forward the systematic completeness 
presented in the abstract in the Metaphysical Deduction so that it becomes
iKant 1996: 209, A137/B176.
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the systematic completeness of a concrete account of the synthesis of 
possible experience in space and time.
Should we follow Kant's apparent strategy and understand the schematism 
first of all as continuing to embody the concerns and the methods of 
argument of the architectonic method? For many commentators we should 
not and should instead understand the schematism as a much more 
convincing argument for the categories precisely because it differs from the 
Metaphysical Deduction. The problem of the heterogeneity of concepts and 
sensations arises in the context of the whole process of securing the a priori 
synthetic cognition of possible experience. However, it has a very different 
position within this whole according to the way we read the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Does it extend and realise the Idea of a whole presented in 
the Metaphysical Deduction or replace it with a more convincing 
characterisation of the whole?
At stake is the role of categories or pure concepts of the understanding in 
the ongoing synthesis or production of experience in space and time. How 
can they be at work in the very synthesis of experience whilst being first of 
all abstract and disengaged, as we saw in the Metaphysical Deduction? 
Showing that they have this immanent and concrete role is the task of the 
schematism chapter. Kant here finds the source of the closer relation of 
concepts and sensations in the imagination, as an ability, and in time, as the 
ultimate form of the synthesis of experience. The question is whether this 
move should be taken as a replacement for the Metaphysical Deduction or 
whether Kant is right to apparently develop it as an extension of his 
architectonic presentation of the Critique of Pure Reason. We will consider 
why the former option is popular among commentators, building upon our 
investigation in the last chapter into why many commentators dislike the 
Metaphysical Deduction. We will see that many seek the justification of 
the categories in the Analytic of Principles with its chapters on the
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schematism and principles that make the categories immanent to the 
ongoing synthesis of experience in space and time. We suggested that this 
denies us the possibility of considering the Table of Categories on its own 
terms, as something justified in the Metaphysical Deduction and applied 
systematically in the Analytic of Principles. The ways of reading the 
Critique of Pure Reason that we have considered so far raise the problem of 
whether aspects of Kant's system can be removed or downplayed in order to 
get closer to what Kant 'really' meant or should have said. Can we re-read 
Kant's work 'from within' in order to make it more consistent with itself 
despite Kant's actual words?
As we saw in the first chapter of this thesis, some commentaries go so far as 
to blame Kant's 'mentality' for the way he seeks to establish the categories 
without reference to their role in the synthesis of experience. This external 
factor led him to isolate or abstract pure concepts in their systematic 
completeness and then seek to apply them to the synthesis of experience. S. 
Korner writes of the proofs provided in the Analytic of Principles for the 
application of the categories to experience that:
'The proofs (not all equally obvious and at times somewhat artificial) 
are symptomatic of a certain formalism which is characteristic of 
Kant's mentality, inclining him first to the conviction that the Table 
of Categories is complete and then to the expectation that their 
schemata lead to an equally complete table of the synthetic a priori 
principles of objective experience'.2
The argument that was put forward in the previous chapter of this thesis, 
and that will be further developed and defended in the chapter after this one, 
is that Kant's architectonic mode of argument and presentation needs to be 
given a fair hearing rather than labelled an 'external' factor. We argued in 
chapter one that speculation concerning Kant's mentality should not stand in 
for this type of evaluation and can in any case only ever be speculative. 
However, there is still a case to be answered. Kant himself sets standards
2K6rnerl955:77.
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for arguments that arise within his architectonic method. They must relate 
the synthetic and the a priori in a clear and convincing way. As we shall 
see, there is an apparent mis-match between arguments that are based upon 
the concrete concerns of cognition and the order of Kant's presentation of 
the text. The abstract and the concrete seem to pull in different directions. 
Many commentators take seriously and evaluate his arguments for the 
necessary role of the particular categories found in the Analytic of 
Principles but see his tendency to form complete and systematic tables as 
irrelevant to these arguments. They affirm his interest in matching 
particular categories to concrete problems in the cognition of possible 
experience and reject his concern to unify and present all his arguments in 
an architectonic.
Our first task in this chapter will be to consider the case for revising or 
replacing the Metaphysical Deduction using the Analytic of Principles. We 
will consider Norman Kemp Smith's argument that the schemata or 
schematised categories were what Kant meant all along, even when he 
talked about pure and abstract categories in the Metaphysical Deduction. 
We will then contrast this reading to Martin Heidegger's attempt to 
articulate Kant's Idea of the whole or inner problematic by bringing the 
imagination to the fore. Having seen how it is foreshadowed by such 
readings of the Critique of Pure Reason as a whole we will then turn to the 
schematism chapter itself. The differences between concept, schema and 
image will help us to elucidate the 'secret art' and irreducible ability that the 
imagination is for Kant in its transcendental power of schematism. We will 
then introduce Deleuze's particular use of Kant's schematism and the limits 
of his positive appreciation of it.
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i. Placing the Schematism in the Architectonic
We will be concerned in this section to consider why it is a common 
tendency among Kant scholars to seek to complete or replace the work done 
in the Metaphysical Deduction using the schematism chapter. Why go 
against Kant's explicit move to involve what he claims he has already 
established, a Table of Categories, in the synthesis of possible experience? 
The architectonic that organises the text seems to be designed to take us 
from categories to their schematism, to be animated by the problem of 
relating concepts and sensations. In this way it maintains a particular Idea 
of the whole. The difference between concepts and sensations seems 
therefore to be a difference internal to Kant's account of experience or a 
problem that animates it from within. It shows how the relation between 
the synthetic and the a priori is at stake at this stage of the account, in the 
relation of the faculties of understanding and sensation. However, Norman 
Kemp Smith finds in the schematism chapter the 'delayed definitions' of the 
categories that were presented quite out of context in the Metaphysical 
Deduction.3 Their proper context, he argues, is their role in the synthesis of 
experience that the schematism chapter belatedly presents. He blames the 
influence of the architectonic, as a method of presenting a philosophical 
account, for misleading both the reader and the writer of the Critique of 
Pure Reason. In the schematism chapter '[i]t forces [Kant] to preface his 
argument by introductory remarks which run entirely counter to the very 
point he is chiefly concerned to illustrate and enforce, namely, the 
inseparability of conception and [sensible] intuition in all experience and 
knowledge'.4 It follows that their abstraction or distance from experience in 
a Table of Categories is not the 'internal' and productive problem that it 
might appear. It is an 'external' and false problem to do with how the 
categories are presented and how the text is organised. It does not then
3Kemp Smith 2003: 340.
4lbid.
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indicate a problem that must be responded to in the process of accounting 
for the cognition of possible experience. As we saw in chapter one of this 
thesis, Kemp Smith goes so far as to claim that: 'This architectonic was a 
hobby sufficiently serious to yield [Kant] keen pleasure in its elaboration, 
but was not so vital to his main purposes as to call for stronger measures 
when shortcomings occurred1 . 5
This argument is something we shall be testing in this chapter, and in the 
chapter that follows it, as we consider the Analytic of Principles. For Kemp 
Smith the architectonic's influence misleads us because categories and their 
involvement in the synthesis of experience are artificially separated by the 
way of presenting the text that the architectonic represents. Categories are 
always already immanent to the syntheses of possible experience in Kant's 
transcendental logic but his systematic presentation of the text fails to 
reflect this when it separates the Metaphysical Deduction and the 
schematism chapter. This takes a lot away from the schematism chapter, 
which is often seen as introducing a unique and necessary ability involved 
in securing the synthesis of possible experience. What is missing in the 
Metaphysical Deduction, according to Kemp Smith, is any proof that the 
categories presented there are the particular forms required for the cognition 
of possible experience. He argues that: 'This omission can be made good 
only by a series of proofs, directed to showing, in reference to each separate 
category, its validity within experience and its indispensableness for the 
possibility of experience'.6 This should have been done earlier because, 
Kemp Smith argues, Kant always thought of the categories in this way. He 
simply delayed his proof of this in order to pursue his architectonic 
presentation of the text and so made it appear that a new power or ability 




more often than not he means 'schemata' or 'schematised category'.7 His 
complaint is that Kant should have started talking about schemata rather 
than categories earlier in the text, avoiding the confusing delay.
To begin to assess this reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason we need 
to consider Kemp Smith's understanding of what is internal to the text. He 
criticises its architectonic presentation because he finds that consistent and 
valid philosophical arguments are obscured by it. We've seen him 
speculating that Kant was influenced by the enjoyment of systematising, as 
something equivalent to the enjoyment provided by a hobby, in order to 
explain why he obscured his own genuine arguments. We will need to 
engage with the schematism chapter and the chapters on the principles in 
order to assess this fully because we saw Kemp Smith claiming that the 
architectonic method was not important enough to Kant's argument 'to call 
for stronger measures when shortcomings occurred'. The schematism 
chapter overcomes its own position in the architectonic and in spite of this 
method of presentation shows itself to be the delayed supplement to the 
Metaphysical Deduction. However, while remaining at the level of the 
Critique of Pure Reason as a whole we can begin to question Kemp Smith's 
argument. When we do this we note that Kant explicitly presents the 
categories as abstract and isolated from their involvement in the synthesis 
of possible experience. This seems to go beyond the mere enjoyment of 
presenting his work systematically insofar as he makes a key claim 
concerning the relation of the faculties. Kemp Smith acknowledges this and 
points to Kant's philosophical and historical context and to a strategy that 
responds to it. He argues that Kant, like his contemporaries, understood 
concepts '... as in all cases a mere concept, i.e. an abstracted or class 
concept'.8 This leads him take abstraction for granted as a starting point and 




the synthesis of experience. We are then misled by the apparent need to 
move from abstraction to concretion, by Kant's strategy for responding to 
the debates of his times. This strategy, Kemp Smith claims, betrays the 
movement of Kant's own arguments in the course of writing the Critique of 
Pure Reason because categories actually function differently in the 
transcendental logic he has been developing. He has come up with a logic 
always already engaged in the cognition of experience. It is as if the 
dynamics of the text, the learning process of the author in and through the 
text he writes, have taken Kant on a journey. It takes him beyond his hobby 
of pursuing an architectonic presentation and beyond his historical and 
philosophical context to categories that are always already schematised. 
Kemp Smith's criticism is that Kant does not clear the ground fully as he 
should and start with a schematised category. His conclusion is that with 
proper clarity and consistency the text would be re-organised in the 
following way:
'The table of categories, in its distinction from the table of logical 
forms [or the table of judgements], would then have been named the 
table of schemata, and the definitions given in this chapter would 
have been appended to it, as the proper supplement to the 
metaphysical deduction, completing it by a careful definition of each 
separate schema. For what Kant usually means when he speaks of 
the categories are the schemata: and the chapter before us therefore 
contains their delayed definitions'.9
We have then a reading that re-organises the Critique of Pure Reason on the 
basis of the claim that understanding and sensation are inseparable if we 
follow the development of Kant's transcendental logic. A concern that 
arises with this reading is that it leaves no room for a productive dynamic 
between what is grasped by the understanding and what is not. We defined 
this dynamic in terms of the relation between the synthetic and the a priori. 
On the basis of this single problem Kant relates understanding's a priori 
concepts to the sensations that arise through synthesis. Kemp Smith 
emphasises the role of the understanding in dealing with sensation but fails
9lbid: 340.
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to acknowledge the challenge presented by the synthesis of sensation on the 
occasions when it prompts the use of cognitive powers or faculties and their 
a priori forms of cognition. It is a reading of this sort that we find in Martin 
Heidegger's He seeks to locate the 
power that unifies the a priori synthesis of possible experience in the 
imagination. He sums up his strategy in this way: The following 
interpretation will not follow each of the twisted paths of the 
Transcendental Deduction, but will lay bare the original impetus for the 
problematic'. 11 From the start an Idea of the whole is at work and 
Heidegger refers to this as keeping '...the whole of pure, finite knowledge in 
view'. 12 Kant is seen to provide the setting in which cognition can take 
place, the transcendental horizon where pure forms of the understanding 
and sensation are unified in the a priori synthesis of possible experience. 
This is the ultimate unity of categories or pure concepts of the 
understanding and the a priori forms of intuition, space and time. They are 
unified in a common project that can only be pursued in the context of their 
unity. Such a unity is therefore 'in view' before all cognitive activity can 
take place and for Heidegger this demands the unique power that is the
10It is interesting to note Deleuze's interest in Heidegger's reading of Kant. Christian 
Kerslake uncovers Deleuze's early interest in a tradition, stretching from Kant to 
Heidegger, which concerns itself with the ability of a system to be autonomously self- 
grounding. The source of this discovery is the transcript of a 1956 seminar entitled 
'What is Grounding' (Kerslake 2008: 30; lecture course available in French as 'Qu'est- 
ce que Fonder?' at www.webdeleuze.com/php/sommaire.html, I rely here on 
Kerslake's account of it). This reflects the shared concern of Kant and Deleuze with 
immanence, something that we considered in chapter two of this thesis. We must not 
look for origins or starting points outside of the critical account of experience we are 
giving. Intriguingly, Kerslake reports Deleuze's interest in the architectonic method: 
'Deleuze claims that Kant's own approach to grounding is vitiated by his inability to 
settle on the side of method or system. Kant places his "Architectonic" of the 
realisation of reason right at the end of the when he should 
have placed the construction of the system at the beginning1 (ibid: 34). This leads 
Deleuze to favour Heidegger's Kant, a Kant concerned with a method for dealing with 
human finitude. Finitude is not dealt with by looking outside of experience but 
through autonomous self grounding. This is something we will develop shortly by 
talking about the 'transcendence within finitude' that Heidegger locates in Kant's





A word of explanation is needed regarding Heidegger's terminology. This 
reflects the nature of his own thought but is worth exploring here because it 
can also help us to understand Kant's concerns. We saw that he articulates 
the Kantian Idea of the whole as 'the whole of pure, finite knowledge'. 
There is a combination of finitude and cognition here, placing the a priori 
unity of cognition in the finite context of space and time as a priori forms of 
sensation. This combination is developed by Heidegger's use of the term 
'transcendence' and the notion of transcendence within finitude. It is a 
transcendence immanent to the finitude of the human situation, to 
situatedness in space and time. It is then a situated transcendence or a 
transcendence within finitude. Heidegger echoes Kant's concern with the 
precariousness of the relation between the synthetic and the a priori when 
he writes of:'... the lasting premonition of the finitude of transcendence...'. 13 
It is the difference between our finitude, our situatedness in space and time, 
and our ability to transcend it that drives forward the work of cognition. 
The subject, the transcendental unity of apperception, rises above sensation 
in order to cognise it but always cognises things as sensible, as 
characterised by space and time. However, this also involves a power of 
the imagination that is immanent to the synthesis of possible experience in 
space and time, and yet secures transcendence because it realises the 
categories in the process of cognition. At this point we must assess the 
relevance of Heidegger's reading to the inner problematic of Kant's 
He uses the term finitude to reflect the concrete and 
synthetic pole of experience, the material without which our a priori forms 
of cognition would lack content. With the term transcendence he captures 
the need to go beyond the givens of experience in a priori ways but 
recognises that for Kant we can only ever cognise objects of possible 
experience. We never cease to be finite beings or beings located in space
13lbid.
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and time, no matter how much of this experience we grasp in abstract ways. 
Deleuze affirms this reading of Kant when he writes in 
that"... when we "know", we employ these words; we say 
than is given to us, we what is given in experience'. 14 In this 
sense the 'finitude of transcendence1 that Heidegger talks about seems 
relevant to Kant's architectonic. Our exploration of the a priori in the first 
chapter of this thesis showed how its ability to rise above the concrete did 
not undermine its relation to the concrete at every stage. The abstract wants 
to go beyond concrete cases but can never achieve anything without the 
concrete.
Heidegger makes an interpretive claim that, as well as being a necessary 
and unique ability that is not merely a supplement to the power of the 
understanding, the imagination actually provides us with an Idea of the 
whole for Kant's He also claims that this is a 
reading '...which grew from the inner problematic of the 
itself, ,..'. 15 For Heidegger this is the problem of securing 
transcendence within finitude, through the combination of concepts and 
sensations, that persists in the ongoing cognition of possible experience. 
Kant presents a unifying image that Heidegger uses to represent the unity he 
finds in the The image in question appears in the 
introduction to the text: 'Human cognition has two stems, viz., 
and which perhaps spring from a common root, though one 
unknown to us. Through sensibility objects are to us; through 
understanding they are What is at stake is the ability of the 
understanding to deal with sensation, to deal with its own finitude using 
forms of cognition that transcend particular cases and yet are immanent to 
them. This is a transcendence that is not distant from finitude, that is
14Deleuze 1984: 11. Deleuze's interest in Heidegger's reading of Kant was considered in
footnote 10 of this chapter. 
15Heidegger 1997: 95. 
! 6Kantl996:67,A15/B29.
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engaged in the synthesis of possible experience itself as well as surveying it 
from the standpoint of the transcendental unity of apperception and the 
Table of Categories. Heidegger then points to places where Kant names 
three sources of cognition in order to interpret the unifying image of an 
unknown common root and its two stems. Thus in section three of the first 
edition version of the Transcendental Deduction Kant writes: There are 
three subjective sources of cognition on which rests the possibility of an 
experience as such and of cognition of its objects: and 
For Heidegger Kant's acknowledgement here of the role of 
the imagination alongside sensation and understanding is still inadequate to 
the 'inner problematic' of the He argues that we 
can interpret the unknown common root of the two stems, sensation and 
understanding, as the imagination. The imagination, he argues, shows itself 
to be more than one faculty alongside two others in accounting for 
experience. If we follow Heidegger's reading we find that this common 
root is to be the genesis of cognition and must therefore not be confused 
with what we meet in sensation or the forms provided by the understanding. 
It must instead be the source of their unity, something they rely upon 
because of its unique and 'unknown1 ability. Therefore: '...the 
transcendental power of imagination is not just an external bond which 
fastens together two ends. It is originally unifying, i.e., as a particular 
faculty it forms the unity of the others, which themselves have an essential 
structural relation to it'. 18 It is what understanding and sensation depend 
upon in order to secure transcendence within finitude. How does this 
imagery show that the imagination is an original power, that it allows 
cognition to account for rather than presuppose the givens of experience?
As we saw in chapter two of this thesis, Kant refers to 'root concepts' in 




determine experience. 19 They are not based upon what has already been 
given in experience and they don't tell us what will happen in it.20 
Heidegger continues to develop this imagery to full effect. In order to show 
that the imagination is unique and original in its power to unify, Heidegger 
denies that this ground of unity is comparable to a 'floor' or 'base'. If it were 
like such things, Heidegger argues, it would provide no account of 
experience but be similar to things already given in experience. A floor or 
base is something already determined as part of experience, something 
fixed and present to us in the way it grounds other things given in 
experience. This distracts us from how experience is given or produced in 
space and time, a grounding that for Heidegger is more originary because it 
accounts for what it grounds. We think in terms of something extracted 
from this process so that it is merely present or 'at hand' as Heidegger puts 
it.21 Instead this original ground must be involved in the giving of 
experience itself, in the growth of experience in space and time. We need 
the source of growth, the root or genesis of cognition, rather than something 
that already forms a part of experience. As Kant's unknown common root 
the imagination is to be original in the sense that'... it lets the stems grow
19See chapter two, section 1, p. 62f.
20This is reflected in Kant's discussion of metaphysics in the introduction to the 
He calls it: '... a science, indispensible to human reason, whose 
every new shoot can indeed be lopped off but whose root cannot be eradicated1 (Kant 
1996: 63, B24). Thus while the attempts made at pursuing metaphysics over the 
course of history are rich and varied this does not exhaust metaphysics or tell us what 
it could be.
2 Heidegger 1997: 97. In Heidegger warns against understanding the 
world in terms of'present-at-hand' properties, something that is informing his concern 
with an unknown common root in Kant's system. He argues that we must not 
approach the world with the attitude of a theorist, merely observing what is given or 
present in our experience of things. This would be to take things in abstraction from 
how they are given and how they exist in time more broadly construed so that: 
'Entities are grasped in their Being as "presence"; this means that they are understood 
with regard to a definite mode of time - the (Heidegger 1962: 47). If we 
disturb the involvement of things in the production of experience they are seen as 
present-at-hand rather than being what Heidegger calls 'ready-to-hand1 . We gain 
merely a collection of present moments or present-at-hand things rather than an 
understanding of the givenness or production of experience that is always ongoing. 
We will see how relevant this is to Kant's understanding of the schematism as a 
unique and original ability that draws ultimately upon time in order to realise 
concepts in the synthesis or production of experience.
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out from itself, lending them support and stability'.22 Thus the imagination 
is to be concerned with supporting and securing the cognition of experience 
but is not limited to how things are already given and present to us in 
experience.
We have found that both Kemp Smith and Heidegger seek what is internal 
to Kant's text and in this way challenge the architectonic presentation of the 
by re-interpreting the Idea of a whole that is 
behind it. Kemp Smith challenged the Idea of a whole whose origin is the 
difference between concepts and sensations. However, we've found that the 
relations of the synthetic and the a priori lead Kant to relate the faculties in 
different ways at different stages of his account. We will now continue to 
make the case for preserving the heterogeneity of concepts and sensations. 
We turned to Heidegger's attempt to take further this 'internal difference', 
locating in the imagination the root of the unity of concepts and sensations. 
He interprets Kant's unknown common root as the transcendental power of 
the imagination on the grounds that Kant has left open its nature, as 
'unknown', and that imagination must mediate in an original and 'unknown* 
way between sensation and understanding. A major obstacle to this reading 
is Kant's move, in the second edition version of the Transcendental 
Deduction, to down play the role of the imagination. As Heidegger 
acknowledges, it now appears to be '...an action of the understanding upon 
sensibility, ...*.23 This leads him to claim that 'Kant shrank back from this 
unknown root'.24 We might ask why Heidegger did not shrink back from 
his own interpretation of the role of the imagination given Kant's explicit
22Heidegger 1997: 97.
23'... [T]he imagination is a power of determining sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of 
intuitions must be the transcendental synthesis of 
This synthesis is an action of the understanding upon sensibility, and is 
the understanding's first application (and at the same time the basis of all its other 
applications) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us1 (Kant 1996: 191, B152). 
This synthesis still involves imagination but it has become 'an act of understanding' 
rather than being a power or faculty relied upon by the understanding.
24Heidegger 1997: 112.
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move in the second edition of the Again we find 
that the schematism is a notion that has the power to re-organise the text in 
spite of Kant's own words. Heidegger argues that even though Kant 
downgrades the role of the imagination in his second edition version of the 
Transcendental Deduction '...the accomplishment of its transcendental 
grounding according to the first edition must still be maintained'.25 There is 
then a unity to the text and to the account of experience provided by its first 
edition that is to be defended even against the intentions of its author. An 
internal problematic or Idea of the whole is at stake. According to 
Heidegger the problem that unified Kant's account, that of relating concepts 
and sensations through the imagination, made him shrink back. This led 
him to move away from the imagination in the second edition. We've so far 
avoided defining Kant's notion of schematism and this was in order to 
explore its situation in the text as a whole and how it is foreshadowed by 
this. We will return to the question of whether it can or should undermine 
Kant's architectonic as both Kemp Smith and Heidegger claim from their 
different standpoints. In the next section we will consider the schematism 
chapter itself and this will allow us to gauge the case for using it as a guide 
for reading or re-reading the as a whole.
ii. The Schematism
The Analytic of Principles of the begins by 
introducing the 'third thing' that Heidegger makes so much of: 'Now clearly 
there must be something that is third, something that must be homogeneous 
with the category, on the one hand, and with the appearance, on the other 
hand, and that thus makes possible the application of the category to the 
appearance'.26 However, this is not identified with the imagination at first
25lbid:113.
2<>Kant 1996: 210-211, A138/B177.
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but is rather presented as being at work in judgement. It is introduced under 
the heading 'On the Transcendental Power of Judgement As Such1 .27 A 
unique and original ability is invoked in response to how judgement differs 
from understanding's concepts and sensation's intuitions. Neither 
understanding nor sensation can fully account for their common project, for 
the unified cognition of possible experience. How then is judgement able to 
apply concepts to sensations? The first way in which Kant seeks to show 
how categories are actually involved in the cognition of concrete situations 
in experience is to refer to rules. Understanding is 'our power of rules' 
whilst judgement has a unique ability to under rules'.28 These are 
rules for the synthesis of experience, ways of ensuring that conceptual 
forms of determination are applicable to experience rather than irrelevant to 
its spatio-temporal forms. The search for a definition of the ability to apply 
rules supplied by the understanding now animates the text, producing at 
first negative definitions that emphasise the uniqueness of this ability rather 
than reducing it to the abilities of the understanding and sensation. We saw 
Heidegger uncovering an unknown common root behind these moves, 
where Kant gets closer to the imagination as the source of the ultimate unity 
of cognition. The unique and 'unknown' role of the schematism does indeed 
take centre stage, as we shall now see.
In the schematism chapter itself Kant provides a definition of the 
imagination's transcendental power of schematism that needs to be 
interrogated because of how little it seems to tell us about this unique and 
original ability: 'This schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism 
regarding appearances and their mere form, is a secret art residing in the 
depths of the human soul, an art whose stratagems we shall hardly ever
27Ibid:206,A132/B171.
28'If understanding as such is explicated as our power of rules, then the power of 
judgment is the ability to under rules, i.e., to distinguish whether something 
does or does not fall under a given rule (is or is not a [case or 
instance of a given rule])1 (ibid).
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divine from nature and lay before ourselves1 .29 First of all we must consider 
Kant's use of the German term which is here translated as 'soul'.30 
This requires our attention because two German terms in the 
and are translated as 'soul'. In the 
Transcendental Aesthetic Kant writes that '[although inner sense provides 
no intuition of the soul itself as an object, yet there is a determinate 
form under which alone [as condition] we can intuit the soul's 
inner state'.31 The soul's inner state is time and we will consider the 
pervasive role of time later in this chapter. However, this passage is of 
immediate help in allowing us to define as an actual or potential 
object of cognition. Howard Caygill analyses this distinction and defines 
for Kant as '... a corporeal awareness of sensation and self- 
affection'.32 Thus it is defined as an inner state in the above passage but can 
also refer to our outer state where we encounter sensations rather than our 
own thoughts.33 This leads us to define as a substance rather than as 
the place where the faculties of cognition are centred. is a term that 
brings together the different faculties of cognition, the capacity to sense, to 
understand, to imagine and to think.34 We are both passive in receiving
29Ibid:214,A141/B180-181.
3°Kant 2005: 178
31 Kant 1996: 77, A22-3/B37, the addition of German terms in square brackets was made 
using the original German text (Kant 2005: 77-8); cited in Caygill 1995: 210.
32Ibid.
33 'By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we present objects outside us, and 
present them one and all in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to 
one another are determined and determinable. By means of inner sense the mind 
intuits itself, or its inner state1 (Kant 1996: 76-7, A22/B37).
34Howard Caygill refers to as embodying certain capacities or faculties on the 
basis of an essay by Kant entitled 'From Soemmerring's 
(1796)'. Here Kant defines the two senses of the soul we are concerned with: 'By 
means only of combining the given representations and 
effectuating the unity of empirical apperception not yet substance 
according to its nature, which is entirely distinct from that matter and form which is 
abstracted here; by this we gain that, with regard to the thinking subject, we must not 
cross over into metaphysics, which is concerned with pure consciousness and with the 
latter's unity in synthesis of given representations (i.e., 
concerned with the understanding); rather we are concerned with the power of the 
imagination, to whose intuitions, as empirical representations (even in the absence of 
objects), there can be assumed to correspond impressions in the brain (actually habits
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sensations and active in applying concepts thanks to these faculties centred 
in the soul.35 This might suggest that while we have to establish the number 
and nature of faculties or capacities concentrated in the soul as we 
may treat the soul (as as something we can uncover like any other 
object or substance. However, this is to neglect the secrecy surrounding the 
schematism as an art of the soul Why this secrecy if the soul, as 
is a substance or object?
In considering Kant's reference to a secret art of the soul we also 
have to consider whether he is avoiding giving an argument. The reference 
to 'the depths of the human soul' seems to obstruct enquiry because in fact 
the soul in this sense is, for Kant, not open to cognition. He refers to the 
soul as something we cannot come to know despite the fact that as the 
soul is something substantial rather than being the centre of different 
faculties as it is when the term is used. In fact it is because the
of reproduction), which belong to a whole of inner self-intuition' (Kant 
2007: 223, the addition in square backets was made by the translator; cited in Caygill 
1995: 210). We note that Kant is here concerned with the empirical use of the 
imagination and this is distinct from its pure or transcendental role. The empirical 
role of the imagination is made possible by its pure role insofar as this is co-ordinated 
with other faculties in a systematic process that accounts for the cognition of possible 
experience as such.
This passage also reflects the Aristotelian origin of the distinction between the 
two senses of the soul when it distinguishes and respectively as 
and Empirical apperception or empirical consciousness is referred to as 
in a way that reflects Aristotle's understanding of the soul in Tor 
if the eye was an animal, then sight would be its soul, being the substance of the eye 
that is in accordance with the account of it' (Aristotle 1986: 158). This definition 
reflects the analogy between an eye and Kant's Table of Categories which we 
considered in the third section of the previous chapter of this thesis. Rather than 
seeking the soul as an object Aristotle sees it as the centre of certain capacities that 
define and account for it. Thus he locates two capacities in the soul of an animal, 
those of discernment and locomotion (ibid: 211). We can define what an animal by 
considering what it He avoids asking 'what is the soul?' and as a result does not 
treat it as an object or substance but as a set of capacities or faculties that play a part 
in accounting for experience. We must not conflate the thought of Kant and Aristotle 
here but we can compare their methodological approaches to investigating the soul. 
We saw in chapter two of this thesis that the architectonic method sets problems 
whose objects are undetermined rather than seeking to determine all objects of 
cognition in advance or ask questions like 'what is the soul?'.
35Caygill 1995: 211.
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German term refers to an object or substance that the secrecy 
surrounding it is appropriate. The soul as is not something that should 
be transparent to us. We saw in chapter two of this thesis that for Kant we 
only have a problematic Idea of the self as a 'simple independent 
intelligence1 . He writes that '[t]he first object of such an idea am I myself, 
regarded merely as a thinking nature (soul However, as we saw, 
'... reason has before it nothing but principles of systematic unity that are 
useful to it in explaining the appearances of the soul It follows 
that this undetermined object of an Idea cannot reveal itself to us in the 
course of cognition but it can play a part in providing an account of 
cognition. We cannot know the soul but we can have a problematic 
Idea of it. We saw in chapter two that it is because the object of a 
problematic Idea is undetermined that it is able to play a productive role in 
the cognition of possible experience.
From this analysis of Kant's reference to a secret art of the soul we have 
learned how to put the schematism in context. The 
is concerned with the faculties involved in accounting for the cognition of 
experience and not with the soul as an object of cognition.38 If it seeks to
36Kant 1996: 647, A682/B710; Kant 2005: 544.
38Hence Kant's concern to deal with empirical psychology in his lectures on
Anthropology and his 1 798 book (see 
pages 19-20, footnote 12, of chapter one of this thesis). Kant also postpones his 
treatment of what he calls rational psychology and presents his critique of it in the 
paralogisms chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic of the 
In contrast to the rich elaboration of the synthesis of experience he is concerned with 
when he talks about the schematism he severely limits the role of rational psychology 
in accounting for experience: 'Hence is rational psychology's sole text, from 
which it is to unfold its entire wisdom' (Kant 1996: 384, A343/B401). It's only 
material is the 'I think' or transcendental unity of apperception which is a part of the 
account of experience that needs to be justified. This means that it is unable to locate 
a soul prior to the synthesis of experience that would be the location of powers or 
faculties like the imagination. Kant calls the 'I think' an empty presentation because 
'...it is a mere consciousness accompanying all concepts' (ibid: 385, A346/B404). 
Thus, whilst it might try to look for an object, rational psychology is only really able 
to reflect upon something that Kant considers to be the mere awareness of the unified 
activity of thought. It follows that empirical psychology is too full of things given in
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'know' the soul we find that it is concerned with what the soul is 
capable of, its faculties, rather than with locating it as an object or substance 
What follows from Kant's definition of the schematism is the re- 
direction of enquiry into this transcendental power of the imagination and 
decisively away from the soul as an object or substance. In order to give a 
positive definition of the imagination as a faculty, and not as an object to be 
discovered, Kant seeks to define it in terms of its role in accounting for 
experience.39 Like other elements in this account it is to be understood in 
terms of what it does in securing the cognition of possible experience. For 
Kant this ensures that nothing is isolated from the process of cognition if it 
is to have significance for cognition. If it is isolated in this way it remains a 
mystery for cognition. However, as an ability rather than the attribute of a 
mysterious object or substance, the schematism is always involved in and 
understood in terms of a wider process. However, Kant also seeks to avoid 
confusing the unique ability of the imagination with the outcomes of 
cognition, with what we can discover in experience or 'lay before ourselves1 . 
He dispels the mystery but does not do this by simply equating the 
schematism with what can be learnt on the basis of experience. As we've 
seen, Kant does not want to rely upon what is given in experience any more 
than on things that are outside or beyond experience. He seeks therefore to 
distinguish thoroughly this unique ability by giving negative definitions, to 
make it part of a transcendental account of the role and relations of the 
faculties insofar as it is not itself an object of cognition.
experience, and rational psychology is too empty, for either to be able to provide an 
account of the role of concepts in the synthesis of possible experience. 
39A word of caution is needed here because in referring to the imagination as a 'faculty' 
we ignore Kant's concern in the second edition Transcendental Deduction of the 
to understand the schematism as '...an action of the 
understanding upon sensibility...' (see footnote 23 of this chapter). We cited this in 
our discussion of Heidegger's reading of Kant earlier in this chapter. The implication 
is that, as well as not being original, the imagination's transcendental power of 
schematism is not a faculty alongside understanding and sensation. However, our 
reading of the schematism chapter has led us to undestand it as a 'secret art' that 
responds to a problem internal to the architectonic. Thus while questions about its 
origin persist it is clear that Kant talks about it as an art or skill in the 
schematism chapter of the (Kant 2005: 178).
This process of clearing the ground by giving negative definitions brings us 
closer to the ability of judgement to subsume under rules. We've seen that 
this ability is not to be confused with the understanding even though it is 
charged with making its concepts applicable to the synthesis of experience 
in space and time: 'And we find that, whereas understanding is capable of 
being taught and equipped by rules, the power of judgement is a particular 
talent that cannot be taught at all but can only be practiced'.40 It is an ability 
that again seems to be mysterious but for Kant it is first of all unique and 
original. Without this 'natural gift' neither understanding nor sensation can 
fulfil their roles in the cognition of possible experience.41 To maintain its 
uniqueness Kant argues that examples cannot instruct the power of 
judgement. They may 'sharpen'42 this power but if wholly relied upon they 
take us away from the universal scope of rules by being too close to a 
particular case. These are rules that are involved in particular cases of 
experience but not limited to them. They must then embody the scope of 
the categories as well as being involved in particular concrete cases that are 
presented in examples. Thus no matter how singular and striking an 
example it is, it does not capture the scope of judgement in applying 
conceptual rules to experience. A singular example cannot tell us what else 
judgement is capable of or what it might come across. As Kant puts it, 
judgement relies upon something quite different and: '[t]his mediating 
presentation must be pure (i.e., without anything empirical), and yet must 
be both on the one hand, and on the other hand'.43 
Examples therefore cannot make up for a lack of natural talent by reducing 
this unique ability displayed in judgement to what sensation presents to us 
in examples. Thus for Kant the insights provided by the understanding and 
sensation do not show us how they work together in the synthesis of
4<>Kant 1996: 206, A133/B172. 





Henry Allison seeks to explain this by pointing to the game of chess where 
we need to have an abstract grasp of the rules and goals of the game if we 
are to play it.44 How is a chess player creative and successful given that 
anyone could acquire this rudimentary knowledge? This can only be in 
pursuit of victory, something that must exceed the images and examples 
anyone might have of possible moves if they know the rules and have 
studied previous games. The player must possess something that cannot be 
'laid out1 in any book of rules or manual. As Allison puts it: '...the fact that a 
move is legal does not make it a good move, that is, one that is called for by 
the particular circumstances'.45 Thus what a particular situation requires is 
still up to one's own judgement, something which one relies upon to 
become a 'good' chess player. Kant's conviction that judgement cannot be 
taught would seem to stem from situations like this that are at once abstract 
and concrete, demanding that an abstract strategy must be combined with 
openness to concrete circumstances. The present case is only similar to 
previous ones; it is too concrete to be exactly the same. To be concrete is to 
involve spatial and temporal relations so that '...even if the location of the 
pieces on the board were perchance identical, the opponent would be 
different'.46 For Kant, Allison argues, '[i]t is rather a matter of immediately 
recognizing the universal (the winning strategy) in the particular, which, in 
Kant's terms, means possessing the schema'.47 If we are to make sense of 
there being grand masters in chess then something distinct from sensation 
and understanding is demanded. This sets the scene for a positive definition 
of the schematism as the transcendental power of the imagination. It seems 
to undermine Kemp Smith's reading which suggested that Kant did not 
really maintain the heterogeneity of concepts and sensations up to this point




in the We get the sense that this difference is an 
internal problem that animates the text with its succession of negative 
definitions whose purpose seems to be to stage the uniqueness of this 'third 
thing1 in response to the heterogeneity of the first and second things.
For Kant we must not lose sight of judgement's ability to apply determinate 
rules. The move is to be made from abstract categories to the concrete 
synthesis of possible experience that involves these categories as rules. He 
talks about judgement at the start of the Analytic of Principles in order to 
emphasise his concern with the application of conceptual rules, with the 
move from the abstract to the realisation of the abstract in the concrete. 
However, it seems that Kant's concern with imagination is behind these 
moves, as we saw Heidegger arguing, so that the concrete is not simply to 
be understood as being ruled by the abstract. The distinction that he makes 
between images and schemata shows that the concrete synthesis of 
experience is far from passive in its relation to abstract concepts. It is in 
fact a distinction between their different roles in this process:
'The is [here] a product of the productive imagination's 
empirical ability. A of sensible concepts (such as the 
concepts of figures in space) is a product and, as it were, a monogram 
of the pure a priori imagination through which, and according to 
which, images become possible in the first place. But the images 
must always be connected with the concept only by means of the 
schema that they designate; in themselves the images are never 
completely congruent with the concept'.48
Kant associates the empirical imagination with images, with something 
already part of experience and therefore not useful in accounting for 
experience. This follows from his concern with the limitations of examples 
for instructing judgement, with how they can exemplify images given in 
experience but fail to capture the scope of the synthesis of possible 
experience itself. They limit our ability to respond to sensation in 
judgement if we see them as exhausting the role of concepts in synthesis.
4«Kant 1996: 214, A141-142/B181.
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This is because they are based upon what has already been given in 
experience and so are not open to the further extension of concepts in space 
and time. In contrast, transcendental or pure imagination is to account for 
the empirical images that populate situations across experience and for our 
ability to recognise them as belonging to objects of experience. Whilst 
situations may be filled by a succession of images no list of these could ever 
exhaust the possibilities of a situation or provide the means of securing 
recognition. We cannot imagine how a situation will look tomorrow on the 
basis of what it has looked like up to now or present a list of examples and 
images to show the scope of imagination in applying conceptual rules to 
sensation. Images characterise empirical situations and this means that they 
must be recognisable, being fixed and determined in recognisable ways. 
They must also be incomplete because further images will be needed, such 
as the images of possible moves in a game of chess that cannot be 
anticipated. The synthesis of recognisable experience under concepts is 
what needs to be accounted for. We are seeking, to use Heidegger's 
formulation, a source of growth and not something already grown or given 
in experience.
While we saw that Kant limited the role of examples in instructing 
judgement he does use them to define the schematism positively. However, 
he does not suggest that the power of schematism can be summed up using 
images taken from experience. We will now consider two examples that he 
gives. The first is the example of a triangle: 'No image whatever of a 
triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of a triangle as such1 .49 It 
will be useful to consider the way Deleuze develops this in his 1978 
seminars on Kant's philosophy using his own example, that of a ring. For 
Kant the schema of a ring would produce images but is not itself any 
particular ring or image of a ring. Deleuze gives his own interpretation of 
Kant's schematism using this example: 'The circumference is what allows
49ibid:213,A140-l/B180.
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us to make certain materials round. The ring must obviously be lived 
dynamically, as a dynamic process; [...] the ring implies an operation by 
which something in experience is rounded. It's a process of production of 
the circumference-type which allows the production in experience of things 
corresponding to the concept circle'.50 This suggests that concepts, as rules, 
are directly involved in the synthesis of possible experience in space and 
time. The schema of a ring is a universal way in which space and time is 
shaped, it connects a universal concept with diverse concrete instances 
where it is at work as a rule of synthesis. It does this by showing how a 
conceptual rule is productive, how it is '...what allows us to make certain 
materials round'.51 No matter how diverse the circumstances the circle can 
be recognised because it can be produced by the imagination. Thus we 
have a recognisable rule of synthesis in the case of a ring that is worn by 
someone to symbolise commitment and in the case where a ring is traced in 
the night sky, and would be studied in different ways by an astronomer and 
an astrologer. The diverse ways in which it is realised in the synthesis of 
possible experience are held together by the abstract unity of the schema or 
rule of production that is at work in each case. This abstract rule must 
therefore be dynamic enough to be stretched by these different ways of 
occupying space and time so that recognition still works in each case. This 
interpretation of Kant's schematism does relate to the concerns of his 
account of experience as we've presented it. Deleuze shows how the 
abstract and the concrete presuppose one another, how there are both 
abstract and concrete reasons for having the schema of a ring. This is 
something we will explore in the next chapter of this thesis in the proofs of 
the principles that Kant provides. He is concerned to relate the abstract and 
the concrete in such a way that the a priori is directly involved in the 
synthesis of possible experience.
5<>Deleuze 1978b: 5.
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A second example that we find in the schematism chapter is the 
schematised concept of a dog. This suggests that a schema fills our 
perception with images, such as a wagging tail, four legs, a prominent and 
active nose, and so forth. We have here an empirical concept, its schema 
and the images that this produces. The distinction between pure concepts or 
categories and empirical concepts is something we must consider.52 Kant 
explores the role of the schematism of empirical concepts in cognition: 
The concept signifies a rule whereby my imagination can trace the 
shape of such a four-footed animal in a general way, i.e. without being 
limited to any single and particular shape offered to me by experience, or 
even to all possible images that I can exhibit The images 
produced by a schema therefore show that the schema exceeds any list of 
images, any attempt to sum up the productive abilities of the imagination 
using images already given in experience. One cannot exhaust the things 
that can be met with but one can still recognise a dog, making this ability to 
subsume under conceptual rules something more productive than a manual 
for the recognition of a dog. The ability to recognise objects of experience 
through concepts is more original because it must deal with the complexity 
of the ways in which this animal occupies space and time. Thus Kant talks 
of tracing 'in a general way1 the concept of a dog, invoking factors that go 
beyond a particular case and also beyond the concept of a dog that one 
possesses. The imagination must make the concept into a rule able to meet 
the challenges presented by experience, such as the dog whose tail is 
missing or who is deaf and so occupies space and time quite differently. 
The empirical concept must be extended without it being defeated by
52In the Analytic of Principles Kant defines empirical concepts as being obtained from 
experience and also pertaining to experience (Kant 1996: 284, A220/B267). Thus, in 
contrast to categories or pure concepts, they cannot become possible a priori: 'Rather, 
they can acquire it only a posteriori and empirically, as concepts given by experience 
itself; and hence their possibility must either be cognized a posteriori and empirically, 
or it cannot be cognized at all' (ibid: 285, A222/B269-270). Categories or pure 
concepts are set out a priori and make experience possible. Empirical concepts can 
be added to only on the basis of pure concepts whose nature and number is 
established once and for all in the Metaphysical Deduction.
53lbid: 213-214, A141/B180.
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sensation when it presents such unusual images of a dog. Thus we extend 
the empirical concept and the rule has not failed, we still recognise a dog 
because we are able to register the possibility of a dog without a tail as it 
arises in experience. We will return to this example of the schematised 
concept of a dog once we have considered the other type of schematism that 
Kant proposes and the importance of this distinction. The other type of 
schematism involves pure, rather than empirical, concepts.
Kant continues the above passage by adding a further distinction to that 
between an empirical image and the schematism of an empirical concept: 
'A schema of a pure concept of understanding, on the other hand, is 
something that one cannot bring to any image whatsoever'.54 Whilst the 
schema of an empirical concept produces images the schema of a category 
or pure concept of the understanding does not. We thus have two different 
kinds of schematism. It is the distinction between the schemata of 
empirical and certain mathematical concepts, and the schemata of 
categories or pure concepts. The triangle and the ring are mathematical 
concepts, they belong to geometry and, as we saw, produce many images 
without being reducible to them. In contrast, the schemata of pure concepts 
or categories produce no images but are still at work in the synthesis of 
experience. As we saw in the previous chapter of this thesis, a 
transcendental logic must allow us to mark out material situations according 
to a Table of Categories or pure concepts. However, we now need to show 
that such concepts are actually involved in the marking out of such 
situations through their synthesis in space and time. Rather than being 
merely relevant to concrete experience they must be involved in how it 
comes about. However, this involvement of the Table of Categories in the 
synthesis of possible experience is something we cannot 'picture'.55 
Lauchlin Chipman sums up this distinction: 'One can call something a dog
54lbid:214,A142/B181.
55Georges Dicker talks about our inability to 'picture1 the role of the categories in the 
synthesis of experience (Dicker 2004: 216-217).
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because of what it looks like - it presents a doggish appearance - but one 
cannot call something a cause because it presents a cause-ish appearance!'56 
Thus we have no images produced by the schema of the category or pure 
concept of cause and effect as we do with the schema of the empirical 
concept of a dog. However, categories or pure concepts make possible the 
formation of all empirical concepts. They are the basis upon which 
empirical cognition proceeds. For example, a noise causes the ears of the 
dog to move and so opens for us a whole domain of the ways in which this 
animal occupies space and time. We might call the dog's way of occupying 
space and time 'territorial' because of the animal's concern with the noise 
that might come from an intruder. This allows us to recognise a dog and 
subsume images under the rule provided by the concept of a dog. It can do 
this because it allows us to engage with the synthesis of experience in space 
and time, involving ways of occupying space and time. However, empirical 
concepts emerge here because experience has the basic forms captured by 
the Table of Categories such as cause and effect. Thus the movement of the 
dog's ears can be understood as the effect of a noise nearby. This means 
that, whilst we could have experience without dogs and our empirical 
concept of them, we couldn't have experience without categories or pure 
concepts like cause and effect. We can only build upon the role of 
categories in the synthesis of possible experience in the course of empirical 
cognition. In this respect Kant's Metaphysical Deduction continues to play 
a central role by providing the ultimate rules of the synthesis of possible 
experience in space and time. It is directly involved in the ways in which 
this animal occupies space and time. How then does the schematism of 
categories or pure concepts work? If we cannot 'picture' it as we can the 
recognition of a dog under its empirical concept does it remain a mystery to 




We are developing a positive definition of the schematism, of its role in the 
synthesis of possible experience. Kant provides a positive definition of a 
particular mode of schematism when he talks about counting. He asks us to 
consider the image of five dots one after the other.57 This is the image of 
the number five that has a role in experience, characterising situations 
where space and time are organised by five points or moments. Then Kant 
asks us to think 'number as such' in order to move from an image, the 
number five, to a schema. 'Number as such' gives rise to numbers that can 
be pictured, like five, and numbers that cannot, like a thousand. One cannot 
keep hold of a thousand dots in one's mind and this leads us to seek a more 
productive ability. It is an ability to realise the scope of the concept 
because it is not tied to an image or our ability to form images. Again, Kant 
must explain rather than leave as a mystery the ability that he has invoked. 
He argues that we must locate the involvement of a concept in this ability to 
grasp numbers without the aid of images: 'Then my thought is more the 
presentation of a method for presenting - in accordance with a certain 
concept - a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in an image, than this image 
itself.58 This method for presenting even that which we cannot picture in 
an image is to realise a concept in the a priori synthesis of possible 
experience.
An objection that might be made is that Kant is drawing upon psychological 
processes when he talks about counting. As a way of grasping situations 
that we come across in experience, in terms of the abstract concept of a 
number that organises them, this appears to be a wholly psychological 
process.59 However, Kant seeks to give this process an autonomy that
5?Kant 1996: 213, A140/B179.
5»Ibid.
59In footnote 38 of this chapter we distinguished empirical psychology and rational 
psychology in Kant's architectonic. We noted that, while rational psychology has a 
very limited subject matter, empirical psychology has a very productive role to play 
in empirical cognition. We saw in chapter one of this thesis (footnote 12, pages 19- 
20) that empirical psychology lacks the mathematical foundations that would make it
155
makes it part of the synthesis of possible experience that precedes and 
makes possible all psychological processes. This he does by understanding 
the schematism as the production of time, as a mode of time itself: 
'Therefore number is nothing other than the unity in the synthesis of the 
manifold of a homogeneous intuition as such, a unity that arises because I 
myself produce time in apprehending intuition'.60 Time is the ultimate form 
of the synthesis of experience, something that marks out the space and time 
of a situation. Counting is the generation or production of time that takes 
part in this marking out, that takes part in the synthesis of experience itself. 
Thus, for example, a three point turn is counted out in space as a series of 
the points of the turn and the series of moments of the turn. It might seem 
that time is how we register the points of the turn in space, making it part of 
a psychological process. However, to understand such a concrete situation 
Kant does not focus upon what is given in experience, such as the vehicle 
which is undertaking this manoeuvre. He also does not focus upon the 
space in which it takes place or the psychological processes involved. 
Instead he seeks to focus upon time and how it precedes and makes possible 
these different aspects of the concrete situations we find ourselves in. We 
must seek to understand how he can rely upon time to account for the 
schematism of concepts and the things it produces in experience. How are 
schemata modes of time and concepts modes of determination in time?
We've found that in its power of schematism the imagination draws upon 
time's resources in order to mediate concepts and sensations. Counting 
generates time and this marks out the space and time of a situation under the 
rule provided by the concept. Kant sets out the direct role of time in the 
schematism of concepts as the ultimate form of the synthesis of possible
a genuine science but while lacking these a priori principles it can be '... a 
consciousness of what [one] insofar as [one] is affected by the play of 
[one's] own thought. It rests on inner intuition, and consequently on the relations of 
ideas in time (whether they are simultaneous or successive)' (Kant 2006: 53, 7: 161) 
6<>Kant 1996: 215, A143/B182.
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experience in the following passage:
'A concept of understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the 
manifold as such. Time, as the formal condition for the manifold of 
inner sense, and hence for the connection of all presentations, 
contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now, a transcendental 
time determination is homogeneous with the (in which its 
unity consists) insofar as the time determination is and rests 
on an a priori rule. But it is homogeneous with on the 
other hand, insofar as every empirical presentation of the manifold 
contains Hence it will be possible for the category to be applied 
to appearances by means of the transcendental time determination, 
which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the 
subsumption of appearances under the category'.61
Hence the imagination's role is understood as the ability to relate things in 
time where time exceeds the organisation of the situation in which one finds 
oneself. If one is ultimately situated in time, what Heidegger calls our 
finitude, it is only through time that concepts are realised in the synthesis of 
experience. Thus the three-point turn becomes a possibility drawn from 
time and the determinations provided by concepts. This re-organises the 
space and time of a situation that before were characterised by the car 
facing in the wrong direction. In the move from an image of the number 
five to 'number as such' we saw how time allows us to mark out a situation 
and so apply a rule even when images fail us. With the schematism of 
categories or pure concepts, where images are not produced, time is our 
only way of grasping its role.62 Lauchlin Chipman understands this in the 
following way: '...any general truth to do with time will manifest itself in 
any appearances; e.g. through a necessary rule of synthesis'.63 Thus when 
Kant talks about counting he is not referring to a psychological process 
from which we can draw examples and images and so sum up the nature 
and scope of the schematism. Instead he is talking about a 'method of
6 llbid: 211, A138-39/B177-78.
62 We will return to the process of counting in the next chapter of this thesis and see that 
it performs the schematism of the categories of quantity, allowing us to grasp the 




presentation' such as the three-point structuring of a situation. This makes 
possible the attempt at a three-point turn and the recognition of this 
manoeuvre only on the basis of schematised pure concepts like cause and 
effect and empirical concepts like that of a three-point turn. The situation is 
determined in time by the concepts according to which the vehicle's wheels 
respond to the movements of the steering wheel and to the friction caused 
by the road's surface, and three points are counted out. These hold no 
matter how different the circumstances in space and time because this is a 
'universal procedure' for synthesising experience.64 It is time's resources, 
rather than those of space or psychology, that account for the productive 
power of imagination in applying a concept even when an image is lacking.
The emphasis upon time that we are exploring follows from Kant's concern 
to make time the a priori form of inner sense that precedes space, which is 
the a priori form of outer sense. Experience is ultimately temporal in form 
because outer sense is encountered from the standpoint of inner sense.65 
We've made some arguments for understanding this in non-psychological 
terms and as the ultimate form of the synthesis of possible experience. Kant 
emphasises the autonomy of the elements of his account of experience so 
that his is animated, as we've seen, by the 
difference between the synthetic and the a priori rather than between the 
psychological and the non-psychological. He seeks to account for the 
cognition of things as psychological or as non-psychological, for this 
difference, rather than presupposing it. We must now consider how in the 
schematism chapter time is not situated as psychological time but is at work 
in the synthesis of experience. We saw Kant defining the schematism as a 
'transcendental time determination'. It is a rule of determination that
this presentation of a universal procedure of the imagination for providing a 
concept with its image I call the schema for that concept' (Kant 1996: 213, 
A140/B179-80).
65'Therefore time is an a priori condition of all appearances generally: it is the direct 
condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and precisely thereby also, indirectly, 
condition of outer appearances' (ibid: 88, B50-51).
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embodies a concept in the very synthesis of experience whose form is 
ultimately temooral.p
How does time in this sense differ from psychological time? Heidegger 
sums up the difference in the following way:
'... time must indeed be taken as pure sequence of nows in the horizon 
within which we "reckon with time". This sequence of nows, 
however, is in no way time in its originality. On the contrary, the 
transcendental power of imagination allows time as sequence of nows 
to spring forth, and as this letting-spring-forth it is therefore original 
time1 . 66
Heidegger argues that Kant is not reducing the role of time to registering 
the 'nows1 or present moments in which we encounter empirical images. 
Just as the imagination is not to be reduced to the images it produces, so 
time is not to be reduced to the presents moments it produces. Otherwise, 
the different images of a dog that we come across would be the source of 
our recognition of objects and sum up the productive power behind it. In 
this case time's role would be limited to presenting 'nows' and the images 
they offer us. It would have nothing more to offer to the imagination and to 
our cognition of experience. Instead time must bring about the 
determination under concepts that makes it possible to 'reckon with time' in 
the first place, as Heidegger puts it. The role of time in accounting for how 
we 'reckon with time' cannot be captured using images or considering how 
images occur to us, as if presenting a succession of images in psychological 
time was time's only role. Thus in our three-point turn example the role of a 
new type of vehicle does not undermine the concept even though it presents 
us with a different image to previous cases. This is because time does not 
realise this concept simply by registering a succession of images that
66Heidegger 1997: 123. This recalls us to our brief discussion of Heidegger's term 
'present-at-hand' in footnote 21 of this chapter. We saw that this referred to an 
understanding of experience that was confined to the present dimension of time and 
now Heidegger is concerned that this restricts time to being a 'pure sequence of 
nows1 . Now that time is understood as the source of the power to schematise 
Heidegger seeks to show that the present alone is too limited in scope to provide an 
account of the synthesis of experience.
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correspond to the concept. We hold on to the concept of a three-point turn 
rather than falling into an unrecognisable situation which exceeds the 
images we have of three point turns. We avoid a crisis of confidence in our 
ability to carry out the manoeuvre or to recognise it. Time must not just 
chart the images that occur to us in experience because then recognition in 
time would always be in danger of being undermined by our inability to 
form an appropriate image. Space, which is full of images, must be marked 
out by time so that it can be determined ultimately by the Table of 
Categories even when images fail us. New images can then be produced by 
the imagination when necessary because it forms new images on the basis 
of concepts and how these are realised in time. This shows how concepts 
are related to time by the schematism, to the time in which synthesis occurs 
and through which these concepts can become 'transcendental time 
determinations'. For Kant this shows that concepts are never exhausted by 
the cases they are applied to but are able to give rise to new cases. They 
can do this because the imagination relates them to time. We will now turn 
to Deleuze's reading of Kant's schematism in order to further explore the 
scope of their relations. This will allow us to extend the comparison we 
made in chapter two of this thesis where their common methodological 
concerns were considered.
iii. Deleuze's Response to the Schematism
In Deleuze focuses upon the role of differences 
that are internal to Kant's account of experience as a whole. In chapter one 
of this thesis we argued that the difference between the synthetic and the a 
priori provides the inner problematic of the We 
reviewed Heidegger's case for focusing upon the difference between 
concepts and sensations in the first section of the present chapter. We will 
now argue that the concern, shared by Deleuze and Heidegger, to begin
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with the relations between the faculties in Kant's account has certain 
limitations. We will defend our reading, according to which it is the 
relation of the synthetic and the a priori that comes first. Deleuze writes 
that '... the problem of the relation of subject and object tends to be 
internalised; it becomes the problem of a relation between subjective 
faculties which differ in nature (receptive sensibility and active 
understanding)1 .67 It is therefore the difference between faculties, between 
their roles in accounting for experience, that animates Kant's thought in the 
The schematism responds to the difference 
between concepts and sensation. However, Deleuze points out that while 
imagination alone schematises, making it unique and original, we must 
recognise its subordinate role in Kant's Idea of the whole: '...it schematizes 
only when the understanding presides, has the legislative power. It 
schematizes only in the speculative interest'.68 This provides the basis for 
his critique of Kant in While he recognises the 
role of 'internal differences' in Kant's account of experience, differences 
between the faculties, he argues that we should critically consider how these 
differences emerge. In this way we can evaluate Kant's account of 
experience. He then seeks to go beyond Kant's project when writes of the 
spatio-temporal dynamisms that are at work in the synthesis of experience: 
'Everything changes when the dynamisms are posited no longer as schemata 
of concepts but as dramas of Ideas'.69 The schematism is now to be realised 
in its own right because it 'dramatises* Ideas in space and time rather than 
referring back to the categories and their systematic presentation in a table. 
We sought to understand the nature and role of problematic Ideas for 
Deleuze in the second chapter of this thesis. The dramatisation of Ideas in 
sensation moves beyond Kant's thought and its emphasis upon thinking 
categories or pure concepts in the abstract first of all. It makes them




something external to what Deleuze regards as a valid account of 
experience.
For Deleuze then the synthesis of experience in space and time must be 
everything. It is not preceded by a Metaphysical Deduction or animated by 
differences that do not arise within the synthesis of experience through the 
dramatisation of Ideas.70 This drama is '...a pure staging without author, 
without actors and without subjects1 .71 This excludes Kant's transcendental 
unity of apperception, the categories as basic forms of an object of 
cognition and even the self as a passive actor in the drama. This drama is 
the synthesis of experience in space and time but, unlike in Kant's thought, 
concepts are not specified prior to the drama and then applied to it. Thus 
the example of a three-point turn is a drama with a subject who wants to 
turn and others who want to avoid the path of a car. All are concerned to 
recognise the role of the concept in the situation. In contrast, Deleuze's 
dramatisation of Ideas is without these conceptual forms of possibility. 
This appears to forestall the engagement between Kant and Deleuze that we 
are seeking to develop on the basis of the positive comparison we made in
70Levi R. Bryant argues that this leads Deleuze to reject the differences that animate 
Kant's account of experience and organise his '...Deleuze 
undermines the opposition between the universal and the particular, concepts and 
intuitions, the sensible and the intelligible, or and by discovering 
intelligibility in the givens of experience itself. 
As such, there can be 
no question or problem of schematism for Deleuze insofar as there are not two terms 
requiring the mediation of a third term' (Bryant 2008: 11).
7 Deleuze 1994: 219. In seeking to clear the ground of presuppositions about how 
experience is produced Deleuze wants to account for experience without 
presupposing what is given in experience. To this end he refers here to Antonin 
Artaud's notion of a 'theatre of cruelty'. Artaud develops this notion in writings such 
as 'The Theatre of Cruelty: First Manifesto' (Artaud 1976: 242-51). Here Artaud 
writes that '[t]he question for the threater, then, is to create a metaphysics of speech, 
gesture, and expression, in order to rescue it from its psychological and human 
stagnation' (ibid: 243). This is a theatre too cruel for psychological and human things 
like scripts, actors and spectators to survive, to undergo the spatio-temporal 
dynamisms that are here at work in producing experience. Rather than having to 
mediate human concepts and the sensations that situate human beings, a theatre of 
cruelty stages the direct communication of its elements so that, as Artaud writes, '[i]t 
flows into the sensibility' (ibid). This is valued by Deleuze as a model for accounting 
for experience without presupposing what one is accounting for.
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chapter two of this thesis. In that chapter we saw how Kant and Deleuze 
disagree when it comes to the categories or pure concepts that mediate the 
intelligible and the sensible in Kant's account. Now we find that this 
disagreement gives rise to a further attempt to move beyond Kant. Deleuze 
seeks a dramatisation of Ideas in sensation which is able to account for 
concepts rather than needing to presuppose them. The power of 
schematism is therefore not to be subordinated to categories or pure 
concepts, things not accounted for through this dramatisation.
We might ask first of all why we should give up the determinations that 
Kant's abstract concepts provide. Indeed, we see no reason to deny that 
Deleuze wants to account for drivers doing three-point turns and others 
getting out of their way or assessing the manoeuvre as part of a driving test. 
Recognition must work and it must be dynamic if it is to meet the 
challenges posed by sensation. However, for Deleuze there is a need to 
disengage ourselves from recognition, to think without taking our bearings 
from it. We must do this in order to account for it. His criticism in 
is that Kant's schemata do not account for their 
own power to schematise. He seeks to avoid presupposing what is to be 
accounted for and therefore to account for the ongoing emergence of 
concepts through the dramatisation of Ideas in sensation. According to 
Deleuze, Kant seeks to apply, to use Heidegger's terminology, a rootless 
concept which lacks any account of its own genesis in the synthesis of 
experience. The heterogeneity of concepts and sensations is therefore 
judged an 'external difference' since it is external to a full account of 
experience; it is something presupposed rather than accounted for.72 
Deleuze proposes that instead we consider differences that are internal to 
the synthesis of experience itself, internal to the dramatisation of Ideas in 
sensation. He writes that'... if the dynamism is external to concepts - and,
72'...[T]he difference remains external, incarnated in a rule of construction which is 
established "between" the concept and the intuition' (Deleuze 1994- 174)
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as such, a schema - it is internal to Ideas - and, as such, a drama or 
dream'.73 Deleuze argues that the schematism chapter is where Kant calls 
upon a miracle that makes up for the lack of a full account of experience, 
one that includes an account of the emergence of concepts. It is a 
miraculous power to apply concepts to experience that do not arise in the 
synthesis of experience itself. He argues that '[a] concept alone is 
completely incapable of specifying or dividing itself; ... f .74 Therefore, for 
Kant imagination can only be productive in applying concepts that are 
formulated in abstraction in the Metaphysical Deduction. What is missed 
out is what accounts for concepts in the first place: '... the agents of 
differenciation [that] are the spatio-temporal dynamisms which act within 
or beneath [a concept], like a hidden art'.75
As we saw in chapter two of this thesis, for Deleuze the intelligible is to be 
incarnated and realised in the sensible. In this critical account of Kant's 
schematism in Deleuze seems to want to escape 
the abstract limitations of Kant's account of experience. However, for Kant 
this reference to the genesis of pure concepts of the understanding has no 
meaning. It is only insofar as we make use of these concepts that cognition 
can have any meaning. His response to Deleuze would be based upon the 
necessary relation of the synthetic and the a priori in accounting for 
experience. If we sought to account for the a priori through the synthetic, as 
we've seen Deleuze proposing, possible experience as such would be 
undermined. Kant's concern to secure possible experience in the face of 
sceptical challenges, something we considered in chapter one of this thesis, 
leads him to avoid all reference to something that precedes the a priori and 
makes it possible. Thus we find him conscious of the danger of seeking to 





'[Possible experience] is the land of truth (a charming name), and is 
surrounded by a vast and stormy ocean, where illusion properly 
resides and many fog banks and much fast-melting ice feign new- 
found lands. This sea incessantly deludes the seafarer with empty 
hopes as he roves through his discoveries, and thus entangles him in 
adventures that he can never relinquish, nor ever bring to an end. We 
should ask, first, whether we might not perhaps be content with what 
this land contains, or even must be content with it from necessity if 
there is no other territory at all on which we could settle1 .76
Kant argues that the preceding Aesthetic and Analytic of the 
have answered such questions. This is because they form an 
argument which is designed to defeat the sceptic by providing a system for 
accounting for possible experience as such. Kant speaks of the possibility 
of us being content with the territory we have thus secured and in this 
chapter we have seen that, as well as being ruled by absolutely necessary 
conceptual forms, possible experience is a rich and fertile land. Thus in 
answer to Deleuze's critique Kant would point to the need to remain focused 
upon the relations of the synthetic and the a priori, and to do this by 
providing arguments that defeat scepticism. We must relate the synthetic 
and the a priori in necessary and indispensible ways, using arguments that 
establish the conditions of possible experience once and for all. Thus if we 
begin with the relations of the faculties we do not see what is at the basis of 
Kant's account. Faculties are related in order to secure the relation of the 
synthetic and the a priori at different stages of this account. This leaves us 
wondering whether we can relate Kant and Deleuze further. To do so we 
must show that Kant's concern to relate the synthetic and the a priori is 
relevant to Deleuze's account even if the ways he does this, for example by 
focusing upon the abstract use of the understanding, are rejected by 
Deleuze. In the next chapter of this thesis we will consider how for Kant 
the Analytic of Principles is shaped by the system embodied in the Table of 
Categories whilst also relating to the concrete synthesis of experience.
76Kant 1996: 303-4, A235-6/B295.
165
Conclusion
Our consideration of the role of time in Kant's account brings us back to a 
question we raised in the introduction to this thesis. Levi R. Bryant argues 
that Deleuze uncovers in Kant's work '...a transcendental dimension more 
fundamental and deeper than those found in the understanding or the unity 
of apperception1 .77 Time is for Deleuze able to account for the emergence 
of subjects and objects through its role in the dramatisation of Ideas. This 
undermines Kant's reliance upon a transcendental subject, or transcendental 
unity of apperception, and a Table of Categories. For Bryant this is 
Deleuze's '...doorway for jumping out of critical philosophy... 1 . 78 He seeks 
to go beyond Kant's concern with a finite subject, situated by the synthesis 
of possible experience in space and time, who relies upon the transcendental 
unity of apperception and Table of Categories to deal with experience. 
Bryant argues that the creative power of time manifested in the schematism 
ultimately takes us beyond the concerns of a finite subject. The schematism 
of the categories or pure concepts is not useful for Deleuze, only the 
schematism of concepts that emerge and develop through a relationship of 
reciprocal determination between the abstract and the concrete. As we've 
seen, the intelligible is incarnated and realised in the sensible in Deleuze's 
account. If time takes us beyond the role of a Table of Categories, opening 
up instead the reciprocal determination of the abstract and the concrete in 
time, this seems to take us beyond Kant's architectonic.
This verdict is not limited to those, like Levi R. Bryant, who seek to explore 
Deleuze's relation to Kant. Paul Guyer finds Kant's architectonic 
presentation of the an 'ill-digested addition'. 
However, what is fully digested and developed is: '... the basic theory of
77Bryant 2008: 181.
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time-determination which really underlies Kant's theory of experience'.79 
This echoes Bryant's verdict since we find that time is said to make the 
Table of Categories obsolete in the synthesis of possible experience. 
However, by re-introducing, in the next chapter of this thesis, Kant's 
systematic tendency we will suggest the need to go much further with Kant. 
Rather than cutting short his systematic journey, or seeing time as a way of 
revising or exiting his system, we will argue that this provides an account of 
experience that is worth giving fuller consideration. In this way we will 
part company with Deleuze in his rejection of the Table of Categories in 
order that we may fully develop Kant's architectonic presentation of his 
account of experience. Having done this we will consider, in the sixth 
chapter of this thesis, the positive role that this account of experience may 
have in Deleuze's own thought. As we have done throughout this thesis, we 
will seek to read Kant in a unifying way in order that we may be able to 
better understand his account of experience and relate it to Deleuze's 




Kant*s Analytic of Principles
It might seem that we have moved away from Kant's architectonic and its 
single and unifying problem in our discussion of the schematism. We 
found its role to be decisive in understanding the Metaphysical Deduction 
in the third chapter of this thesis. In the previous chapter we presented and 
evaluated the schematism as something that makes concepts immanent to 
the synthesis of possible experience. We saw that time is affirmed by Kant 
as the ultimate unity of this synthesis. Thus, whilst Kant begins with the 
abstract and moves to the concrete, he does not reduce the synthesis of 
possible experience to the simple application of categories to experience. 1 
We noted that for many readers of Kant, including Deleuze, we should 
make the most of Kant's elaboration of the determination of experience in 
time in the Analytic of Principles. We should not view it as extending the 
systematic tendency that characterises the architectonic but as providing 
independent arguments for necessary and productive ways of cognising 
experience.2 However, when we recall our exploration of Kant's
Beatrice Longuenesse identifies here Kant's concern to '... account for the schematism 
as a production (the "determination of inner sense by the understanding"), not merely 
as a result (the correspondence between the schemata and the categories)1 
(Longuenesse 1998: 246). As we saw in the previous chapter, the Table of Categories 
must be involved in the synthesis of possible experience if its relation to the concrete 
or synthetic is to be secured. Otherwise we remain at the level of the abstract and do 
not tackle the problematic Idea of the relation between the synthetic and the a priori 
that is at the heart of Kant's architectonic.
2The role of time in Kant's is something that Deleuze often 
takes forward in his own thought. He begins the preface to the English edition of 
by acknowledging Kant's role in the philosophy of time he wants to draw 
upon: 'Over several centuries, from the Greeks to Kant, a revolution took place in 
philosophy: the subordination of time to movement was reversed, time ceases to be 
the measurement of normal movement, it increasingly appears for itself and creates 
paradoxical movements. Time is out of joint: Hamlet's words signify that time is no 
longer subordinated to movement, but rather movement to time' (Deleuze 1989: xi) 
He goes on to argue that a similar revolution took place in cinema after world war 
two (ibid). This presents us with a selective reading of Kant because it takes forward
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architectonic method of presentation and argument in the first chapter of 
this thesis we see that the relation of the abstract and the concrete is at the 
heart of the architectonic. Abstract concepts are involved in the concrete 
synthesis of possible experience in the schematism chapter. However, Kant 
goes further when he defines the nature and role of the abstract in a highly 
systematic way. He does this when he provides the schematism of the 
Table of Categories as a whole.3 This is followed by a Table of Principles4 
whose four divisions correspond to the four divisions of the Table of 
Categories. Thus for Kant it is not enough that we involve the abstract in 
the concrete. This will not secure an account of possible experience. To do 
this we must extend the system that was set out in the Metaphysical 
Deduction in a Table of Categories. In this chapter we will continue to 
consider whether this is an artificial way of organising the text or something 
integral to Kant's account of experience.
i. The Role of the Table of Categories
Returning then to the mode of argument we sought to highlight in the 
Metaphysical Deduction, we find that its systematic focus upon a Table of 
Categories is carried forward by Kant. He claims to move from the abstract
his contribution to the philosophy of time which, as we've seen, develops only the 
concrete aspect or pole of his architectonic.
In Kant scholarship we find that, for example, Paul Guyer reads the Analytic of 
Principles as the place where "... Kant prepares us to reverse the direction of his 
schematism and to derive the categories of the understanding from the principles of 
time-determination, rather than vice versa' (Guyer 1987: 181). For Guyer, as we shall 
see, the principles stand alone as arguments rather than drawing upon the Table of 
Categories. Such attempts to re-read or revise the architectonic presentation of the 
text show the power that the Analytic of Principles has and demands that we consider 
very carefully the case for making such revisions. Most important of all is the 
concern which we've already expressed, that by aborting the unfolding of Kant's 
architectonic we do not gain any understanding of its nature, outcomes and 
possibilities. 
3Kant 1996: 214-217, A142-145/B181-185.
*lbid: 231, A161/B200. For ease of reference, the Tables of Judgements, Categories and 
Principles are included as an appendix to this thesis.
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to the concrete using this table as his guide. To do this he invokes the 
arguments and reasoning that, in the third chapter of this thesis, we found so 
curious and yet to be something that we should take seriously. Thus he 
does not simply take forward the outcome of the Metaphysical Deduction, 
the Table of Categories, but also its way of arguing. This is evident in the 
following passage of the schematism chapter where Kant relates the 
schematism to the Table of Categories: TStow, instead of letting ourselves 
be detained by a dry and tedious dissection of what is required for 
transcendental schemata of pure concepts of understanding as such, let us 
exhibit them, rather, according to the order of the categories and in 
connection with them'. 5 A common complaint among Kant scholars is that 
this shows a lack of argument. However, as we saw in the chapter two of 
this thesis, this brief mode of presentation can be understood as a form of 
argument that pursues solidity through brevity. Kant now speaks of 
avoiding dryness and tedium. This can be understood as referring to the 
same concern that we do not introduce external factors into the argument. 
Instead of elaborating the elements of an account of experience at length, or 
to the point of tedium, we must present the swift and lively unfolding of 
Kant's systematic Idea of the whole. The concern seems to be that a dry 
exposition would not invoke the impetus of Kant's architectonic, one that is 
drawn only from its own parts and not from anything that might arise, given 
more time, over the course of experience. A great deal is demanded of the 
Table of Categories. As a systematic whole it must carry us forward into a 
full and convincing account of the synthesis of possible experience in space 
and time. For Kant, as we saw in chapter three, it embodies the ideals of 
the architectonic. As an account of the basic forms of experience it leaves 
nothing out and it draws upon nothing external. For Kant this is because it 
is the outcome of an argument that is brief and inclusive in order that it 
should prove to be solid. How does this abstract and systematic 
completeness relate to the concrete work of synthesis? Matthew C. Altman
5lbid: 214-215, A142/B181.
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writes that if we follow Kant's systematic presentation we will reach a table 
of '...the concepts as they are relevant to our kind of sensible experience (in 
space and time)'.6 We then move from relevance to involvement, via the 
schematism, with the Table of Principles. In this move from abstract to 
concrete the Table of Categories and time together provide the ultimate 
forms of unity, the transcendental time determinations, which allow the 
synthesis of possible experience to proceed. The former is the system and 
the latter its concrete realisation. How do we include time along with the 
Table of Categories in Kant's account of possible experience?
In the previous chapter we considered the role of time and found it to be 
crucial to the schematism, providing the resources for the rich development 
of empirical cognition. However, we suggested in chapter three that the 
Table of Categories is also crucial to the synthesis of possible experience 
for Kant precisely because it embodies and presents the basic rules of 
synthesis. In the following passage Kant summarises the moves he makes 
from schemata to time, as the a priori form of inner sense, and then to Table 
of Categories:
'... the schematism of understanding provided by the transcendental 
synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity 
in inner sense of all the manifold of intuition, and this comes down 
indirectly to the unity of apperception as a function corresponding to 
inner sense (a receptivity). The schemata of the pure concepts of 
understanding are, therefore, the true and sole conditions for 
providing these concepts with a reference to objects and hence with 
Here we see that the ultimate unity provided by time does not exclude that 
provided by the categories but is held together by it insofar as it refers to 
objects of experience. Categories provide rules for determining different 
modes of time so that we have transcendental time determinations, as the 
example of counting showed in the previous chapter. How are we to
6 Altaian 2008: 146.
?Kant 1996: 217-218, A145-146/B185.
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understand the singular roles of the categories as Kant uncovers these in the 
modes of time determination at work in the synthesis of possible 
experience? In what follows we will consider the modes of schematism or 
transcendental time determinations, and how they lead us to the systematic 
presentation of the principles at work in the ongoing synthesis and 
cognition of possible experience. Our concern will be with the 
architectonic or systematic presentation of the principles while recognising 
how singular and individually compelling each principle and its proof is. 
The challenge will be to keep Kant's architectonic in view, to treat the 
principles not as individual arguments but as principles for the realisation of 
this Idea of the whole in the synthesis of possible experience. We will first 
of all ask how the architectonic unfolds rather than assessing each principle 
and its proof as independent arguments. However, we shall also evaluate 
this architectonic mode of presentation and argument by considering some 
objections to the way schemata and principles are divided according to the 
order of the Table of Categories. These come from commentators who 
think that the principles should be understood as independent or 'stand 
alone1 arguments. Since we will be following the progress of Kant's 
architectonic mode of argument and presentation we will be able to make a 
fuller assessment than would be possible if, as is often the case, it is 
dismissed before it can make itself heard.
ii. From the Schematism of the Categories to the Table of Principles
Modes of schematism or transcendental time determination are presented 
according to the order and division of the Table of Categories towards the 
end of the schematism chapter. This appears to be the basis for the 
elaboration of the principles that follows. The schemata provide the 
concrete basis for the categories to be systematically involved in the 
synthesis of possible experience as principles. Kant seeks to find in time
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ways of realising the categories but always according to the systematic 
presentation of the Table of Categories as rules of synthesis. The section 
that follows the schematism chapter is thus entitled 'Systematic Presentation 
of All the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding'. 8 Being systematic 
here involves formulating a Table of Principles as the realisation of a 
schematised Table of Categories in the ongoing synthesis and cognition of 
possible experience. In pursuing his apparently rigid architectonic method 
here Kant in fact seeks to realise the Table of Categories as a dynamic and 
open system of determination. As we shall see, he divides the four 
components of his Table of Principles into mathematical and dynamical or 
discursive principles, a distinction he originally made in the Metaphysical 
Deduction.9 He explains this in terms of the intuitive certainty of 
mathematical principles in contrast to the discursive certainty of dynamical 
principles. 10 As we shall see, both types of principles are dynamic or open 
to the production of experience but the second type is involved in how we 
respond discursively to this ongoing process. Jill Vance Buroker informs us
8lbid:229,A158/B197.
9Ibid: 135-136, Bl 10. This section of the text was added to the Metaphysical Deduction 
in the second edition of the We find Kant writing of the 
Table of Categories that '[t]he concepts in the first division are directed to objects of 
intuition (both pure and empirical) while those in the second are directed to the 
existence of these objects (these objects being referred either to each other or to the 
understanding)1 (ibid). The location of this passage is significant. Since it is placed 
in the Metaphysical Deduction it is given a basis in the understanding like the other 
characteristics of the Table of Categories. From the understanding there emerges an 
abstract and unfolding system, the architectonic, in which this division recurs as 
different forms of unity are secured in accounting for experience. The division 
between the mathematical and the dynamical comes to characterise the forms of unity 
that are provided by different faculties in the cognition of experience. Thus as well as 
recurring in the Analytic of Principles thanks to the mediating role of the imagination 
it appears in the Antinomies chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic in order to 
distinguish 'world' and 'nature1 as two forms of unity projected by reason as Ideas 
(ibid: 452, A418-419/B446-447). The world is a mathematical Idea because, 
although it is never attained in cognition, it is approached through the composition or 
construction and division of appearances. This aggregation progressively secures 
magnitudes but never exhausts all the quantities experience has to offer. Nature, on 
the other hand, is an Idea that is envisaged as the unity ultimately provided to 
experience by causes. This matches the distinction made between mathematical 
principles and dynamic or discursive principles in the Analytic of Principles whilst 
occurring at a different stage in Kant's account of experience.
l<>Ibid:232,A162/B201.
that 'Kant recalls the Latin which means "running through"1 . 11 
The understanding '...operates by "running through" diverse representations 
and classify ing them in terms of a concept1 . 12 We will seek to understand 
how this can be a dynamic process when we consider the two dynamical or 
discursive components of the Table of Principles (the Analogies of 
Experience and the Postulates of Empirical Thought As Such). We will 
seek to show how this system of determination unfolds in the Analytic of 
Principles, in this way gaining a better understanding of Kant's rejection of 
any 'dry and tedious dissection'. This will allow us to understand the nature 
of these systematic divisions and to assess their contribution to a convincing 
account of experience.
a. The Axioms of Intuition
The first member of the Table of Principles is the Axioms of Intuition. It 
corresponds to the first division of the Table of Categories, the categories of 
quantity. The schema of the three categories of quantity is number13 and 
we considered in the previous chapter how counting is the temporal process 
that marks out the space and time of a concrete situation. For Kant what is 
at stake in this transcendental time determination is the determination under 
a rule of a The time series is then a mode of time that must 
be determined under the rules provided by the three categories of quantity 
when they are schematised. First let's consider what this schema presents 
us with in experience. We have '...a presentation encompassing conjointly
12Ibid.
!3Kant 1996: 215, A142/B182.
14Ibid: 217, B184-185/A145. The full quotation is as follows: 'Hence the schemata are 
nothing but a priori according to rules; and these rules, according 
to the order of the categories, deal with the the , the 
and finally the in regard to all possible objects'. The order of 
the Table of Categories tells us that the schematised categories of quantity come first 
and so deal with 
successive additions of one item to another (homogeneous item)'. 15 We saw 
in the previous chapter that this is the generation or production of time, 
something that participates in the synthesis of experience. Counting or 
successive addition is a concrete process but one that realises an abstract 
concept in '... the unity in the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous 
intuition as such, a unity that arises because I myself produce time in 
apprehending intuition1 . 16 It is the staging of a schemata or transcendental 
time determination in different situations that makes a time series into the 
source of a determinate unity in space. An example to add to that of the 
three point turn, which we explored in the previous chapter, would be a 
measurable distance whose parts are presented successively in time. As a 
dynamic rule of synthesis this schema allows very different situations to 
become recognisable according to the abstract concept of a number that is 
to characterise them. If we return to Kant's divisions of the Table of 
Principles, carried forward from the Table of Categories, we note that as a 
mathematical principle the Axioms of Intuition must provide an 'intuitive' 
grasp of experience on the basis of the schematism involved. Sebastian 
Gardner interprets the distinction between mathematical and dynamical or 
discursive principles as pointing to a stage in the process of accounting for 
the objectivity of experience. Mathematical principles are not sufficient to 
give us objects of experience but provide a series of determinate parts or 
aspects of the object. These determinate intuitions include the extensive 
magnitudes generated by counting or successive addition. 17 Thus distances 
are built up in experience but these do not give us a complete object but a 
determinate intuition that is part of the ongoing determination of an object 
over time. They unify an object 'here and now1 , providing a series of its 
different determinations that are built up over time, but do not provide it 





point turn or a distance covered both allow us to recognise something about 
an object, they tell us what this body can do insofar as this can be counted 
or measured but no more. We will consider this further because it helps us 
to integrate the principles in Kant's full, architectonic account of experience. 
The Axioms of Intuition provide a partial account of the determination ot 
objects of cognition and therefore look to other principles. This suggests 
that we have here something other than an argument that is confined to the 
role of successive addition in the synthesis of possible experience. We have 
instead a stage in the unfolding of Kant's architectonic.
How do we move from a schematised category to a principle in this case? 
Paul Guyer argues that Kant does not follow his architectonic strategy when 
he provides the principle and its proof, the strategy of moving from schema 
to principle on the basis of the Table of Categories and its relation to time. 
He argues that in the first two components of the Table of Principles, the 
Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception, Kant does not 
draw upon 'the temporal re-interpretation of the categories of quantity and 
quality' 18 that he presented in the schematism chapter. These are the 
transcendental time determinations that realise a conceptual rule in a mode 
of time, such as the time series that is ruled by the schematised categories of 
quantity. Nor, Guyer argues, does Kant show that categories must be 
applied on the basis of the temporal structure of experience. Time does not 
provide an argument in favour of the necessity of the categories any more 
than the categories show how time is to be ordered. Thus if we find it 
convincing that mathematical operations like successive addition must take 
place to secure objects of cognition this is an argument about what 
mathematics can do and not about what time and the categories together are 
capable of. Guyer argues that'... what Kant actually does in these sections 
is to argue that the spatial as well as the temporal structure of our 
experience justifies the application of certain parts of to its
18Guyer200t
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objects, namely, the mathematics of "extensive" and "intensive" 
quantities1 . 19 We will now consider this reading that puts mathematics at 
the basis of Kant's arguments in the proofs of the two mathematical 
principles rather than involving the Table of Categories and its relation to 
time.
The principle of the Axioms of Intuition is 
'.20 Taking forward his schematism of the categories of quantity 
Kant defines an extensive magnitude as a magnitude where the presentation 
of the whole is made possible by the presentation of the parts. This is then 
a determinate unity because it is successively built up over a time series. 
Kant argues from the evidence that...
'I can present no line, no matter how small, without drawing it in 
thought, i.e., without producing from one point onward all the parts 
little by little and thereby tracing this intuition in the first place. And 
the situation is the same with every time, even the smallest. In any 
such time I think only the successive progression from one instant to 
the next, where through all the parts of time and their addition a 
determinate magnitude is finally produced'.21
In this passage Kant moves from an example of how cognition actually 
works to time as the ultimate form of this synthesis of possible experience. 
He makes it clear that while his concern is with space or extension, the 
medium in which the cognition of extensive magnitudes is produced is time. 
There is 'the successive progression1 in time that builds up parts so that a 
whole, an extensive magnitude, can be formed. Thus a distance in space 
has to be assembled through successive apprehension in time and is always 
open to being extended through time. This ensures that no extensive 
magnitude is discrete or self-contained. The unity of an extensive 
magnitude is the aggregate of parts presented in space but the role of time in 
the presentation of these parts keeps this extension open. It is then a
20Kant 1996: 233, A162/B202. 
2llbid: 234-235, B203/A163.
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principle of the synthesis of possible experience that extensive magnitudes 
are built up through time in order to make space determinate and keep open 
its determination in time.
It is clear that Kant is drawing upon mathematics and how it is necessary to 
our cognition of possible experience. We saw Paul Guyer argue that this 
makes the Axioms of Intuition an independent argument that is artificially 
presented through Kant's architectonic as following from his Table of 
Categories and the correlated modes of schematism. The arguments made 
concerning the Axioms of Intuition actually draw upon mathematics and 
stand or fall according to the evidence it draws from this source. 
Mathematics provides the rules that apply to the objects that we come 
across in experience and Kant therefore refers to what we do when we count 
rather than to the role of time and the categories in the synthesis of possible 
experience. However, if we follow Kant's architectonic mode of argument 
and presentation, mathematics is seen to participate in a wider process in 
the Axioms of Intuition rather than standing on its own. It is situated as 
something happening in and through time and the role of the categories in 
time. In chapter one of this thesis we saw how it is a supporting argument 
when set in the context of Kant's architectonic method. It is nevertheless 
privileged because it shows what time and the categories can do in a unique 
way and so supports Kant's architectonic like no other cognitive 
achievement. To count is to produce time and in this way stage a 
transcendental time determination, to apply a rule that deals with time 
series. However, it is in time that this series has been able to arise as a 
succession of parts in space. It is also in time that the categories provide the 
ultimate rules for making this succession into the determination of an 
extensive magnitude or partial object. It follows that the synthesis of 
possible experience does not wait until someone learns or decides to count 
before this temporal operation takes place. Time and the categories are at 
work prior to the existence of a mathematician or to the evolution of life to
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the stage where counting is possible. It must make possible those situations 
where we can count by introducing number as the schema of the categories 
of quantity in the synthesis of possible experience. If we follow the 
architectonic, time and the categories come before mathematics as a 
practice but mathematics is privileged because it participates in synthesis 
like no other discipline.
It follows that while number is not a member of the Table of Categories it is 
the schema of a division of this table, of the categories of quantity. If we 
follow this architectonic presentation of the text we find that mathematics 
informs us about how the synthesis of possible experience proceeds 
according to the system provided by the Table of Categories. However, we 
have not yet shown how the three categories of quantity are at work in the 
Axioms of Intuition. In his Howard Caygill sets out the 
role of each category of quantity in three rules for the determination of a 
time series.22 They are the rules that turn a time series into a process of 
successive addition with an extensive magnitude as its outcome. The 
category of unity is realised in the instant or moment of time which forms 
part of the extensive magnitude that is being built up over time. The 
category of plurality is realised in the course of time that builds up the parts 
of an extensive magnitude. A plurality of unified moments is gone through 
in order to realise the first two categories of quantity in a concrete way. 
Finally, the category of totality is realised at the end of this time of the 
successive addition of parts, in the extensive magnitude they now form and 
its determinate unity. We see that the categories can be understood as 
structuring or determining a time series, providing a dynamic system of 
determination that produces extensive magnitudes in very different 
situations. A temporal interpretation of the three categories of quantity 
takes all three together and makes this part of a systematic unfolding of the
22Caygill 1995: 90.
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schematised Table of Categories.23 This is not to downplay the role of 
mathematics for Kant but to situate it in time and the work of the categories. 
It is very informative for Kant because it deals with appearances or partial 
objects, objects needing to be determined under rules. For Kant we cannot 
look beyond rules that deal with appearances in order to get to what is 
objective about space. In this sense, we must think about space like a 
mathematician does.24 We need to envisage a mathematics of appearances
23Georges Dicker argues that '...Kant associates all three categories of quantity with only 
a single principle,...' (Dicker 2004: 62). From this it would seem to follow that the 
order of the three categories of quantity in the Table of Categories has no contribution 
to make to the formation of this principle. The Table of Categories thus ceases to be 
our systematic guide because we are guided by the process of counting or by the 
lessons of mathematics. For Dicker the Axioms of Intuition complements the 
Transcendental Aesthetic by showing that mathematics is capable of exhibiting a 
priori truths (ibid: 63). This challenges the reading we've been giving because, in 
chapter one of this thesis, we argued that such isolation arguments in the 
play a supporting role in its architectonic. The unfolding of the Analytic 
of Principles under the guidance of a Table of Categories in the Transcendental 
Analytic is part of a wider transcendental argument because it doesn't isolate the a 
priori but shows it to be a condition of possibility for experience as such. It can be 
supported in a unique way by the lessons of mathematics but we cannot substitute an 
isolation argument for a transcendental argument. We've just seen that Howard 
Caygill provides a response to Dicker's reading by showing how the three categories 
of quantity and their specific order are involved in the formulation of the Axioms of 
Intuition. Dicker's reference to the Axioms of Intuition being a single principle 
neglects the more significant fact that three categories are involved. The Axioms of 
Intuition is certainly not split into three sections and three principles like the 
Analogies of Experience. However, the fact that Kant does not treat the role of each 
category separately or organise the Axioms of Anticipation into three sections does 
not mean that the Table of Categories and its tripartite structure ceases to be his 
guide.
24 We considered Kant's relation to mathematics in chapter one of this thesis (p. 84f). 
We saw that his view of mathematics is 'intuitionist1 or 'constructivist' because the 
foundations or truths of mathematics are for him established synthetically rather than 
purely formally and in abstraction from concrete cases. In the following passage 
from the locates a truth about 
appearances that mathematics is well placed to reveal: 'At issue here is not the 
transformation of semblance into truth, but of appearances into experience; for, in the 
case of semblance, the understanding with its object-determining judgments is always 
in play, although it is in danger of taking the subjective for objective; in the 
appearance, however, no judgment of the understanding is to be met with at all - 
which needs to be noted, not merely here, but in the whole of philosophy, because 
otherwise, when appearances are in question, and this term is taken to have the same 
meaning as semblance, one is always poorly understood1 (Kant 2004: 94, Ak. 4: 555). 
Appearances do not lack an object or 'thing in itself that would complete them. We 
should not aim at truths behind appearances but at more productive ways of realising 
appearances in the synthesis of possible experience. Mathematics treats objects in a
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that is always already at work in the synthesis of possible experience. Thus 
appearances must be built up according to rules for securing unity, plurality 
and totality in the production of a magnitude just as in geometry the rule 
that two straight lines cannot enclose a space must always hold.25 These are 
partial objects, not complete ones that cannot be further determined in time 
under a priori rules. Mathematics then shows how objects are built up out 
of appearances that are only 'partial', as Sebastian Gardner suggested when 
he argued that mathematical principles do not give us complete objects. As 
extensive magnitudes they are open to change as well as being determined 
in time under rules. In this sense mathematics actually points to the 
involvement of objects in the synthesis of possible experience that 
necessarily involves the categories as rules rather than, as Guyer suggests, 
standing alone as a way of cognising objects already given in experience. 
For Kant mathematics does not involve objects that come to an end but it 
does involve determination in time and under rules. This leads us to the 
open-ended determination of extensive magnitudes. In this way we can 
understand and situate mathematics within the unfolding of Kant's 
architectonic.
revealing and truthful way when, as we saw, it understands them as a series of 
potential parts of objects. It does not take objects for granted, locating them behind 
appearances, but focuses upon the synthesis through which objects emerge. 
However, as we noted in chapter one of this thesis, mathematics can only provide a 
supporting argument in Kant's architectonic. It reveals or isolates truths about how 
experience is to be accounted for but does not have the scope of a transcendental 
argument.
25'This successive synthesis of the productive imagination in the generation of shapes is 
the basis of the mathematics of extension (i.e., geometry) with its axioms. These 
axioms express the conditions of sensible a priori intuition under which alone the 
schema of a pure concept or outer appearances can come about - e.g., the axioms that 
between two points only one straight line is possible; or that two straight lines enclose 
no space; etc. These are the axioms that, properly speaking, concern only magnitudes 
as such' (Kant 1996: 235, A163/B204).
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b. The Anticipations of Perception
We will now consider the second mathematical principle in order to see 
how it complements the first. We move from the building up of magnitudes 
in extension to differences in intensive magnitude. The systematic route 
that Kant takes is via the categories of quality and their schematism. 
However, he also draws upon the concrete role of intensive magnitudes 
which we've seen Guyer emphasising so that the abstract and the concrete 
both play an indispensable role. Kant seeks to put the categories of quality 
in touch with the concrete synthesis of possible experience in space and 
time when he writes about them in the schematism chapter:
'Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is what corresponds to 
a sensation as such. Therefore reality is that whose very concept 
indicates a being [of something] (in time); and negation is that whose 
concept presents a not-being (in time). Hence the contrast of reality 
and negation is made by distinguishing the same time as either a 
filled or an empty time'.26
The categories of reality and negation are involved but they are schematised 
and so are translated into the ways in which they occupy space and time. 
They occupy space and time as fullness and as emptiness respectively. This 
is because the mode of time to be dealt with by the schematised categories 
of quality is Kant makes it clear in the Anticipations of 
Perception that the role of the schematised category of reality is not to be 
cancelled out by the role of the schematised category of negation in the 
ways in which these rules deal with time content. The production of reality 
in experience, of spaces and times full of sensation, is not to come to an end 
with negation and nor is it to start from nothing.28 It is instead what is
26lbid:215,B182/A143.
27Ibid: 217, A145/B185, the full quotation is given in footnote 14 of this chapter.
28Kant argues that we can never meet an empty space and yet this fullness is the source 
of variety in the degrees of reality or intensive magnitudes which characterise 
experience: 'Thus something that spreads and fills a space as, e.g., heat, and likewise 
any other reality (contained in appearance), can decrease in degree 
without leaving even the smallest part of this space in the least empty, and can 
nonetheless fill this space just as well with these smaller degrees as another
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always already underway because experience is always ultimately in time 
and so being continuously filled with degrees of reality. However, negation 
is necessarily involved in this determination of time content while not being 
something we ever perceive. We only perceive degrees of reality or spaces 
and times full of sensation. Kant writes that: f ... the schema of a reality 
taken as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time is precisely this 
continuous and uniform production of that reality in time, where from a 
sensation having a certain degree we descend, in time, until the sensation 
vanishes, or ascend gradually from the sensation's negation to its [actual] 
magnitude'.29 The categories of reality and negation deal with time content 
by keeping it full of degrees of reality but also open to changes in degree of 
reality. We have then continuity in the production of degrees of reality and 
a negation that prevents any stoppage in this production because any 
particular degree will always be 'negated' in favour of another. Negation 
thus ensures that our perception of degrees of reality flows rather than 
coming to an end, that we perceive further partial objects determined under 
rules and in time. How does this complement the Axioms of Intuition and 
so play a part in the unfolding of Kant's architectonic?
Kant argues that 'We can,..., abstract entirely from the extensive magnitude 
of appearances, and can yet present in mere sensation in one moment a 
synthesis of uniform ascent from 0 to the given empirical consciousness'.30 
Here Kant suggests that in one moment a synthesis can, as it were, 'come 
from nowhere* in the sense that it is not accounted for by the building up of 
the parts of an object over time. An object may still have exactly the same 
number of parts in extension, the same extensive magnitude, but something 
has changed. Kant is concerned that recognition can keep up with a change 
in the way space and time is marked out for us by intensive magnitudes. 
This means that it needs a principle dynamic enough for this process to be
appearance can with greater degrees' (ibid: 245, A174/B216). 
29ibid: 216, A143/B183, the addition in square brackets was made by the translator. 
30ibid: 246-7, A176/B217-18.
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anticipated. We do not anticipate the particular degree of reality but we do 
anticipate the role of the schematised categories of reality and negation in 
keeping perception full and flowing with degrees of reality or intensive 
magnitudes.31 These categories keep reality full of different degrees, 
ensuring that the production of intensive magnitudes is open ended. An 
example would be an object that is perceived as 'too hot' to hold whereas a 
moment before it was an object that could be held. The object's role in 
possible experience thus exceeds any particular degree of reality. Kant 
describes the necessary role of negation here in terms of'...a synthesis in the 
production of a sensation's magnitude, from the sensation's beginning, i.e. 
from pure intuition, = 0, up to this or that magnitude of sensation'.32 The 
role of the schematised category of negation is here further specified as the 
zero degree intensity that opens situations to the different ways in which 
things can occupy space and time. It does not specify the number of 
degrees by which the temperature of the object rises or how the person 
holding it reacts, something that will depend upon the psychology and 
physiology of the individual concerned. However, behind each change of 
degree we anticipate the role of the zero degree, ensuring that intensive 
magnitudes flow and so keep open what can happen in a situation in 
relation to the degrees of reality that characterise it. Thus in order for 
recognition to be adequate to the synthesis of possible experience it must 
anticipate a continuous production of degrees of reality. Only in this way 
can it account for the unpredictable ways in which we occupy space and 
time. Recognition is in this way armed with a principle that allows it to 
envisage a sudden and perhaps frightening or alarming change in intensity 
which is nevertheless a determinate change in magnitude.
31 Kant writes of intensive magnitudes that: '[s]uch magnitudes may also be called 
magnitudes, because the synthesis (of productive imagination) in their 
production is a progression in time, and the continuity especially of time is usually 
designated by the term flowing (flowing by)1 (ibid: 241-242, A170/B211-12).
32lbid:239,A166/B208.
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This brings us to the role of the third category of quality, the category of 
limitation. We saw in the Axioms of Intuition that the three categories of 
quantity together form a dynamic system of determination for possible 
experience. This is echoed in the Anticipations of Perception where we 
find that limitation in space and time is the combination of the first two 
categories of quality. Here Kant extends the system presented in the Table 
of Categories. As we saw in chapter three, the third category in each 
division is derived from the combination of the first two. We found that if 
this is to be convincing, rather than rigid and artificial, it must play a 
necessary part in providing a full account of possible experience. In the 
case of the third schematised category of quality (limitation) and the 
principle derived from it (the Anticipations of Perception), Kant seeks to 
ensure that determinate unity is the outcome of a dynamic process of 
continuously producing the content of time. Limitation is to enclose a 
degree of reality within limits, within the limits of a situation where it might 
make things 'too hot' and where it has a definite, measurable degree. A 
degree of reality needs limitation to make it relevant to a concrete situation 
where it matters whether the content of time makes us retreat from an object 
that is now 'too hot'. This must realise the production of degrees of reality 
in a situation but not neglect the role of negation in keeping this process 
open. Thus the result of limitation in space and time is that we have a 
measurable degree of reality or intensive magnitude, such as a temperature. 
We can compare its role to the third category of quantity, totality or 
'allness', in the Axioms of Intuition which ensures that the temporal process 
presents a unified extensive magnitude, something determinate in 
experience. For Kant the abstract and systematic guidance of the Table of 
Categories is necessarily complemented by concrete reasons for involving 
these three schematised categories in the synthesis of possible experience. 
Together the categories of quality form a dynamic system of determination 
that keeps experience full of sensation, of degrees of reality, but that also 
breaks this continuous flow. This determinates the situation we find
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ourselves in as 'too hot1 or 'too cold' or 'just right' and as so many degrees 
higher or lower than before. Limitation must not then limit us to a 
particular degree but make sure that we can account both for the surprise of 
finding something too hot and the accuracy of our measurement of this 
change in intensive magnitude.
It is important to note Deleuze's assessment of this part of the 
We saw that he is concerned with differences internal to an 
account of experience provided by sensation. The Anticipations of 
Perception contributes to his understanding of their role. In 
he envisages '...a step-by-step, internal, dynamic construction of 
space which must precede the "representation" of the whole as a form of 
exteriority. The element of this internal genesis seems to us to consist of 
intensive quantity rather than schema, and to be related to Ideas rather than 
to concepts of the understanding'.33 The construction of space as a concrete 
process introduces intensive differences into a situation. As we saw, this 
leads the inhabitants of this space to occupy it differently. However, for 
Deleuze this must not rely upon categories or pure concepts that he 
understands as external to this concrete process. Changes in temperature 
represent an open ended process that results in different ways of occupying 
space and time ranging, for example, from a rapid but temporary retreat to a 
permanent change in way of life in response to the onset of an ice age. For 
Deleuze this does not have to do with three schematised categories of 
quality and how they form what he understands as an 'external' system. 
Instead it is the dramatisation of Ideas directly in sensation. This selective 
affirmation of the echoes Paul Guyer's reading 
insofar as it takes the argument of the Anticipations of Perception in 
isolation, leading Deleuze to make use of it in his own account of 
experience in Our focus will remain on the
33Deleuze 1994: 26.
34Deleuze's use of Kant's account of intensive magnitudes tells us more about his
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unfolding of Kant's architectonic rather than upon a selective approach that 
would evaluate the components of the Table of Principles in isolation. 
Understood in this way, the Anticipations present part of the unfolding of 
the abstract Table of Categories in the concrete synthesis of possible 
experience. They show how the abstract and the concrete presuppose one 
another as part of a wider account. Therefore, while concrete reasons for 
the necessary role of principles in the production of experience are crucial 
they are not isolated in Kant's account from abstract reasons. Kant's answer 
to Deleuze's criticism would be that we don't apply categories from outside, 
that there is a system of determination always already at work in the 
synthesis of possible experience. We will continue to consider how for 
Kant the abstract is realised in the concrete, and vice versa, as we consider 
the two remaining components of the Table of Principles.
c. The Analogies of Experience
The third component of the Table of Principles, the Analogies of 
Experience, introduces us to dynamical or discursive principles. In the 
schematism chapter Kant refers to the schematised categories of relation as 
providing the rules for dealing with At stake is our discursive
closeness to, and distance from, Kant. We note that Kant limits his investigation of 
intensity to magnitudes or quantities. Deleuze has a wider view of the life and role of 
intensities. They actually account for extensity. Kant moved in this direction when 
he separated intensive magnitudes from magnitudes built up in extension. Deleuze 
wants to go further so that intensities are now qualitative as well as quantitative. 
Therefore, intensities will not only differentiate sensation in every way but also 
provide their own power to do so: 'Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by 
which it is conditioned. [...] Intensity is the form of difference in so far as this is the 
reason of the sensible. Every intensity is differential, by itself a difference' (ibid: 
222). However, Deleuze echoes Kant when he argues that a temperature is not 
composed of other temperatures or a speed of other speeds (ibid: 237). It is not built 
up in extension but is indivisible because it is an irreducible difference. It is not made 
up of parts already given in experience. Like Kant then Deleuze is keen to avoid 
involving anything given in experience in accounting for experience but he will go to 
greater lengths to liberate intensity.
35Kant 1996: 217, B184-185/A145, the full quotation is given in footnote 14 of this
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understanding of experience in space and time rather than how magnitudes 
are built up or how they occur to us in space and time. In the Analogies of 
Experience a certain discursive activity is demanded in response to a time 
order presented to us by the production of experience. They bring us to 
how experience is to be thought through time rather than how it is given in 
determinate magnitudes through time. However, the basis for this is still 
the synthesis of possible experience in time through the system of 
determination presented in the Table of Categories. These principles 
demand certain discursive activity when they make us look for the relation 
that holds a situation together, a relation that determines a time order in the 
very production of experience. This leads Beatrice Longuenesse to locate a 
certain genesis of cognition in the presentation of a time order in space. 
This must be understood in terms of the determination of this time order 
under a rule if cognition is to move forward: 'We shall acquire a 
determinate cognition of it only by means of the indefinite, never- 
completed process of corrections and specifications of our discursive 
judgements in actual experience. Nonetheless, this process finds its initial 
impulse and its first step in the mere consciousness of the 
We will consider how in each Analogy a 
time order, something that makes things simultaneous in space, prompts us 
to seek the role of a schematised category in the synthesis of this 
experience.
Before considering each of the three Analogies of Experience we must 
remember that for Kant time alone cannot show us the necessary relations 
that hold in the synthesis of possible experience. The initial impulse to look 
for a necessary relation arises because we cannot rely upon time to show us 
how things are related in their synthesis. We saw in the previous chapter 




cannot be located or 'laid out1 before us. If it could then we would find the 
power of time presented or 'laid out' in space. We would then fail to 
account through time for what Longuenesse referred to as the 'simultaneous 
existence of things in space'. The relations that arise in space in the course 
of experience, that are 'laid out' before us, are what need to be accounted 
for. Therefore, space must not show us its time order but prompt us to look 
for it. Kant therefore preserves the non-spatial character of time when he 
writes that: Time, however, cannot itself be perceived. Therefore 
determination of the existence of objects in time can come about only 
through the linking of perceptions in time as such, and hence only through 
concepts connecting them a priori'.37 Thus for Kant determination in time 
does not remain a mystery despite our inability to perceive it in space, 
despite the fact that time is not 'laid out' before us. We should not be left 
merely contemplating the mysterious abilities of time but instead be 
prompted to seek the role of the categories in schemata or transcendental 
time determinations. It is this role of categories that allows necessary 
relations to be discovered and time to be de-mystified through its role in 
synthesising experience under the rule of these pure concepts. Thus whilst 
we cannot perceive time as a whole this is because what time 'is' can be 
presented only in terms of what it 'does' and what it does is here the 
realisation of the categories. This gives us our only View' of time but it is 
one that must orientate discursive thought, as we shall see. We must 
respond to the simultaneity of things in space as a time order whose 
determination under a category we must discover. Rather than perceiving 
or contemplating time we are challenged to seek the category of relation 
that is being realised in the ongoing synthesis of possible experience.
In his 'General Comment on the System of Principles' Kant suggests the 
dependence of the three categories of relation upon the concrete synthesis of 
possible experience for their realisation:
3?Kant 1996: 248, A177/B219.
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'From mere concepts we can have no insight whatever into (1) how 
something can exist only as and not as mere determination of 
other things, i.e., how it can be or (2) how because 
something is, something else must be, and hence how in general 
something can be a cause; or (3) how, when several things are there, 
then from the fact that one of them is there, something follows for the 
others, and thus also reciprocally, and hence how a community of 
substances can in this way occur'.38
It follows that time, as the ultimate form of the synthesis of possible 
experience, enables the categories to occupy and determine space and time. 
Heidegger sums up the role of time when he writes of the first Analogy, 
where the abstract logical subject becomes a substance in a concrete 
situation, that: 'Time thus shows its own permanence'.39 Thus, whilst we 
cannot perceive time as a whole we can perceive its role in the first Analogy 
in realising the permanence of a substance as a rule for the determination of 
a time order. Heidegger argues that the permanence of time itself is the 
basis for the application of the category of substance and accident. The 
permanence of a substance, which distinguishes it from accidents that befall 
it, is ultimately provided by the permanence of time as the realisation of this 
category. For Kant this follows because, given that we cannot perceive it as 
a whole, time is not subject to change. He writes that f [t]ime is not in 
transition; rather the existence of what is mutable is in transition in time. 
Hence to time, which itself is immutable and enduring, there corresponds in 
[the realm of] appearance what is immutable in existence, i.e., substance; 
and only by reference to substance can succession and simultaneity of 
appearances be determined in terms of time'.40 Thus, whilst time cannot be 
perceived, its role in the production of experience can be presented when it 
realises the category of substance and accident in a concrete way. Equally, 
while the schematism of the category of substance and accident cannot be 
presented using images it is here presented in the concrete, spatio-temporal 
form of a substance which we distinguish from its accidents. Change is
3 8lbid: 298, A235/B288. 
39Heidegger 1997: 75.
4°Kant 1996: 216, A144/B183, in parenthesis in the original.
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now objective or belongs to an object as the substance to which various 
accidents are attributed. Thus, whilst extensive and intensive magnitudes 
are partial objects, we need complete objects or substances to which they 
can be attributed. We keep hold of the object through change because, 
while it is perhaps larger in extension than before or suddenly 'too hot1 , 
recognition is dynamic enough to be able to keep hold of it over time. 
Recognition seeks something permanent that allows us to say that 
something has changed rather than losing sight of the subject of change 
over time because we cannot tell it apart from the accidents that befall it. 
Thus for Kant we must draw both upon time's permanence and upon the 
Table of Categories that has guided us to a third member of this Table of 
Principles. This adds to the first two members of the table a discursive 
principle that leads us to seek permanence when we encounter a time order.
Kant's examples in the second Analogy draw upon the successive nature of 
our experience of the permanent substances established in the first Analogy. 
If we encounter a house, or a ship floating down stream, in experience we 
do so successively and therefore in time.41 However, the two examples are 
different insofar as the succession is reversible in the case of our experience 
of a house and irreversible in the case of a ship floating down stream. This 
difference takes us to a further requirement of recognition but takes with it 
the need for the permanence of a substance if we are to recognise changes 
as belonging to one and the same object across a time order. We are again 
directed to how we are led by time in the cognition of objects, how it 
contributes to the means by which we recognise what is objective about a
41 The example of the house: 'Thus, e.g., the apprehension of the manifold in the 
appearances of a house standing before me is successive. Now the question is 
whether the manifold of this house itself is successive intrinsically as well; and this, 
to be sure, no one will grant1 (ibid: 262, B235-6/A190). The example of the ship: Tor 
example, I see a ship floating down the river. My perception of its position lower 
down in the course of the river succeeds the perception of its position higher up, and 
there is no possibility that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should be 
perceived first lower down and afterwards higher up in the river' (ibid: 263, 
B237/A192).
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situation because it realises a category in a concrete way. The schematised 
category of cause and effect rules in the time order if it is an irreversible 
time order, like the ship floating down stream. Thus it doesn't matter for 
cognition if we experience the roof or a window of the house first because 
this time order is reversible. All we need here is the permanence of the 
subject-concept of the judgement, 'the house', in order to attribute the 
different attributes or predicate-concepts to something objective or 
substantial in possible experience. However, things are quite different in 
the example of the ship sailing down stream. If we don't see the ship up 
stream before it appears further down stream recognition doesn't work. We 
do not recognise an objective change which is objective thanks to its 
irreversible order as well as its permanent substance. For Kant this is not 
simply a matter of how we make sense of objects or of the order of 
psychological time. It is first of all a matter of the synthesis of possible 
experience in time according to a priori rules. A time order leads us to seek 
the conceptual rules at work in this synthesis. In this unfolding of the Table 
of Principles a second Analogy combines with the first Analogy and this 
now leads us to a third Analogy. It thus forms part of a dynamic system of 
determination whose outline or plan is the Table of Categories and its 
tripartite structure.
Rather than considering the objections that could be made to the arguments 
for the first two Analogies, or to the need to have a third one, we will move 
forward with Kant's architectonic. The argument for doing this is that the 
first two Analogies alone are not the full account Kant gives us in the 
Analogies of Experience. To stop now and make assessments would be to 
consider something unfinished. As we've seen, Kant's architectonic is 
offered to us as a whole that is greater than its parts. For this reason we will 
seek to complete the model provided by the Analogies of Experience by 
adding the third Analogy before turning a more critical gaze upon this 
system of determination. We have sought to show that Kant's architectonic
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is concerned with its own unfolding and not with anything external to this. 
We have consistently argued that we must not pre-empt this unfolding if we 
are to assess it fully. W. H. Walsh argues that we do need to keep an Idea 
of the whole in view if we are to understand the involvement of the 
schematised category of community in the Analogies of Experience. He 
writes that: '...the story about substance both gains support from and lends 
support to the story about causality, and the same is true 
of the story about reciprocity in its relation to each and both of the others'.42 
Yet Walsh also bemoans the lack of development by Kant of'...the internal 
or systematic connections of the individual categorial concepts that he had 
put forward'.43 This makes the point that for Kant's architectonic to work as 
an account of experience it would have to convince us that only this 
dynamic system of determination, taken as a whole, can account for 
experience fully. Echoing the concerns we considered in chapter three of 
this thesis, Kant is seen to have been in a rush to present his account of 
experience and so does not develop internal and systematic arguments as he 
should. This criticism is important for us because it concerns the unfolding 
of Kant's architectonic.
The schema of the category of community, the third category of relation, is 
'...the simultaneity, according to a universal rule, of the determinations of 
the one substance with those of the other'.44 The first Analogy provides the 
substance that persists and the second Analogy provides chains of cause and 
effect that relate persisting substances to past causes and future effects. 
However, if we only consider how substances are related in chains of cause 
and effect we have a system for determining a time order that excludes any 
community of substances. Kant is concerned with how time relates things 
here and now, in a unified space and time that makes up a concrete
42 Walsh 1975: 147.
43lbid.
44Kant 1996: 217, A144/B183-84.
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situation. Thus rather than a model that envisages only substances isolated 
in chains of cause and effect he includes communities of substances. How 
can this be said to develop 'the internal or systematic connections' of the 
categories that W. H. Walsh is rightly concerned about? Kant seeks to 
show that his Metaphysical Deduction presents categories that are 
presupposed by the concrete synthesis of possible experience just as these 
abstract categories presuppose this process of production in order that they 
are realised and do not remain empty. The abstract and the concrete 
presuppose one another, each allowing the other to be realised in the only 
way possible. The three Analogies are to show the necessity and 
completeness of the Table of Categories as conditions of possibility. They 
are therefore presented systematically according to this table. However, 
they must also show that this table is necessarily realised by being open to, 
and involved in, the synthesis of possible experience. The third Analogy is 
then to follow internally and systematically from the first two principles. 
To do this within Kant's architectonic it must follow both from the abstract 
order of the Table of Categories and the concrete concerns of the synthesis 
of possible experience.
The reciprocal determination of substances interacting in a concrete 
situation must then complete the dynamic system of determination 
presented in the Analogies. Kant uses an example from experience and 
again is concerned both with the discursive activity of the understanding in 
response to what we perceive and with the synthesis of possible experience 
itself:
'Things are if their perceptions can in empirical 
intuition succeed one another (which cannot occur in the 
temporal succession of appearances, as was shown under the second 
principle [the second Analogy]). Thus I can carry on my perception 
either first with the moon and thereafter with the earth, or, vice versa, 
first with the earth and then with the moon. And because the 
perceptions of these objects can succeed each other reciprocally, I say 
that the objects exist simultaneously. Now simultaneity is the
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existence of the manifold in the same time'.45
The emphasis is again on time as the ultimate form of the synthesis of 
possible experience. We have a single stretch of time which will provide 
the basis for the application of the schematised category of community. 
This is because it makes it possible to determine substances as simultaneous 
under the rule of this category. For Kant the result is that 'the law of 
interaction' holds and this reference to law is meant to show that the lack of 
a necessary order in the perception of the moon and the earth is not a sign of 
a lack of determination in time. Simultaneity is in fact a determinate time 
order that is highly significant because it makes us look for the relation at 
work in the synthesis of possible experience. It asks what rule of 
determination holds in this time order as distinct from an irreversible 
succession where cause and effect is the rule. In simultaneity in time the 
reciprocal determination of substances is revealed to us, to use Kant's 
example, because there is no priority in time to the perception of either the 
moon or the earth. Each substance is influenced by each of the others rather 
than one asserting itself as the cause of the existence or character of the 
others. We have a unified and law-governed scene without the onward 
march of chains of cause and effect undermining this particular form of 
determination and unity. This makes the schematised category of 
community the simultaneous interaction and reciprocal determination of 
substances. There is then no cause that imposes itself upon our attention 
first, that draws us away from interaction in the here and now. A 
community of substances is the outcome of the category which does not 
elevate one thing to be the cause of others but presents them as equal in 
their reciprocal determination. However, we see that it must also be a 
structure that is dynamic because it is grounded in how these substances 
interact. It must be grounded in how substances relate in space and time 




When we explore the role of the concrete in Kant's formulation of the third 
Analogy we do indeed find that it is not an addition dictated solely by the 
order of the Table of Categories and without basis in the synthesis of 
possible experience. In other words, the abstract does not simply dictate to 
the concrete. However, this has been disputed by some commentators. 
Arthur Melnick uses the example of two billiard balls to show that we can 
understand substances sufficiently in terms of causal chains and without 
using the Table of Categories as our systematic guide.46 In this sense, the 
concrete synthesis of possible experience rebels against the unfolding of 
Kant's architectonic where a third category necessarily complements the 
first two. This echoes Guyer's argument that Kant's proofs in the Analytic 
of Principles are based solely upon the concrete role of each principle. 
Melnick points to a situation where two billiard balls are hit by a third 
billiard ball and then move off in different directions. Now if we were to 
use the category of community to understand this scene we would talk 
about a game of billiards as a community of substances and so situate the 
balls in relation to one another, their surroundings and the players. 
However, Melnick argues that chains of cause and effect allow us to 
account for the position of the two balls (which he refers to as and on 
the billiard table: 'We thus have two series of successive states: 1) at place 
pi, at p2..., at pn; 2) at pi', at p2',..., at pn' f .47 What he seeks to do 
here is to understand a game of billiards by talking separately about the two 
billiard balls that are hit simultaneously. He talks about them in terms of 
two isolated casual chains. This has to include variables like the elasticity 
of the billiard balls and the direction of the acting force and its magnitude.48 
Thus the wider situation is included but only in relation to the causal history
46Melnick 1973: 103; cited in Allison 2004: 268f. 
4?Ibid.
48Melnick also factors in the coefficient of friction of the balls with respect to the 
billiard table (ibid).
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of each of the two balls that are hit. The community of substances 
represented by the game is then the outcome of these separate causal 
histories rather than being involved in accounting for the situation as such. 
Henry E. Allison objects to Melnick's argument on grounds that are very 
important for our investigation. He does not deny the validity of his 
analyses of each ball taken individually and indeed being able to isolate a 
billiard ball is crucial to recognition. This is especially important if we 
want to recognise a wining strategy that separates one ball from all the 
others so that it allows us to win the game. However, Allison points to the 
difficulty of predicting the relations between the two balls at particular 
times if we think about each one in isolation. He argues that '...this cannot 
be done apart from a determination of the temporal relation of and at 
their respective locations, which, [...], presupposes their reciprocal 
influence'.49 We cannot separate each ball into a causal chain without 
losing touch with their positions. The game necessarily involves the unity 
of a community, without which we lose a determinate grasp of where each 
ball is at a particular time. The two billiard balls are therefore only 
determinable through their relation to one another in time. This makes 
Melnick's analysis of the billiard balls a perfectly valid outcome of a more 
original process, that of the synthesis of possible experience in which the 
category of community is involved along with the category of cause and 
effect. This makes possible the charting of the separate causal histories of 
substances which is also necessary to playing a game of billiards. Allison 
argues that Kant seeks to distinguish subordination and co-ordination by 
having a second and third Analogy, reflecting the difference between the 
categories of cause and effect, and community.50 This shows that there are 
concrete reasons for the inclusion of the third Analogy; for drawing upon 
the abstract order of the Table of Categories. We will now develop the 




the concrete, meeting the concerns of both as Kant's architectonic demands.
We have suggested that there must be concrete, as well as abstract, grounds 
for viewing the three Analogies as the systematic unfolding of the third 
division of the Table of Categories. For Kant the Analogies have to be 
shown to take forward the Table of Categories, to show how it is at work in 
the synthesis of possible experience rather than being artificially imposed 
upon it. For readers like Paul Guyer and Arthur Melnick the Analogies 
stand or fall as arguments in their own right. Guyer argues that Kant'... can 
be seen as finally proving the objective validity of the category of substance 
from his proof of the conservation of substance, rather than vice versa'. 51 
He finds here an argument based on the necessary structure of experience, 
suggesting that in the Analytic of Principles the Table of Categories 
becomes a list of possible categories and something open to revision. 
However, for Kant the architectonic mode of argument and presentation is 
convincing insofar as it is able to show that the abstract and the concrete 
presuppose one another. Thus Guyer's recognition of the concrete 
importance of rules of determination is not lost but made into a sign of the 
presupposition of the abstract by the concrete. Beatrice Longuenesse seeks 
to argue in favour of this reading and she develops the insights we have 
been uncovering about how categories are involved in providing an open 
and dynamic system of determination in the Analytic of Principles. She 
wants to think about how: '...in his argument, Kant calls upon all three 
forms of relation in judgment, and thus all three categories of relation 
together with their schemata, to account for our generating our own 
representation of a unified space and time in which empirical objects may 
be cognized through their relations of universal interaction1 .52 Thus we 
cannot consider the three Analogies individually but only as together 




relate only in '...the context of their universal interaction1 . 53 Her point is 
that whether substances interact successively or simultaneously, through 
cause and effect or reciprocal determination, they belong to this concrete 
context. Kant has not then started from three necessary features of 
experience that each stand alone but with the third division of the Table of 
Categories and its realisation in a dynamic model for securing determinate 
relations in the context of universal interaction. Interaction in space and 
time is universal in the synthesis of possible experience. Out of interaction 
must come not confusion but determination that is secured by the 
permanence of a substance, chains of cause and effect, and reciprocal 
determination. Kant's arguments in the Analytic of Principles therefore 
rely upon the mutual presupposition of the abstract Table of Categories and 
the concrete context of universal interaction. These must convincingly 
presuppose and determine one another and in the process provide a full 
account of possible experience.
We considered, in chapter three of this thesis, the debate over the derivation 
of the category of community in the Table of Categories from the 
disjunctive judgement in the Table of Judgements. We may add to the 
points we made in that chapter now that the role of the concrete has been 
developed in the Analytic of Principles. What does this tell us about the 
relation between disjunctive judgement and the category of community? If 
the interaction or reciprocal determination of substances in the Third 
Analogy makes objects recognisable then their recognisable 'marks' allow 
them to become objects of disjunctive judgement. 54 A situation is thus 
'marked out' in the concrete context of 'universal interaction', something 
reflected and formulated in the abstract by the category of community. The 
schematised category of community now makes possible the work of
53lbid: 384.
54'Reciprocal causality is the relation by means of which substances are recognizable by
their essential and accidental mark, and thus eventually reflectable in accordance with
the form (ibid: 386).
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disjunctive judgement in experience because it provides concepts to be 
combined in disjunctive judgements. While chains of cause and effect put 
different states of objects one after the other, in community opposites meet 
one another and are thus material for a disjunctive judgement. This 
provides concrete material for disjunction or material that arises from the 
context of universal interaction. However, the abstract does not simply 
reflect the concrete and its universal interactions. The disjunctive 
judgement provides the category of community with its 'totalizing 
character'. 55 A full account of community in space and time relies upon 
disjunction to totalise or individuate a community given the danger that if a 
community includes everything it will lack any individuality and 
significance in experience. This reflects the fact that being dynamic is not 
simply about being open to what happens in space and time or in the 
context of universal interaction. It is about being able to define a 
community in terms of what it is or what it is not, through exclusive 
disjunction. A completely open community could be said to be no 
community at all insofar as, lacking in distinction, it means nothing to its 
members and adds nothing to experience. Disjunction then totalises a 
community; it secures something very concrete by being very abstract. A 
community 'lives' it's distinctive and totalised character, it exists through 
being exclusive and different, through exploring its own disjunction as a 
community of substances. However, it provides the material for this 
disjunction and so allows cognition to respond dynamically to the universal 
interactions among substances. A community can thus develop in concrete 
ways but is always made distinct in the abstract by disjunctive judgement. 
In this way the mutual presupposition of the abstract and the concrete, in the 
unfolding of Kant's architectonic, characterises the third component of 
Kant's Table of Principles as it did the first two.
55'Conversely, only the logical form of disjunctive judgment can bestow on the category 
of community, as reciprocal interaction, its totalizing character' (ibid).
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d. The Postulates of Empirical Thought As Such
Now we come to the fourth and final component of the Table of Principles. 
It can be said to carry forward Kant's Idea of the whole because it very 
clearly draws upon the previous three components of the Table of 
Principles. However, it is unique in its concern with the empirical use of 
the understanding. We've noted that for Kant the pure use of the 
understanding is only a very small part of the total work of cognition. The a 
priori does not take over all cognitive activity and stifle its creativity by 
setting out the outcomes of cognition beyond their most basic forms, the 
forms that make cognition possible in the first place. In the schematism 
chapter Kant concludes his presentation of the schematised Table of 
Categories with the categories of modality. He writes of: '... the schema of 
modality and of its categories, [which is] time itself as the correlate of the 
determination of an object as to whether it belongs to time'. 56 It follows 
that the mode of time that is to be dealt with by the schematised categories 
of modality is This makes time, as sum total, the horizon 
of the empirical use of the understanding. Now we've seen that time is 
ruled by schematised categories. Time as sum total is the sum total of the 
ways in which time realises the categories in concrete or synthetic ways. 
Thus it is time and the Table of Categories together that become the 
transcendental horizon of possible experience. The Postulates now demand 
that we ask if an object belongs to time, making this the horizon of all our 
thought about objects of possible experience. Turning to another systematic 
division of the Table of Principles that is carried forward from the Table of 
Categories, we see that the Postulates are dynamic or discursive principles. 
They call for thought in response to what is met with in experience but, 
unlike the discursive principles of the Analogies of Experience, this
56Kant 1996: 217, A145/B184.
5?Ibid: 217, A145/B185. The full quotation is given in footnote 14 of this chapter
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concerns the empirical rather than the pure use of the understanding. Time 
is directly involved in the synthesis of possible experience and can now, in 
the Postulates, become involved in how we think about experience. As 
we've seen, insofar as time is ruled by the categories it is the ultimate 
medium of anything that can be included in possible experience.
The principles developed in the Postulates of Empirical Thought As Such 
are as follows:
'1. What agrees (in terms of intuition and concepts) with the formal 
conditions of experience 
What coheres with the material conditions of experience (with 
sensation) is 
3. That whose coherence with the actual is determined according to 
universal conditions of experience is (exists necessarily)1 .58
We've noted that Postulates are not involved in the pure use of 
understanding and we will now consider the implications of this for their 
role in Kant's architectonic. The Postulates do not precede what Kant calls 
the 'empirical use' of the understanding as the previous three components of 
the Table of Principles do.59 The pure use of the understanding marks out 
a priori the space and time where empirical understanding can then be at 
work by providing the magnitudes and the relations that form part of 
possible experience. It is then in this empirical use of the understanding 
that we are faced with questions of possibility, actuality and necessity. 
Possibility, the first Postulate, must make us think in terms of time as 'sum 
total', about what is possible in time and according to the categories that it 
realises as principles. Kant writes of the impossibility of'...the concept of a 
figure enclosed by two straight lines.,.'.60 The figure is not negated in 
thought because it is not contradictory and yet it is an impossible figure in
58lbid: 283, A218/B265-266.
59Referring to the categories of modality that are here to be realised Kant writes that
'[tjhrough these categories no further determinations are thought in the object itself;
rather, the question is only how the object (along with all its determinations) relates to
understanding and its empirical use, to the empirical power of judgment, and to
reason (as applied to experience)1 (ibid: 283, A219/B266). 
60lbid: 284, A220/B268.
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experience because it cannot be constructed in space. This refers us back to 
the building up of objects in extension that was the concern of the Axioms 
of Intuition. We are ultimately referred to how, through time and its 
relation to the categories, objects emerge only if they can be constructed in 
space. Equally, it would not be possible for two opposite determinations to 
belong to one object simultaneously, carrying forward the concern of the 
Anticipations of Perception to account for the production of degrees of 
reality. Something cannot be both 'too hot' and 'too cold' if it is to have a 
real and productive role in possible experience. This becomes a condition 
of possibility in the context of time as 'sum total' where, as the 
Anticipations showed, different magnitudes are not simultaneous in the 
same object but successive in their continuity. Thus when in the 
schematism chapter the modal category of possibility is schematised this 
excludes opposites as determinations of the same object: The schema of 
possibility is the harmony of the synthesis of different presentations with 
the conditions of time as such. (Thus, e.g., what is opposite cannot be in a 
thing simultaneously, but can be in it only sequentially.) Hence this schema 
is the determination, at some time, of the presentation of a thing'.61
For Kant a great deal is realised in the Postulates despite their role being 
limited to the empirical use of the understanding: The postulate of the 
of things demands, then, that their concept agrees with the 
formal conditions of experience as such. But this experience, i.e. the 
objective form of experience as such, contains all the synthesis that is 
required for cognition of objects'.62 In other words, the Postulates refer to 
what is possible in experience according to how experience is synthesised. 
It adds nothing to this but makes possible the realisation in empirical 
understanding of the work of a priori synthesis. The second and third 




Experience and the a priori rules they present in order to secure actuality 
and necessity in the context of'time sum total'. The Analogies are shown to 
be a source of coherence that makes experience possible and so must be 
postulated in all empirical use of the understanding.63 Kant argues using 
the following example: Thus the existence of a magnetic matter 
permeating all bodies is cognized by us from the perception of the attracted 
iron filings, even though direct perception of this material is impossible for 
us in view of the character of our organs1 .64 Here we have something more 
than possibility and yet something we cannot perceive. Kant seeks to keep 
cognition in touch with experience as something ultimately unified in time, 
in time as 'sum total1 , even when perception is lacking. He refers to the 
coherence of appearances whose laws are set out in the Analogies of 
Experience in relation to time. These laws are to hold at all times or in time 
as 'sum total' rather than in particular cases. There is in this example 
coherence between the perceived movement of bodies and the unperceived 
cause of that movement (magnetism). It is a coherence that holds across all 
times and so for time as the 'sum total' of all relations that hold in 
experience and all magnitudes presented in experience.
Necessity, the third postulate, is also referred to the Analogies of 
Experience and specifically to the second Analogy.65 Kant writes that:
'Modality adds to causal determination the concept of necessity; but 
this necessity is subject to a rule of understanding. The principle of 
continuity prohibited in the series of appearances (changes) any leap
63Kant writes that things don't need to be perceived to be actual but do need to cohere in 
a unity of possible experience that obeys the the rules of the Analogies of Experience. 
Thus the Postulate of Actuality '...does require that the object cohere with some actual 
perception, according to the analogies of experience, which set forth all real 
connection in an experience as such' (ibid: 287, A225/B272).
64lbid: 288, A226/B273.
65'From this it follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of possible 
experience which says that everything that occurs is determined a priori by its cause 
in [the realm of] appearance. [...] The necessity concerns, therefore, only the 
relations of appearances according to the dynamical law of causality, and the 
possibility based thereon of inferring a priori, from some given existence (a cause) 
another existence (the effect)' (ibid: 293, A227-28/B280).
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(iw but it also prohibited in the sum of all 
empirical intuitions in space any gap or breach between two 
appearances For the proposition can be 
expressed by saying that nothing that would prove a vacuum, or 
would so much admit it as a part of empirical synthesis, can enter 
experience'.68
If something is not presented in time and under the category as part of a 
sequence of causes and effects it is not a part of possible experience. The 
third Postulate thus ensures that this rule is realised continuously in the 
thick of the empirical use of the understanding. It ensures that the empirical 
understanding does not speculate about voids or gaps in the unity of 
possible experience, that it is on firm ground in the most concrete situations. 
It does this by taking forward the concern of the previous three components 
of the Table of Principles with the continuous synthesis of possible 
experience. Thus in the Anticipations of Perception the role of negation 
was not to present us with a void or gap but to keep the production of 
degrees of reality flowing and continuous. Kant is then primarily concerned 
that '...in empirical synthesis [there is] nothing that could impair or interfere 
with the understanding and the continuous coherence of all appearances, 
i.e., the unity of understanding's concepts'.69 This ensures that the 
systematic realisation of the Table of Categories extends into the most 
concrete realms without being disrupted by what we come across in the 
course of experience.
This positive presentation of the role of the schematised categories of 
modality is still seemingly at odds with Kant's own apparently depreciating 
assessment of their role.70 We will now end this section by considering 
whether the Postulates are out of place in the Table of Principles. This is
66'In the world there is no leap1 . 
67'There is no break'. 
68lbid: 293-294, A228-229/B281. 
69lbid, p. 294, A229-30/B282.
70Through these categories no further determinations are thought in the object itself ' 
(ibid: 283, A219/B266).
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important if we are to assess Kant's architectonic and it's supposed 
completeness and integrity. What is at stake in the Postulates of Empirical 
Thought As Such for Kant is '...only the object's relation to the cognitive 
power'. 71 The production of experience has been secured but questions still 
occur. Do we have a merely possible concept of an object or an actual one? 
If it is actual is it also necessary? Georges Dicker questions the need for a 
schematism of the categories of modality given that through them we only 
reflect upon possible experience at a distance from its synthesis.72 
According to Dicker's reading the Postulates concern only the attitude of the 
judger towards the judgements they are making: '... they simply pertain to 
the attitude one holds toward the application of a concept to something, 
toward the linkage of two or more concepts in a proposition, or toward the 
linkage of two or more propositions to each other'.73 Thus the Postulates 
counsel against having a speculative attitude. We must not speculate about 
things that exceed the bounds of coherent and continuous possible 
experience, such as about gaps or voids in the determination of experience 




74Although we are not considering Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism 1 section here we must 
note its place in the Postulates of Empirical Thought As Such, an addition that was 
made in the second edition of the As we saw in the first 
chapter of this thesis, Kant uses a transcendental argument to draw out the conditions 
of possibility of something already accepted by his opponent. He notes that for an 
empirical or material idealist we can be sure of the proposition 'I am conscious of my 
existence as determined in time' (Kant 1996: 290, B275). However, in order to avoid 
impoverishing possible experience for the empirical use of the understanding we must 
not treat this as an isolated experience like the empirical or material idealist does. 
Such a thinker is plagued by doubt about the outside world rather than being armed 
with Kant's Postulates. Kant seeks to prove that a condition of the possibility of the 
truth accepted by the empirical or material idealist is the existence of things outside 
the self and ultimately the horizon of time as the ultimate form of the synthesis of 
possible experience. I am in fact conscious of my existence hi time or of being 
determined in time. This is not an isolated experience but is included in a much 
wider process, the process of all temporal determination through the Table of 
Categories. In this way the horizons of the empirical use of the understanding are 
widened precisely because they remain within the bounds of possible experience. As 
we saw in chapter one of this thesis, for Kant an inclusive and internalising account 
of experience provides the fullest horizon of empirical cognition.
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Another concern is that, in the Postulates of Empirical Thought As Such, 
Kant is again brief in his presentation and arguments. He presents the three 
Postulates in terms of our most general ways of thinking about time and 
makes limited appeal to examples and concrete cases. W. H. Walsh 
complains that:
'It is not enough to say that what is really possible must agree with 
the formal conditions of experience; he must show, in particular 
instances, how what look like genuine possibilities are not such 
because they conflict with those conditions. Otherwise Kant runs the 
risk of appearing to be merely dogmatic, dismissing speculation of 
one type on the basis of convictions which are equally speculative 
and equally unargued'.75
We've sought to show throughout this thesis that Kant employs an 
internalising method. He therefore does not look at the a priori synthesis of 
possible experience from the outside. He does not in this unfolding of his 
architectonic stop to seek proofs using examples of how we actually 
distinguish the possible from the impossible. Rather than what is given in 
experience, the product, his concern is with the process of accounting for 
experience. He writes that: '... the principles of modality affirm nothing 
other than the action of the cognitive power by which the concept is 
produced'.76 We must remember that the cognitive power is, at the stage of 
the a priori synthesis of possible experience, the transcendental unity of 
apperception which we touched upon in chapter three of this thesis.77 The 
Postulates draw upon this 'cognitive power' that was developed over the 
preceding pages of the Transcendental Analytic as the transcendental unity 
of apperception. They form part of an argument that is not based upon what 
is given in experience in order that we do not presuppose what is to be 
accounted for. Therefore, any talk of a 'cognitive power' has nothing to do
75 Walsh 1975: 150.
76Kant 1996: 297, A234/B287.
77The transcendental unity of apperception is an element of Kant's architectonic account
of experience which, in chapter three of this thesis, pages 124-5, we sought to
characterise as impersonal.
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with a personal or psychological 'attitude' that we form over the course of 
experience or observe in inner sense. It has everything to do with the 
impersonal elements of an a priori account of experience. These elements 
are referred to in the Postulates because they are involved in the realisation 
of the categories in time as sum total. This is affirmed by the Postulates as 
much as it was affirmed in the Metaphysical Deduction and the rest of the 
Analytic of Principles. As we saw in chapter three of this thesis, the 
synthesis of possible experience realises conceptual rules that are given all 
at once in the abstract in a Table of Categories. Having been given all at 
once they will unfold in a similarly decisive fashion, eschewing dryness and 
tedium in a way that is unsatisfying for readers like W. H. Walsh. 
However, we've seen that for Kant we cannot develop these rules at our 
leisure. We again find that we cannot make sense of Kant's progress unless 
we take the time to consider his singular mode of argument.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have put Kant's move from abstraction to concreteness in 
his Analytic of Principles in the context of his architectonic. This, we 
argued, was the only way of making sense of Kant's rejection of the dry and 
tedious just as in the Metaphysical Deduction it is behind his concern with 
the brief and solid. The decisive affirmation of the Table of Categories in 
the schematism chapter is followed by the unfolding of the Idea of the 
whole that this table embodies in the schemata and principles. It culminates 
in the affirmation of 'time sum total' as the horizon in which categories are 
realised as the conceptual rules of synthesis that make experience possible. 
At the end of the previous chapter we saw that, having appropriated and 
revised his notion of schematism, Deleuze appears to take his leave of Kant 
rather than following him in his architectonic mode of presentation and 
argument. The schematism was useful for Deleuze and in this chapter we
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noted that he also finds the Anticipations of Perception useful. However, 
we've argued that these meeting points do not exhaust their relations, that 
listing aspects of the that Deleuze makes use of 
restricts our potential understanding of how these two thinkers relate. We 
therefore sought to follow Kant's architectonic strategy in order to 
understand it more fully. We saw that this can lead us to think about the 
mutual presupposition of the abstract and the concrete in the context of 
Kant's architectonic. Here an abstract Table of Categories is to be realised 
in the concrete synthesis of possible experience. We have sought to follow 
Kant's strategy and see where this leads us in order that we can then make a 
deeper comparison between Kant and Deleuze. This will involve, not 
isolated parts of the whole, but Kant's architectonic and its problematic Idea 
of the whole. The next chapter of this thesis will be concerned with the full 




In this chapter we will seek to relate our reading of Kant's 
to Deleuze's account of experience. We've seen that Kant's account 
of experience is organised by a Table of Categories. We will not, however, 
be holding up each of Kant's categories in turn in order to ask what 
relevance it has to Deleuze's work. As we have seen, Deleuze is concerned 
with an account of 'real experience'. He rejects Kant's attempt to provide 
conceptual forms that are applicable to sensation and always given in 
advance. However, we will seek to show that Kant's Table of Categories is 
not a point at which his relations with Deleuze are exhausted. In order to do 
this we will build upon the methodological common ground uncovered in 
chapter two of this thesis. We will add to their common concern with 
problematic Ideas a concern with arguments that are founded upon 
problematic Ideas. We've seen that Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the 
Table of Categories is such an argument but can we characterise Deleuze's 
method in the same way?
In order to explore the relevance of Kant's Table of Categories to Deleuze's 
project we will first seek to consider how Deleuze and Kant share a 
common problem. Kant's concern to relate the abstract and the concrete 
will be shown to resonate with Deleuze's thought. This common ground 
will then be tested by being put in the context of Deleuze's critique of 
Kant's philosophy. The second section of this chapter will consider 
Deleuze's reading of Kant's categories and how he proposes to relate 
categories to character and mood. In the third section we will relate this 
interpretation of the categories to Deleuze's emphasis upon sensation in his 
account of experience. We will see that, while Deleuze's categories differ
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from Kant's, they have similar ways of arguing for the role of categories in 
an account of experience. This will allow us, in the final section of this 
chapter, to argue that by considering the role of categories in Deleuze's 
account we can better understand his concerns. The main contention of 
this chapter will be that Deleuze himself gives a productive reading of 
Kant's categories and opens the way for establishing a necessary role for a 
Metaphysical Deduction in his own project.
i. A Common Problem
In order to grasp the role of Kant's Table of Categories in Deleuze's thought 
we have to first show that they share common concerns and that this table is 
Kant's response to these common concerns. In chapter two of this thesis we 
focused upon the methodological common ground to be found in Kant and 
Deleuze. Can we develop this further and say that they share a common 
problem that unifies their accounts of experience? James Williams seeks to 
capture a problem at the heart of Deleuze's thought and uses this to assess 
his relations to other thinkers. This is the problem of attaining both 
openness and reach: 'I define openness in metaphysics as a relation that 
does not impose restrictions on future transformations and events. A 
metaphysics that sets down the path of the world from now to some final 
judgement day, or a metaphysics indebted to a particular science or set of 
laws, or one that sets out fundamental ontological forms and elements 
would not be open'. 1 We can see from the work that we've done so far that 
Kant and Deleuze share a concern to provide a full account of experience. 
In chapter two of this thesis we saw that they are both concerned with how 
a problematic Idea can open up experience. Sensation must continue to add 
to experience although this 'openness' to sensation is realised in different 
ways by these two thinkers. However, both argue that we not must look
1 Williams 2005: 4.
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outside of experience to find the ends of inquiry. To seek such ends is an 
approach that Deleuze describes as Tilling in1 experience. We 'fill in' 
openness rather than allowing openness to be realised in different ways.2 
Our inquiry must be synthetic because we are seeking to uncover the 
synthesis of experience and not what is given in experience. Thus rather 
than filling our account with givens of experience we must keep it open to 
synthesis.
James Williams points to the danger that openness and reach can cancel 
each other out unless we relate them in a way that realises them both.3 To 
secure reach there needs to be a way of determining experience such that 
things we are open to can be distinguished from one another. We must not 
be permanently overwhelmed by sensation, unable to distinguish what is 
met with in experience. Thus, to be simply open is to fail to be dynamic or 
in any way successful in dealing with what arises through synthesis. 
Nothing is distinguished and so we really aren't open to anything that has 
any significance or effect upon us. In openness alone we have something 
that cannot be called experience if experience involves, by definition, 
distinct and significant things. However, we must also avoid the danger 
that openness is sacrificed because our ways of reaching different parts of 
experience lead us to neglect the concrete particularities that sensation has 
to offer. At stake then is the need for openness and reach to be realised 
through one another because, as Kant puts it, '[tjhoughts without content are 
empty; intuitions without concepts are blind1 .4 In other words, a concern 
with reach alone sacrifices openness to synthesis and openness alone 
produces nothing worthy of being called experience. This reflects Kant's 
concern to relate the synthetic and the a priori that we've been considering
2?If the mistake of dogmatism is always to fill that which separates, that of empiricism is 
to leave external what is separated, and in this sense there is still too much 





in this thesis. However, when we consider how reach is to be secured Kant 
and Deleuze differ strongly. We will now consider whether the differences 
that emerge here undermine the relations between these two thinkers.
If the problem of openness and reach seems to be of common concern we 
find that Deleuze is also concerned that we attain an 'internal' account of 
experience that rules out aspects of Kant's account. In chapter two of this 
thesis we understood this as the incarnation and realisation of the 
intelligible in the sensible. For Deleuze this ensures that we do not 
represent experience in terms external to sensation but encounter its own 
ways of determining things. We do not Till in1 experience but remain open 
to its synthesis, to what sensation has to offer. For Deleuze openness is 
being sacrificed, rather than secured, through Kant's categories or pure 
concepts of the understanding. He develops this critique when he writes 
that Kant's mistake in the is to '...leave external 
what is separated, ...'. 5 In other words, openness is not realised through the 
sensible synthesis that accounts for experience. We leave external what 
could actually provide this internal account, the differences that are 
involved in the synthesis of sensation. As we saw in chapter two of this 
thesis, for Deleuze problematic Ideas lead us to learn from sensation or 
from the differences internal to it. In Kant something external is added to 
complete the account of experience rather than allowing sensible synthesis 
to provide an internal account. In chapter two we also considered how 
moments of concrete synthesis make us idiotic so that we learn about 
experience from sensation rather than relying upon our concepts. Insofar as 
it is unintelligible synthesis extends our reach over experience as we learn 
more about experience in these moments than in moments when things are 
intelligible. For Deleuze then Kant proceeds by assuming something 
external in order to make up for the lack of an internal account of 
experience. He does not grasp what sensation can do through its own
5Deleuze 1994: 170, the full quotation is given in footnote 2 of this chapter.
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resources and therefore has to rely upon concepts that do not reflect what 
sensation has to offer.
How important is this critique of Kant to Deleuze's approach to the 
Deleuze suggests that although both he and Kant are 
concerned with accounting for experience, with securing openness and 
reach, something quite different is at the centre of his account: 
Transcendental empiricism is meaningless indeed unless its conditions are 
specified. But the transcendental "field" must not be copied from the 
empirical, as in Kant. It must be explained on its own terms: "experienced" 
or "attempted" on its own terms (but it is a very particular type of 
experience)1 .6 When in chapter two of this thesis we considered 
unintelligible moments of synthesis we uncovered the role of our 
encounters with sensation in Deleuze's account. He argues that instead of 
applying conditions to sensation we must learn from our 'experiences' or 
'attempts' to be open to concrete synthesis. We must then develop our reach 
by being open to experience, by learning from sensation. This takes us to 
the heart of Deleuze's critique of external presuppositions and concern to 
secure an internal account of experience. His critique of Kant includes the 
charge that his categories, these allegedly pure concepts of the 
understanding, are 'copied' or 'traced' from the empirical. In this sense they 
are given in experience rather than being significant in how experience is 
accounted for. This helps him to give a positive definition of a 
transcendental field that is to be 'experienced' or 'attempted'. What is 
'experienced1 or 'attempted' is something actually involved in accounting for 
experience. We engage with the sensible synthesis of experience and in 
chapter two we saw how we are made idiotic by unintelligible moments of 
this synthesis. For Deleuze this brings us closer to an internal account of 
experience by involving us in the synthesis by which sensation accounts for 
experience as such. We encounter the synthesis through which experience
^Deleuze 2006: 362.
214
is given. This is to 'experiment' with the ways in which sensation itself 
stages experience. James Williams argues that this is something that we 
can '...only experiment with, rather than grasp'.7 Deleuze's approach is to be 
contrasted to one that seeks to 'grasp1 experience since this carries the 
expectation, an external presupposition, that experience will always be 
'graspable' in a certain ways. For Deleuze, if experience becomes 
unintelligible then this is positive, it allows us to learn more about it or to 
experiment. Does this put him at odds with Kant? In the previous chapters 
of this thesis we have seen how Kant is concerned to relate the a priori to 
synthesis or to relate reach to openness. Synthesis is the process through 
which experience is given but is not to be confused with what is given in 
experience. Thus while Deleuze rejects Kant's categories as external to the 
synthesis of experience he shares Kant's concern to relate our ability to 
reach experience to an openness to experience in its synthesis or production.
Can we develop links between Kant and Deleuze's projects without their 
similarities being too vague or too general to be significant in how we 
understand their work? The problem of openness and reach which we 
began with, which is in a very real sense the concern of any and every 
philosopher, must be shown to have a common meaning and common 
outcomes in their two projects. Like Deleuze, Kant is concerned that 
openness to synthesis is realised. He takes rapid and definite steps to secure 
this in the Metaphysical Deduction. We saw, in chapter three of this thesis, 
how he takes decisive action to defeat the sceptic. This means that our 
openness to synthesis does not, as it does for Deleuze, account for the 
abstract ways we are able to reach experience. He does not account for the 
a priori through openness to sensible synthesis but first secures the a priori 
and then relates it to the synthetic. We have then a common problem but a 
markedly different solution. Let's remind ourselves of why Kant argued 
that openness to experience could only be secured if we formulated a Table
7lbid.
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of Categories once and for all. His concern here is with how situations are 
grasped or secured in the most basic ways. Thus we have the proliferation 
of empirical concepts like 'body', 'house', 'table', 'landmass' and 'cosmos' 
which reach across different presentations of objects but rely upon the more 
basic reach or unity provided by categories or pure concepts. Kant is here 
asking: What is behind this diversity of empirical concepts? What makes it 
possible in the first place? Categories together provide the basic forms of 
unity and embody the transcendental horizon in which these empirical 
concepts can arise. We have then categories that hold together situations in 
the most basic ways so that objects of cognition can multiply and develop 
because empirical concepts can always reach diverse sensations. Like 
Deleuze Kant is concerned to realise openness to the concrete in the reach 
of the abstract. We will now consider how, despite this common concern, 
Deleuze's emphasis upon sensation distinguishes him from Kant. This will 
allow us to situate their common ground within their different projects.
In Deleuze writes that: 'It is true that on the path 
which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility. [...] 
The privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an 
encounter, what forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one 
and the same thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct'.8 
This is a privilege earned by sensation insofar as it provides an internal 
account of experience. If sensation were brought into experience by 
something external, if its force derived from how categories always unify 
sensations, then it would not provide an internal account. However, we've 
seen that for Deleuze we must be open to sensation's own synthesis of 
experience. This is a force involved in accounting for experience that can 
only be sensed because it is internal to sensation and relies upon nothing 
external. We saw that Deleuze does not want difference to be left external. 
In the sensible synthesis of experience it is made internal and this privileges
SDeleuze 1994: 144-145.
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sensation as the source of an account of experience. The encounter with 
sensation is therefore with a force that is entirely its own. It involves being 
open to a synthesis that does not obey the rules of the understanding. 
Therefore, while in Kant's Metaphysical Deduction we encountered 
understanding's abilities, its forms of judgement, for Deleuze we must 
instead come face to face with what sensation alone can do.
How does this concern with sensation separate Kant and Deleuze? James 
Williams writes that '... a distinction must be drawn between Kant and 
Deleuze. For the former, abstracted universal forms are seen to presuppose 
pure transcendental forms. For the latter, singular events in sensibility are 
seen to presuppose pure transcendental forms1 .9 This captures the role of 
encounters with the sensible synthesis of experience that we've just 
considered. For Kant an encounter with an object of cognition may well 
lead us in thought to conceptual conditions of possible experience. It would 
bring us to what is most basic in experience, what secures openness to 
possible experience prior to any encounter with it. However, for Deleuze 
the encounter with the sensible must lead to an account of experience 
internal to sensation. Levi R. Bryant argues that Deleuze moves decisively 
away from Kant's project because he seeks to learn through encounters with 
sensation about how it accounts for experience: 'It is precisely this dogma 
[held by Kant], this assumption of the non-productivity of intuition, of its 
lack of intelligibility as opposed to the rational structure of concepts, that 
Deleuze's transcendental empiricism is designed to overcome'. 10 This 
presents us with the contrast between their sharing a common problem, that 
of openness and reach, and their lack of common ground when it comes to 
sensation. On the reading we have been giving, Kant formulates an open- 
ended '... of understanding's a priori cognition ... f n but
9Williams 2005: 10.
!OBryant2008:8.
UKant 1996: 118, A64/B89.
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this horizon opens up only because it is secured once and for all in the 
Metaphysical Deduction. It seems that Deleuze could not share his concern 
to secure the reach of categories or pure concepts in advance of experience 
because he wants to learn from sensation how it, and not the understanding, 
accounts for experience. Despite this we will seek to show, in the next 
section of this chapter, that Deleuze's way of responding to the problem of 
securing openness to the concrete does resonate with Kant's project. Kant 
may turn to the understanding rather than sensation to secure this but how 
he does this, the form of argument he employs, is relevant to Deleuze's own 
attempt to secure openness and reach.
ii. Deleuze on Categories and Moods
Deleuze presents Kant's account of experience in an original way during a 
seminar of 14th March 1978. 12 This presentation is more positive than those 
that we have so far considered but the question we must answer is whether 
it has any relevance for his own project. In this seminar Deleuze seeks to 
explain the nature and role of the categories or pure concepts of the 
understanding in the He takes the example of a 
rose which for Kant would first of all be referred to using empirical 
concepts. All roses form a set that is part of a broader set formed by all 
flowers and is also distinguished from those flowers that are not roses. 
However, Deleuze then locates the role of categories or pure concepts: 
'When I say "all objects have a cause", am I not in another domain 
completely?' 13 This a priori predicate-concept is what allows us to be 
certain that something is an object and thus part of experience. It is a 
category or pure concept of the understanding because it is one of the basic 




order to make experience possible in the first place. Deleuze argues that '... 
it is thus via the notion of conditions of experience that the idea of a whole 
of possible experience will take on a sense. There is a whole of possible 
experience because there are predicates or pseudo-predicates which are 
attributed to all possible objects and these predicates are precisely what are 
called categories'. 14 Here Deleuze stages the move from the empirical to 
the transcendental, to the horizon or Idea of the whole that envisages 
experience on the basis of categories. For Kant, it is the categories that 
secure openness to experience because, as we've seen, they are involved in 
its synthesis. Does this, as well as aiding Deleuze's presentation of Kant's 
philosophy in this seminar, have a basis in his own project? We must be 
careful not to assume a degree of similarity that is in fact blocked by 
Deleuze's critical concerns. Thus we find Deleuze writing here that Kant is 
concerned with an 'idea of the whole of possible experience1 and the role of 
possibility contrasts with his own concern to account for 'real experience1 . 
He understands possibility as an external presupposition, as something 
traced from experience rather than accounting for it. For Deleuze the 
encounter that brings us closer to an account of experience is always an 
encounter with sensation. However, we will pursue Deleuze's 
understanding of how Kant attains the level of the transcendental or of an 
Idea of the whole. If Deleuze rejects Kant's Table of Categories how can 
his thought relate to the move from the empirical to the transcendental that 
they involve?
We find that Deleuze goes beyond the mere exposition of Kant's account of 
experience in this seminar: 'I could define the categories in the simplest 
way as being the predicates of any object whatever. Thus you can yourself 
make your list of categories according to your mood, according to your 
character ... what would be good would be to see if everybody came up with
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the same list of categories1 . 15 The exercise that Deleuze suggests involves 
asking '...what is for me predicable of any object whatever'. 16 This is what 
we might call Deleuze's version of Kant's Metaphysical Deduction although 
we have yet to establish its nature and whether it is relevant both to Kant's 
deduction and to Deleuze's own project. A mood can be expressed briefly 
but can everyone understand the outcome of this deduction? It will 
certainly be a brief deduction, like Kant's, but does this make it a solid one 
given that moods are liable to constant and sudden change? As an 
argument it seems to fail to meet the criteria set by Kant's architectonic 
method. It relies upon mood and character, things apparently given in 
experience, and would thus appear to draw upon empirical psychology 
which for Kant studies fluctuating inner states rather than conditions of 
possibility for experience. 17 If the basis of the deduction of categories is 
found in moods and character then they would seem to be too open to 
experience to be able to secure it, to realise both openness and reach. 
However, if categories respond to mood and character we find that for 
Deleuze these are not in fact things which are given in experience. For him 
moods are the valid foundations for accounting for experience, for 
providing arguments that establish categories. Deleuze's thinking on mood 
and character actually makes them a potential non-empirical starting point 
for a Metaphysical Deduction rather than things that are given in 
experience. We must try to work out in what sense, according to Deleuze, 
mood and character actually account for experience without presupposing 
what is given in experience. It will be important to remember that in this 
seminar Deleuze has not merely equated categories with mood and 
character but also discussed their necessary and universal role. He writes 
that '...there is a level where the whole of possible experience takes on a 
sense, it is precisely because there are universal predicates which are
17The nature of empirical psychology for Kant is explored in chapter one of this thesis, 
pages 19-20, footnote 12.
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attributed to all things, which is to say are attributed to any object 
whatever'. 18 Therefore, Deleuze is not playing the role of the sceptic when 
he bases categories upon character and mood. He is not saying that we 
cannot have a priori, necessary and universal, categories. Instead he is 
seeking to find the source of such categories in character and mood.
In order to understand how Deleuze accounts for categories through 
character and mood we will return to the emphasis upon sensation that 
characterises his account of experience. As we have seen, sensation 
provides the object of the encounter through which we learn about the 
sensible synthesis of experience. If sensation is to provide the moods and 
characters that account for categories it must be the non-empirical starting 
point for a Metaphysical Deduction of the conditions of real experience. 
We have seen Deleuze writing that '...what would be good would be to see 
if everybody came up with the same list of categories'. 19 We also saw that 
he recognises the universal and necessary role of categories, something that 
demands that mood and character are not things given in experience. 
Character and mood are encountered as somehow involved in the way in 
which sensation itself is at work in accounting for experience. We've noted 
already that Deleuze finds resources in sensation that for Kant could only be 
secured given the role of the understanding in providing the judgements and 
categories behind cognition. Sensation alone is to be the source of a 
deduction of the categories. However, we will argue that despite his 
emphasis upon sensation to the exclusion of Kant's concern with the 
understanding he is seeking to develop a Kantian form of argument. This 
argument is a Metaphysical Deduction which starts with the non-empirical 
and secures categories with brevity and solidity. For Kant the non- 
empirical starting point is the pure use of the understanding while for 




This will lead us to focus upon the form of argument both Kant and Deleuze 
employ. In the next section of this chapter we will consider how Deleuze's 
emphasis upon sensation gives rise to a Kantian form of argument, a 
Metaphysical Deduction of categories that has its starting point in 
encounters with sensation.
iii. The Being of the Sensible
Deleuze emphasises sensation in his account of experience by talking about 
'the being of the sensible'.20 What does it mean to say that sensation has a
20Deleuze describes the term 'being of the sensible' as uniting the two senses of the 
'aesthetic' which we can identify in Kant's critical philosophy. One is put forward in 
the in its Transcendental Aesthetic and the other in the 
in its Analytic of the Beautiful. Deleuze shows that the 
combination of these two senses of the Aesthetic is another way of developing his 
critical engagement with Kant's Table of Categories: The elementary concepts of 
representation are the categories defined as the conditions of possible experience. 
These, however, are too general or too large for the real. The net is so loose that the 
largest fish pass through. No wonder, then, that aesthetics should be divided into two 
irreducible domains: that of the theory of the sensible which captures only the real's 
conformity with possible experience; and that of the theory of the beautiful, which 
deals with the reality of the real in so far as it is thought. Everything changes once 
we determine the conditions of real experience, which are not larger than the 
conditioned and which differ in kind from the categories: the two senses of the 
aesthetic become one, to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in the 
work of art, while at the same time the work of art appears as experimentation' 
(Deleuze 1994: 68). Deleuze seeks an account of sensation which unites the two 
senses of the aesthetic so that we can account for experience within sensation rather 
than having to rely upon an external Table of Categories. For him this is to recognise 
what sensation is capable of, to find the conditions of experience in sensation alone. 
We have been considering how Kant's account, when read in a unified way, can relate 
to Deleuze's thought. We are seeking to show that while he rejects the Table of 
Categories Deleuze's project resonates with the method and form of argument that is 
behind it. However, this passage from reflects another side 
to Deleuze's relation to Kant. Our justification, as set out in the introduction to this 
thesis, for excluding the from our present study is that it allows 
us to pursue a new avenue in relating Kant and Deleuze. We argued that while 
Deleuze finds an account of the relations of the faculties in Kant's 
we learn from the about the relation of the 
synthetic and the a priori (see pages 11-12 of the introduction to this thesis). This 
precedes the relations of the faculties of theoretical cognition and allows us consider 
the role of Kant's architectonic method and then relate what we've learnt to Deleuze's 
account of experience.
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'being'? Miguel de Beistegui argues that Deleuze is concerned to avoid 
mediating sensation through concepts: 'What escapes us is the thing in its 
difference or And this we can achieve by following the real in its 
self-differentiation, by pursuing the thing all the way to its internal 
difference, at the stage at which it becomes a "this". Yet the empiricism in 
question is further qualified as empiricism, and one that, in 
the process, becomes a empiricism'.21 It is in this sense that the 
move that we have already observed in Deleuze's critique of Kant is central 
to his own theory of sensation. This is the move from talking about or 
representing sensation to what sensation itself does, to its own syntheses. 
This invokes its 'self-differentiation' or the internal differences that are at 
work in its synthesis. Insofar as this synthesis can provide an internal 
account of experience it is elevated to a transcendental and superior status. 
This is something that we encounter in sensation, as its own 'being' or role. 
We saw in chapter three of this thesis that Ideas are dramatised in sensation 
without this process relying upon an author, actor or subjects. Sensation 
does not need such external conditions to account for experience. However, 
if sensation is to account for experience through its synthesis, how does it 
account for the reach we have in experience? How do we, through 
sensation, grasp individual things or object of experience? This leads us to 
consider Beistegui's reference to 'the thing in its difference'. This concerns 
how we understand and envisage a thing as being determined and 
distinguished solely through the sensible synthesis of experience. This 
'thing in its difference' does not need conceptual forms of determination to 
be what it is but instead we are referred to its own difference and the 
synthesis through which this arises. Thus something is different or 
individual insofar as it is nuanced or distinguished by sensation itself. 'The 
thing in its difference' is the individual given in and through sensation and 
through a difference that makes it individual. This brings us to Deleuze's 
account of individuation. This is something we must explore further
21 Beistegui 2004: 242.
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because it will bring us significantly closer to the categories that concern 
Deleuze. These categories are involved in an account of individuation that 
is internal to sensation.
In response to the problem of securing openness and reach we have arrived 
at a conception of a 'thing in its difference'. We need to be able to both 
encounter and reach different individuals and for Deleuze we can do this 
because sensation individuates or differentiates experience. In a seminar 
entitled Deleuze considers how this process 
can be formulated. We will compare this to his presentation of Kant's 
categories. The focus is upon sensation and the way it accounts for 
experience. In Deleuze seeks to formulate 
the questions that are staged in the very individuation of experience through 
sensation. He presents these questions as forming a universal system 
which...
'...sketch[es] out the multiple coordinates which correspond to the 
questions and which 
gives such questions their transcendent consequences, beyond 
empirical examples. These determinations as a whole indeed are not 
connected with any particular example borrowed from a physical or 
biological system, but articulate the categories of every system in 
general. [...] It happens all the time that dynamisms which are 
qualified in a certain way in one domain are then taken up in an 
entirely different mode in another domain'.22
In contrast to Kant's account, 'the categories of every system in general1 
cannot be set out in advance of sensation. However, they must be set out in 
advance of what is given in experience and provide an account of 
experience. As we've seen, they concern 'the being of sensation' or 
sensation's own synthesis. We see that Deleuze is concerned here with 
what he calls 'determinations as a whole' that are to precede and make 
possible 'every system in general'.23 These are what 'the being of the 




understanding must secure certain basic concepts in every case. Like Kant, 
Deleuze rejects the idea of a list of categories and opts instead for a 'whole 
set of determinations'. To list determinations would be to take one's 
bearings from things arising in experience, things which are listed as and 
when they arise, rather than from what is involved in accounting for 
experience. Kant and Deleuze both reject any notion of looking outside a 
process always already under-way. Instead they seek to secure these 
determinations 'as a whole'. Thus while for Kant the understanding is the 
source and for Deleuze it is sensation, brevity and wholeness are valued in 
both cases. The method by which categories are secured must not leave 
time for any external additions, external to sensation for Deleuze and 
external to the understanding for Kant. Categories should then be given all 
at once and as a whole on the basis of what sensation, or understanding, is 
capable of. Thus we have an argument that is internally focused, that is 
brief in order to provide an internal account of experience. This reflects 
Kant and Deleuze's methodological common ground, something that relates 
them despite their differences when it comes to the origin of the categories.
If the questions that Deleuze presents are involved in accounting for 
experience, we need to consider how this secures a 'thing in its difference', 
something we found to be a necessary feature of Deleuze's account. We ask 
in order to grasp the individual that is a necessary determination in 
any case of experience. Sensation asks this question in order to secure the 
individual or 'thing in its difference' and what this individuating difference 
entails. This is not a question of grasping situations by seeking a stable 
individual or a way of classifying individuals. Instead, sensation is able to 
secure a 'thing in its difference' that is unmanageable and something to be 
approached instead, as we saw earlier, through 'experiments' and 'attempts' 
to harness or realise this difference. In other words, we have a question that 
seeks to capture the role of difference in a situation in such a way that it 
presents the ongoing role of sensation in a process that Deleuze calls
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individuation. We encounter a 'thing in its difference' as something 
undergoing individuation, as animated by a difference whose outcomes are 
open-ended for a process of individuation. Deleuze is concerned that we 
interrogate this process correctly: The question prematurely 
judges the Idea as simplicity of the essence; from then on, it is inevitable 
that the simple essence includes the inessential, and includes it 
and thus contradicts itself.24 This would involve asking questions in order 
to better manage or understand sensation rather than to learn from 
encounters with it, to experiment with differences that are individuating in 
oneself and in others. We must approach a 'thing in its difference' rather 
than considering how things remain the same. By doing this we get closer 
to an account of experience, we focus upon individuation through sensible 
synthesis. is a question that does not focus on the 
individuating difference of a thing on the grounds that this would leave our 
grasp of it incomplete. However, for Deleuze we need to grasp a thing in 
its ongoing individuation, something that is always incomplete or 
unfinished. Only in this way do we learn about its synthesis and about how 
experience is accounted for. We consider a thing 'in its difference' or in 
terms of its individuation through difference. For Deleuze we must include 
this determination in the categories of'every system in general'.25
How is the question involved, like Kant's categories, in the synthesis 
of every case of experience? The individual or 'thing in its difference' can 
also be understood as a 'force' to be played out in a situation. Why use the 
term 'force1 here? It enables us to distinguish the individual or 'thing in its 
difference' from any subject or any object that we grasp on the basis of 
experience. We have something that is impersonal and non-empirical, 
something not given in experience. It can therefore be involved in the 
synthesis of experience. In this way we do not presuppose something
24Ibid: 95-96.
25Ibid: 98, the quotation was given on page 224 of this chapter.
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already given in experience but uncover something involved in accounting 
for it. This is an individuating difference or force that is at work in subjects 
and objects but is not to be confused with them. For Deleuze we need to 
have a force that is individuating in a situation and to be open to the ways 
this force can be realised given the obstacles and means that the situation 
provides. This leads us to the other questions that Deleuze poses in his 
account of experience. We ask and grasp an individuating difference 
or force, but what does this individual relate to?
Other questions expand individuation, putting it in context so that we have 
situations in which individuals develop, experiment and interact. As we 
saw, the full set of questions are: 
Deleuze brings these into play when he talks about 'the 
characteristic or distinctive trait of a thing in general':
'Such a trait is twofold: the quality or qualities which it possesses, the 
extension which it occupies. Even when we cannot distinguish actual 
divisible parts, we still single out remarkable regions or points; and it 
is not only the internal extension that must be examined, but also the 
way in which the thing determines and differentiates a whole external 
space, as in the hunting grounds of an animal. In a word, each thing 
is at the intersection of a twofold synthesis: a synthesis of 
qualification or specification, and of partition, composition, or 
organization'.26
The distinctive trait or character of a thing, secured by what we've described 
as its ongoing individuation, is related to its environment as an animal is 
related to its hunting grounds. We see that 'the being of the sensible', 
through the questions it poses, provides the determinations that mark out 
and develop 'hunting grounds'. First there is the role of the question 
in the individuation of the hunter. The hunter is not a hunter because it is 
distinguished from its prey but because it is a 'thing in its difference'. It 
expresses an individuating difference provided by sensible synthesis, 
something that plays a part in marking out 'the hunting grounds of an
26ibid: 96.
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animal'. The question is a condition of this and every other situation 
because it determines this situation by locating a particular character or 
mood within it. This makes individuation one of a number of 
determinations that we saw Deleuze referring to as 'determinations as a 
whole'.27 The situation is also determined by various ways of occupying 
space and time. The term Deleuze uses is 'spatio-temporal dynamisms'28 
and these are to be behind the emergence of hunter and hunted, and the 
development of the practice of hunting over time. Thus and 
refer to spatio-temporal dynamisms that determine how the force expressed 
in the individual is actually realised in a situation. We could say that they 
externalise individuation so that a 'thing in its difference' faces an outside 
world, a and a This introduces clashes between highly 
individual forces, such as we witness in the hunting field of the animal 
between the hunter and its prey. We also ask and this brings 
into play the amount of force of each individuation in a situation. Then we 
ask so that the ways hunter and hunted occupy space and time allow 
them to experiment, to respond dynamically and strategically to this 
situation. In this way Deleuze's 'whole set of determinations' has the power 
to explain an open ended variety of situations by specifying only the basic 
ways in which individuals occupy space and time. As we saw with Kant's 
Table of Categories, the aim is to account for experience but without over- 
determining it. Deleuze seeks to provide conditions that make experience 
possible, 'a whole set of determinations', but not to determine it any further.
We will now explore the nature and role of Deleuze's categories by further 
expanding upon his reference to 'the hunting grounds of an animal'. Here 
there are basic co-ordinates that situate the animal in relation to its prey. 
We ask at the same time as asking and so that these
2<7lbid: 98.
J.L/J.V1* S V/*
28'Beneath organization and specification, we discover nothing more than spatio- 
temporal dynamisms: that is to say, agitations of space, holes of time, pure syntheses 
of space, direction, and rhythms' (ibid: 96).
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times and places become obstacles or means of capture or escape. Here 
and now there are certain obstacles and certain means 
that give rise to questions of strategy This allows an individual 
to experiment with how experience is determined over the course 
of experience. This experimentation can have lasting results for a species, 
such a distinguishing a species like the zebra that has never been 
domesticated because it is so dangerous to humans after a certain age.29 It 
is distinguished by an individuating difference, by a violent character and 
mood, and how this is expressed in space and time, and in relation to other 
individuals. Zebras cannot be confined so as to be selectively bred and 
developed in captivity through human intervention. Unpredictable 
behaviour and aggression are then ways of occupying space and time that 
overcome the forces of individuation expressed in human attempts at 
domestication. Human beings fail in their attempt to experiment with the 
individuating differences they encounter in zebras, to remove through 
selective breeding the differences that make them wild and exploit their 
other characteristics in a domestic setting. The way in which this 
animal occupies space and time allows it to sustain and 
develop an individuating difference that has resisted all human intervention. 
We find that solitary and territorial species are less likely to have been 
domesticated, exceptions among territorial mammal species being the cat 
and the ferret. 30 In the case of herd animals attempts at domestication can 
be undermined if, for example, herds have exclusive territories which they 
protect against other herds. They occupy space and time in such a way that 
if they are penned in, a strategy of domestication used by humans beings, 
they will not behave in ways that can be predicted or managed. These 
examples give us a sense of what is at stake in Deleuze's account of 
individuation.31 They help to show us how the categories are at work in any
29Diamond 2005: 171-2. 
3 <>Ibid: 173.
3 1 Another example put forward by Jared Diamond in his is of the 
vicunas, an Andean wild camel, which has never been domesticated. The wool of
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case of experience. The clash of individuating differences or forces takes 
place in space and time. We do not ask but rather concern 
ourselves with places and times where individual forces clash, and with the 
strategies that they employ - In 
our example this gives continuity to the story of the zebra's relation to 
human beings over thousands of years. This is the history of the clash of 
individuating differences. We find an individuating force or difference in 
zebras that has consistently opposed human experimentation, something 
that emerges in a time and space where strategies of domestication are met 
with strategies of resistance. We have then a sense of the way in which for 
Deleuze the individual 'determines and differentiates a whole external 
space'.32 This exploration of Deleuze's categories has revealed their role in 
an account of experience. However, we now need to consider the relation 
they have to mood and character if we are to understand how such 
categories are formulated.
Deleuze enlightens us further about the question and also relates it to 
the singular reading of Kant's Table of Categories that we found in his 1978 
seminars on Kant. He does this when he names the individual who is 
sought by this question 'the larval subject'. Deleuze argues that'... it is not 
enough to ask the question: "what is the true?" As soon as we ask 
we have the task of 
assigning larval subjects (the jealous man, for example) and pure spatio-
this animal is very fine and light, making it a valuable commodity. Domestication 
would therefore be very worthwhile, especially because methods of shearing wild 
vicunas involve trapping them or killing them. Diamond accounts for the failure to 
domesticate vicunas by pointing to their '...long and elaborate courtship ritual before 
mating, a ritual inhibited in captivity; male vicunas' fierce intolerance of each other; 
and their requirement for both a year-round feeding territory and a separate year- 
round sleeping territory' (ibid: 170). Thus we find that the way space and time is 
occupied by these animals is what makes them individual in a very forceful way. 
When pitted against the individuating difference of these animals, the force that 
dominates in situations where it is trapped or in captivity, human strategies of 
domestication have failed.
32Deleuze 2004: 96, the full quotation was given on page 227 of this chapter
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temporal dynamisms (sometimes we cause the very "thing" to emerge, at a 
certain time, in a certain place; sometimes we accumulate indexes and signs 
from moment to moment, following a path that never ends)1 .33 This allows 
us to understand how the larval subject is the non-empirical starting point 
for a deduction of the categories. Deleuze illustrates this using the example 
of 'the jealous man1 . This larval subject is no-one and yet it can be 
expressed by anyone or everyone. It can be the mood of you or I, or indeed 
of both you and I in a case where it forms the mood of a crowd of which we 
both form a part and in whose mood and character we participate.34 This 
distinctive larval subject might have been absent a moment before, a 
moment at which space and time is not occupied by a crowd or person 
animated and held together in what they are doing by jealousy as their 
dominant larval subject. Deleuze's singular reading of Kant's categories 
proposed a deduction of categories based upon mood and character. In 'the 
jealous man', as a larval subject, we are dealing not with empirical 
manifestations of mood or character but with something involved in an 
account of experience that is internal to sensation. Thus Deleuze describes 
the questions staged in actualisation as '... the dynamisms of inquisition or 
admission, accusation or inquiry, silently and dramatically at work, in such 
a way as to determine the theoretical division of the concept'. 35 These 
secure a larval subject but specify this subject not as a person but as a mood 
or character that dominates a person or a crowd. The character or mood 
Deleuze is concerned with is secured as part of a process of posing 
questions that accounts for experience. It emerges through the sensible
33Ibid: 98.
34Thus if we consider Ellas Canetti's we have many different types 
of crowd presented to us (Canetti 1973). However, they would have in common the 
individuating difference or larval subject that is dominant in each case. The dominant 
force gives rise to types of crowd depending upon what mood it expresses. The list of 
these is open-ended. There is the baiting crowd, fight crowd, feast crowd, slow 
crowd, invisible crowd and so forth, in Canetti's account. In itself this category, 
secured by the question, is empty but it is realised in an open-ended way by the 
individuation of crowds over the course of experience.
3 5Deleuze 2004: 99.
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synthesis of experience that also secures the 
of different cases of experience.
In the example we used to explore Deleuze's account of experience we 
suggested that the zebra has never been domesticated because the ways in 
which it occupies space and time are not predictable or manageable. The 
individuating force or larval subjectivity that is dominant in situations 
where it is penned in overwhelms human strategies of domestication. For 
Deleuze this would show that even a domesticated individual, one 
predictable enough to be domesticated, exceeds our grasp when considered 
as a 'thing in its difference'. The ways in which they occupy space and time 
can be experimented with, giving rise, for example, to domesticated animals 
that are smaller or larger than their wild ancestors or with less developed 
organs because they no longer rely upon these to escape from wild 
predators.36 However, this does not give us a concept of an animal species 
that exhausts their individuation, that gives us a complete picture of the 
ways in which they might occupy space and time. For Deleuze 
individuation is never finished or complete and so the success of 
domestication is not an end to the process. While we can affect their 
individuation in many ways, by providing a new environment or through 
their selective breeding, human beings can never understand what 
domesticated animals might become in quite different situations. This 
shows how the questions involved in accounting for experience ensure that 
we do not sacrifice openness when we seek to secure an understanding of 
sensation. We will now consider an objection to Deleuze's understanding of 
how the larval subject, as an individuating difference or force, is the starting 
point for a deduction of categories.
The issue that we must now consider is that individuation can seem to take 
place in an inner and excessively individual realm. If we consider a 'thing
36Diamond2005: 159.
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in its difference1 this can appear isolating insofar as we do not look outside 
of this thing. We focus on its individuating difference or larval subject. 
Thus while we saw that Deleuze is focused upon 'the hunting fields of an 
animal1 , the danger is that by beginning with individuation he cannot avoid 
neglecting the external world. James Brusseau draws this conclusion in his 
book He argues that for Deleuze '... difference is both 
the genesis of being and limited in its scope with respect to being. [...] 
Difference is a restricted ontology. If difference explains a certain event, 
then understand and deploy difference in that one slim place'.37 In this 
sense the individual is the playing out of individuating differences or larval 
subjects and this is an excessively individual process. It has no need of a 
shared world because it is only concerned with its own private dramas. 
Thus the individual is caught up in the mood or larval subject it is possessed 
by to the detriment of its relations to other individuals. This shows how the 
emphasis upon individuation in Deleuze's work runs the risk of preventing 
him from providing a full account of experience. This seems to be the case 
in when Deleuze invokes the name of Narcissus. 
He writes that '... we are all Narcissus in virtue of the pleasure (auto- 
satisfaction) we experience in contemplating, even though we contemplate 
things quite apart from ourselves'.38 What is most different, or 'quite apart 
from ourselves', provides the resources for what is most individual. It is 
therefore the object of a Narcissism that is a condition of our ongoing 
individuation. Deleuze makes the external world something through which 
the individual seeks to extend and deepen their own individuation. This 
process is thus outward looking only insofar as this serves the purposes of 
individuation. Whilst we contemplate things quite different from ourselves,
37Brusseau 1998: 13.
38Deleuze 1994: 74. Deleuze develops the role of narcissism in 
'We must always first contemplate something else - the water, or Diana, 
or the woods - in order to be filled with an image of ourselves1 (ibid: 75). This is a 
concern with the individuation of a self through the accumulation of habits which are 
first of all found in the world but are then 'contracted' in a self. In the context of our 
present discussion this refers to the individuating differences that become habits that 
constitute the self.
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we are narcissistic and ultimately inward looking. Brusseau proceeds to 
look for cases that fit into Deleuze's limited account of experience: 'I am 
looking for cases of unilateral distinction, of being generating its own 
limits'.39 If Deleuze concentrates on isolated individuals, the locations 
where individuation takes place, he neglects relations between 
individuals.40 Brusseau's worry is that Deleuze turns the individual into a 
solitary location where individuating differences or larval subjects occur 
rather than situating it in the midst of experience and a shared world.
The individual is in splendid isolation, a Narcissus who only relies upon the 
world for the differences that animate and extend its inner life. This allows 
moods or larval subjects to play out individually and avoid the distractions 
and obstacles found in a shared world. One example Brusseau offers is of a 
life that seems to represent the ideal of Deleuze's account of individuation, 
the life that it is best able to account for.41 It is the example of a wretched 
existence made up of aimless travelling. Brusseau takes this as an 
illustration of a world where relations to other individuals and things are 
neglected in the name of one's own individuation: Tor her, every 
separation from everybody else becomes a measureless distance'.42 We 
have an individual who is opened fully to the differences expressed in 
herself as larval subjects, but who relates minimally to outer experience. 
We have openness to a process of individuation but little reach beyond an 
inner life. The life in Brusseau's example ends in suicide. It is a life 
without other people or things, a life in which they do not figure in a way 
that could make this life worth living or extend it further. Thus the
39Brusseau 1998: 17. Deleuze uses this phrase when writes that '[difference is this state 
in which determination takes the form of unilateral distinction. One must therefore 
say that difference is made, or makes itself, as in the expression "make the 
difference"1 (Deleuze 1994: 28).
4°Ibid: 158.
41 This is in fact the historical example, used by Brusseau throughout the final section of 
(ibid: 181 -195), of Isabelle Eberhardt who was born in 1877 and 
died in 1904 (ibid: 181).
42lbid: 194.
individual would eat food as a minimal relation to the external world but 
would never relate to other individuals through this. They would be a 
solitary diner with no interest in the social and professional practices related 
to food. For Brusseau this extreme case of alienation leads to suicide as the 
final and inevitable renouncement of everything external in the name of 
individuating difference: The ultimate scene of [her] possession, and the 
highest display of her alienation from any need in common, from any 
shared world, and finally, from any other, is her sinking herself in rushing 
flood waters1 .43 This is the ultimate fate of an individual who '...wallows in 
the solitude of difference'.44 This critique must be answered if Deleuze's 
account of experience is to be shown to be full and convincing. Has the 
emphasis upon an individual source of the deduction of the categories 
created a gulf between the individual and the external world?
We appear to have a highly individual Metaphysical Deduction of 
categories that depends upon non-empirical moods or larval subjects that do 
not join or contribute to shared worlds. This seems to be the outcome of 
Deleuze's presentation of categories that depend upon our mood and 
character in his 1978 seminars on Kant. However, there are two key points 
that Brusseau's account neglects when it paints this picture. The first point 
is that the individual is not to be confused with a personal or psychological 
self, such as the hunter or the farmer in our previous example. A process of 
individuation may result in, and continue to sustain, the life of a hunter or 
indeed the life of the solitary and doomed individual of Brusseau's example. 
However, this is always the outcome of a wider process. We must again 
qualify the individual as the individual difference or force behind things 
given in experience. For Deleuze the individual must be something non- 
empirical insofar as it is one of the 'determinations as a whole' involved in 




located in isolation from a world outside but a determination involved in 
accounting for experience along with certain other determinations. We 
have a 'whole set of determinations' and not a dominant determination to 
which the others are subordinate. Thus if a deduction of the categories 
depends upon our mood or character this refers to a non-empirical larval 
subject, to something bound up with other determinations that are involved 
in accounting for experience. For this reason the individual is not alone. 
Contrary to Brusseau's account, the question is bound up with the 
questions and 
iv. The Situations and Strategies of Proust's 'Jealous Man*
How can we test the explanatory power of Deleuze's account of experience 
that makes use of categories? By turning to literary examples provided in 
Marcel Proust's we will seek to explore the role of 
certain questions in providing a 'whole set of determinations' or categories 
in every case of experience. A deduction of the categories that proceeds by 
considering the mood or character at work in a situation will be tested using 
this novel. In his Deleuze argues that for Proust: 'The 
beloved appears as a sign, a "soul"; the beloved expresses a possible world 
unknown to us, imprisoning a world that must be deciphered, that is, 
interpreted'.45 This energizes the activity of the narrator in 
and this literary example will be useful in showing that 
individuation takes us beyond the narrow account of experience Brusseau 
claims to find. Indeed, the 'jealous man' is an individual who is expressed 
in Proust's narrator but who could not be understood in isolation, any more
45Deleuze 2000: 7. Deleuze's relation to Proust is explored in an article by the author of 
this thesis entitled 'Art as Non-Knowledge: Gilles Deleuze on Consciousness and 
Apprenticeship'. Here the role of time in Proust's is related to 
the work of art and to the apprenticeship of the narrator that culminates in his deeper 
relation to time through art (Willatt 2008: 436-444, this article is included at the end
of this thesis).
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than the hunter could emerge in isolation from the hunted in our previous 
example. Deleuze writes that for Proust: To fall in love is to individualise 
someone by the signs he bears or emits1 .46 In the second volume of 
we are presented with the individuation of Albertine, 
the narrator's future lover, from among a group of girls he sees for the first 
time from his hotel room window at Balbec.47 This may appear to involve 
only a lack of recognition, the inability to affix diverse features and 
characteristics to a single and unified self. However, for Proust this 
experience is inseparable from the individuation of the narrator as the 
'jealous man' through his relation to Albertine. Seeking to know her is 
integral to this process. On first seeing the group the inability of the 
narrator to distinguish one girl from the other is thus found to be significant 
in itself: 'And this want, in my vision, of the demarcations which I should 
presently establish between them permeated the group with a sort of 
shimmering harmony, the continuous transmutation of a fluid, collective 
and mobile beauty'.48 This is not an error or lack of anything but refers to 
the process by which an individuation is staged. In fact, never knowing 
Albertine, her motives and thoughts, is to know her truly. As an object of 
jealousy and in her own ongoing individuation she is never someone who 
can be known. She is most truly 'fluid' and 'mobile'. The 'jealous man' that 
the narrator becomes again and again is a larval subject brought to the 
surface by a relation to the many Albertines that the narrator finds in his 
experience and memory of her, in his ongoing attempt to know her.
46Ibid.
47'Although each was of a type absolutely different from the others, they all had beauty; 
but to tell the truth I had seen them for so short a time, and without venturing to look 
hard at them, that I had not yet individualised any of them. Except for one, whose 
straight nose and dark complexion singled her out from the rest, like the Arabian king 
in a Renaissance picture of the Epiphany, they were known to me only by a pair of 
hard, obstinate and mocking eyes, for instance, or by cheeks whose pinkness had a 
coppery tint reminiscent of geraniums; and even these features I had not yet 




Deleuze finds here a truth about the process individuation, whether it be the 
individuation of another person or one's own individuation in relation to 
another. Proust shows the narrator realising this truth in volume five of 
that: '...none of us is single, that each of us contains 
many persons who do not all have the same moral value, and that if vicious 
Albertine had existed, it did not mean that there had not been others, ...\49 
Thus what is significant in the process of individuation, what gives rise to 
all kinds of situations in experience, is this lack of a single, unified self. 
Instead there are larval subjects like Vicious Albertine' that are part of a 
process of individuation through which there also arises again and again 'the 
jealous man' as the individuating difference that dominates the narrator. 
The search for a single self behind these many selves is fruitless and futile 
and yet this is what jealousy most truly is. We can then chart the two series 
of moods or larval subjects in and see how they are 
played out in the way these characters occupy space and time in relation to 
one another.
If we return to we may remind ourselves of 
the whole set of questions that allow us to assign the categories of any 
situation: 'As soon as we ask 
we have the task of assigning larval subjects (the jealous man, 
for example) and pure spatio-temporal dynamisms (sometimes we cause the 
very "thing" to emerge, at a certain time, in a certain place; sometimes we 
accumulate indexes and signs from moment to moment, following a path 
that never ends)'.50 The jealous man' is a larval subject that emerges in the 
midst of actual situations and this may well conflict with what is already the 
case and with the ongoing individuations of another person. An incident 
that takes place in volume five of may help us see 




questions in turn in order to see whether they fully interrogate the process 
through which this incident comes about. The jealous man' is the 
larval subject that is realised in and through the narrator in this situation. 
The narrator is situated by his love for Albertine, which is inseparable from
the continued emergence of this larval subject. It is his encounter in 
memory and in outer experience with the different selves of his beloved that 
makes 'the jealous man' dominant in him. He is also situated by the 
scenarios that arise in his search for the truth about Albertine, implying 
further questions. In the apartment where Albertine is staying with 
the narrator and where she finds herself a captive and under surveillance. 
Here the narrator finds himself a spy and gaoler as result of the friction 
between their conflicting larval subjects. After the musical evening 
attended by the narrator at the Verdurin's house. A septet by Vinteuil is 
performed that is new to the narrator and yet the music contains a 'little 
phrase' that he has heard before in the composer's work. In his sonata it had 
a different effect in the sensations it gave rise to. 51 The narrator now listens 
to the septet: '...all of a sudden, I found myself, in the midst of this music 
that was new to me, right at the heart of Vinteuil's sonata; and, more 
marvellous than any girl, the little phrase, sheathed, harnessed in silver, 
glittering with brilliant sonorities, as light and soft as silken scarves, came 
to me, recognisable in this new guise'. 52 This experience of the same phrase 
gives rise to different sensations and we therefore do not recognise it as
51 On the different structures of sensation that the sonata and septet give rise to Proust 
writes: 'Whereas the sonata opened upon a lily-white pastoral dawn, dividing its 
fragile purity only to hover in the delicate yet compact entanglement of a rustic bower 
of honeysuckle against white geraniums, it was upon flat, unbroken surfaces like 
those of the sea on a morning that threatens storm, in the midst of an eerie silence, in 
an infinite void, that this unknown universe was drawn from the silence and the night 
to build up gradually before me. This redness, so new, so absent from the tender, 
pastoral, unadorned sonata, tinged all the sky, as dawn does, with a mysterious hope' 
(Proust 2000a: 282). In the midst of this new landscape is the 'little phrase1 but it is "... 
no longer the cooing of a dove as in the sonata ..." (ibid) but"... something like a 
mystical cock-crow, the ineffable but ear-piercing call of eternal morning1 (ibid: 283). 
Here the 'little phrase1 gives rise to a new structure of sensation for the narrator, 
showing its potential role in the artistic creativity which he is distracted from by the 
recurrence in himself of'the jealous man'.
52n>id:281.
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identical or similar to a previous experience. However, it does still take us 
beyond the particular case because it is the same 'little phrase' that structures 
the sensations the narrator undergoes in each case. The encounter with it 
ultimately revives the narrator's jealousy rather than leading him to continue 
the meditation on artistic creativity that he at first entered into in response 
to the 'little phrase'. It now resonates with the object of his jealousy because 
in seeking the same self he meets many Albertines just as he undergoes 
different sensations in response to the 'little phrase'. It thus captures the 
truth behind Albertine as the object of his jealousy: 'Alas! Albertine was 
several persons in one'. 53 She is never to be individuated as an object of 
knowledge, as a single self and this is precisely how jealousy proceeds. 
This is how sensation works in both of these cases, whether in the case of 
love or art. However, in the novel it is the artwork that is closer to this truth 
than jealousy because it is created in the knowledge that its object is 
multiple and it makes use of this.54 Art is creative because it draws upon 
the variety of sensation while jealousy is frustrated because it continues to 
search for a single self that it can never find.55 We have then a truth of 
individuation discovered in art, making art a worthwhile pursuit and
53Ibid: 384.
54Thus in volume 6 of it seems that the work of 
art exemplifies the role of a larval subject. The narrator finds that f [i]t is our passions 
which draw the outline of our books, the ensuing intervals of repose which write 
them1 (Proust 2000b: 269). It is the activation of a larval subject, passion as a pure 
and basic determination, that provides the outline or the categories of works of art just 
as it had done for jealous scenes. However, this process has now become creative 
and the narrator becomes an artist rather than remaining in the world of jealousy.
55In Deleuze characterises the stages of the search for 'lost time' as 
different worlds full of the 'signs' emitted by subjects and objects which are 
interpreted by the narrator. These are the world of worldly signs, the world of love, 
the world of sensuous impressions or qualities, and the world of art (Deleuze 2000:? 3- 
14). The world of art is superior in the sense that at this stage the narrator interprets 
signs without seeking an object or subject behind them as the source of their meaning, 
and thus without associating them with anything recognisable or given in experience. 
There remains nothing that resembles the past and there is nothing empirically 
recognisable about the way these signs are incarnated: 'At the end of the Search, the 
interpreter understands what has escaped him in the case of the madeleine or even of 
the steeples: that the material meaning is nothing without an ideal essence that it 
incarnates' (ibid: 13). Signs are treated as multiple without this signifying any lack, 
such as of the lack of the single, unified self which is the illusion constitutive of 
jealousy, but are now the source of creativity in the work of art.
showing jealousy to be futile.
We find that the 'little phrase' that unifies and differentiates Vinteuil's music 
resonates with and revives the object of the narrator's jealousy because both 
express the multiple nature of individuation through sensation. It reveals 
the truth of individuation, that larval subjects occur in our experience of 
ourselves and of others. Albertine's continued mystery, like that of the 
phrase of music that the narrator had heard in Vinteuil's compositions, is 
essential to her ongoing individuation for the narrator. It sustains the 
narrator's love for her just as the 'little phrase' continues to animate 
Vinteuil's music in different ways and with different results. However, the 
force of jealousy, of 'the jealous man' as a larval subject, means that the 
narrator is tormented again by his inability to know Albertine as a single, 
unified self. This recurrence of'the jealous man' as dominant larval subject 
is behind his renewed search for this knowledge of Albertine. 56 Rather 
than, as will later be the case, leading him to pursue his vocation as a writer, 
this 'little phrase' returns him to the world of jealousy: The fact is that 
jealousy is as a rule partial, intermittent and localised, ,..'.57 Thus it is upon 
returning home from this musical evening that the narrator is confronted by 
Albertine who is angry at not having been told where he was going and is
56Thus when the narrator is assured of his knowledge of what Albertine is doing, 
assured of having her captive or under surveillance, he becomes indifferent to her 
because his jealousy loses it force. He falls in and out of love with her according to 
the emergence and disappearance of this larval subject as the reason behind his search 
for knowledge of her. Thus the narrator's suspicions and frantic concerns about 
Albertine's relations with Mile Lea and her friends have behind them 'the jealous 
man1, which is expressed in his schemes to prevent her meeting them. However, 
when such a scheme succeeds this larval subject is no longer dominant and behind his 
thoughts and actions: 'Whereupon, the danger of her renewing relations with them 
having been averted, it at once began to lose its importance in my eyes and I was 
amazed, seeing with what ease it had been averted, that I should have supposed that I 
would not succeed in averting it' (Proust 2000a: 171-172). He continues: 'I no longer 
felt the slightest impatience to see Albertine. The certainty that she was at this 
moment engaged in shopping with Fran9oise, that she would return with her at an 
approaching moment which I would willingly have postponed, lit up like a calm and 




feeling oppressed by her captivity. Now her own mood or larval subject 
challenges his jealousy. Answering the question has brought us to 
the collision of two larval subjects.
This question brings us to strategies of jealousy. In his attempt to 
know the self of his beloved the narrator seeks to maintain the captivity he 
hopes will make this possible. He pretends that he wants to end their 
relations right away and this is a strategy prompted by Albertine's anger at 
his having attended the Verdurin's musical evening without telling her. He 
fears her attempt to escape her captivity. The larval subject that has become 
dominant in her is something that could have enough force to prompt a 
course of action that would overpower the force of his jealousy. He intends 
that she should be overcome with tender feelings for him at the sudden 
prospect of their separation, that a different larval subject should then 
become dominant in her. Having extracted maxim distress from Albertine, 
as planned, he relents upon his decision that they should separate. 
However, he is left with the feeling that the problem has not been solved, 
something that reflects his continued inability to know what Albertine 
thinks, to know her as a single self. He cannot tell when the same larval 
subject will occur again in her, something that is likely to result in a 
strategy of flight. As we've seen, the selves that compose her are multiple 
and become dominant in different situations. Finally we ask 
The jealous man' is a mood or larval subject that overpowers Albertine's 
desire for flight as the expression of her own, forceful larval subject at this 
moment. It is the dominant force in the situation partly thanks to the 
strategy that the narrator employs but also because of its own degree of 
force as an individuating difference. When Albertine eventually employs a 
strategy of flight, packing her things in the night and leaving before the 
narrator is out of bed, it is the larval subject dominant in her at that time
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which is most forceful.58 In this way certain questions provide a 'whole set 
of determinations' or categories that map out a situation but only in order to 
make possible the open-ended course of experience.
We've seen that there is no single Albertine and so questions must be 
dynamic enough to cope with a succession of larval subjects rather than 
seeking a single, unified self. Unlike in James Brusseau's account we find 
that an individual is preoccupied with an external world, seeking to keep up 
with the individuation of an other by devising strategies and engaging 
extensively with things other than themselves. In Proust's novel this is the 
case even when his beloved is no longer alive. After her death in a riding 
accident Albertine lives on in the narrator's memory because he is still in 
love with her. The jealous man' is activated as he remembers things she 
had said and done, seeking the truth behind them. However, this still leads 
him to engage widely with the external world. Until his love is at an end he 
seeks the truth about Albertine, even commissioning research into her 
activities when she was alive but not in his company. 59 The larval subject is 
therefore to be found in the midst of experience, bound up with other 
questions.
Conclusion
Our exploration of literary examples from Proust's novel has allowed us to 
consider what is distinctive about Deleuze's account of experience, how it 
draws upon the role of sensation, and also how its concern with categories 
resonates with Kant's thought. Kant sought to involve categories in the
: 473f.
59 After Albertine's death the narrator searches his memory for signs of the truth as well 
as questioning her friend Andree (ibid: 625-628, 686-9) and even asks Aime, the 
headwaiter at the Grand Hotel in Balbec, to investigate the nature of her activities in 
Balbec (ibid: 563) and in Touraine (ibid: 598).
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synthesis of possible experience as such. We've seen how for Deleuze the 
role of categories in cases of experience is secured by always asking the 
same questions. We secure the larval subject and then on the basis 
of the mood in question add further categories in response to further 
questions On the basis of a mood 
or character we populate situations with categories that allow this larval 
subject to develop over the course of experience in unpredictable ways. If 
we can speak of a Deleuzian Metaphysical Deduction it will be in this 
sense. Categories emerge through the synthesis of sensations that accounts 
for experience. These deductions are multiple for Deleuze so that, unlike 
for Kant, we do have different categories according to the mood we are in. 
Thus we might find ourselves in the same time and place and 
but new strategies could arise in this situation in response 
to a new larval subject that has arisen within it. However, it is 
always the same questions that are answered in securing categories. These 
basic questions echo the role of Kant's Metaphysical Deduction insofar as 
they set out the basic categories of any case of experience. It is this concern 
to ensure that experience is accounted in basic ways, that it has a 'whole set 
of determinations', that relates Kant and Deleuze in their accounts of 
experience.
In comparing the categories that are involved in these two accounts of 
experience there is a danger of overlooking the significant differences 
between Kant and Deleuze, and of pointing to common concerns that are 
too vague to be significant in how we relate them. However, by locating a 
concern with a deduction that is brief and solid, and with its non-empirical 
starting point, we find that significant links can be made between the ways 
in which Kant and Deleuze account for experience. Deleuze does not 
embrace Kant's Table of Categories or his attempt to locate categories in the 
understanding. However, we have seen that there is much more than this to 
the Metaphysical Deduction. We saw that Deleuze takes an interest in
Kant's move from level of the empirical to level of the transcendental. This 
invokes an Idea of the whole or a problematic Idea of the relation 01
openness and reach. This relation is to be realised by providing categories 
for any case of experience which are able to combine openness to the 
synthesis of sensation, to emerging larval subjects, with the reach provided 
by a 'whole set of determinations'. For both Kant and Deleuze a deduction 
of categories must hold together a situation without borrowing from 
experience. This concern contributes to their respective philosophical 
accounts of experience that nevertheless have strong points of divergence. 
Deleuze's own Metaphysical Deductions may be multiple, unlike Kant's, but 
they express the same concern to secure and elaborate, without borrowing 
from experience, cases of experience in all their most basic determinations: 
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CONCLUSION
Debates in Kant and Deleuze Studies
'The great concern of most philosophers working on transcendental arguments 
has been to extricate them from the bog of critical doctrine that surrounds them, 
to dust them off and disassociate them from anything too idealistic, and to enlist 
them in the struggle against the more lunatic forms of scepticism - in short, to 
reassert their philosophical utility1 .
(Stapleford 2008: 1)
'... [SJince it acknowledges only a unilateral relation between virtual and actual, 
there is no place in Deleuze's philosophy for any notion of change, time or 
history that is mediated by actuality. In the end, Deleuze offers few resources for 
thinking the consequences of what happens within the actually existing world as 
such1 .
(Hallward 2006: 162)
In this conclusion we will seek to contribute to key debates in Kant and 
Deleuze studies on the basis of the work we've done in this thesis. In 
chapter one we defined transcendental arguments, which have been much 
debated recently, according to a particular reading of the 
In the first section of this conclusion we will engage with the 
contemporary debate over the nature and scope of transcendental 
arguments. We will argue that the way in which we read Kant's text 
provides the key to formulating and assessing transcendental arguments. 
They are to be made convincing insofar as they embody the criteria of 
Kant's architectonic method rather than being understood in isolation from 
his account as a whole. Thus whilst formulations of transcendental 
arguments have become more modest in their ambitions, and those who 
formulate them have sought to escape the alleged subjective origins of 
Kant's account, we will take a different approach. We will argue that they 
would benefit by relating to Kant's more closely. 
In the second section of this conclusion we will consider the debate in
Deleuze studies over the relation of the actual and the virtual. Deleuze's 
account of experience suffers if the actual is neglected in favour of the 
virtual. He can seem to reduce the role and importance of the actual insofar 
as the virtual does not resemble it and appears to be superior in various 
respects. We will show that the reading of Kant's 
we've developed provides resources for meeting this challenge to Deleuze's 
thought. On the basis of the relation between Kant's architectonic method 
and Deleuze's concern with individuation, something we established in 
chapter six of this thesis, we will seek to conclude that Deleuze's thought 
needs to be developed along Kantian lines.
i. Transcendental Arguments
Let's remind ourselves of the challenge faced by any formulation of 
transcendental arguments. The scope of such arguments is particularly 
challenging. Ralph C. S. Walker writes that: 'If transcendental arguments 
are not capable of exhibiting factors that must be shared by all experience at 
every time, they degenerate into observations about how we do think, not 
arguments about how we must think'. 1 We saw in chapter one of this thesis 
that this form of argument emerged from Kant's architectonic method. It 
refers to all of experience at all times. We also saw that some arguments 
are too limited to be transcendental in the sense that Kant would recognise. 
We will now seek to apply these lessons to the contemporary debate over 
the nature and scope of transcendental arguments. P.P. Strawson rejected 
Kant's transcendental idealism while re-formulating his account of 
experience. According to his formulation transcendental arguments refer 
only to reality 'for us' and never to an 'in itself reality.2 They refer to that
1 Walker 2006: 254.
2'In order to set limits to coherent thinking, it is not necessary, as Kant, in spite of his 
disclaimers, attempted to do, to think both sides of those limits [of possible 
experience]. It is enough to think up to them' (Strawson 1966: 44)
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which is involved in the ongoing cognition of possible experience. 
Strawson writes: 'If, therefore, our experience is to have for us the character 
of objectivity required for empirical knowledge, our "sensible 
representations" must contain some substitute or surrogate of the real, 
unknown object'.3 This substitute is the 'rule-governed connectedness of 
our representations' which distinguishes the natural world from 'the 
subjective order of our perceptions'.4 We only experience subjective 
perceptions but the rule and order they exhibit allows us to argue that they 
are objective. This sets the scene for formulations of transcendental 
arguments that start with the world as it is 'for us' and not with truth-claims 
concerning an external or independent reality. However, when we review 
the debate for which Strawson set the terms, it seems that an external 
remainder to the process of cognition is unavoidable. A gap remains 
between reality as this is captured by cognition and the external reality of 
objects of experience. Thus while we don't talk about a 'thing in itself after 
Strawson, an object beyond our experience or in a second world of objects, 
something remains of this in the notion that there is a reality external to our 
concepts. This leaves us wondering if we actually refer to objective reality 
when we secure the subjective conditions of experience using 
transcendental arguments. If these arguments cannot close the gap they 
become more modest but, as we shall see, for some commentators this is a 
positive thing. In the introduction to this thesis we considered the 'two- 
world' or 'two-object' reading of Kant's account of experience and suggested 
reasons for rejecting it. In the following chapters of the thesis we found 
that our approach was supported by the internal focus of the architectonic 
method. We argued that Kant never looks outside of cognition in order to 
account for it. The conclusions we can draw from this reading will now be 
used to assess accounts of transcendental arguments that assume that Kant 




appearance and reality. We will question the notion that for Kant 
theoretical reality was ever anything other than what is internal to the 
process of cognition.5
Strawson argued that we can defeat scepticism by focusing on the way in 
which any argument makes sense. For experience in general to make sense, 
he argues, we must have a certain conceptual scheme.6 This will provide 
the rule and order that subjective perceptions need if they are to refer to 
something objective. It follows that we can only think about particular, 
objective things in experience on the basis of this scheme. For example, we 
make sense of experience because there are objective particulars in the 
world and some of them are independent of us.7 This is a condition without 
which all our talk about experience would be meaningless. Like Kant, 
Strawson seeks to implicate even sceptical statements and arguments in a 
reliance upon this conceptual scheme. He writes of the sceptic that: 'He 
pretends to accept a conceptual scheme, but at the same time quietly rejects 
one of the conditions of its employment. Thus his doubts are unreal, not 
simply because they are logically irresoluble doubts, but because they 
amount to the rejection of the whole conceptual scheme within which alone 
such doubts make sense'.8 Thus a sceptic might argue that there are not
5 We must again clarify this reality as theoretical for Kant because in the case of practical 
cognition something external is invoked. This does not involve possible objects of 
theoretical cognition but rather objects of practical cognition. These include a self 
who is free or unconditioned and undetermined by theoretical concepts like cause and 
effect. This postulate of practical reason allows us to think about the self as free in 
moral situations but must not interfere with our theoretical cognition of the self as 
subject to cause and effect and hence as conditioned. For Kant practical reason 
postulates things outside of experience solely in order to account for morality: These 
postulates are not theoretical dogmas from a necessarily practical 
point of view; hence, although they do not expand theoretical cognition, they do give 
objective reality to the idea of speculative reason (by means of their 
reference to the practical [sphere]) and entitle it to concepts of which it could not 
otherwise presume to assert even the possibility' (Kant 2002: 167, Ak. 5: 132, the 





particular things in the world of experience that are independent of us and 
exist when there is no one to perceive them. However, this argument makes 
sense only because this conceptual scheme holds true and we can therefore 
make sense of the notion of independently existing things. The sceptic has 
used a conceptual scheme to state their argument but has then denied its 
existence. They have denied the necessary conditions for their own 
argument making sense.
Barry Stroud seeks to undermine this formulation of a transcendental 
argument when he argues that Strawson has invoked 'an additional factual 
premiss'.9 This is a serious concern for us because we've argued that for 
Kant any reference to the facts or givens of experience would undermine a 
transcendental account. Stroud argues that the unacknowledged use of a 
verification principle secures this hidden factual premiss. Without this, he 
claims, the argument would not be convincing. He agrees with Strawson 
that the notion of independently existing objective particulars makes sense 
to us. It follows that we can 'sometimes' know certain conditions which 
imply that objective particulars do or do not continue to exist unperceived. 10 
Thus in any number of cases we can verify the conclusion that objective 
particulars exist independently. In this way he limits the conclusions we 
can draw so that: 'We sometimes know that the best criteria we have for the 
reidentification of particulars have been satisfied'. 11 Understood in this 
way, an apparent transcendental argument relies upon a verification 
principle for its force. It is now limited to certain cases, as all arguments 
based on a verification principle are, and thus forms a narrower argument 
than Kant demands. If transcendental arguments are made superfluous 
because they are shown to rely upon a narrower form of argument we have 
to admit that we cannot make such general arguments about experience.




The only progress we can make is with narrower verificationist arguments. 
Stroud makes transcendental arguments superfluous insofar as bridging the 
gap between our concepts and an external reality turns out to rely upon a 
verification principle. We know that objects exist unperceived in some 
cases and we can verify this without being able to make a transcendental 
claim about experience in general. This is a far cry from the arguments we 
located in Kant's architectonic method. Before turning to Kant's concern to 
locate both our concepts and any external reality within the architectonic we 
will consider how other scholars have responded to Stroud's challenge.
Robert Stern recognises the difficulty of formulating transcendental 
arguments that allow us to make knowledge claims about an external 
reality. 12 We cannot secure a conclusion general enough to rule out the 
possibility that we are in error concerning the conditions of experience. His 
response is to accept that this ambitious aim cannot be met. 13 He argues 
that Stroud has weakened transcendental arguments because he has shown 
that there is a gap between external reality and our beliefs concerning that 
reality. 14 We cannot set conditions applicable to this reality because of the 
gap between our concepts and something independent of them. This seems 
to leave two alternatives. We can give up transcendental arguments and 
accept the limitations of a verification principle. The other alternative 
would be to embrace idealism but for Stern this would abandon any sense 
of our being in touch with reality. 15 We either limit our conclusions to 
particular cases or lose touch with the reality we are trying to secure. 
However, in our reading of the the synthetic and 
the a priori were seen to articulate possible experience through their 
relations. An external reality was ruled out by the architectonic method but
12Stern 1999b: 47.
13 Stern argues that transcendental idealism survives in his modest formulation of 
transcendental arguments only in form of the 'epistemological humility1 it implies
concerning 'things in themselves' (ibid: 58). 
"Ibid: 49.
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all aspects of the real were to be accounted for and included in its 
unfolding, from the most concrete to the most abstract. We saw that for 
Kant the object of cognition secured by synthetic a priori judgement is to 
embody reality without remainder. Stern seeks to hold onto, or keep in 
touch with, reality by considering how norms or beliefs about reality form a 
coherent system and are made objective and real by their very coherence. 
He quotes F. H. Bradley who writes that the test for the truth of a belief is 
whether '... to take [it] as error would entail too much disturbance of my 
world'. 16 This coherence theory of truth can support beliefs insofar as their 
coherence with one another secures the reality and objectivity of the world 
we inhabit. Stern argues that the second Analogy of Experience in the 
embodies this criteria. It argues that we must 
accept the belief that A caused B, making it a norm for all experience, in 
order to relate A and B in time and treat them as events. 17 This norm is to 
make experience possible and to do so by being coherent with itself and 
with other norms like the inherence of a substance in both A and B, 
allowing us to recognise them over time. Stern names such arguments 
'belief-directed' transcendental arguments as opposed to those that are 'truth- 
directed' or that seek to know reality independently of our cognition of it. 18 
This echoes the argument we uncovered in chapter two of this thesis where 
for Kant a coherent system was to guarantee the objectivity of experience. 
It has the internal focus that his architectonic method demands and realises 
in a system. Similarly, Stern wants to focus upon the coherent system of 
beliefs and norms that structure our experience and not upon an external 
reality. However, his account lacks the ambitions we uncovered in Kant's 
We will now consider why Stern lacks this 
confidence given our understanding of why for Kant transcendental 
arguments are 'in touch with reality' whilst also being concerned with the




Stern's account is modest because he is not claiming to be able to defeat a 
sceptic who doubts our claims to knowledge of an independent or external 
reality. Such a sceptic looks outside of our system of beliefs and norms to a 
world that they must correspond to and challenges this correspondence. For 
Stern we can never bridge the gap between appearance and reality, and thus 
defeat this type of sceptical challenge. However, he is claiming to be able 
to defeat a sceptic who doubts things that are internal to our belief-system. 
Such a sceptical challenge doubts norms that make our experience possible 
and does not refer to what is external to this system of beliefs. 19 Stern 
writes of such a sceptic that: 'His position is instead thoroughly "internal" to 
our practice: that is, he takes the norms that constitute our practice as given, 
accepting that practice itself is well formed, whilst claiming that the belief 
in question nonetheless fails to conform to any of those "standards and 
procedures", as we take them to be'.20 The sceptic is once again caught in 
the trap of something that makes sense of his own statements. Something 
doubted is shown to be necessary to ensure the integrity of a belief-system 
that is shared by the sceptic who doubts it. Neither the sceptic nor the 
transcendental philosopher refers to anything external to this system. Both 
refer to a coherent system of beliefs and norms, and argue in ways that 
make sense only on the basis of this system. In this way Stern preserves 
Strawson's concern not to refer to what is external to our experience but he 
also avoids Stroud's challenge by referring not to particular cases of 
experience but to a system that is general enough to encompass all our 
experience. He avoids doubt over whether we refer to reality by making 
reality relative to our beliefs and norms, things that are real insofar as they 
structure our experience coherently. As we've noted, this move to secure 




chapter two of this thesis but we can now register a crucial difference. We 
argued in chapter two that Kant's system offered a third way between an 
'order of being' and an 'order of thought'. This insight can now be brought 
to bear on this debate over the nature and scope of transcendental 
arguments. Kant does not want to refer to anything external to cognition in 
the argument he makes and yet he wants to account for experience in all its 
reality. How would he respond to Stern's formulation of transcendental 
arguments?
Scott Stapleford accuses Stern of neglecting Kant's intentions, of missing 
the ambitions and concerns that animated his thought:
'One could even go so far as to speculate that the shift away from 
questions of truth and of the conditions of experience, to questions of 
the "rational legitimation" of beliefs and the related matter of 
assigning beliefs to the appropriate norms of belief formation that 
cover them, are notions so far removed from Kant's immediate 
concerns he would have had a hard time in even understanding what 
they mean'.21
This criticism of Stern is supported by the conclusions we can draw from 
our reading of the There is something missing in 
Stern's account insofar as it neglects the internal and inclusive nature of the 
architectonic method. This ensures that all dualisms are accounted for 
rather than being presupposed in giving an account of experience. Rather 
than seeking to deal with the gap between our concepts and an external 
reality, Kant seeks to deal with the relations between the elements of his 
architectonic through which all knowledge of reality is to arise. The 
synthetic and the a priori are to secure the reality that Stern wants to keep in 
touch with. As we saw, the a priori must be involved in the synthesis of 
possible experience rather than providing ways of making sense of an 
external reality. The a priori is related to synthesis before we are aware of 
it, before we encounter sensations. Thus rather than an 'order of being' or
2lStapleford2008:22.
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an 'order of thought' we have a system that makes possible these two sides 
of reality, the objective and the subjective, in the first place. We saw in 
chapters four and five of this thesis that a priori concepts were not beliefs 
concerning sensation but directly involved in the synthesis of sensation 
prior to experience and in the midst of experience. Kant argues that reality 
is shaped or constructed in this way and that these necessary conditions 
make it possible rather than only being a way in which we respond to 
sensation. Thus he only recognises a reality produced through the relations 
of the synthetic and the a priori in an ambitious architectonic account. 
Stern's use of a coherence theory of truth is useful and reflects Kant's 
understanding of the architectonic as the art of constructing systems. 
However, for Kant a system is to make reality possible and is made up of 
conditions of possibility rather than beliefs about reality. In chapters four 
and five we saw how reality is secured in such processes as the counting of 
parts of space that mark out concrete situations in the a priori synthesis of 
possible experience. Therefore, if a system makes experience possible then 
for Kant it does this in the fullest sense, not simply as a reality relative to us 
but as one in which we find ourselves.
In response to Stern's account Scott Stapleford argues that for Kant 
transcendental arguments must relate abstract concepts through their 
reference to concrete experience. Although we cannot refer to the givens of 
experience in transcendental arguments we can still make reference to the 
concrete: 'As strange as it may sound, the stuff that binds concepts in 
philosophical proofs is experience or intuition'.22 This 
reflects the reading we have given, according to which the relation of the 
synthetic and the a priori takes priority over the dualisms that it must 
account for. These include the dualisms of subject and object, self and 
world, and appearance and reality, which occupy Strawson, Stroud and 
Stern so very deeply. We saw in chapter three of this thesis that synthetic a
22Ibid: 43.
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priori judgements are part of a transcendental or material logic that refers to 
the concrete synthesis of possible experience in order to relate a priori 
concepts. Such a logic was to mark out situations in which dualisms arise. 
It makes possible the distinction between self and world by providing 
categories through which this is first cognised. Thus if we distinguish a self 
as the cause of certain events in the world and as effected by causes found 
in the world this is because categories have already been at work and 
secured cause and effect as an a priori form of synthesis. These are not 
beliefs or norms but provide a very material logic for concrete situations. 
They mark out the dualisms that we recognise so consistently. Thus rather 
than arguments that reflect upon an external reality Kant seeks arguments 
that account for all cognition of experience, outside of which there is no 
external reality to be reached by theoretical cognition. This should not 
suggest that there are no problems or challenges in Kant's system. As we've 
seen, the opposite is the case. However, it helps us to understand how for 
Kant the problems of relating very different things are positive rather than 
negative. His architectonic is animated not by a lack of reality but by the 
problem of relating the synthetic and the a priori through which the 
cognition of experience is to be made possible.
Quassim Cassam's assessment of transcendental arguments continues to 
develop the reading of Kant's that has set the terms 
for this debate. We saw Stern pursuing an internal focus in his account but 
this was limited to a belief-system and its norms. As we've seen, this 
modesty helps those formulating transcendental arguments to avoid making 
assumptions about an external reality whilst holding onto beliefs that are 
real. Cassam develops this understanding of transcendental arguments 
when he talks of the 'subjective origin thesis'.23 This characterises Kant's
23Cassam 1999: 89.
Quentin Meillassoux's critique of transcendental philosophy makes a similar 
move. He argues that it is marked by 'correlationism1 : 'By "correlation" we mean the 
idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking
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arguments concerning the a priori conditions of experience. These proceed 
on the basis of the subjective origin of the conditions of possibility they 
seek to establish. This would explain why the thinkers we've considered 
struggle to deal with a gap between appearance and reality in formulating 
transcendental arguments. Cassam traces this back to Kant's formulation of 
arguments in his account of experience. He argues that: To say that the 
categories have subjective origins in Kant's sense is therefore to say that the 
understanding is their "birthplace". It follows that conditions of 
the possibility of experience" in Kant's sense are not just necessary 
conditions. They are conditions which are wholly subjective in origin'.24 
This means that for Kant origins confer legitimacy on the conditions of 
experience and this has led to the problem of relating something with a 
subjective origin to something that arises in experience and thus has an 
objective origin. It follows that transcendental arguments have struggled to 
get over this difficulty ever since, something which was inherent in their 
first formulation. Cassam understands Kant as arguing that if conditions of 
possibility are not located in experience, in the object, they must be located 
in the subject. This allows Stroud to challenge such arguments because
and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other1 (Meillassoux 
2008: 4). The correlation between the knowing subject and the object known is 
imprisoning because anything 'outside' or 'external' is always something that is 
'relative to us1 (ibid: 7). Meillassoux asks how a transcendental philosopher can 
account for something that no one has or ever could experience. This has opened a 
huge debate over the future of philosophy but, like debates over transcendental 
arguments, it is in danger of offering an inadequate reading of the founder of 
transcendental philosophy. Whilst not engaging directly with Meillassoux here we 
will engage with the reading he shares with those currently formulating 
transcendental arguments. Both assume that Kant invokes a subjective origin and is 
trapped by it, that he is always unable to reach an external reality that is therefore 
neglected by his account.
This critique of transcendental philosophy is explored in the editorial 
introduction, co-authored by the author of this thesis, to a collection entitled 
Here the point is made that Meillassoux's reliance upon 
the mathematical data provided by science takes for granted the meaning that this 
information has for us. The case is made for following transcendental philosophy in 
seeking the conditions of meaning rather than assuming that it is simply given in 
scientific data (Willatt and Lee 2009: 9-10, this piece of work is included at the end 
of this thesis). 
24Cassaml999:91.
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they cannot close the gap between the subjective and the objective or what 
is internal to cognition and what is external to it. Cassam writes: This 
argument assumes that in the case of concepts such as and 
there are only two mutually exclusive options: either they are derived from 
sensation, or they are wholly subjective in origin and therefore quite 
ideal'.25 He distinguishes what he calls 'world-directed' and 'self-directed' 
transcendental arguments on these grounds.26 They arise because we must 
find the origin of a priori conditions either in the subjective or the objective. 
We must either look inwards to the self and its cognitive apparatus or 
outwards to the world. Is this background to transcendental arguments 
inescapable? We will suggest that, given the reading of the 
we've presented in this thesis, Kant does not in fact argue 
against this background.
Cassam's solution, as articulated in his book 
involves replacing a concern with 'conditions' with a concern with 'means'. 
Unlike Stern he does not seek beliefs and norms because this would give 
rise to another self-directed argument and he wants to provide a world- 
directed account. He wants to break with the focus on the subject that he 
traces back to Kant. His alternative is to argue that: '...specifying 
appropriate means of coming to know is an appropriate means of explaining 
what empirical knowledge is'.27 Such an argument is world-directed
25Ibid: 97.
261 Just as world-directed arguments tell us something about the nature of the world in 
which our thinking takes place, so self-directed arguments tell us something about the 
cognitive faculties of the thinking or knowing self. If it is a necessary condition of 
the possibility of a certain cognitive achievement that our cognitive faculties are thus 
and thus so, then, given the assumption that the achievement is actual, it follows that 
our cognitive faculties thus and so' (ibid: 85). Cassam argues that this makes self- 
directed transcendental arguments redundant. There are always other ways of 
uncovering the structure of our faculties and so any particular self-directed argument 
is dispensable. In chapter one of this thesis we argued that, for this reason, these 
'isolation arguments' do not meet the criteria of Kant's architectonic method but do 
play a supporting role in the 
27Cassam 2007: 81. Cassam writes that '[a] Means Response to a how-possible question 
regards the identification of one or more of the means by which something can come
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because it provides an open ended list of means to know objects of 
experience. These means are different ways of connecting with the world, 
of expanding our knowledge of its objects. We note that Cassam does not 
share Kant's concern with a complete and indispensable account of 
experience. He sees this as necessarily relying upon subjective origins and 
invoking self-directed arguments because completeness is never given in 
the world. In the world there are only different means of knowing and these 
can be added to in ways we cannot predict. We also note that Cassam 
wants to know what empirical knowledge is rather than how it is possible, 
giving up any ambition to provide an architectonic account. Rather than 
exploring his approach further here we will consider whether he is right to 
argue that Kant invokes a subjective origin. If Kant's arguments do not face 
an inevitable choice between subjective origins and an external reality there 
will be no reason to seek a different account. We've argued that Kant does 
not accept that the subjective and the objective are given in advance or that 
self and world are the two possible directions that transcendental arguments 
can take.28 The architectonic method of the 
about as a means of explaining how it is possible' (ibid: 6).
28Thus we find Kant defining 'world' in the following passage from The Antinomy of 
Pure Reason in the rather than taking its definition for 
granted: 'We have two terms, world and nature, which sometimes blend. The first 
term means the mathematical whole of all appearances and the totality of their 
synthesis on both the large and the small scale, i.e., the totality of the synthesis as it 
advances both by composition and by division. But this same world is called nature 
insofar as we consider it as a dynamical whole and take account, not of the 
aggregation in space or time in order to bring this aggregation about as a magnitude, 
but of the unity in the of appearances' (Kant 1996: 452, A418-19/B446-47). 
We notice that this distinction between world and nature carries forward the 
distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical that organises the Tables of 
Judgements, Categories and Principles. This is because Kant is accounting for our 
understanding of a world on the basis of an account of experience which involves 
these tables. The world is defined as an aggregate because it is constructed out of 
quantities secured in cognition according to mathematical judgements, categories and 
principles. It is not given as a whole but as an Idea of the potential progression of 
experience, the notion that cognition will continue to increase through aggregation. 
Thus we have mathematical Ideas as well as mathematical judgements, categories and 
principles. Kant's strictly systematic account of experience determines how we 
understand and refer to a world in the first place. Therefore, for Kant the choice 
between being self-directed and world-directed in the arguments we make to account 
for the cognition of possible experience is a false choice.
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mustn't be seen as taking certain things for granted. It is a context- 
independent argument or one that accounts for the contexts where cognition 
takes place, like the one where self and world are distinct because the 
categories allow us to recognise their distinctness. Only on the basis of this 
account can we define empirical knowledge by talking about the means by 
which it can be achieved. The reading we've presented suggests that for 
Kant the need to include all of possible experience in this account is 
overwhelming. This shows the importance of considering Kant's thought 
carefully before reformulating transcendental arguments. In this thesis we 
have seen that those who seek to respond to his apparent neglect of an 
external reality fail to engage with his architectonic method. Until this is 
taken seriously and explored in depth the will not 
be able to play its full role in contemporary philosophical debates.
ii. The Actual and the Virtual
In turning to Deleuze's thought we will be concerned with how Kant can 
add constructively to his account of experience. In the introduction to this 
thesis we noted that much work has been done on how Deleuze adds to our 
understanding of Kant. On the basis of the readings we've given we will 
show how a major criticism of Deleuze's account of experience can be met 
using the resources we've uncovered in Kant's A 
major debate has been taking place over the relation of the actual and the 
virtual in Deleuze's thought. Does the unique nature of the virtual lead him 
to neglect the actual which it does not resemble? How can two such 
different things relate and contribute to one another such that their relation 
is one of reciprocal determination?29 This is a crucial debate because the
29In Deleuze defines reciprocal determination in the context 
of a critical assessment of Kant. We considered his critique of Kant's notion of 
schematism in chapter four of this thesis and the following comparison arises from 
this: 'In Kant, therefore, difference remains external and as such empirical and
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reciprocal determination of these two poles of experience will ensure that 
both are accounted for and have a role in experience. For Deleuze, 
reciprocal determination is inseparable from complete determination.30 If 
the actual and the virtual determine one another this must give rise to a 
complete account of experience rather than being one-sided. As we saw in 
the debate over transcendental arguments, there is much current concern to 
safeguard all the real aspects of our experience. Commentators on both 
Kant and Deleuze worry that in accounting for very real problems and 
objects of experience we risk undermining their reality and significance. 
How can Kant help Deleuze meet these challenges? According to the 
criteria of the architectonic method the abstract reach of the a priori must 
not lead it to neglect the particularities of the concrete that would be left 
behind if the abstract was only concerned with itself.31 Likewise, the
impure, suspended outside construction "between" the determinable intuition and the 
determinant concept. Maimon's genius lies in showing how inadequate the point of 
view of conditioning is for a transcendental philosophy: both terms of the difference 
must equally be thought - in other words, determinability must itself be conceived as 
pointing towards a principle of reciprocal determination' (Deleuze 1994: 173). 
Deleuze's positive appraisal of the philosophy of Solomon Maimon reflects his theory 
of Ideas as we have understood it in this thesis. He continues: 'The reciprocal 
synthesis of differential relations as the source of the production of real objects - this 
is the substance of Ideas in so far as they bathe in the thought-element of 
quantitability' (ibid). Ideas are incarnated in sensation and in this way the reciprocal 
determination of their sensible elements accounts for our abstract concepts. 
However, we will argue that the reciprocal determination of the two elements that 
characterise Deleuze's account as a whole, the actual and the virtual, can be 
developed and further established using Kant's thought.
30As we noted in the previous footnote, if difference is left external then for Deleuze we 
do not attain the reciprocal determination that completely determines experience. We 
saw in chapter two of this thesis that this comes about because Ideas are incarnated in 
sensation rather than the intelligible relating to sensation at a distance and therefore 
failing to realise all that sensation is capable of. Deleuze looks to the virtual to 
provide determination: 'We have seen that a double process of reciprocal 
determination and complete determination defined that reality: far from being 
undetermined, the virtual is completely determined' (ibid: 260).
31 For Kant it follows that we do not have 'intellectual intuition': 'Our kind of intuition is 
called sensible because it is I.e., it is not such that through this intuition 
itself the existence of its object is given (the latter being a kind of intuition that, as far 
as we can see, can belong only to the original being). Rather, our kind of intuition is 
dependent on the existence of the object, and hence is possible only by the object's 
affecting the subject's capacity to present' (Kant 1996: 103, B72). Our sensible 
intuition means that we must work with the material provided by sensation, through 
its a priori synthesis, to secure objects of cognition. Abstract thought must therefore
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abstract can only be realised in the concrete, in the sensible synthesis of 
experience, because, as Scott Stapleford puts it, '[t]he concepts that feature 
in philosophical proofs are little more than logical shells before perception 
saturates them with intuitive content'.32 Our investigation of this problem in 
Kant's helped us to think about Deleuze's account 
of experience and the problems that characterise it in chapter six of this 
thesis. On the basis of this reading we will consider critical concerns over 
whether Deleuze relates the actual and the virtual in a way that accounts for 
experience fully and convincingly.
It may seem odd that we have neglected the terms 'actual' and Virtual' until 
this late stage of the thesis. The reason for doing this is that by not 
foregrounding two dominant terms in many readings of Deleuze we have 
been able to approach his thought in a new way. We sought to approach it 
in terms of his relation to Kant rather than, for example, approaching it in 
terms of his relation to Henri Bergson whose work is the source of the term 
Virtual' for Deleuze.33 The virtual is always in danger of crowding out 
other parts of Deleuze's account and distracting us from his relation to 
different thinkers.34 By approaching his thought through our reading of 
Kant's we sought to show that Deleuze is 
concerned, like Kant, with the integrity of an account of experience. In
be concerned with the concrete if it is to achieve anything.
32Stapleford 2008: 48.
33 'Bergson is the author who pushes furthest the critique of the possible and also most 
frequently invokes the notion of the virtual1 (Deleuze 1994: 327, n23). The virtual is 
not to be confused with the possible because it is not subject to laws of possibility 
but, like the larval subject we encountered in chapter six of this thesis, is 
unpredictable. No sum of possibilities could sum it up and potentially allow us to 
calculate its outcomes. The direct role of the virtual in actual situations is therefore to 
be understood without invoking any notion of possibility.
34 James Williams argues that if we give priority to one part of Deleuze's account the 
whole would break down: '...he engineers systems where the concept of priority must 
not be confused with independence, separateness, abstraction or ethical superiority. 
As a good engineer, Deleuze's constructions are holistic as opposed to abstract 
hierarchies: if a crucial small, actual part perishes in a particular practical situation 
where it has a role to play, then it does not matter how much virtual power you have 
in reserve1 (Williams 2008: 97).
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such an account the virtual would play its part but not overpower or 
dominate other elements. Deleuze writes about the virtual in the following 
terms in 'The virtual is opposed not to the real 
but to the actual. Exactly 
what Proust said of the virtual: "Real without being actual, ideal without 
being abstract"; and symbolic without being fictional 1 . 35 It is the reality of 
the virtual that leads Alain Badiou to fear for the reality and integrity of 
what Deleuze calls 'the actual'. This embodies the concrete particularities of 
experience and the means by which experience proceeds. These include 
abstract relations between objects and between objects and subjects. Such 
relations and particularities make it possible, for example, for a threat to be 
real and for us to have real means of dealing with this threat. Badiou fears 
that only the virtual is real in Deleuze's account. This can seem a strange 
complaint when, as we've seen, Deleuze emphasises the concrete and seeks 
to explore concrete cases. Badiou acknowledges Deleuze's concern to think 
'under the constraint of cases' but wants to put this in the context of his 
account of experience as a whole.36 He argues that while Deleuze is 
concerned with ever different cases, rather than with generalising about 
experience, this is based upon the notion that Being is One. It is the Being- 
One of reality that thought reflects and extends when it thinks about very 
different cases. Thought reflects the dominant power of the virtual to 
produce different cases of experience rather than reflecting the integrity and 
importance of particular cases. For Badiou this is Deleuze's way of 
unifying reality by thinking about the power of the virtual to differentiate it. 
The equality of being follows from this, with all of reality being equally an
35Gilles Deleuze, p. 208; the passage Deleuze quotes belongs 
to the following sentence in the final volume of Proust's 'But 
let a noise or a scent, once heard or once smelt, be heard or smelt again in the present 
and at the same time in the past, real without being actual, ideal without being 
abstract, and immediately the permanent and habitually concealed essence of things is 
liberated and our true self, which seemed - had perhaps for long years seemed - to be 
dead but was not altogether dead, is awakened and reanimated as it receives the 
celestial nourishment that is brought to it' (Proust 2000b: 224).
36fiadiou 2000: 20.
expression of the virtual.37 Everything is equally a product of the virtual 
rather than being anything important in itself.
Philosophy's task is now understood in the following terms: 'When thought 
succeeds in constructing, without categories, the looped path that leads, on 
the surface of what is, from a case to the One, then from the One to the 
case, it intuits the movement of the One itself.38 The virtual dominates 
thought, distracting philosophy from the actual and its concerns because the 
actual in fact only tells us what the virtual can do and makes little 
contribution itself. Thus, whilst the equality of all actual beings in 
expressing virtual Being might seem to empower the actual, for Badiou this 
is not the case. It means that nothing actual stands out or makes a 
difference because it is only a sign of the many different things the virtual 
can bring about. The virtual is therefore the ground of the actual, the source 
of its complete determination.39 We can understand this by referring to 
Deleuze's concern, in with a 'groundless 
ground'.40 This ground makes sure that all cases are different, it 'ungrounds' 
experience in order to produce very different cases of experience. In other 
words, it grounds the actual by differentiating it rather than by preserving 
resemblance across cases. For Badiou this only shows what the virtual can 
do and distracts us from the actual. Everything actual is equally a product 
of the virtual and nothing significant in itself. Thus:'... [if] the virtual is the 
deployment of the One in its immanent differentiation, then every 
actualization must be understood as an innovation and as attesting to the 
infinite power of the One to differentiate itself on its own surface'.41 It 




4°'At this point, it must be said, there is no longer recognition. To ground is to 
metamorphose' (Deleuze 1994: 154).
4 1 Badiou 2000: 49.
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distinction or a nominal opposition.42 They describe what the virtual does, 
its ability to give rise to actualities, by formally distinguishing actual 
products from their virtual production. However, the reality of the product 
is subsumed by the superior reality of its production. It follows that when 
we account for the production of the actual we concern ourselves less and 
less with the actual itself, we reduce it to the outcome of something more 
interesting and more productive.
Peter Hallward also mounts a defence of the actual and brings to the fore 
the concerns of those who see the virtual as a threat to the integrity of the 
actual. He writes: That something is means that it exists in the 
conventional sense of the word, that it can be experienced, perceived, 
measured, etc'.43 He defines the virtual as something that does not resemble 
this at all. It is not objective, perceptible or measurable. It is not present or 
presentable because it does not make an 'actual1 difference, in the 'here and 
now'. For Hallward the actual is what is useful and indeed necessary to 
human life whilst the virtual is not. The virtual refers to the whole of time 
rather than a present moment of time. This whole is limited or constrained 
when it relates to the actual as one of the present moments that characterise 
the temporality of actual experience.44 It is in the present that human 
beings act and react, that they encounter actual things and use them to do 
things. Hallward concludes that for Deleuze being concerned with the 
present is less important than relating to the virtual or time as a whole.45 
What isolates human beings from the virtual are 'the needs of the moment' 
or the priorities of human life.46 These needs or priorities cut us off from 
the virtual which relates all of time regardless of whether it is relevant or 
useful to the actual. It follows that actual conditions must be disrupted so
42lbid.





that the whole of time can be thought. Hallward writes 'If the actual is 
sustained by the interests of action then virtual insight will require the 
paralysis of actions and the dissolution of the actor1 .47 His critique echoes 
Dr Johnson's response to the philosophy of Bishop Berkeley. We encounter 
forceful individuations that make a significant difference in actual 
experience. Accordingly, Dr Johnson kicked a stone in order to refute 
Berkeley's idealism.48 He encountered a forceful individuation in the sense 
we explored in chapter six of this thesis. There is friction between two 
individual forces, between the stone and Dr Johnson's foot. We saw how 
this also arose between Proust's 'jealous man' and the other conditions of 
actual situations: Insofar as the 
virtual doesn't resemble these conditions it surely cannot be relevant to 
them. However, we saw that Deleuze shares Kant's concern to account for 
experience without presupposing the forms it takes. We encounter actual 
objects and experience proceeds by means of these but how do we account 
for forceful individuations like the stone that stops our foot or will break a 
window when thrown at it with sufficient force? Could it be that something 
that does not resemble the actual intervenes in the course of actual 
experience in a way that makes it possible and is deeply relevant to it? In 
response to the defence of the actual mounted by Badiou and Hallward we 
will turn to the shared concern of Kant and Deleuze to account for 
experience without presupposing it.
What if we understand time as a whole in the sense we developed in 
chapters four and five of this thesis? We saw that for Kant time is involved 
in the schematism of the categories. It is a very concrete and actualising
4?Ibid: 34.
48'After we came out of the church we stood talking for some time together of Bishop 
Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that 
everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his 
doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I shall never forget the alacrity with 
which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone till 
he rebounded from it, - (Boswell 1993: 295).
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force thanks to its four modes that mark out concrete situations. We saw 
that counting is a process that presupposes the involvement of time in 
situations and responds to problems that arise in the course of experience. 
Contrary to Peter Hallward's understanding we find that time as a whole can 
be deeply relevant to the actual and to the present moments that concern it. 
How does a Kantian reading of Deleuze allow us to respond to the apparent 
shortcomings of his account of experience as a whole? Keith Ansell 
Pearson argues that:
'The notion of individuation plays a crucial role in the unfolding of 
the psycho-biology of since it serves to 
mediate the virtual and the process of actualisation. [...] Deleuze 
stipulates that evolution does not simply progress from one actual 
term to another, or from general to particular, and this is precisely 
because there is the intermediary of an individuation which creates a 
realm of difference between the virtual and its actualisation'.49
Ansell Pearson's reading of Deleuze's account of individuation draws upon 
the biological theory that he engages with.50 We took a different course 
when we explored individuation in terms of the literary models Deleuze 
develops. However, both biological and literary models relate the actual 
and the virtual in a way that is Kantian. They both introduce a 'realm1 that 
is between the actual and the virtual. This realm secures the conditions of 
actual situations, it makes the virtual relevant to the actual whilst preserving 
and realising their difference. Thus a forceful individuation is relevant to 
the actual but can change it in fundamental ways. A larval self plays a very
49Ansell Pearson 1999: 94. James Williams makes a similar point when referring to the 
intensities or intensive differences involved in individuation: 'You have never 
finished with intensity. You are always working through the surface shared by actual 
depth and virtual height. Privilege one or the other and you have not understood your 
engine1 (Williams 2008: 99). He argues that for Deleuze our embodiment is 
something we undergo, it is a shifting experience of the transformation of varying 
intensities (ibid: 100). We touched upon Deleuze's account of intensities in chapter 
five of this thesis and here we see how for Deleuze they embody the process of 
individuation, giving us a further sense of how it is a sensible 'realm of difference' 
that is not to be confused with the actual or the virtual.
5°'There is, I believe, a quite specific intellectual context within which to illuminate 
Deleuze's work and its engagement with biophilosophy, and this is the tradition of 
nee-Darwinism that stems from the revolutionary work of August Weisemann carried 
out at the end of the nineteenth century' (Ansell Pearson 1999: 4).
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full role in actual situations and yet when and where it will occur is not 
predictable. We also saw that individuation relates the actual and the 
virtual in a way that allows them to reciprocally determine one another. It 
ensures that the actual can make a difference to the virtual. Thus the larval 
subject is a category of any situation and this category draws upon both the 
actual and the virtual. It draws upon the power of the virtual to make things 
different without specifying this in actual ways. It also draws upon the 
actual ways in which it is realized as a larval subject, such as in the actual 
relations and strategies of jealousy. Thus, whilst the actual decisions made 
by someone who is jealous do not fully account for experience, they do 
contribute to this account by making it possible for a larval subject to be 
realised in specific ways. We saw that while the course of experience is 
unpredictable, because a new larval self can occur at any time, the choices 
of someone afflicted by jealousy can affect the course of jealousy. There is 
then a balance to be struck between specific details that enrich the actual 
and the pure virtual emotions that do not specify anything but are always 
realised in specific ways in actual situations. This helps avoid Badiou's 
conclusion that the actual is collapsed into the virtual, that it is devalued and 
neglected because it has no reality in itself and thus no significant 
contribution to make. It helps keep the actual and the virtual in play as non- 
resembling but necessary conditions of experience through their shared 
project of individuation. We saw in chapter six that this aspect of Deleuze's 
account can be developed using Kant's way of arguing in his architectonic 
method. Now we are able to form conclusions about how this does not 
simply develop an aspect of Deleuze's account of experience but contributes 
significantly to his account as a whole. We can now see that Deleuze's 
version of Kant's Metaphysical Deduction ensures that the conditions of 
actual situations are not swept away by the virtual. In the face of challenges 
by Badiou and Hallward, the integrity of Deleuze's account as a whole can 
be defended using a Kantian form of argument.
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We sought to justify our textual focus in the introduction to this thesis. We 
argued that the needed to be presented on its own 
terms and that these terms were outlined in the architectonic method. This 
has led us to present a distinctive reading of the text and question the 
approach of commentators who isolate parts of the whole. We argued that 
certain limitations commonly identified in Kant's account of experience can 
be traced to the reading strategy we employ. Such things as the relation 
between disjunctive judgement and the category of community were shown 
to be convincing insofar as they were related as parts of a wider whole. We 
also argued that this strategy would allow us to relate Kant and Deleuze 
with positive results for our understanding of how Deleuze's account of 
experience is to be further integrated and made more convincing. We allied 
these two thinkers on the basis of their methods, the problem-setting and 
forms of argument they both engage in. Similarities emerged that led us to 
focus upon and develop one aspect of Deleuze's account of experience, his 
notion of individuation, allowing us to conclude that the virtual does not 
undermine his account as a whole. We have been able to develop the role 
that Kant's methods and forms of argument can play in contemporary 
philosophical debates. It therefore seems that reading Kant's 
on its own terms is a worthwhile undertaking, one that can 
make a significant contribution to both Kant and Deleuze studies.
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APPENDIX
Relevant Tables from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason




















Allness [or Totality] !
2 3 
Reality of Inherence and Subsistence 
Negation 
Limitation of Causality and Dependence
(Cause and Effect) 
of Community 
(Interaction [or Reciprocity] 2 




translated from the German as 'Allness1 by Werner S. Pluhar (Kant 1996: 132, 
A80/B106, see footnote 61, page 115, in chapter three of this thesis) and as Totality1 
by Norman Kemp Smith (Kant 2003: 113) and by J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Kant 1993: 
85).
2Translated from the German as 'Reciprocity1 by Kemp Smith and J M 
D. Meiklejohn (Kant 2003 113, A80/B106; Kant 1993: 85) and as 'Interaction' by 
Pluhar (Kant 1996: 132).
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iii. The Table of Principles (Kant 1996: 231, A161/B200)
1
of intuition
of perception of experience
of empirical thought as such
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Art as Non-Knowledge: Gilles Deleuze on Consciousness and
Apprenticeship
Deleuze's work on consciousness and apprenticeship demands a great deal 
of our encounters with the world. They both unify and differentiate 
consciousness and apprenticeship. This paper will try to explore what this 
means, to flesh out the idea of unity through difference. We will see that 
this follows first of all from Deleuze's critique of knowledge and defence of 
what he calls 'non-knowledge'. This concerns a production that does not in 
any way resemble what it produces because it unifies only through 
difference. This takes us to the heart of Deleuze's philosophy as both a 
critical and a creative enterprise, to the moves he makes that are very tricky 
to articulate and assess. It is very hard to think about unity through 
difference and yet for Deleuze this is how apprenticeship and consciousness 
work. We are forced think about such things through apprenticeship. This 
kind of unity is a problem that arises within Deleuze's thought and we must 
assess his means of dealing with it.
What is the role of art in this? Art is the staging of the production of 
experience that doesn't seek to preserve the form of what can be known and 
recognised across time. Instead this non-knowledge unifies experience in 
the process of undermining the kind of unity that knowledge attributes to it. 
In art the problem of unifying consciousness and apprenticeship is dealt 
with but not in the way knowledge would expect. In this paper I want to 
ask first how in Deleuze's non-knowledge 
becomes defined as distinct from the knowledge it produces. Secondly, I 
want to briefly explore Deleuze's work on Francis Bacon's painting. I will 
then turn to an engagement with his work on Marcel Proust's 
where an apprenticeship to non-knowledge is staged. The key 
concerns will be how categories of the object and subject of knowledge are
undermined and how it is sensation and time that unify experience through
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the differences they deploy.
1. Non-Knowledge
The approach taken towards the world by an apprentice is to overcome the 
habits of thought that would essentialise the forms that the object and the 
subject can take. This is an approach to the world in terms of its production 
and not through anticipating what can be found in it. The apprentice is to 
find new determinations through treating the world as a space of learning 
and not of knowledge. Deleuze writes: To learn is indeed to constitute this 
space of an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points renew 
themselves in each other...'. 1 The terms Deleuze uses here are important 
and need to be developed. What Deleuze calls distinctive points are 
differences which are at work in the organisation of bodies. This includes 
the body of the apprentice. To encounter is to be open to re-organisation 
through the distinctive points or differences which are contracted in the 
body. To learn is then to come to embody differences which one 
encounters, to expand one's relations to the world and then to embody the 
differences that are encountered through this. In order to illustrate this 
notion Deleuze considers learning to swim and learning a foreign language. 
This he argues is to compose the distinctive points of one's own body or 
one's own language with those of another shape or theme. This is never to 
copy or imitate but is to embody a common theme which organises the 
body in ways that cannot be anticipated. Given that this process is for 
Deleuze a universal account of the emergence of bodies in the first place, 
this is for him what the body is capable of doing.
Consciousness is criticised by Deleuze when it opposes such relations, in so 
far as it considers other bodies as opposed to its own. Consciousness seeks
1 Deleuze 1994: 23.
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to essentialise the body's organisation because it fears this process of 
transformation that, as Deleuze puts it, '...tears us apart but also propels us 
into a hitherto unknown and unheard-of world of problems1 .2 The 
transformation of our body and language in learning refers to how a 
character emerges, develops and is transformed through apprenticeship. 
The world of problems we are propelled into concerns the new theme that 
challenges us to realise the variety contained within it. They are the 
problems of realising its variety in experience and in the character we form. 
Thus how to speak a foreign language or how to swim are not something we 
suddenly come to know but a world of problems whose different solutions 
cannot be anticipated as a set of possibilities. The theme differentiates the 
activity of the apprentice in dealing with the problems deployed and yet 
unifies this activity because it is 'to learn to swim1 or 'to learn a foreign 
language'. It is in and through the theme that different bodies are related, 
finding common problems of extending its variety. Therefore what a body 
can do depends upon the consciousness of a theme.
It is also important to note that for Deleuze distinctive points 'renew 
themselves in each other' so as to continuously produce new determinations 
that differentiate and unify bodies. They have a unity amongst themselves 
and yet through this the distinctiveness or difference of each one is 
renewed. To learn to swim is to seek to embody a theme whose potential 
effects cannot be known since the distinctive points it deploys are always 
renewed. They will always exceed our knowledge. Therefore rather than 
the unity of knowledge telling us what can happen or what is possible we 
find the unity of non-knowledge or of a differentiating theme which is 
inexhaustible. So far then we have found that Deleuze envisages a unity of 
differentiation within bodies and across bodies.
Bodies are organised through differences but Deleuze also speaks also of
2 Deleuze 1994: 192.
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their meaning. This is also produced and expanded by differences which 
'renew themselves in each another1 . The term Deleuze uses is sign and 
signs are emitted by objects and subjects. In signs we seek to decipher the 
meaning to be attributed to the object or subject. Yet, like distinctive, 
points signs are not attributes of the object or subject but expressions of a 
process through which these emerge, develop and are transformed by their 
encounters with other bodies and themes. Thus the subject may find they 
are unified in a larger community, one social or biological, and through this 
set of relations draw upon a wider variety of differences. As social or 
biological beings we can become different characters, do different things, 
through a common theme. Consciousness must then decipher not an 
identity and resemblance but a theme and how its variety is extended in the 
various bodies that it includes. This is to be consciousness of the world in 
its capacity to embody a differentiating a theme rather than as an object of 
knowledge. A theme continuously and inexhaustibly differentiates a certain 
meaning rather than attributing it to a particular organisation of bodies. The 
aim of learning and apprenticeship is to find themes that unify and 
differentiate both the organisation of bodies (their distinctive points) and 
their meaning (the signs they emit). Consciousness is advanced and unified 
by deciphering signs, finding the unifying themes that are always renewed 
and never exhausted. This leads Deleuze to call signs 'the true elements of 
theatre'.3 This is a theatre that we are always already involved in or in 
which we are always already a character who develops and undergoes 
transformations.
We must emphasise that in this theatre distinctive points and signs are two 
different series. It can seem as if signs and distinctive points are coupled to 
start with but for Deleuze their relation must be accounted for.4 He would
3 Deleuze 1994: 23.
4 Deleuze develops this in terms of Proust's where 'An original 
difference presides over our loves. Perhaps this is the image of the Mother - or that of 
the Father for a woman, for Mile Vinteuil. More profoundly, it is a remote image
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argue that the identity of body and meaning is wrongly presupposed by 
knowledge when in fact non-knowledge must operate by accounting for 
how things emerge and relate to one another. Rather than signs being the 
signifiers of the distinctive points of a body they are asignifying. Between 
the signs and the distinctive points of the very same object or subject 
Deleuze puts a difference or fracture. Yet what fractures the known object 
or subject is the very theme that holds together and articulates what it 
divides. This is the theme that rises in the fracture as the swarming of 
differences that are incarnated both as distinctive points and signs. Deleuze 
writes of signs that: They testify to the spiritual and natural powers which 
act beneath the words, gestures, characters and objects represented'.5 The 
apprentice is then dealing with the power to think and do things differently 
through a differentiating theme. This variety rising up in the fracture 
includes the power to become a new character, to be transformed by what 
the theme deploys in the space of encounter. Miguel de Beistegui writes in 
his book that learning for Deleuze is 'to experience the 
power of heterogeneity behind beings, to allow our own singularities [or 
distinctive points] to communicate with those of other beings, in what 
amounts to a new, unique assemblage'.6 The fracture where a theme arises 
forms part of Deleuze's account of the incompleteness of our knowledge of 
experience. It never includes difference but must learn from it. The 
fracture is an empty space that exceeds knowledge, which can never be 
filled in by it. However, it is full of non-knowledge or a power of 
heterogeneity that rises up as a differentiating theme like the variety 
concentrated in 'learning to swim' or 'learning a foreign language'. What 
can happen through a theme is non-knowledge - it is not a set of
beyond our experience, a Theme that transcends us, a kind of archetype. Image, idea, or 
essence rich enough to be diversified in the beings we love and even in a single loved 
being, but of such a nature too that it is repeated in our successive loves and in each of 
our loves taken in isolation' (Deleuze 2000: 67). He continues '...we realize the 
existence of the original theme or idea, which transcends our subjective states no less 
than the objects in which it is incarnated' (Deleuze 2000: 69).
5 Deleuze 1994:23.
6 Beistegui 2004: 285.
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possibilities that can be anticipated - and yet it holds together different 
bodies in their apprenticeship. I want to consider how in the work of art the 
apprentice must seek to encounter this empty space without trying to fill it 
in with forms of knowledge. In this way he or she may extend the 
production of experience, something that always exceeds our knowledge in 
order to account for it.
2. Sensation and Time
In his book Deleuze speaks of 
rendering visible non-organic life. Bacon's figures attain a life that is non- 
organic, that is not organised by the form and life of an organism. 
Sensation opens onto this life at its limit and draws from it new differences 
that extend and expand organic life. Through this Deleuze wants to think 
about what an organism or organised body can do. I want here to focus 
upon a particular observation Deleuze makes about Bacon's paintings. 
Instead of thinking of'animal' and 'human' as two objects of knowledge, as 
essentially distinct species defined by an essential organisation and 
meaning, Bacon paints the common limit and theme of these apparently 
opposed things. In his work we cannot recognise the confusing sensations 
we encounter and yet this unrecognisable element is always in the process 
of producing the clear sensations we recognise. Difference both confuses 
and clarifies the sensation presented in the painting as the non-knowledge 
that is behind our knowledge. Deleuze writes that 'Meat is the common 
zone of man and the beast, their zone of indeterminability'7 . This theme of 
meat occurs again and again as the limit behind the various forms of 
organic life. For Deleuze what bodies can do in relation to one another is
7 Deleuze 2003: 23. Deleuze gives the example of'Painting 1946' (Luigi Ficacci 2003, 
22). He writes that 'The painter is certainly a butcher, but he goes to the butcher's shop 
as if it were a church, with the meat as the crucified victim.' (Deleuze 2003, 24)
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now opened up through how they emerge, and continue to emerge, in 
sensation. Meat is the confusion behind the clarity of sensible forms which 
are known as human and animal. Yet while it is empty of forms recognised 
by knowledge it is full of unrealised variety. Presenting bodies in the 
process of their production here couples the recognisable and the 
unrecognisable or knowledge and non-knowledge. It leaves a space for 
non-knowledge to rise up at the heart of sensation and set problems of 
further realising its variety in the activity of organic or organised bodies. 
Deleuze writes that Bacon's painting show how '...the spectator is already 
in the spectacle'. 8 The spectator is constituted as a body by sensation just as 
the bodies emerging in the painting are. At the limit of our organisation and 
our consciousness of meaning (including our self-consciousness) we are all 
meat. Through this encounter with the artwork the spectator learns not to 
oppose human and animal in their consciousness and apprenticeship but to 
draw upon this relation. However, we are also shown that there is a 
difference, that their unity in meat actually produces the differences we 
recognise between human and animal. To think sensation fully is to couple 
the organic and the inorganic and the clear and the confused so that we don't 
allow either side to dominate. In this way non-knowledge is always 
involved in knowledge, providing the differences that make knowledge 
clear and organised. It makes sensation into something we want to know 
because it is not only knowable but full of variety. As I shall try to develop, 
this also ensures that we learn to become something different in and through 
the variety we encounter.
Now that we've engaged briefly with the faculty of sensation in the 
paintings of Francis Bacon we must look at how the faculty of thought is 
affected by the work of art. For Deleuze we have a unity of distinctive 
points in a space of sensation in which bodies emerge and relate. We also 
have a unity of thought in time, a unity of all the signs thought seeks to
8 Deleuze 2003: 24.
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decipher. Time provides the differentiating themes that rise up at the limit 
of thought as well as at the limit of sensation. They unite thought and 
sensation - signs and distinctive points - because a common theme arises at 
the limit of what is known through both faculties. In his reading of Proust 
Deleuze locates themes as essences and these 'renew themselves in each 
other1 . The ultimate unity of experience is time and this is what the thought 
of the apprentice opens onto at the limit, expanding consciousness to its 
highest level. Deleuze seeks consciousness of experience in its very 
production because through this the apprentice is able to learn to create, 
literally extending it in the work of art. For Deleuze in Proust's 
time must be regained because knowledge alone cannot unite 
what it finds in space as it is related in time. Apprenticeship is then for 
consciousness a '...violent training, a culture ... which affects the entire 
individual'.9 This individual is a character in the theatre constituted by 
signs. What the individual can become depends upon overcoming a 
consciousness of what time can do in the individual and in the world insofar 
as it rises up in the fracturing of knowledge. This concerns what the world 
and all its characters or apprentices can become in and through time. 
Deleuze poses the question in his book that will concern 
us here. He asks: 'What else is there except the object and the subject'? 10
In Proust the revelation of a world of signs means a new theme or essence 
has risen up. It circulates as a meaning that the apprentice seeks behind 
signs, the source of their richness and variety. Yet the variety is never 
exhausted by any object or subject and so this world of signs is overcome. 
A new theme arises to bring the apprentice closer to the ultimate meaning 
of all signs which is only found in time, where all themes relate. The 
revelation of a world of signs therefore marks a new stage in the 
apprenticeship and in consciousness, bringing the apprentice closer to the
9 Deleuze 1994: 165.
10 Deleuze 2000: 37.
292
production of experience itself. The key point is that a new world of signs 
gives new life to objects and subjects but it is only in and through time that 
this occurs. Ultimately meaning can only be found in time and so along the 
way there are failures because inadequate sources of meaning are pursued. 
Deleuze finds that for Proust only the signs of art are adequate to time. Yet 
when this stage is reached we have not a unity of knowledge but a unity of 
non-knowledge. The apprentice can do what they truly capable of in and 
through time as the non-knowledge or essence that rises up in the work of 
art.
Does this mean that we must simply contemplate time in its perfection in 
the work of art? Is our own imperfection guaranteed insofar as we are not 
wholly in time? For Deleuze difference and its activity in time must both 
differentiate and unify the life of the apprentice. What Proust offers us is 
not at all the perfection of time outside of or beyond the world. Time as a 
whole is plural. 1 ! Its plurality concerns themes or essences relating in time. 
They are the ultimate differences that are involved in producing different 
meanings and organisations in different cases of experience. They are also 
involved in the work of art where the apprentice is truly creative, creative in 
and through time, drawing upon the widest horizon of consciousness. 
Essences or themes are unified in time insofar as this contributes to the 
renewal of their difference, the difference that rises up in experience and not 
simply in relation to other essences. Let's turn to 
itself where on the last page the hero describes his task of writing now that 
the ultimate unity of the search has been attained, now that time is regained. 
It is not a case of knowing this unity but of responding to it as non- 
knowledge so that what time can do isn't limited by forms of knowledge. 
The apprentice can now write and create in and through time. 
Consciousness now has the horizon of the production of experience through 
a plural time of essences or themes. Proust writes that the task of writing
11 Deleuze 2000: 17.
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IS...
'..., even if the effect were to make them resemble monsters, to 
describe men as occupying so considerable a place, compared with 
the restricted place which is reserved for them in space, a place on the 
contrary prolonged past measure, for simultaneously, like giants 
plunged into the years, they touch the distant epochs through which 
they have lived, between which so many days have come to range 
themselves - in Time'. 12
Here we find that the 'restricted space occupied' within knowledge by the 
subject is expanded by the essences or themes that unite 'distant epochs'. 
This unity is time and through time bodies and meanings can do more than 
knowledge will allow because they respond to the problems of realising the 
variety concentrated in essences or themes. They can 'resemble monsters' 
because for knowledge non-knowledge gives rise to the monstrous, to the 
unheard of problems of realising its variety. The place a subject occupies 
within knowledge is expanded if non-knowledge rises up. It allows for the 
apprentice to become something unrecognisable as a character and to create 
through the unrecognisable at the heart of what is recognised. The hero's 
writing must involve non-knowledge because he is now conscious that this 
is how the world itself works. For Deleuze the apprentice now no longer 
wants to '.. .attribute to the object the sign it bears'. 13 He is keen to find out 
what a body can do in and through time now that this is found by the 
apprentice to be the source of organisation and meaning. This responds to 
the problematic internal to Deleuze's thought - that of finding unity through 
difference. Time differentiates and unifies by incarnating themes or 
essences across experience.
12 Proust 2000: 451.
13 Deleuze 2000: 27.
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Conclusion
I wrote at the start of this paper that Deleuze demands a great deal of our 
encounters with the world. The rising up of an essence or differentiating 
theme provides the potential for a subject or object to 'become monstrous' 
as long as the consciousness developed by apprenticeship has the horizon of 
a plural time of essences. Then it includes non-knowledge in the very 
production of knowledge. We saw that, according to Deleuze's reading of 
Proust, the subject and object are to be related to the time of their own 
production. The characters that arise in apprenticeship are overcome 
insofar as they confine their desire for lost time to what is inadequate to 
time and its essences. The writer that the apprentice becomes is a character 
whose desire is able to draw upon time as a whole, whose very character is 
formed in and through this expanded consciousness. Non-knowledge must 
then undermine forms of knowledge so as to incarnate the variety of a 
theme in new organisations and meanings that can be known. Knowledge 
is then expanded because non-knowledge overcomes its forms. We must 
for Deleuze speak of the non-knowledge within knowledge, of the un- 
thought within thought, the non-sense within sense. It is un-liveable time 
and inorganic life that must give rise to the variety that can be realised and 
made use of in liveable time and organic life.
Deleuze argues that Proust's hero finds the unity of his search when: '... he 
understands that the very world he had known and loved was already 
alternation, change, sign, and effect of a lost Time'. 14 Deleuze never 
abandons knowledge but seeks to account for it in the fullest sense. This 
helps to explain his preference for Francis Bacon's painting over abstract 
art. He wants the figure to be in the process of emerging, even though this
14 Deleuze 2000: 18.
295
involves un-liveable and inorganic forces. 15 It is the relation of knowledge 
and non-knowledge that helps us understand how Deleuze thinks. He does 
not want to limit us to the completion of knowledge or to make us 
contemplators of differences in their perfect temporal unity. It is when we 
keep this relation always in play that the widest horizon of consciousness is 
attained through apprenticeship.
15 Deleuze writes of Bacon's scream paintings that 'If we scream, it is always as victims 
of invisible and insensible forces that scramble every spectacle, and that lie beyond pain 
and feeling.' (Deleuze 2003, 60) This production of experience is the object of an 
involuntary encounter in the painting. It is important that the figure is shown in the 
process of finding its well known determinations. This process is unrecognisable and yet 
coupled with the recognisable organisation of the body that it accounts for.
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The Genesis of Cognition: 
Deleuze as a Reader of Kant16
In what sense is Deleuze a reader of Kant's He 
offers an account of Kant's critical system and of the points at which he 
finds it most productive. Does this mean that he is first descriptive and then 
selective, using Kant's thought as a tool box for his own purposes? If we 
want to see Deleuze as a descriptive and consistent reader of Kant it would 
seem that we must turn to his book Kant's Critical Philosophy where he 
seeks to explain Kant's critical system. Yet I will seek an alternative to 
both of these approaches, descriptive and selective, by considering a place 
where Deleuze uses a term that Kant also uses but is not explicitly writing 
about his philosophy. This is his essay 'How do we recognise 
structuralism?' 17 and the term is 'object=x'. This might seem to be a case 
where Deleuze is selecting from Kant the terms or tools he finds useful 
rather than giving a wider and immanent reading. Yet I shall attempt to 
show that by presenting an account of structure and genesis in this essay 
Deleuze provides a way of reading Kant's in terms 
of what we will call an 'Idea of the whole'. This Idea is to provide an 
account of the process of cognition as a whole through its genesis, the 
object=x. As we shall see, this contributes to debates in Kant scholarship 
over the terms he uses and even challenges Deleuze's own assessment of his 
work. This is not to deny the role of genesis in the reading of Kant that 
Deleuze provides in Yet whereas the genesis of 
the critical system is here situated in the we will be 
using other work by Deleuze in order to locate a notion of genesis in the 
Without seeking to deny the importance of the
16 1 would like to thank Mick Bowles and Matt Lee for their comments on various drafts 
of this essay.
17 Deleuze 2004b: 170-92.
18 Deleuze locates the genesis of Kant's critical system in the the
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former text in Kant's critical system we will attempt to show that Deleuze 
provides an immanent and unifying way of reading the latter text. By 
focusing upon a place were Deleuze is not engaged in setting out Kant's 
system, its terms and relations, we will be able to consider how the notion 
of genesis he presents can transform our understanding of these terms and 
relations.
The first section of this paper will seek to show that Deleuze offers us an 
approach to Kant's through the notion of the 
object=x as the genesis of structures that differentiate and unify experience. 
We will be concerned to show that this approach offers a new way of 
reading Kant because it focuses upon a notion of the genesis of structures. 
The second section will consider the differences between Kant and Deleuze 
that get in the way of this approach. We will consider how Deleuze is 
critical of Kant's account of cognition in the and 
yet argue that he allows us to locate a notion of genesis in this text. Having 
sought to show that the reading of Kant we are proposing has a basis in 
Deleuze's work we will then seek to show that it has relevance to Kant's 
text. The rationale behind this way of reading is that a lot of the terms used 
are understood very differently depending on whether they are considered 
in isolation or as part of a whole. For proponents of the latter strategy this 
is a transformation in how we understand the meaning of Kant's terms 
which comes from within his system and how its works. Deleuze brings to 
this tendency in Kant scholarship a concern with genesis and how it relates 
the terms or parts of the process. Gerd Buchdahl is a reader of Kant eager 
to discard the baggage that Kantian terms have collected because they have 
been considered in isolation. He writes that he wants to break through '. . .
third and last of Kant's Critiques, in the following terms:
Thus the first two Critiques set out a relationship between the faculties which is 
determined by one of them; the last Critique uncovers a deeper free and 
indeterminate accord of the faculties as the condition of the possibility of every 
determinate relationship1 (KCP: 68).
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the usual idea of an "authoritarian timelessness" assumed to surround the 
transcendental approach1 . 19 We will try to see what this means and how 
Deleuze helps to make this a convincing and effective reading strategy. 
Rather than isolating and analysing the terms used in the 
from an external viewpoint, these terms are to be viewed, as Kant 
himself counsels, by '. . . someone who has gained command of the idea as 
a whole1 .20 The task then is to gain an Idea of the process of cognition as a 
whole, how it relates it terms and assigns them roles and meanings. This 
might seem to be an uncritical reading strategy but I want to argue that we 
can only be critical or evaluative when we have grasped and understood this 
Idea rather than forestalling it. Let's now see in what sense Deleuze can be 
said to provide a way of reading the that focuses 
upon its genesis and through this attains an Idea of the whole.
1. Deleuze on Structure and Genesis
Deleuze raises the question 'How do we recognise structuralism?' in his 
essay of the same name.21 When it comes to the subject of Deleuze's essay 
James Williams has argued that it is as much about poststructuralism as 
structuralism.22 This is because it moves away from an understanding of 
structure as being developed through its own relations, things already given 
or secured. It thus moves away from a concern with '. . . arriving at secure 
knowledge through the charting of differences within structures'.23 The 
move is to a structure that is disrupted by its own limit when this introduces 
instability and plurality of meaning into structures. For Deleuze we do not 
recognize structuralism by considering how structure is the same across
!9Buchdahll992:9. 
2<> Kant 1996: Bxliv. 
2 ! Deleuze 2004b: 170-92.
22 Williams 2005: 53.
23 Ibid: 1.
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different cases because of the empirical resemblance between how things 
are structured in each case. As Todd May puts it, Deleuze seeks '. . . 
concepts through which the world becomes strange to us again, through 
which the borders between things become porous and their identities 
fluid'.24 This is not just a way of viewing the world but is to view the world 
in terms of the way it always comes to be structured. It is to view the world 
in terms of this process as a whole and not according to the outcomes with 
which we are familiar. Strangeness has to be realized through this account 
of structures, structures that allow experience to be grasped but are not tied 
by resemblance to past experience that is already structured. Deleuze is 
then concerned with the genesis of differences that make up structures 
rather than securing what is given through the differences that already make 
up a structure.25 It is in search of this that he demands of structuralism a 
certain radicalization that makes it sound like what we would today call 
poststructuralism. James Williams writes of how: 'No poststructuralist 
defines the limit as something knowable (it would then merely become 
another core). Rather, each poststructuralist thinker defines the limit as a 
version of a pure difference, in the sense of something that defies 
identification'.26 This is the standard Deleuze sets for any notion of 
structure. It is a reading strategy that looks for what animates the whole, 
the limit or genesis of the process but also for a structure that is able to be 
open to its own genesis. Genesis is what makes things fluid and porous in a 
structure and across structures, unsettling how we are used to classifying
24 May 2005: 72-3.
25 Jean Piaget defines structuralism in a way that points to the role of differentiation or 
transformation in structures but also seeks to capture transformation in terms of laws. 
This passage from his book Structuralism illustrates the distinction that James Williams 
makes between transformation as the genesis of the system or transformation as such 
and transformation as something subject to structural laws:
'At a first approximation, we may say that a structure is a system of 
transformations. Inasmuch as it is a system and not a mere collection of 
elements and their properties, these transformations involve laws: the structure is 
preserved or enriched by the interplay of its transformation laws, which never 
yield results external to the system nor employ elements that are external to it' 
(Piaget 1971:5).
26 Williams 2005: 3.
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things. Structure must therefore be what is differentiated or what realizes 
this genesis rather than something that is maintained because of its 
resemblance to what went before in structures. There is then a whole 
process or system of realizing pure difference through structure, difference 
that is never already included or given in structure but for this reason 
differentiates structure rather than becoming something recognizable. What 
term captures the nature of this genesis for Deleuze? He writes: '. . .we 
again find the paradox of the empty square. For this is the only place that 
cannot and must not be filled . . . '.27 This is because ? [i]t must retain the 
perfection of its emptiness in order to be displaced in relation to itself, and 
in order to circulate throughout the elements and the variety of relations1 .28 
We have then the genesis of structure in pure difference which is productive 
insofar as it produces new structured things without ever becoming part of 
structure itself. We have a recognition of structuralism in terms of its 
genesis and how this transforms our notion of structure.
If structure is to be accounted for by a genesis that disrupts it then the 
obvious question is how structure is held together by this recurring genesis. 
We have said the structure is not the same across cases because it is familiar 
or because of the empirical resemblance between how cases are structured. 
Genesis is empty of these terms of reference which allow empirical 
recognition to take place. Empirical recognition does not then provide what 
is always the same, in and across every structure. Can the notion of genesis 
that Deleuze formulates provide an account of both the differentiation of 
structure and how it is consistent or unified across cases? Deleuze seeks to 
do this by talking about genesis in terms of problems that unify the 
structuring of experience. They are at work in how a recognizable or 
structured object emerges but are not recognizable in this object. In what 
sense is the empty square a source of problems? It is a void but'. . . not a
27 Deleuze 2004b: 189.
28 Ibid.
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non-being; or at least this non-being is not the being of the negative, but 
rather the positive being of the "problematic," the objective being of a 
problem and of a question . . ,'.29 This combination of the problematic and 
objectivity is key. In recognizing structuralism we are recognizing the 
formation of structures as well as their disruption. Deleuze seeks, as he 
puts it"... a way of recalling the objective consistency that the category of 
the problematic takes on at the heart of structures'.30 Problems have 
objective consistency insofar as they hold together what they differentiate. 
This objectivity of a problem is not confined to the outcomes of this 
process, such as the empirical resemblance of an object, but concerns the 
way in which they are continuously realized across structures. It is not 
something to be attributed to the structured object but rather to the way it 
emerges through the structuring of experience. We must further consider 
the nature of this sameness and objectivity of structure since they are key 
concerns for Kant. We will then attempt to secure their role in Deleuze's 
thought so as to be able, in section two, to better assess his relation to Kant.
We are concerned with the objectivity and consistency of structure that 
Deleuze develops when he also names the problematic genesis of structure 
the object=x.31 Structure is differentiated and yet the objective consistency 
of the problems set by its genesis secure the sameness of structures. This 
begins with sameness in the most universal sense. The object=x as genesis 
of structures is what remains the same in every structure, it is the pure 
difference that differentiates structures and is what they have in common. 
Yet this has also to be sameness across cases of a problem within a structure 
or across structures. How is this sameness secured? Deleuze writes that 
The orders of structure do not communicate in a common site, but they 
communicate through their empty place or respective object=x'.32 This
29 Ibid: 189-90.




means that a problem can unify two series that have nothing in common 
because it itself does not resemble either of them, being itself the empty 
square of structure with no such terms of reference. However, we have to 
see how this emptiness can become a fullness in the widest communication 
of series and in objective outcomes in the life of a structure. Let's consider 
how this communicator of series can be the source of both differentiation 
and unity.
With the term object=x Deleuze is able to give the sense that a structured 
object will be the outcome of the process but that its nature is open. 
Openness is then to be realized in objective structures, accounting for how 
structured things are recognized and so how they become a part of the 
familiar world. In other words, this objectivity is to account for what is 
familiar in the world while having strangeness as its genesis. The structure 
will thus be extended in objective ways but the genesis that operates is not 
tied to the way things are already structured and it does not dictate how they 
will be structured. If we take two structured series of events, which are 
therefore empirical or already part of structures, then we have to account for 
their relation through an object=x or common problem. In 
Deleuze refers to this object=x, in the case of linguistic 
structures, as the 'esoteric word'. 33 Here he is concerned with how literary 
works are differentiated and unified, with esoteric words displacing 
accepted meanings and creating new ones. There are problems that are 
realized in understanding how books are meaningful just as in biological 
structures the object=x is involved in how bodies are organized. The 
esoteric word lacks meaning, it has no place in structure. However it 
continues to occur and objectively structure the novel without ever being 
exhausted, without ever attaining a place in structure that captures and 
exhausts its meaning. Across the text we recognize a problem not because 
of the same results but because it is a theme that is realized differently in
33 Deleuze 2004a: 150.
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each case. What does it mean to say that the same theme is realized 
differently?
In Deleuze uses the example of Proust's 
to show how two series are related by the object=x.34 
One is the former present, the structured experience of the town of 
Combray, and the other is the present present where we remember 
Combray. The two series do share empirical resemblances. This is first of 
all between two sensations of taste and smell that occur in both series. In 
the second series, the present present, the taste and smell trigger the 
remembrance not just of the past sensation but of Combray itself. This 
suggests that Combray is not an 'esoteric word' at all but something that 
stabilizes the present structure of experience, securing the meanings that 
make it up through its empirical remembrance to a structured past. The 
intense and overflowing meanings that are triggered by the taste and smell 
are explained by a past experience that links them to a town, Combray, and 
what happened to the narrator while he was there. The former present is a 
breakfast on a Sunday morning in Combray in the narrators youth. His aunt 
Leonie used to give him a piece of madeleine '. . . soaked in her decoction 
of lime blossom'.35 In the present present the narrator is again tasting a 
piece of madeleine cake soaked in tea. Yet for Deleuze, if what relates 
these two series were empirical resemblance between how they are both 
structured we could not account for the sensations undergone by the 
narrator who is remembering. As Proust writes, the structures of 
experience, such as the narrator's knowledge of Combray, may be forgotten 
but something remains:
'But when from a long distant past nothing subsists, after the people 
are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, taste and smell 
alone, more fragile but more enduring, more immaterial, more 
persistent, more faithful, remain poised a long time, like souls,
34 ibid: 149.
35 Proust 1996: 54.
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remembering, waiting, hoping, amid the ruins of all the rest and bear 
unflinchingly, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their 
essence, the vast structure of recollection'.36
For Proust the memory of a structured experience - the person of Aunt 
Leonie, the room in which they breakfasted, even the shape of the 
madeleine - is less permanent than the sensations of taste and smell that 
persist. They overcome the structure of the narrator's present situation 
through this remembrance. What he experiences cannot be attributed to the 
structure of the former present or present present. Furthermore, when the 
memory of Combray occurs something different results in each case 
because the narrator is at a different stage of his apprenticeship to these 
moments. He thus encounters the same thing but the result is a different 
structure of experience. Combray is then the object=x or theme that is 
realized in different sensations and thoughts every time rather than a 
structured object of memory.
Proust's notion of apprenticeship is important because the apprentice moves 
away from the empirical resemblance of the two series, they learn how their 
relations can be more productive than this. For Deleuze, instead of the 
structured experience of Combray, we have a quality recollected that Proust 
calls '. . . something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of origin1 .37 
Apprenticeship involves learning to make this object=x productive without 
seeking to understand it as part of a structure. It must be encountered as the 
empty square of structure. In volume six of the work, it is 
the memory of Combray that prompts the exploration of time as a whole 
that concludes the novel.38 It did not have to result in this highly productive 
and conclusive meditation on the subject of the novel. The Combray 
moment we considered in volume one was where Combray rose '. . .
3* Ibid: 54.
37 Ibid: 51.
3« Proust 2000: 447-51.
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from my cup of tea1 . 39 This rush of sensation is productive because it 
exceeds the Combray that was lived and therefore already structured. But 
in volume six the Combray moment gives rise to the thought of the whole 
of time, the account of how problems like Combray arise and ultimately 
relate. Not even taste and smell survive as they did in the first Combray 
moment because rather than structuring the experience of a sensation 
differently it now gives rise to the ultimate horizon of every structure, to 
something that every structure is in search of. We have here an objective 
process of apprenticeship. The object=x is evoked in different ways 
throughout prompting new sensations that structure 
the experience of the narrator and advance his apprenticeship. Combray 
does not specify how this is realized, it is not a structured object given to us, 
but rather sets the problems of realizing it in the differentiation of structures 
that give rise to new forms of objectivity.
So far we have emphasized the role of the object=x and the objective 
consistency of the problems it sets for structure. We have a series of 
occurrences of the object=x. For Deleuze then: 'A structure only starts to 
move, and become animated, if we restore its other half.40 The result is the 
inexhaustible playing out of the other half of structure, problems or Ideas, in 
the differentiation of structures. Thus it is always through common Ideas, 
such as artistic, linguistic, biological or social Ideas, that this activity takes 
place.41 Combray is an artistic Idea, one giving rise to new sensations that 
take us beyond the structured or organized bodies we know, just as 
biological Ideas are realized through new ways of organizing bodies. The 
apprentice, Proust's narrator, learns that the object=x is not explained or 
realized through the structure of the social world he inhabits but can be 
realized by an artist. The artist encounters the object=x not as part of a
39 Proust 1996: 55.
40 Deleuze 2004b: 182.
4 * See Deleuze 2004a: 232-5 where Deleuze presents a physical Idea, a biological Idea
and a social Idea.
308
structure but as the source of the differentiation of structures that the artist 
extends and seeks to contribute to in original ways. Meaningful or 
organized bodies always become porous and fluid in relation to Ideas, 
whether this is realized through artistic, social or evolutionary activity. 
Does this provide us with an Idea of the whole that we can work with and 
proceed to consider whether it provides a valid model for a reading of 
Kant's Deleuze does make his account of 
structure and its genesis universal, setting forth an Idea of the whole, by 
declaring structuralism to be:
'...a truly general method, valid for all the structurable domains, a 
criterion for every structure, as if a structure were not defined without 
assigning an object=x that ceaselessly traverses the series[.] As if the 
literary work, for example, or the work of art, but other oeuvres as 
well, those of society, those of illness, those of life in general, 
enveloped this very special object which assumes control over their 
structure1 .42
Yet before considering what the object=x is for Kant himself we need to 
consider whether it really has Kantian connotations for Deleuze. Both 
questions will determine whether it has purchase on Kant's 
as a reading strategy for this text. Is there a sense in Deleuze's work 
that his thinking on the object=x as genesis of structure is relevant to Kant 
and can provide the basis for a reading of his text? In a series of seminars 
given in 1978 that are concerned with Kant's philosophy Deleuze considers 
the Kantian notion of the object=x.43 We find a similar enthusiasm for the 
object=x as we do in the essay on structuralism, an interest in treating it as 
the genesis of an ongoing process of structuring experience. Deleuze writes 
that, ...
'...the object=x only receives a determination as lion, table or lighter 
by the diversity I relate to it. When I relate to the object=x a diversity 
of antelopes: long hair in the wind, a roar in the air, a heavy step, a 
run of antelopes, well I say it's a lion'.44




This relates the object=x to the Ideas that are realized in objective series. 
The diversity encountered in sensation is able to extend biological Ideas but 
it requires objective consistency to do this. To realize this diversity the 
object=x must provide the focus of the process. This is a focus upon how 
diversity diversifies an organized body in the process of extending Ideas 
that range beyond the life and reach of such bodies. In other words, the 
organized and meaningful objects of experience must not be exceeded or 
left behind in the name of extending Ideas but must play a part in the 
extension or realization of these Ideas. We note that the example does not 
proceed by relating the attributes of a lion to an organized body that is 
recognizable in advance. Instead it shows how an object emerges from the 
diversity of sensations that are in play. The lion emerges from a diversity 
of sensations including those that do not belong to it as a recognizably 
organized body. Thus we see that what this organized body of the lion can 
do, its roar and heavy step, is grasped and extended through its relation to 
the ability of antelopes to run. The example starts with how everything 
relates through a diversity of sensations. Through this there emerges 
organized bodies with certain abilities. The hunter and hunted are 
organized according to the abilities that are brought out and developed in 
the hunt. We therefore start in Deleuze's example with a range of 
unattributed abilities which are part of a field of activity, a field of hunting, 
and out of these emerge organized bodies. The concern is with the 
realization of the diversity of sensation in the form of an object, such as in 
the meaningful bodies of literary works or in organized biological bodies 
like that of a lion. Deleuze writes that this is how'.. . the sensible diversity 
goes beyond itself towards something that I call an object'.45 It therefore 
seems that in Kant there are the resources to strengthen Deleuze's account 
of how, in the differentiation of structures, both Ideas and their realization 
in objective forms are involved in the process as a whole.
45 ibid.
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So far we've seen that the object=x as the 'empty square' is indeed very 'full 1 
in terms of what it can do in differentiating structure and extending the 
variety of determinations of the artistic, the linguistic, the biological, the 
social, and so on. Yet it is 'empty' in that it isn't to be confused with any 
possible element of structure. In the section that follows we must seek to 
locate the role of structure and genesis in Kant's 
because this will allow us to argue that Deleuze's understanding of this 
process as a whole can provide a way of reading Kant's text. Yet before we 
do this we must consider the obstacles to relating Kant and Deleuze in this 
way.
2. The Strangeness of Kant's Structures
What objections might be raised to finding in Deleuze's essay 'How do we 
recognize structuralism?' a strategy for reading Kant? If both Kant and 
Deleuze provide an account of the structures of experience then there is a 
certain integrity to each of these accounts. Surely this is what is involved in 
grasping an Idea of the whole? This concerns what is internal to their 
accounts and what is not respected if external notions and ends are 
introduced. Are we not in danger of doing just this? We must consider the 
scope of the relations between Kant and Deleuze to see if they allow for 
Deleuze to be considered a reader of Kant using the Idea of a whole he 
forms when talking not about Kant but about structuralism. Deleuze was 
concerned to grasp an Idea of structuralism as a whole and we saw that this 
had its basis in a concern, shared with structuralism, with differences that 
unify and determine structures. The move to the differentiation of structure 
through its genesis could plausibly be seen as preserving the integrity of 
structuralism because it is a radicalization that takes structuralism's concern 
with difference to its ultimate conclusion. We cannot assess here this claim
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about structuralism but we must assess the validity of the similar approach 
that we have so far been taking to the Are the 
ends Deleuze pursued in forming this Idea of a whole external to Kant's 
text? We have so far used Deleuze's work as a guide to form this reading 
without fully assessing its grounding in either Kant or Deleuze's work. Yet 
upon this depends the possibility that structure and genesis in Deleuze's 
work actually allows us to capture an Idea of the whole of the 
Let's consider first whether this reading strategy has any grounding in the 
text of the In a section that follows shortly after 
the deduction of the Table of Categories or pure concepts of the 
understanding Kant writes:
'But even for these concepts, as for all cognition, we can locate in 
experience, if not the principle of their possibility, then at least the 
occasioning causes of their production. Thus the impressions of the 
senses first prompt [us] to open up the whole cognitive power in 
regard to them, and to bring about experience'.46
This provides a notion of genesis and one that is combined in the notion of 
object=x with the Categories or pure concepts of the understanding. We 
have then the occasion and the basic forms of cognition combined. The 
occasion is always realized through these necessary forms that any object of 
cognition must take and these basic forms are realized through the 
occasion.47 Kant first formulates his notion of the object=x in the three 
syntheses of time, which are apprehension, reproduction and recognition.48 
Here he relates the occasioning cause, apprehension, to the reproduction of 
these moments of apprehension through imagination and then to the 
recognition of an object through the object=x. We move from an occasion,
46Kantl996:A86/B118.
47 On the surface this notion appears circular but in fact employs a concept of reciprocal 
determination where pure and basic forms of cognition and their occasioning causes are 
determined through each other.
4« Ibid: A98-110.
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via reproduction, to the form of an object in general or object=x which 
always realizes these reproduced moments in a recognizable object. This he 
calls the 'transcendental object' or 'object=x'. Kant writes that: 'The pure 
concept of this transcendental object (which is actually always the same, 
=x, in all our cognitions) is what is able to provide all our empirical 
concepts in general with reference to an object, i.e., with objective reality'.49 
The problem is to realize the occasion when sensations are to be secured in 
the unity of cognition by the objective forms provided by the understanding 
prior to all experience. Empirical concepts are not sufficient because they 
could be disproved by experience and so would be unable to secure 
cognition. Pure, non-empirical concepts or Categories are what is always 
the same, concentrated in the object=x, occasioned by sensory impressions 
and yet are not taken from experience. We have an echo here of Deleuze's 
concern with something that is always the same but is not confused with 
what is already realized and recognized in the structures given to 
experience. The question for Deleuze, in his critique of Kant, is whether 
these structures are strange enough to play a part in the genesis of 
experience. We saw that Deleuze seeks to be consistent in not assuming 
what is to be accounted for. Thus the process that remains the same does 
not empirically resemble previous occasions or structures. Kant, like 
Deleuze, is seeking sameness without empirical resemblance by emptying 
his Categories or pure concepts of the understanding of any empirical 
reference.50 The critical question is whether he meets Deleuze's high 
standards which are set when he makes pure difference the genesis and the 
test of any notion of structure.
For Kant then we have the force of the occasion and the completeness of the 
Categories or pure and basic forms of cognition united in the object=x. 




wherein objects - i.e., appearances - are given to me'. 51 In embodying the 
occasion upon which sensations prompt the use of cognitive faculties the 
object=x must also embody this rule, the pure and basic forms of cognition 
that realize the occasion. How are we to understand this strange object? For 
Buchdahl it is to be understood in the context of the process of cognition as 
a whole. It has a recurring role in the process and in this way distinguishes 
itself from other types of objects. Thus it is the occasion that animates the 
activity of cognition in securing objects of cognition rather than being the 
object of cognition that we are able recognize across experience as a result 
of this process. Buchdahl argues that the object=x or transcendental object 
'. . . always lies at the origin of a realization, still to be achieved1 . 52 He 
seeks to show that this object, which is never included in the structured 
unity of cognition, is its genesis: '. . . Kant's reduction ends up with the 
object as something with a genuine zero value, as an "object in the 
transcendental sense'".53 This allows the process to begin again rather than 
being limited by what has already been structured through cognition. It is a 
reduction that keeps the structures of cognition open. Thus for Buchdahl 
the transcendental object or object=x is what'. . . neither posses nor lacks a 
constitution'.54 In this sense it is empty but not lacking and so echoes 
Deleuze's concern with the empty square of structure, with how structure is 
kept open. It is not outside of the process because of its emptiness but is 
fully involved in the activity of filling out structures with well objects of 
cognition.
Despite these similarities between Kant and Deleuze, our positive 
presentation of their relations must inevitably falter. James Williams 
develops the contrast that arises when we consider structures and how they 
can relate to their genesis. For Deleuze structures are not timeless like
5 lIbid:A496/B524.




Kant's Table of Categories. James Williams argues that:
'In fact, for Deleuze, in great contrast to Kant's work in the 
we will see that conditions are appearance-specific 
in the sense that the abstract form of conditions turns out to be that 
there must be specific conditions for each thing, rather than general 
ones for all of them'.55
For Deleuze the object=x would be the condition for realizing appearances 
in structures but this realization would be singular rather than a general 
solution to the problem of structuring experience. For Kant, in contrast, the 
object=x embodies the basic forms of an object in general as secured prior 
to all experience in the Table of Categories. He produces a Metaphysical 
Deduction that is timeless, that for him has the virtue of securing once and 
for all the basic structures of possible experience.56 For structure to be open 
to the occasion of its genesis thus means different things. For Deleuze it 
means that it is involved in a universal process but on each occasion genesis 
must be realized in different or singular ways. Deleuze's concern with the 
reciprocal determination of structure and Ideas means that structure both 
undergoes its own genesis and provides different ways of realizing the Ideas 
that it poses as problems. Structure is both active and passive in this sense. 
James Williams has described this as a 'Deleuzian dialectics' in the sense 
that structure and the Ideas it incarnates are both involved without being 
confused and without one side become passive or dominated by the other.57 
Thus genesis always provides the starting point for the process and the 
Ideas to be extended but structure realizes these in different ways that are
55 Williams 2003: 18-19.
56 Kant writes of the pure and basic judgements of the understanding, from which the 
Table of Categories is to be derived and which are always already at work in cognition, 
that: c . . . these functions of the understanding are completely exhaustive and survey its 
power entirely' (Kant 1996: A80/B105).
57 Williams 2003: 17. Writing here on Deleuze's James 
Williams talks of actual and virtual rather than empirical structures and the Ideas behind 
them but the same process is referred to. It is here expressed in terms of the relation 
between actual structures and virtual structures or virtual Ideas. Deleuze seeks to show 
the role of both actual and virtual, forming a dialectic, as we have seen in his notion that 
Ideas are extended or realized through empirical structures as well as occurring in the 
genesis of these structures.
315
not set out in advance. Yet despite this significant contrast we must 
remember that what remains the same for both Kant and Deleuze is not 
something empirical. It does not prevent the outcomes of cognition from 
responding to their genesis by assuming in advance the empirical forms this 
may take. This is what is so strange about Kant's Table of Categories. It's 
a priori concepts are not to be taken from experience and yet it must be able 
to respond to the occasion of the genesis of cognition. This common 
concern should prevent us from concluding at this stage that there is no 
basis for Deleuze's notion of structure and genesis in Kant's text.
Another factor in how we understand the relations of Kant and Deleuze are 
places where, in contrast to what we saw in his 1978 seminars on Kant, 
Deleuze questions the scope of these relations. His critique of Kant's 
alleged empiricism implies that his own approach to the relation of structure 
and genesis has no relevance to Kant's work other than as an alternative. 
Levi R. Bryant makes the case that for Deleuze Thought does not simply 
involve mental acts but is that which requires us to go beyond what is 
familiar'.58 In other words, thought must not seek to overcome strangeness 
by reasserting the control of the mind over what it encounters. This 
negative appraisal of Kant has firm grounding in Deleuze's work when he 
complains that empirical recognition comes to characterize the account 
Kant gives of cognition and its role in thought. He accuses Kant of tracing 
'. . . so-called transcendental structures . . . ' from the empirical.59 Kant is 
said to use this '... tracing method ... '60 in the as 
a means of securing the sameness of transcendental structures. It is traced 
from the habits of the mind in stabilizing and dealing with what it 
encounters. It is not then enough to argue that Kant's structures are 
dynamic because they respond to the occasion of genesis if we want to find
5 * Bryant 2008: 90.
59 Deleuze 2004a: 171.
60 Ibid.
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in Deleuze's reading of structuralism a way of reading the 
This is not enough to make the two accounts resonate because 
such dynamism in responding to the occasion in fact preserves the habits of 
the mind that Deleuze rejects. In Kant a concern with empirical 
resemblance mediates the relation of structures and Ideas through their 
common genesis in the object=x. What James Williams called Deleuzian 
dialectics excludes any such mediation, whether it be a non-empirical Table 
of Categories or is in fact traced from the empirical. In other words, the 
dynamism of structure is no good if it guards against its genesis, if it seek to 
confine what it encounters to the stability of patterns of empirical 
recognition. Bryant argues that Kant's transcendental structures are dynamic 
in the sense that they preserve a mechanical causality that moves between 
given or already structured objects of cognition.61 It is a dynamism that 
does not realize the strangeness of the genesis it encounters but preserves 
the stability of cause and effect throughout structures and across structures. 
The movement of the process goes from object of cognition to object of 
cognition according to relations such as those of mechanical cause and 
effect.62 The result is that a structure is always too close to standards of 
empirical recognition to attain those of Deleuze's notion of genesis. On this 
reading then Kantian structure is based on what is familiar and so defeats 
the strangeness of Deleuzian genesis in advance. It seems that to Deleuze's 
rejection of the notion of timeless structures and deductions in Kant we 
have to add his critique of an allegedly pervasive empiricism characterizing 
Kantian transcendental structures. On this basis there seems to be little 
grounding in Deleuze's work for the assertion that his thoughts on 
structuralism provide the basis for a reading of Kant's system as an integral 
whole.
Bryant 2008: 112. .
62 In the Causality and Dependence or Cause and Effect is the 
second Category of Relation in the Table of Categories (A80/B106) and its application 
as a Principle for the a priori structuring of experience is developed in the Second 
Analogy of Experience in the Analytic of Principles.
The question that now arises is whether we can locate in Deleuze's work a 
reading of Kant's that takes us beyond his 
criticisms of Kant's account of cognition. We saw Buchdahl writing of how 
the 'authoritarian timelessness' of Kant's a priori structures could be 
overcome by reading the text in terms of the system or process as a whole. 
This means that we locate the terms used in the as 
various stages in Kant's account of the process of cognition as a whole. 
This is what Buchdahl argues for when he proposes that Kantian terms are 
to be understood in terms of'... the dynamical imagery of "flow", enabling 
us to keep in focus simultaneously the various nodal points of the Kantian 
structure,.. , f . 63 We saw in the last section that it is in his 1978 seminars on 
Kant that an Idea of the whole seems to flow in the sense that by focusing 
upon the object=x other terms find their place in the process that it 
animates. On this reading of Kant's account of cognition the object=x is a 
strange and elusive thing that circulates in experience in order that 
cognition should be open to occasions where diversity must be realized in 
the form of an object. There must be nothing behind this activity and so we 
have what we saw Deleuze calling an 'empty square' in his essay on 
structuralism. This is a way of reading Kant that echoes Buchdahl's 
approach most clearly when Deleuze warns us that we must'. . . above all 
never confuse, in the Kantian vocabulary, the object=x and the thing in 
itself.64 Instead of charting structures given in advance of the process 
Deleuze argues that for Kant 'We begin again from zero'.65 Behind 
structure and its genesis there is nothing that would set out in advance the 
outcomes of this process. This is then the viewpoint of the process as a 
whole and excludes any external or in-itself reality.
63 Buchdahl 1992: 38.
64 Deleuze 1978: 11.
65 Ibid.
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The question that persists as we consider this way of understanding Deleuze 
as a reader of Kant is whether Deleuze's thought on structure and genesis 
resonates with the way Kant presents his own system. Is there a basis in 
Kant for readings like this? We've seen Kant writing about the object=x 
but does the allow us to argue that this implies an 
Idea of the whole, of a process through which terms are to be defined? We 
have suggested that readers like Deleuze and Buchdahl seek to override the 
meanings attached to terms by taking the viewpoint of an Idea of the whole 
and we've seen this strategy at work in readings of structuralism and Kant. 
We saw that Deleuze sought to recognize structuralism by talking about it 
in terms that we now associate with poststructuralism. Is it possible to 
argue that rather than imposing external ends upon structuralism he sought 
to realize its own ends by locating its internal genesis? Deleuze arguably 
took the structures of structuralism and developed their relation to a genesis 
that had not yet played its full role in how structuralism was understood by 
its own scholars. We do not have the space to assess this claim about 
structuralism but we are seeking to assess our claim that Deleuze's approach 
to structuralism can be applied to Kant's We have 
still to see whether a reading of Kant that takes as its starting point the 
object=x has any basis in Kant's text.
The imagery of Kant's Copernican Turn may provide a link with the Idea of 
a whole that we've been uncovering in Deleuze's work and that is realized 
in the role of the object=x. It sets out the position of various terms in 
relation to a process of cognition and its genesis. However, the notion that 
this reference to the work of Copernicus is really helpful in grasping Kant's 
system is disputed by Paul Guyer. He argues that Copernicus lowered the 
significance of the subject's role, making them an observer, while Kant 
promotes it. For Kant objects have to conform to our pure and basic forms 
of cognition, and this distances us from objects as things-in-themselves. 
Guyer concludes that: 'The analogy seems to be only that in philosophy, as
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in astronomy, progress sometimes requires a radical reversal of traditional 
assumptions'.66 He argues that, unlike in Copernicus1 work, our experience 
of objects is downgraded by Kant. There is no orientation towards 
substantive objects, like the stars and the planets, as there is in Copernicus' 
new universe. This shows Guyer to be a very different reader of Kant to 
Deleuze. We saw Deleuze providing a different reading of the thing-in- 
itself to Guyer's view that it is the most real or substantial object. Guyer's 
strategy is to evaluate the term 'thing-in-itself in isolation. For him it refers 
to ordinary objects, such as tables and chairs, which exist both as we 
represent them and as they are in-themselves.67 They exist prior to the 
process of cognition and are what it is unable to reach, what is lacking in it's 
outcomes. We only have representations of these ordinary objects, not 
knowledge of them as they are in-themselves. It seems therefore that 
Deleuze intervenes in Kant scholarship on a matter that concerns the whole 
character of Kant's system. A reading of the analogy with Copernicus that 
follows from his approach would be to understand it as presenting Kant's 
own Idea of the whole which must orientate a reading of the 
It would argue against Guyer's move to isolate the thing-in- 
itself. Kant writes of Copernicus in the second edition Preface that:
'Having found it difficult to make progress there when he assumed 
that the entire host of stars revolved around the spectator, he tried to 
find out by experiment whether he might not be more successful if he 
had the spectator revolve and the stars remain at rest'.68
Copernicus' revolution is embraced because it makes the spectator active 
but also gives to the star-like genesis of cognition a new and unrecognizable 
role. It is a mechanism for throwing the now active Transcendental Subject 
into a process where sensations occasion or prompt its activity and test its 
agility. The inactive genesis of the structures of cognition is quite different 
from the thing-in-itself that would take responsibility for providing or
66 Guyer 2006: 50. 
"Guyer 1978: 335. 
Kant 1996: Bxvi-xvii.
withholding the real and substantive objects of cognition. This genesis is 
not active in providing objects to a passive subject and it doesn't put them 
beyond its reach. It rather sets the problems that animate the activity of 
cognition.
What is the significance of this way of reading Kant's text? In Paul Guyer's 
reading the down-graded objects or appearances characterize the system as 
a whole whereas for readers like Deleuze and Buchdahl it is the whole that 
characterizes its parts. Guyer's reading is often referred to as the 'two- 
object' or 'two-world' view.69 It argues from the inability of cognition to 
reach ordinary objects as things-in-themselves. From this it follows that 
Kant's system is constituted by an inability or a lack rather than the open- 
ended potential of problems that never exclude any outcomes of cognition 
by making them things that cognition lacks or cannot attain. On Deleuze's 
reading there is nothing that the object of cognition cannot become through 
the object=x. None of the diversity that can be realized through the 
object=x exists beyond its reach. We saw Deleuze developing the genesis 
of structure in terms other than lack because for him this 'empty square' is 
full of the problems of extending or realizing Ideas through structures. 
When this is applied to the it becomes possible to 
see the lack of a transcendent thing-in-itself as being instead the fullest 
possession of genesis as the immanent source of the activity of cognition. 
Henry Allison also argues that the notion of objects outside of the realm of 
cognition is vacuous in Kant's system.70 There are for him different 
'aspects' of objects rather than different objects. There are objects as things- 
in-themselves or insofar as they are not involved in possible experience and 
objects as 'appearances' or as the very materials of cognition. Thus his 
view is distinguished from the 'two-object' or 'two-world' view as the 'two- 
aspect' view because it has behind it an Idea of the process of cognition as a
69 Guyer 2006: 68; Allison 2004: 3.
70 Allison 2004: 62.
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whole. It allows the whole process of accounting for cognition to question 
the assumption that these objects of cognition pre-exist this whole and 
characterize it. As we've seen, Deleuze's model of structures that is focused 
upon their genesis is able to develop this. It allows us to read with an Idea 
of the whole in view so that we can try to see how convincing the parts 
really are.
Conclusion
In seeking to locate a reading strategy for approaching Kant's 
in Deleuze's essay on structuralism we began by ignoring their 
differences. When we then considered these we sought to show that they 
now appear in a new light because of the reading strategy we have been 
following. We have thus sought to consider Deleuze as a reader of Kant, 
making him a contributor to vital debates in Kant scholarship, but have had 
also to consider whether his critique of Kant will allow this. If he is so 
different in his thought from Kant how can we say that he allows us to read 
Kant when he writes about structuralism? There must be common ground if 
we are to say that Deleuze's thought can, without referring to Kant, help us 
to understand Kant better. By drawing us to Kant's notion of genesis, the 
occasioning cause of cognition, Deleuze led us to begin to re-think aspects 
of his system that are otherwise read in isolation. Their shared concern with 
the occasion of genesis and the sameness of structures that should not be 
based upon empirical resemblance helped to show the relevance of the 
reading strategy we have uncovered. Deleuze pursued a concern that he 
shared with Kant and yet which he believed Kant to have betrayed through 
his 'tracing method'. Yet, as he claimed to do with structuralism, he allows 
us to 'recognise1 Kant's account of cognition through its genesis. To avoid 
the impression that this is to undermine the integrity of Kant's account we 
sought to show that Deleuze makes highly relevant contributions to debates
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in the field of Kant scholarship. It could be argued that he allows us to 
preserve the integrity of an Idea of the whole of Kant's account of cognition 
while a reader like Paul Guyer endangers it by making the thing-in-itself an 
external term. This questions an approach that isolates the parts of Kant's 
system in order to understand them. We saw that this can make the 
difference between an Idea of the whole characterized by the lack of things- 
in-themselves, and one characterized by the fullness of problems that 
account for all aspects of objects. It does then seem to make sense to call 
Deleuze a reader of Kant without limiting this engagement to a selective or 
a descriptive approach.
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COPIES OF PUBLISHED MATERIAL
3. Co-author (with Matt Lee) of editorial introduction to E. Willatt and M. 




'On the Very Idea of Conditions of Thought*
It is clear that this edited collection has developed a definite focus. It is one 
requirement of an editorial introduction that it explains the focus of the 
chapters in that volume, that it justifies excluding what might have been 
expected or could have been included. Chief among exclusions are Kant's 
and Kant's 
which has of late become of increasing interest, his pre-critical 
writings and the many shorter works that he wrote during his critical period 
have received only limited engagement here. The positive reason we offer 
is that the genesis of this collection is the genesis of the text that dominates 
it - the This genesis can be said to be behind the 
focus of the collection if it provides positive or productive reasons for the 
exclusions involved. Exclusion is the by-product of a very productive 
engagement with something that urgently needs this space and attention in 
order to explore and expand upon the relations of Kant and Deleuze. The 
focus of the collection was not intended by the editors but tells us a great 
deal about the current state of Kant and Deleuze studies and about the 
conflicts between transcendental philosophy and naturalism in which they 
are both deeply involved.
What do we mean by talking of the genesis of the 
We mean a moment capable of animating this text but also something that 
has been repeated in the work of later thinkers and so earned them the title 
'post-Kantian'. Deleuze is arguably included in this since, unlike 
contemporary thinkers like Quentin Meillassoux, he makes use of a notion 
of transcendental. He is concerned with conditions for thought that 
repeatedly and forcefully pose the question of what it is capable of. We 
could call this the 'critical moment', the moment when Kant began his
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critical period with the seeking to provide 
transcendental conditions for thought, after his 11 silent years. In the 
context of the current debates between transcendental philosophy and 
naturalism, spawning the opposed terms transcendental materialism and 
speculative materialism or realism, the value and implications of the 
'critical moment' are being keenly debated. Kant at this point becomes 
concerned with transcendental conditions for knowledge, with what can and 
cannot be attained in thought by finite rational beings. Emblematic of this 
change and how Kant responds to it is the contrast between his 'Inaugural 
Dissertation' of 1770 which proposes an open-ended list of categories and 
the Table of Twelve Categories presented in the 
(first edition 1781) which is closed and is to be viewed as an exhaustive 
whole.71 This 'limitation' is to be a condition of thought's openness to 
experience as such and its source is the understanding and what it alone is 
capable of. Unlike for Deleuze, we do not question the limits of cognition 
again no matter how forceful and singular our encounters with sensation. 
For Kant then a Table of Categories provides a condition for thought no 
matter what happens in experience. The very idea of a condition then 
brings us to deep conflicts in philosophy and for these we do not have to 
wait for Deleuze's critique of Kant from the standpoint of sensation and 
what happens to thought in the wake of our encounters with it. Conflicts 
between transcendental philosophy and naturalism range in time from 
Kant's contemporaries to post-Deleuzian thinkers, from Johann Gottfried 
Von Herder, a former student of Kant's, and his 'metacritique' of 
transcendental thought, to Quentin Meillassoux and his attack on the 
alleged 'correlationism' of transcendental thought in Is 
Deleuze to be included in the naturalist camp, given his emphasis upon 
encounters with sensation that leave Kant's transcendental conditions of 
thought behind in a manner that would make them not exhaustive and 
complete but exhausted and redundant? Naturalists see the conditions for
7lKuehn2001:243.
thought in something other than the question 'what can thought do and what 
can it not do?' or 'how can thought be open to experience?' They seek the 
genesis of thought in something prior to the transcendental, something that 
opens onto a wider terrain of enquiry than a transcendental thinker can 
envisage. It is not immediately clear that Deleuze, with his emphasis on 
transcendental empiricism, fits easily into this naturalist framework.
Let's delve into the late eighteenth century milieu where the issues that 
animate were also able to bring together thinkers in debates 
and sometimes bitter disputes. Herder's approach to the conditions of 
thought is very well illustrated in the opening sentence of the First Essay of 
his 'On the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul' (1778): 'In 
everything that we call dead nature we know no inner condition. We daily 
express the words mass, impact, fall, motion, rest, force, even force of 
inertia, and who knows what they mean within the thing itself?'.72 He 
focuses upon language here and seeks the source of language in a way that 
contrasts with Kant's concern with transcendental conditions that precede 
language. He calls for us to observe more 'thoughtfully' what he calls '. . . 
the great drama of effective forces in nature'.73 This is to provide the 
genesis of language, of concepts that for Kant would either be pure, and 
hence prior to any account of natural forces, or empirical and so derived 
from the observation of nature on the basis of pure concepts that structure 
experience. Herder's critique of transcendental conditions follows from his 
concern to seek the genesis of thought in natural forces, forces that for him 
make things individual in a way that linguistic forms such as categories or 
pure concepts do not. Concepts are never pure and could never account for 
the individuality of things but are rather expressions of this individuality. 
For Herder then cognition does not make sense without the forces of 




because they make the object that is cognized individual. He writes of the 
failings of any thought that does not make the individual its source of 
insight:
'Natural science was unable to arrive at forces as long as people 
failed to regard each individual thing as what it is, as unique, as long 
as they always only imputed to it what it could be or should be in 
general. The science of the soul must become entirely natural science 
in regard to each individual force, as though there was no other force 
but it. There is always time to classify, to unite, when we have first 
cognized individually; but we will never cognize what something is if 
we only begin measuring it according to what it is not, i.e. if we only 
grasp it as a deviation, negatively'.74
This concern with how forces of sensation are individual is echoed in 
Deleuze's work and in this collection we will see the tension between this 
aspect of his thought and his concern with how the transcendental is played 
out. On the one hand he too finds that pure concepts are unconvincing 
because they lack a genesis in sensation and empirical concepts are made to 
catch up with sensation rather than dictating its form. Yet we cannot then 
simply call him a naturalist if his account of forces that echoes Herder's 
naturalism forms part of what he calls a transcendental empiricism. He 
does not abandon the term but does subject it to a critique that echoes 
Herder's account of cognition. The similarities with Herder's work are very 
significant and point to a tension in Deleuze's thought that is central to his 
account of experience in all of its aspects. Deleuze asks 'what can thought 
do?' through experimenting with its relation to sensation and vice versa. 
We see that Herder provides an account of the emergence of reason in 
human beings, rejecting Kant's transcendental account in which reason is 
always already at work prior to the emergence of phenomena studied by 
naturalism, in terms of the individual and the expression of individual force 
or volition. He can envisage within a naturalistic horizon the emergence of 
rational beings: 'If animal sensuality and restriction to a single point fell 
away, then a different creature came into being, whose positive force
74 ibid: 181.
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expressed itself in a larger space, in accordance, more clearly, and which, 
separated and free, not only cognizes wills, and effects, but also knows that 
it cognizes, wills and effects'.75 We see Deleuze too noting the lack of an 
account of the genesis of reason and the understanding, of Ideas and 
categories, in Kant, noting that it has been left out of critique, perhaps most 
notably in his Here the concept of active and 
reactive forces is to account for and evaluate the abilities of thought, to tell 
us whether thought is more or less productive on the basis of its relation to 
sensation. Yet for Deleuze it seems that we need a transcendental 
empiricism so that forces immanent to sensation produce individuation; we 
need mechanisms that ensure that individuation is the result of the work of 
forces. In other words, thought is never to lose sight of the individual 
because the individual is the ever developing outcome of forces rather than 
being swept away by them. Otherwise individuation becomes merely an 
epiphenomenon of the wider movements of forces, and an account of 
experience as something individuated and thus open to thought is lacking. 
We see then that this collection will have to make the case for Deleuze 
being Kantian in the face of his apparent naturalism when it comes to forces 
immanent to sensation and their role in individuation. The value of the 
'critical moment' needs to be shown to be at work in an account of 
experience that opens itself to encountering sensation. We ask: Is Deleuze 
concerned with what thought can do when he seems to put thought at the 
mercy of sensation? How is their relation productive of thought? How 
does it liberate thought? Kant is clearly concerned with what thought 
cannot do because he turns to the understanding for the basis of his account 
of experience. What has this to do with a Deleuze who is concerned with 
what thought can do merely in response to the limitless forces of 
individuation that are in themselves not concerned with what it can do?
The case clearly needs to be made for the question 'what can thought do?',
75 ibid: 84.
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linking Kant's and Deleuze's thought. Kant is concerned with what thought 
cannot do as we noted in his move to closed set of categories. Yet Kant 
ultimately asks 'how can thought be productive?' This is to understand his 
concern to 'limit' thought to be a concern with what is transcendental where 
this is understood as what is always the same about experience but is not 
taken from experience. In this sense categories are not tied to experience, 
they are dynamic structures that therefore embody openness to experience. 
Now whilst Deleuze argues that Kant does derive the categories from 
experience, that he betrays his own criteria for transcendental conditions, he 
still affirms the aim of transcendental philosophy to locate what remains the 
same but is non-empirical. Thus we have an account of individuation 
providing transcendental conditions for thought as well as bringing about 
the encounter with the un-thought in thought or the traumatic limit of 
thought.76 What remains the same is not a particular individual or a general 
type of individual but the individual as the outcome of individuation and the 
means of realizing the scope of virtual production. Thus if thought is 
traumatized or encounters its own limit this is because it brings thought 
closer to a process of individuation, to how things have become 
individuated and thus can form parts of unities grasped by thought. 
Deleuze then is concerned with what thought can do, with how it is 
extended through individuation and how individuation provides a 
transcendental condition for thought that is, unlike in Kant's allegedly 
flawed account, not derived from experience.
We see that the capacity of thought refers us to its conditions. We ask: 
what can it cope with? For Kant there are limits to what can function as 
conditions of thought if it is to attain dynamic openness to experience 
whilst, for Deleuze thought must experiment with conditions to keep open 
the question of what thought can do. Yet we must emphasize that there is 
still a concern with the transcendental structures of experience, structures
76 Deleuze 2004: 242.
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that are intended to be wholly non-empirical so as to be dynamic, to be 
equal to the genesis that sensation and its forces provide. It seems that for 
Kant thought must be sure of what it can do and limit itself to this, whilst 
for Deleuze thought must be open to its conditions or to matter as a field of 
problems and experimentation whose limits are not given. For Kant 
understanding must legislate in advance (answering the question 'what can 
thought not do1 with principles) whilst for Deleuze conditions for thought 
are encountered and thought must experiment with these (answering the 
question 'what can thought do* with facts).
Yet this distinction can be too sharp and make us miss the common concern 
with transcendental conditions that do not refer to experience in order to 
provide the fullest account of it, in order to provide openness to it. For 
Deleuze then there are no limits to what philosophy can do but this is a 
response to the Kantian question, to a Kant who becomes critical when he 
seeks to pose this question. This collection then takes its bearing from this 
'critical moment' and considers how Deleuze takes it up.
We've seen that for Herder the conditions of thought are the forces 
immanent to sensation that articulate the individuality of things - something 
that Deleuze embraces whilst nevertheless seeking to provide a 
transcendental account of experience that brings him closer to Kant. When 
we turn to Meillassoux's post-Deleuzian broadside against transcendental 
philosophy the conditions of thought are '. . . all those aspects of the object 
that can be formulated in mathematical terms'.77 Thus rather than turning 
like Kant and Deleuze to faculties like sensation and understanding or to the 
a priori forms and syntheses of space and time Meillassoux turns to the 
question of what is anterior to these transcendental structures. He turns to 
what is anterior78 to conscious forms of life and so anterior to what Kant
77 Meillassoux 2008: 3.
78 Meillassoux is careful to distinguish the term 'anterior' from the term 'distant'. What
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and Deleuze seem to be talking about, to the question 'what is thought 
capable of?1 . In the data provided in mathematical terms we have, for 
Meillassoux, the thing-in-itself that is lacking in a transcendental account of 
experience.
For Meillassoux transcendental philosophy carries forward the legacy of 
Kantianism by ensuring that thought has no outside that is not relative to us, 
to the conscious life forms to which experience is given. The relative 
outside in question is the field of enquiry whose relation to a conscious 
subject cannot be escaped. It is always a world for conscious beings and 
never an 'in itself reality because of how we start to philosophize, because 
of the 'critical moment' that has been animating countless thinkers since the 
composition of the It makes materialism 
transcendental when it could be speculative, concerned with what thought 
can do in relation to matter itself. Meillassoux paints a picture of a 
prospective liberation of philosophy from transcendental thought:
Tor it could be that contemporary philosophers have lost the great 
outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside 
which was not relative to us, and which was given indifferent to its 
own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether 
we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought could explore 
with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory   of being 
entirely elsewhere'.79
The great limitation of transcendental philosophy is then that it limits 
thought to what is 'for us', excluding what is 'in itself.80 A process of 
cognition is 'always already' underway81 and if we start with this we only 
have an outside relative either to consciousness and its forms of
he calls 'ancestral time' concerns what is anterior to life and so in no sense related to 
conscious life. It is therefore not just an un-witnessed time but a time that is not given or 
is 'not contemporary with any givenness' (ibid: 20). He argues that we can think the 
coming into being of givenness rather than finding that what we refer to is just un- 






understanding (as in Kant) or to consciousness of sensation and its 
characteristics (Deleuze). The chapters in this volume explore the notion of 
transcendental conditions and whether they can account for experience fully 
rather than relatively to conscious forms of life. They show the importance 
of naturalistic critique of transcendental thought for debates over the 
relation of Kant and Deleuze.
We suggested that Kant and Deleuze are concerned with what remains the 
same because it is non-empirical, because it is dynamic enough to embody 
openness towards experience. What is thought capable of given 
transcendental conditions which necessarily remain the same? Answers 
developed in this volume include Ideas, genesis, mechanisms and concepts 
of critique, sensation, understanding, consciousness, temporal synthesis, 
object=x and so on. The argument is made that these transcendental 
structures are not simply for us but are what come before us and what 
fracture our conscious selves.
Patricia Farrell's chapter locates a transcendental condition in Deleuze's use 
of Kantian Ideas to account for processes of learning and in this way 
combine the dynamics of the encounter with dynamical transcendental 
structures. We see that the autonomy of sensation does not lead Deleuze to 
reject the transcendental but rather, as we've suggested, to improve its 
ability to account for experience by purifying it of any reference to 
experience whatsoever. Levi Bryant takes on Meillassoux's 
characterization of transcendental philosophy as trapped in a 'correlationist 
circle' by showing the role of time as both prior to conscious life and as 
fracturing it. In Matt Lee's chapter we find an exploration of the level of 
sophistication and naivete in Kant's version of transcendental philosophy 
and how this relates to Deleuze's thought. In interrogating the ability of 
Deleuze's notion of the transcendental to 'level' these levels he shows that it 
is possible for the transcendental to operate immanently to the world of
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forces that characterize a naturalistic account of thought. Mick Bowles 
stages a conflict between naturalism and the transcendental in Deleuze's 
work by interrogating the productivity of force, asking whether it can 
account for consciousness and understanding. Can naturalism do justice to 
the faculty that Kant venerated? Edward Willatt poses the question of a 
genesis of cognition in Kant and the way Deleuze uncovers it, seeking to 
show that object=x is a transcendental condition capable of attaining 
openness to experience. Christian Kerslake's chapter makes a strong case 
for combining a legacy of pre-critical or pre-Kantian metaphysics with 
Kant's critique of thought. Deleuze is said to make use of a transcendental 
that combines the ambitions of rationalism that precedes Kant with Kant's 
own contributions to questions regarding what thought is capable of. Henry 
Somers-Hall opposes Descartes' naturalistic account of critique to Kant's 
account of transcendental illusion as being internal to reason. He shows 
Deleuze's debt to Kant's critique, the mechanisms of which are now put to 
work in the attempt to account for experience through difference. The case 
is made by all the chapters for the need for a transcendental account to 
grasp what thought can do, to avoid drowning thought in its forceful 
individuation but to balance this by making this individuation the source of 
encounters needed for thought to be productive. The 'critical moment' 
staged in the is seen to connect with his concern 
with the emphasis upon sensation that we find in Deleuze so that what 
thought can do and what sensation does to us become part of a full account 
of experience, part of the discordant accord of the faculties that for Deleuze 
characterize Kant's critical system.
Deleuze's move from a transcendental empiricism with a concern first of all 
with what sensation can do, as influenced by Kant's transcendental idealism, 
and its concern first of all with what understanding can do to a 
transcendental materialism is something that is also explored. Writing with 
Felix Guattari in Deleuze avoids the language of Kantian
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faculties that has been present in a number of his earlier solo works. 
Instead they develop a materialism that is characterized as transcendental in 
terms of machinic operations rather than the work of faculties. This 
provides a reading or appropriation of Kant that places the transcendental 
further from consciousness and closer to matter, dealing with the pressing 
issues that we saw being raised by Meillassoux. All hint of the 
psychologism that had characterized Kant's three syntheses in the A-edition 
of the is radically blown away by the terminology 
of desiring-machines. The three syntheses are transcendental conditions 
because they are what is always the same about their operations. Michael 
Olson's chapter considers the object in this context, something that must, 
like the three syntheses, be transcendental in the sense that it remains the 
same but must be dynamic enough to cope with an engineering through 
difference. He seeks to show what makes Deleuze and Guattari's 
materialism in transcendental, concerned with a 
transcendental account of objects that ensures that differences in flows of 
desire are realized productively. The challenge to naturalism comes here 
from the role of difference in machines that are considered in terms of what 
they do and not in terms of meanings attached to conscious life. This brings 
us to some observations about Meillassoux's approach with which we end 
this introduction.
We must ask whether Deleuze and Guattari's version of transcendental 
philosophy is able to respond to the problems that Meillassoux raises in 
Meillassoux argues that the 'critical moment' has continued 
to be at work as the 'post-Kantian' starting point for philosophy. A number 
of questions are raised by his account. Does speculative materialism rely 
upon a knowledge structure that could be characterized precisely as 
transcendental? This is something many of the chapters here are concerned 
with when they consider Deleuze's use of transcendental conditions and 
their value to his thought. We find evidence for such reliance in
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Meillassoux's reference to the meaning of things for us and in themselves: 
'All those aspects of the object that can give rise to a mathematical thought 
(to a formula or to digitalization) rather than to perception or sensation can 
be meaningfully turned into properties of the thing not only as it is with me, 
but also as it is without me'.82 Deleuze and Guattari talk of machines in 
Anti-Oedipus as an attempt to focus upon use and function so as to evacuate 
all reference to meaning and hence to conscious life and its way of relating 
to objects. They attempt to think in terms of processes in order to make 
what is anterior to conscious life immanent to that very life and to envisage 
within a machinic transcendental horizon a world prior to such life. 
Meillassoux's anterior could be the limit of thought for Deleuze and 
Guattari. Yet Meillassoux claims that what science does is aim for 'external 
references' that will 'endow [its] experiments with meaning' rather than to 
support the universal status of its experiment.83 Thus the conditions of 
thought are not tied up with a transcendental horizon but are instead discrete 
and concerned only with themselves. Science then is not concerned with 
supporting the transcendental structures of consciousness but with 
conditions that do not refer to this form of life. Yet we find that for 
Meillassoux science is concerned with providing meaning. This seems to 
avoid or neglect Deleuze and Guattari's move to undermine the hold of 
consciousness upon the conditions of thought. It comes down to an 
evaluation of whether machinic synthesis or mathematical data are better 
able to capture what Meillassoux describes as anterior to conscious life. It 
seems as if scientists for him are implicated in normativity, ignoring the 
sense in which scientists are concerned with making things work. Do 
scientists make truth claims or do they engage in technics? It could be 
argued that the information that they secure through experiment is placed in 
apparatuses whose value is that they work or successfully account for 




next philosophical fashion in our attempts to deal with the valid problem of 
avoiding presupposing what we are seeking to account for.
In this introduction we have sought to provide some justification for the 
focus of these chapters. The 'critical moment' is as alive in the context of 
the clash of transcendental materialism and speculative materialism today 
as it was in the clash between transcendental idealism and the metacritique 
in the late eighteenth century. The volume itself shows that the focus is 
justified; it shows that it is productive enough to exclude many of Kant's 
other works and Deleuze's productive engagement with them. It shows that 
the focus, its narrowness, is not arbitrary but is the result of the singular 
genesis we summed up with the question 'what can thought do?'.
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